ML18093A544
| ML18093A544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/24/1987 |
| From: | Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A545 | List: |
| References | |
| NLR-N87192, NUDOCS 8712300194 | |
| Download: ML18093A544 (6) | |
Text
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box236, Han cocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4800 December 24, 1987 NLR-N87192 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT
.FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-70 AND DPR-75 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272/50-311 In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of-1954, as amended, and the regulations thereunder, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby transmits a request for amendment of Facility Operating License DPR-75 for Salem Generating Station.
(SGS), Unit No. 2.
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR170.21, a check in the amount of $150.00 is enclosed.
Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.9l(b)(l), a copy of this request has been sent to the State of New Jersey as indicated below.
This amendment request revises Technical Specification 3/4.3.4 and the associated bases for Turbine Overspeed Protection Surveillance requirements (see Enclosure 2) for Salem Unit 2.
The changes, identified by revision bars in the right margin, consist of reducing the test frequency of the turbine stop valves, control valves, hot reheat stop valves, and hot reheat intercept valves.
This request is based on an evaluation performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation for the Westinghouse Owners Group Turbine Valve Test Frequency Evaluation Subgroup.
The results of this evaluation are contained in topical report WCAP-11525, "Probabilistic Evaluation of Reduction in Turbine Valve Test Frequency."
WCAP-11525 demonstrates that significant increases in the interval between turbine valve functional tests can be achieved without exceeding the NRC acceptance criteria for the ~robability of a turbine missile
- ejection incident (1.0 X 10-per year).
PSE&G also requests that Facility Operating License DPR-70 for Salem Unit 1 be similarly amended to make the Technical Specifications consistent between units (Enclosure 3).
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PDR ADOCK 05000272 p
Document Control Desk 2
12-24-87 WCAP-11525 has been submitted on the Prairie Island docket, Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 (reference letter dated 9/28/87), and is applicable to eleven plants in addition to Salem.
For this reason we ask that WCAP-11525 be reviewed with this amendment request and a separate Safety Evaluation Report be issued for WCAP-11525.
This will allow for simplified review of future license amendment requests from the other members of the Westinghouse Owners Group Turbine Valve Test Frequency Evaluation Subgroup.
This change is being submitted in conjunction with the submittal from Prairie Island as a lead plant submittal. contains further discussion and justification for the proposed revisions.
This submittal includes one (1) signed original, including affidavit, and thirty-seven (37) copies pursuant to 10CFR50.4(b)(2)(ii).
Should you have any questions on the subject transmittal, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, Enclosures C
Mr. D. c. Fischer USNRC Licensing Project Manager Mr. T. J. Kenny USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. w. T. Russell, Administrator USNRC Region I Mr. D. M. Scott, Chief Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Department of Environmental Protection 380 Scotch Road Trenton, NJ 08628
Ref: LCR 87-15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS.
COUNTY OF SALEM Corbin A. McNeill, Jr., being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am Senior Vice President of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in our letter dated December 24, 1987, concerning Facility Operating Licenses DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem Generating Station, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
and Sworn to be$ore me day of
~t:.L..-, 1987
-+'!~---
New Jersey My Commission expires on
ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272/50-311 Description of Change Page 1 of 3 This amendment request proposes to modify Technical Specification section 3/4.3.4 and the associated bases for Turbine Overspeed Protection surveillance requirements.
Rather than having a specific turbine valve test frequency in the Technical Specification it is proposed that the licensee be free to use a turbine valve testing frequency determined by the methodology presented in WCAP-11525 "Probabilistic Evaluation of Reduction in Turbine Valve Test Frequency", and in accordance with the established NRC acceptance criteria for the probability of a missile ejection incident of <l X lo-5 per year.
The request also proposes addition of this specification to Salem Unit 1 for consistency between units.
Justification for Change Current restrictions on turbine valve test intervals are a result of applying test intervals generated for fossil plants to early nuclear plants.
As nuclear plants have developed their own operating history, design and operations have improved, making the applicability of the fossil turbine valve test interval restrictions inappropriate.
Evaluations of turbine valve test intervals have shown that significant relaxation of turbine valve testing frequency is warranted (reference WCAP-11525, "Probabilistic Evaluation of Reduction in Turbine Valve Test Frequency").
The evaluations have shown that with extended testing intervals, the probability of generating a turbine missile is significant!~ lower than the established NRC acceptance criteria (<1.0 X 10-per year).
Addition of a surveillance requirement to review WCAP methodology ensures that proper valve surveillance intervals have been established.
Currently, turbine valve testing is conducted on a weekly basis.
Conducting a test of the turbine valves requires reduction in power output.
The plant's power level is dropped to approximately 90% of maximum for the conduct of the turbine valve tests.
This power reduction places unnecessary thermal and pressure cycles on plant equipment which may carry an accompanying reduction in overall plant safety and reliability.
Addition of this section to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications is part of an overall effort to achieve consistency between the Salem 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.
.Page 2 of 3 Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3/4.3.4 does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of Salem Unit 2 in accordance with these changes would not:
- 1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The referenced analysis as reported in WCAP-11525 provides an evaluation of the probability of turbine missile ejection for the purpose of justifying a reduction in the frequency of turbine valve testing.
In a letter to Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated February 2, 1987 (C. E.* Rossi, USNRC to J.
A. Martin, Westinghouse), the Commission established acceptable criteria for the probability of generating a turbine missile from an unfavorably oriented turbine (acceptable probability of missile generation< 1.0 X lQ-5).
The evaluation in WCAP-11525 shows that the probability of a missile ejection incident for turbine valve test intervals of up to one year is significantly less than the established acceptance criteria.
The small change in the probability of generating a turbine missile with longer turbine valve testing intervals does not represent a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
The proposed amendment reduces the frequency at which turbine valves are tested.
The proposed amendment does not change the kind, number or type of overspeed protection components available.
Changing the frequency of turbine valve testing does not result in a significant change in the failure rate or change failure modes for the turbine valves.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
As noted above and as shown in the attached WCAP-11525, this change to the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification will not result in a significant reduction in the margin ~f safety for missile ejection.
The probability of missile ejection remains acceptably small and within guidelines established by the NRC staff.
The changes to the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications proposed in this amendment request are similar to example II.4 of 48FR14870.
Example II.4 relates to the granting of a relief from an operating restriction upon demonstration of acceptable means of operation.
This assumes that acceptable operating criteria have been established and that it is satisfactorily shown that the criteria have been met.
Page 3 of 3 WCAP-11525 establishes acceptance criteria for turbine valve test frequency and demonstrates that increases in the interval between turbine valve functional tests can be achieved without exceeding the NRC acceptance criteria for the probability of a turbine missile ejection incident.
The addition of a surveillance requirement to review the WCAP methodology ensures a proper valve surveillance interval and is consistent with the significant hazards consideration presented above.
Addition of a similar specification to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration in that it is an administrative change only and conforms to examples 1 and 2 of 48FR14870 in that (a) the change is being made to achieve consistence between the Technical Specifications of Salem 1 and 2 and (b) the change imposes an additional limitation not currently included in the Unit 1 specifications.
The significant hazards consideration above applies to this change also.
Based on this guidance and the reasons discussed above, we have concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.