ML18095A360
ML18095A360 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem ![]() |
Issue date: | 07/17/1990 |
From: | Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
90-3, NUDOCS 9007230375 | |
Download: ML18095A360 (4) | |
Text
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PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 90-3
. July 17 I 1990 This Special Report addre~ses fire barrier penetration seal impairments (for both :Salem Unit 1 and Salem Unit 2) which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.
This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.
MJP:pc Distribution The [ne?*g:.' People Sincerely yours,
~c76'~rf~
L*. K. Miller i( /) i'Jd,d-/..eA./
General Manager -
Salem Operations re:~~
Ill 95,189 (10MI 12-89
~
SPECIAL R~PORT 90-3 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038
-IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Technical Specification 3.7.11 - Fire Barrier Impairment Repair > 7 Days Due to Personnel Error Discovery Date:
06/11/90 Report Date:
01/17/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.90-389 and 90-453.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On June 11, 1990, a fire barrier penetration was found impaired by Nuclear Fire Protection personnel.
The penetration is normally kept sealed by placement of a cover over the penetration opening.
The penetration is used for temporary cable access between adjacent fire areas (e.g.,,cables for welding equipment).
The penetration involved is located between the Unit 1 100' Mechanical Penetration Area and the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building corridor.
An hourly roving fire watch had been established for this area previously due to other fire protection concerns.
Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met.
On June 30, 1990 another fire barrier penetration was found impaired by Nuclear Fire Protection personnel.
This penetration is also used for temporary cable access.
It is located in Unit 2 between the Auxiliary Building Corridor and the Mechanical Penetration Area.
An hourly roving fire watch had been established for this area previously due to other fire protection concerns. _Therefore~ the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met.
Both impaired fire barrier penetrations were discovered by Nuclear Fire Protection personnel as part of routine follow-up to recently closed fire barrier impairment permits.
Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:
"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers}, in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."
Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:
"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier
UNIT-i SP-ECIAL REPORT -3 111 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd) penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either e~tablish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire*
barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of-any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration -and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."
The Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.7.11 is identical to the Unit 1 Specification except that the Unit 1 term "functional" is replaced with "OPERABLE".
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The cause of the impaired fire barrier penetrations has been attributed to personnel error.
Maintenance supervision had failed to mainfain accountability of the fire barrier penetrations in question.
The Un1t 1 penetration had been impaired on May 25, 1990 in support of work involving welding.
A Penetration Impairment Permit (per Administrative Procedure AP-25, "Fire Protection.Program") had been initiated to allow the use of the penetration.
The permit specified that the penetration would be open for less than seven (7) days.
On June 1, 1990 the permit was cancelled.
The Fire Protection Department personnel were informed (via telephone conversation) by a Maintenance supervisor (other than the one who initiated the permit) that the welding job was on hold and that the permit could be closed.
The maintenance supervisor did not verify that the penetration had been closed as required by AP-25.
The* Unit 2 penetration was impaired on June 15, 1990 in support of work involving welding.
An impairment permit had been initiated, as per AP-25.
This permit also specified that the penetration would be open for less than seven (7) days.
The permit was closed on June 29, 1990 based on a telephone conversation with a Maintenance supervisor (other than the one who initiated the permit).
The maintenance supervisor did not verify that the penetration had been closed.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensur-es that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.
The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairment is greater than seven (7) days.
As stated previously, an hourly.fire watch patrol was in
- .ii UNIT.. 1.. SP.ECIAL REPORT e-3 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd) place {as per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a) due to other fire protection concerns during the period the penetrations were impaired.
The Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire areas, in question, contairi detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in an area would be detected before it could involve the adjacent area.
This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
This event has been reviewed by Maintenance Department management.
The individuals involved in this event were held accountable.
This event will be reviewed with applicable Maintenance Department personnel stressing the need to ensure full compliance with all requirements of Administrative Procedure AP-25.
4/"o>t9~ d1~.
ttZ /f ~
General Manager -
Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-088