ML18093B062

Special Rept 88-5:on 880817,several Fire Barrier Penetrations in Support of Design Mods During Current Refueling Outage Impaired for Greater than 7 Days.Hourly Fire Watches Will Continue Until Concerns Resolved

ML18093B062
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/06/1988
From:	Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-5, NUDOCS 8809140243
Download: ML18093B062 (4)

Text

• .OPS~~

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station September 6, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL REPORT 88-~

This Special Report addresses fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within severr (7) days. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Tech.pi cal Specification Action 3. 7 .11. a pursuant to Technic.al Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted within thirty {30) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 8809140243 880906 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PNU The Energy People 95-2189 I 11 M) I 2-84

UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPOR.8-5 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Barrier Penetrations Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s): 8/17/88 Report Date: 9/06/88 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This report addresses the planned impairment of several fire barrier penetrations located throughout Salem Unit 2. These impairments are in support of design modifications during the current refueling outage. The impairments will in some cases last greater than seven days. Therefore a Special Report is required as per Technical Spec~fication Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire-penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, rire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be OPERABLE."

Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations inoperable, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected

• penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration{s) to functional status within 7 days or, .in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

As explained in* prio"r co"rrespondence with tl:ie. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (e.g., PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988),

PSE&G is undergoing a complete review of its Fire Protection Program. Included in this review was the adequacy of the fire.

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UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPOR.8-5 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURREN_C~E_:~~<~c_o_n_t~'d~)

barrier penetrations to meet their design function. To ensure consistent and adequate seal design, PSE&G. decided to curtail the repair of fire barrier penetration impairments until' completion of the Penetration Seal Task Force review of the penetration configuration/design. This rev~ew, due to the work scope of the task force, can take greater than seven days.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or prevented from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are ~ passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.* Since the penetration impairments will not be sealed within seven days, this report is required as per Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Where fire watches are not yet in place,. they will be posted in accordance with the requirements of Technical *specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a when barrier penetrations within those areas are impajred. With the controls implemented in accordance with Technical Spedification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this practice will not involve undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

To date, five (5) planned impaired penetrations have not been resealed as per the policy addressed in this report. On August 10, 1988, the first of these penetrations was impaired.

CORRECTIVE.ACTION:

The hourly fire watches, as addressed in the Analysis of Occurrence section, will continue (or be established as applicable) until all fire protection concerns associated with the subject fire areas are resolved.

Impaired penetrations, caused in support of the Unit 2 outage, will be resealed utilizing existing procedures prior to unit restart.

However, those penetrations where additional engineering review (e.g., awkward configuration) is required (-15%) to complete an appropriate seal, per the Penetration Seal Task Force, may not be resealed upon Unit restart. These penetrations will be resealed by January 1989.

The NRC resident will be periodically apprised of those fire b_arriers affected by this policy. Fire watches will be posted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.11.a as applicable. "Special Reports", such* as this, will not be issued for fu t-ure planned*

impairments which are not sealed within seven days due to continued engineering review of the penetration configuration by the Penetration Seal Task Force (reference PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated

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UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPOR.8-5

• CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd)

March 4, 1988). However, a supplement to this Special Report will be prepared at the conclusion of the Unit 2 outage to identify those Unit 2 penetrations which have not been resealed.

/{;~

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-073

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