ML18093B204

Special Rept 88-5:on 880907,fire Barrier Penetration Impairments Not Restored within 7 Days,Per Tech Spec 6.9.2. Cause of Degraded Fire Barrier Penetrations Could Not Be Determined.Hourly Roving Fire Watch Established

ML18093B204
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/06/1988
From:	Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-5, NUDOCS 8810140200
Download: ML18093B204 (4)

Text

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P-S~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 6, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-5 This Special Report addresses fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted within thirty {30) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours,

• ~

L. K. Miller General Manager-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 8810140200 88100A

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UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-5 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public-service ~lectric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11 Non-Compliance; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than Seven (7) Days Event Date: 09/07/88 Report Date: 10/06/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.88-355, 88-361,88-363, 88-364,88-375 and 88-376.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1: Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% - Unit Load 1165 MWe Unit 2: Mode 6 Reactor Power 0 Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Between September 1 and September 30, 1988 thirty-three (33) electrical and mechanical penetrations were found degraded by Site Protection Department personnel. They were found as part of the Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 which requires fire barrier penetration seal visual inspections every 18 months to ensure continued operability of the penetration seals. The penetrations either had no seal (NOS), the seal is not deep enough (DPT), had foreign material imbedded in it, or had a hole through the seal (HOL). The areas of the plant where these penetrations are located are:

Unit Location # Inadequate Penetration Seals 1 No. 1 4160V Vital Bus Area Floor Twenty-two 2" - 3.5" Pene. - DPT 1 #1 Relay Room East Wall Two 3.5" penetrations - HOL 1 84' El. Aisle #1 East Section Floor One 16"x10" spare penetration with a damming board on one side - DPT East One 10" P.enetration containing a 2.5" pipe - NOS around perimeter One 6" penetration containing a cable - HOL North One 6" penetration - HOL 1 84' El. Valve Alley One 2" penetration - NOS 1 #1 Spent Fuel Pit Heat Two 25"xl8" ceiling penetrations; Exchanger Room these penetrations co~tain trays, conduit, and cables - HOL

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd}

Unit Location # Inadequate Penetration Seals 1 Stairwell #1 - Auxiliary One 3" penetration - NOS Building 2 122 Diesel Oil Tank Room One lO"xlO" penetration containing a duct with FMT imbedded in perimeter seal An hourly roving fire watch had been established for these areas previously due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers}, in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s} to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s}

to functional status."

Note - Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2.

The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable".

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that a fire will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REP0~8-5 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a (both Units) to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire areas contain detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The one hour roving fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with the area(s) are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

The two (2) Relay Room (a halon discharge area) penetrations which have holes through their seals have been repaired in accordance with station procedure MJY-1, "Installation of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals".

This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule and the telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office conducted on August 26, 1988.

• ~

General Manager -

Salem Operation~

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-083