ML18095A279

Special Rept 90-02:on 900601,automatic Actuation Feature for Both Fire Pumps Deactivated.Caused by Equipment Failure Associated W/Actuation of Local Alarm Indication for Overspeed Trip.Fire Pump Overspeed Trip Reset

ML18095A279
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/13/1990
From:	Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-02, 90-2, NUDOCS 9006190063
Download: ML18095A279 (4)

Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 13, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docum_ent Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir-:

SALEM GENERATING STATION' LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 90-2 This Special Report addresses the circumstances surrounding inoperability of the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.10.1.b.2c pursuant to the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted within fourteen (14) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 1f-J:?

9006190063

/ \ ' 95-2189 (10~\) 12-8~

e PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Automatic Actuation Feature For Both Fire Pumps Deactivated Due To Inadequate Administrative Control Discovery Date: 6/01/90 -

Report Date: 6/13/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.90-358.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A

• DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 1, 1990, at 1405 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.346025e-4 months <br />, the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps was discovered inoperable. The No. 1 Fire Pump was inoperable due to ongoing maintenance of the overspeed relay valve which had been leaking by, causing spurious overspeed trips. The No.

2 Fire Pump automatic actuation feature was inoperable due to.the overspeed trip circuit being in alarm.

Technical Specification 3.7.10.1.c requires operability of the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps at all times. If this feature is not operable, then the following must be done per Action Statement 2.b:

"With both fire suppression water systems inoperable:

1. Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and

2. Submit a Special Report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2; a} By telephone within 24- hours, b) Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, and c) In writing within 14 days following the event, out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."

The Technical Specifications and Action Statements are identical for both Salem Units.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT e-2 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this event has been attributed to an equipment failure associated with the spurious actuation of the local alarm indication for an overspeed trip.

On June 1, 1990 at approximately 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />, the Diesel Fire Pump House was inspected by the night shift duty Fire Protection Supervisor in support of routine rounds. The supervisor observed that the No. 2 Fire Pump was in its prepared status for automatic operation. At 1405 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.346025e-4 months <br /> that day, the day shift Fire Protection Supervisor observed that the overspeed trip alarm was up for the No.

2 Fire Pump. With this alarm up, the pump cannot start. The day shift supervisor was in the area to support the No. 1 Fire Pump post maintenance retest.

Sometime during the hours of 0530 and 1405 {on June l, 1990) the alarm actuated. However, the armature associated with the overspeed mechanical trip device did not appear to have moved from its normal position. The Control Room overhead "trouble alarm did not respond to the overspeed trip alarm actuation since it already indicated an alarm due to inoperability of the No. 1 Fire Pump. Interviews of the Site Maintenance and fire pump vendor personnel, working the No. 1 Fire Pump that day, indicate that they were not involved with the actuation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located in either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The Fire Suppression System consists of a water distribution system, spray and/or sprinklers, COz, Halon and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. With the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps inoperable, the station fire protection system was degraded.

For a maximum of approximately 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on June 1, 1990, neither pump would start upon receipt of an automatic start signal. However, during that period no need arose requiring the use of the pumps; therefore, this occurrence involved no undue risk to the health and safety of the general public.

This report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.b Section 2.c requirements.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Work associated with the No. 1 Fire Pump was completed and the pump declared operable at 1444 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.49442e-4 months <br /> on June l, 1990. Subsequently, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.b was exited.

The No. 2 Fire Pump overspeed trip was reset (via its pushbutton). A second spurious actuation of the overspeed trip alarm has not recurred. Also, a review of past records indicate that the spurious

UN~T 1 SPECIAL~PORT 90-2 CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) actuation of the alarm had not occurred previously. No additional corrective action is deemed necessary at this time.

After the No. 1 Diesel Fire Pump was declared operable, the No. 2 Diesel Fire Pump relay valve was removed, disassembled, cleaned anc had its O-ring replaced. Upon successful completion of a Diesel Fj Pump functional test, the No. 2 Diesel Fire Pump was declared operable on June l, 1990.

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With both Diesel Fire Pumps operable, the Control Room will receivE

( an alarm annunciation if the No. 2 Fire Pump overspeed alarm actuation recurs. Also, the Fire Department inspects the Fire Pumr Area once per shift. During these inspections the overspeed alarm actuation would be identified.

General Manager -

• Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-069

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