ML18102B329
| ML18102B329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1997 |
| From: | Eric Simpson Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-272-97-09, 50-272-97-9, 50-311-97-09, 50-311-97-9, IEIN-92-018, IEIN-92-18, LR-N97320, NUDOCS 9705300030 | |
| Download: ML18102B329 (6) | |
Text
Public Seriice Electric and Gas Company Simpson Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1700 Vice President - Nuclear Engineering MAY 1 9 1997 LR-N97320 United States *Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 STATUS OF ITEMS FROM NRC INSPECTION 97-09 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. l AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Gentlemen:
During the exit meeting for Inspe_ction 97-09, on April 23, 1997, the NRC identified fire protection items at the Salem Generating Station.
This letter provides the.status of these items, and PSE&G's action plan.
In addition, this letter describes measures taken to provide reasonable assurance of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of fire.
The status of these items is as follows:
Corrective Action For Information Notice 92-18 Issues
Background:
Modifications were needed for motor operated valve control circuits to have the torque and limit switches re-wired such that a postulated hot short in the control circuit due to a fire in the Control Room, Relay Room, or ceiling of the 460/230V Switchgear Room, will not cause a bypass of their control functions.
Status: Modifications are installed for Salem Unit 2.
Modifications are scheduled to be installed for Unit 1 prior to restart
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. y Document Control Desk LR-N97320 Corrective Action Reliance of Using Jumpers During Alternate Shutdown
Background:
Modification of motor control and control panel circuits were needed for equipment required for alternate shutdown.
These modifications include local switches which isolate component wiring from the Control Room, Relay Room.and 460/230V Switchgear Room and allow for local operation of the equipment, thus precluding the necessity of electrical re-wiring and jumper installation to operate the equipment in achieving Hot Standby in the event of a fire in these areas *.
Status:
Modifications are installed for Salem Unit 2.
Modifications are scheduled to be installed for Unit 1 prior to restart.
Fire Hose Station 2FP230
Background:
NRC inspectors questioned whether additional hose can be used at Station 2FP230, and whether Station 2FP230 has been hydraulically analyzed
- Status:
Hydraulic analysis of h9se station 2FP230 determined that adequate pressure is available at the hose nozzle for fire fighting purposes when connected to one hundred fifty feet of 1-1/2" fire hose.
Fire Door Hinge Material
Background:
NRC inspectors questioned the material used for fire door hi_n9es.
Status:
Hinges on all Appendix R fire doors have been inspected by Fire Department personnel.
The hinges used were determined to be steel which is an acceptable material.
This has been verified by Quality Assurance personnel.
High Pressure in Deluge System
Background:
NRC inspectors noticed that a Deluge System pressure indicator read 184 psig.
Status: Calibration of the gauge was verified to be correct.
The*
184 psig pressure at deluge valve 2FP301 is less than the system hydrostatic test pressure of approximately 200 psig.
- Further, the deluge_ valve is a Viking model D-5 which is hydrostatically.
tested to 350 psig.
Document Control Desk LR-N97320 E~rgency Light Aiming
Background:
NRC inspectors noted that some of the emergency lights appeared to be misaligned or the lamp heads were loose.
Status: Appendix R Emergency Lighting has been evaluated, illumination patterns verified, and matching marks applied as necessary to allow ready visual verification of correct lamp head position.
Cable Raceway Fire Barrier Wrap
Background:
The NRC identified fire barrier wrap performance as an unresolved issue in Salem inspection report 93-80..
Since 1993 PSE&G has put in place measures to compensate for the indeterminate status of the wrap mate.rial.
PSE&G has been working with others in the industry to resolve this generic issue.
PSE&G has maintained a dialogue with and has updated the NRC on the progress to resolve this issue.
Status:
To further the efforts in resolving this industry issue, PSE&G has developed the following plan to address cable raceway fire barrier wrap:
The Cable Raceway Fire Barrier Wrap Action Plan (plan) is divided into three phases.* Phase 1 is Engineer:i,.ng Evaluation; Pha*s.e 2 is Design Change Package Preparation; and Phase 3 is Design Change Package Implementation.
