ML18093A556
| ML18093A556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1987 |
| From: | Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-7, NUDOCS 8801070035 | |
| Download: ML18093A556 (3) | |
Text
e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulator:r' Commission.
Document Control Desk WashingLon, DC 20555
Dear c -:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NC. DPR-75 DOCKET NO_ 50-31:
UHI'I" NO. 2 S?ECIA.L REPC>R~r U.: -
I December 29, 1987 Generator occurring en December 07, 1987.
This report is being Surv2illance 4.S.1.1.4.
MJP:pc Distribution 8801070035 871229 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S
DCD The Energy People Sincerel:rr yours, General Manager-Salem Operations 95-2189 111 Ml 12-84
SPECIAL REPORT WJMBEP. --7 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
2A Diesel Generator Valid Failure Due To Personnel Error Event Date(s}:
12/07/87 Report Date: 12/29/87 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.87-481.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 5 - Reactor Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
This special report describes a valid test failure involving 2h Diesel Generator occurring on December 07, 1987.
This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Techuical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4 and contains the information required by Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, Regulatory Position C.3.b.
S~r?eillance Requirement 4.3.1.1.4 states:
All diesel ge~e=utor failures, valid er non-valid, shall bs reported to the Com~ission pursuant to Specification 6.9_1.
On December 07, 1927, a required functional test of 2A Dies~l Generator was performed in accordance with Surveillance P=oce~~~e SP(O} 4.8.1.1.2., "Electrical Power Systems -
Emergency Diesels" following maintenance.
The D/G failed to attain a rated voltage =f 4160 +/-_ 420 VAC within 13 seconds as per Technical SpecificatioL Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.a.2.
It did attain rated voltage in approximately 14.2 seconds.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of this D/G valid test failure was personnel error.
The leads to a newly installed fuse, installed to meet breaker coordination requirements, were installed backwards thereby reversing the circuit's polarity.
This occurred as a result of the electrician cutting the polarity identification off when the cable was cut to relocate the cable onto the fuses.
The installation was performed by contractor personnel.
The reverse configuration caused th2 field flash circuit to be inoperative.
The field flash is required to initiate Generator output.
The Generator did eventually stare due to residual magnetism on the rotor.
No specific qualifications were required of the electrician ot~er than the individual being IBEW "ls t Class".
A "ls t Class"
SPECIAL REPORT 87-7 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd) electrician is qualified to make electrical feeder termination~
specified for this particula~ job.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
No. 2A DIG was the first of the DIG's to receive the new fuse.
installations were completed in package requirements.
No other six (6) Salem Generating Station The other five (5} DIG fuse accordance with the design change DIG failures occurred.
The failure of the DIG to attain rated voltage in less than 13 seconds constitutes a valid test failure as described in Regulatory Guide 1.108.
This was the third DIG failure in the last 100 starts for all three (3) DIG's.
With one diesel inoperable, the remaining diesels are capable of providing power to the minimum safeguards equipment required for analyzed accident and transient conditions.
Therefore, this event did not impact the health and safety of ~he general public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The fuse leads were disconnected and installed correctly.
The subsequent successful functional test of the D/G was performed on December 08, 1987 at 1402 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.33461e-4 months <br /> and the DIG was declared operable.
Contractor supervision counseled all contractor electricians invo1ved stressing the importance of accurate work and the need to ensure that attention tc detail is ~aintained to p~eclude this type of event.
The surveillance test in~e~val was decreased to every sevE~ (7) days in compliance with Regulatory Position C.2.d of Regulatory Guide 1.1.0.8.
MJP:pc SORC Mtg.87-116