ML18093B284

Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-3:on 880720,0809,0907 & 1011, Fire Barrier Cable Penetrations Impaired for More than 7 Days.Cause Not Determined.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Fire Protection Concerns Resolved

ML18093B284
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/01/1988
From:	Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-3-3, NUDOCS 8811080186
Download: ML18093B284 (6)

Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 1, 1988

• .u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET.NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-3 This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days. These impairments have been identified by the Penetration Seal Task Force. This repor~t satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is bei~g submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement. In addition to identifying non-functional-Unit 1 penetrations, those penetrations found for Unit 2 (Docket No.

50-311) have been included.

Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 8811080186 881101 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PNU

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR'4t8-3-3 Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATJ:ON OF OCCURR~-~~E:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s): 7/20/88, 8/09/88, 9/07/88, 10/11/88 Report Date: 11/01/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.88-268.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCl.IB_~&NQ~:

N/A As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals. Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a. This report summarizes the task force findings and Technical Specification 4.7.11 surveillance activity findings associated with inadequate penetration seals for both Unit 1.and Unit

2. The *inadequate penetration seals found. to the date of issue of this report, include:

On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded. The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant. The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal. The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the floor). The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling. This fire wrap extends over the penetration. There is no foam behind the fire wrap. It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/2" diameter hole.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR~8-3-3

• DESCRIPTION OF OCCURR~~j_:-~(con_t'd)

Between August 2, 1988 -and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and 4 penetrations are located' in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room. The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. .The nature of the impairments.include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded in the seal (one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape) ,

30 with a void in the seal (due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation (e.g.,

cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reference LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not. deep enough into the penetration per design (less than 6 inches).

Between August 31, 1988 and September 30, 1988, 68 addi tiona*l penetration seals were found impaired. The majority of penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. One floor penetration in the 84' Elevation Aisle #1 East Section is 47"x12".

Between October 1 and October 30, *1988, 166 additional*

penetration seals were found impaired. The majority of penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. There were 13 penetrations of the 146 found which were larger than 6" in diameter. These penetrations ranged from 3"x5" to 42"x36".

Page 3 of this report contains a table of the penetration seals found impaired, between August 31, 1988 and October 30, 1988, in relation to the fire zone where th~y were found. The impairment designator terms include:

No Seal NOS Hole in Seal HOL Void in Seal VIS Depth Not Great Enough DPT Color/Cell Structure CEL Seal Degradation DEG Foreign Material Imbedded FMT An hourly fire watch patrol had been established for the above areas previously due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the requirements of Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.7.11.a a~e met.

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR~8-3-3 DESCRIPTIO_N O_f_Q_CC:YRR_~:NCE  : ___ J_~.Qnt_~qJ_

the non-functional fire barrier *and establish an hourly fi~e watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status withiri 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specificatiori 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

NOTE - Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE and "inoperable".

T~~AE OJLn~*_g~J;:RA~IiE P~~_ETRATIOlJ_§_:fl:~LS 8/31/88 - 10/30/88 AREA ~Q§_ HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT U-1 Relay Room 20 16 26 39 2 U-1 lA 125 v Battery Room 2 1 U-1 #1 250 v Battery Room 1 1 5 u-.1 #3 Stairwell 1 1 U-1 84' Elevation, Aisle 4 1

1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Boric Acid Transfer 1 Pump Area U-1 100' El. Mechanical 1 5 2 1 Penetration Area - Blowdown Tanks U-1 100' El. Corridor 2 3 2 1 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Elevation, Aisle 1 2 2 3 11

1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 &: 11 7 6 17 31 2 Common East &: West

• U-2 Relay Room - 4

• - The opposite room for the north and east walls is the Unit 2 Relay Room.

~PP~Jl:-~T ___<;~l]_S_:t;:____Q_Jf__Q_C_ClIB~_ENG~:_

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

• UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR-8-3-3 ..;_4_

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap. The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed from the Relay Room side, as described in the Description of Occurrence section. Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group procedures, revealed.the nature of the impairments. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months via a visual inspection. This inspection would not necessarily

• identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach.location. The gap in the seal may have formed dua to shrinkage. It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap). -

The 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal appears to have*

formed as a result of a cable pull. It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.

The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and October 30, 1988, are similar in configuration (except as noted) to the penetrations identified in the origial issue of this Special Report. The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This.design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report* *satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The. subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR*-3-3 CORRECTIVE ACTIO_tI;_ __ {_c;_Qp. t '_gj_

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7)

-days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of_this review the penetrations will be sealed.

The majority of those penetrations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Relay Rooms (halon discharge areas) which either have no seal or holes through the seal have been sealed using approved station procedure M3Y-1, "Installation of Fire Barrier and flood Protection -seals".

Work orders have been issued to seal those penetrations not yet*

sealed as of the date of issue of this report.

• This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance with PSE&:G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, .1988, to the NRC which discus_ses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule and the telecommunication between PSE&:G and the NRC Region 1 office conducted on August 26, 1988.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-098