Phase 1 of the plan includes actions that are consistent with the approach used at other facilities to address issues involving Thermo-Lag.
Thermo-Lag is a material (not used at Salem) that was chaiienged in the early 1990's because of questions raised about testing reports.
The action steps below were used and found effective in addressing the Thermo-Lag issue and the approach is equally applicable to the effective resolution of the Salem fire barrier wrap issue:
- 1. Review of the Safe Shutdown analysis.
This action reduces the reliance on cable raceway fire barrier wrap material.
- 2. -Review of installed cable raceway fire barrier wrap configurations.
This action confirms the installed configuration
- Document* Control Desk LR-N97320
- 3. Review of cable raceway fire barrier wrap tests for correlation to installation details.
This action confirms the tested configuration.
- 4. Comparison of installed cable raceway fire barrier wrap
- configurations to cable raceway fire barrier wrap tested configurations.
This action confirms that fire tests bound the installed configurations.
PSE&G has started the Phase 1 evaluations on Salem Unit 2.
Initial estimate for Phase 1 activities for Salem Unit 2 is approximately eighteen months.
This time period is reasonable based on the scope of the engineering review and is consistent with similar efforts at other facilities in the* resolution of Thermo-Lag issues.
The work scope *for Phases 2 and 3 is necessarily based on results from the Phase 1 effort.
A more definitive schedule for the Phase 2 and 3 efforts and Unit 1 review will be available at the completion of the Unit 2 Phase 1 evaluation.
PSE&G has performed an engineering assessment of the twenty eight fire areas containing cable raceway fire barrier wrap material.
The assessment consisted of a review of information from the Fire Hazards Analysis, Combustible Loading Analysis, Safe Shutdown Analysis, and the IPEEE Fire Risk Analysis.
Exemption requests were also reviewed as part of this assessment.
A walkdown of each fire area was performed to assess fire protection adequacy.
This assessment considered effective application of the following systems, programs, and controls:
Fir~ _detection systems
- Fire **.suppression systems
- Control of combustibles.(including transient)
- Transient/ignition source control near cable raceway fire barrier wrap
- Use of the Fire Protection Impairment Permit to maintain compensatory measures in effect
- Daily.fire safety inspections by Fire Department personnel
- Use of on-site pz:ofessional fire department
-* Fire watches The evaluation concluded that existing plant fire protection features and the added measures of hourly fire watches comply with the overall fire protection requirements and provide an adequate level of protection.
- J Document Control Desk LR-N97320 There is an exception to the hourly roving fire watch patrol in two areas.
The first area is the Condensate Demin Alleys within Fire Areas 1(2)FA-AB-100C. In this area, an hourly fire watch patrol will be provided prior to Mode 4.
At Mode 4, hourly fire watches will continue and fire detection will be provided.
If detection is not available, then continuous fire watches will be provided.
The second area is the Unit 2 Waste Gas Evaporator Room within Fire Area 2FA-AB-100C.
This room.is a locked vital area and most equipment in the room is not used~
The area has limited combustibles and automatic detection.
The only entrance is from outside the power block (an outdo"or entrance) and is controlled by security personnel.
Additionally, following any maintenance activities in this area, a fire pro.tection close-out inspection will be performed by Fire Department personnel.
PSE&G concluded that a twice-daily (i.e., every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) fire watch patrol is adequate for this room.
PSE&G intends to continue fire watch patrols as described until the cable raceway fire barrier wrap issue is resolved.
Compensatory measures described.above, in conjunction with existing fire protection features, are consistent with those which have been previously accepted by the NRC in similar situations throughout the industry.
PSE&G recognizes the need to expeditiously complete activities associated with the cable raceway fire barrier issues at Salem.
Generating Station. Although compensatory measures are in place, PSE&G is proceeding with execution of the cable raceway fire barrier wrap action plan to resolve this issue.
If you ***have questions regarding information contained in this letter, **please contact us.
We are available to meet with you at your convenience to discuss this submittal.
Sincerely,
4 Document Control Desk LR-N97320 C
Mr. H. J. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. L. Olshan, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 14E21 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. C. Marschall (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. K *. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 33 Arctic Parkway CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
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