ML18093A477

Forwards Operating Ltr for IAEA Surveillance Interval of 870821-0921.Proposed Tech Spec Change Re Deletion of Check Valve V453 from IST Program Justified

ML18093A477
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/26/1987
From:	Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NLR-N87200, NUDOCS 8711020050
Download: ML18093A477 (7)

Text

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.* Public Service Electric and Gas Company Corbin A. McNeill, Jr. Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4800 Senior Vice President -

Nuclear October 26, 1987 NLR-N87200 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

OPERATING LETTER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Attached is the operating letter for Salem Unit No. 1 for the IAEA surveillance interval of August 21, 1987 to September 21, 1987.

Sincerely, Attachment C Mr. D. c. Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. T. J. Kenny Senior Resident Inspector Mr. w. T. Russell, Administrator Region I Mr. c. Emeigh Safeguards Material Licensing and International Activities Branch Off ice of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards Mr. D. M. Scott, Chief Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Department of Environmental Protection 380 Scotch Road Trenton, NJ 08628

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DOE/NRC FORM 740M (12-81)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Page of Pages ..

Approvtd by OMB \

AND 038-R0477 \

MANDATORY DATA COLLECTION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved by OMB AUTHORIZED BY 10 CFR JO, 40, 50, 70, 75, 150, Public Laws83-703, 93-438, 95-91 CONCISE NOTE 3150-0057 I3X~ ; /UXHF 1

1. NAME 2. ATTACHMENT TO 4. REPORTING PERIOD Public Service Electric & Gas Co. a.000E/NRC 741 b.0DOE/NRC742 c. DDOE/ NRC 742c FROM STREET ADDRESS 5. TRANSACTION DATA 8/21/87 ITO 9/21/87 P.O. Box 236 a, SHIPPER'S b. RECEIVER'S c. TRANS. NO. d. COAR e. PC I, AC g DATA 6. REPORTING DATE CITY Hancocks Bridge ISTATE NJ I 08038 ZIP CODE RIS XHF/

RIS XHF/

NO. CODf-UXHF UXHF 25 M 6 7. LICENSE NUMBERS DPR70 Ba. LINE NO. b. ENTRY REFERENCE c. TEXT OF CONCISE NOTE '

1 Operating Letter Salem Unit #1 2 During the IAEA surveillance interval from 3 August 21st to September 21st, there were no 4 fuel transactions conducted in Unit 1 Fuel 5 Handling Building. The Fuel Handling Building 6 lighting breakers have been cautioned tagged 7 requiring Reactor Engineering notification 8 prior to operation. Reactor Engineering 9 received no notif-ication durinq this period.

10 A filter was placed in the transfer pool on 11 September 17th. Power was reduced August 21st 12 to 80% for system stability and coastdown 13 concerns. Power coastdown began September 18th.

14 Cumulative cvcle burn up throuqh Septembe.r 21st, 15 ' 1987 16500.4 MWD/MTM; 1,472,215.8 MWD.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the information given above and in any attached schedules is true, complete, and correct.

9. SIGNATURE (See instructions for provisions regarding confidentiality.) 10. TITLE 11. DATE nAA ~-*-1 /j~ General Manager - Salem Operations J 8 U.S.C. SECTlc)ff 100 l; ACfl OF JUNE 2 5, 194 8; 62 STAT. 749; MAKES IT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE TO MAKE A WILLFULLY FALSE STATEMENT OR REPRESENTATION TO ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO ANY MATTERS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION.

10/7 /87

~herefore, it can be concluded that the proposed change does not create the possibility for an accident different than any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed action reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification?

RESPONSE

The operability of check valve V453 is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications. Although the valve would prevent backflow into the system during maintenance, there are other valves upstream of the subject valve, including MOV V452, which would normally be closed to provide redundant system isolation. Additionally, the operability of MOV V452 is specifically verified through the performance of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.1.2.b thereby assuring that system isolation is available. This surveillance further justifies the highly unlikely situation in which V452 could not be closed as discussed in Paragraph (1) above.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed change does not reduce the margin of safety for any Technical Specification.

CONCLUSION PSE&G therefore concludes, based upon the arguments presented in the above three paragraphs and in Attachment 3 that the proposed change does not involve any unreviewed safety question. Hence, the deletion of check valve V453 from the !ST Program is justified.

r ATTACHMENT 3 SAFETY EVALUATION ADDENDUM The maximum flood level in Reactor Building Rooms 4209, 4211 and 4213 was previously calculated to be 1 foot in Bechtel Calculation ll-92(Q). The calculated flood level is the result of a postulated crack in a 36" service water pipe. The crack blowdown was modeled as orifice flow with the flow rate calculated as:

where:

c is the discharge coefficient which was assumed to be 1 for conservatism, Ac is the crack area (ft2) g is gravitational acceleration, 32.17 ft/sec2 I is water density @ 33°F (minimum SSWS temperature) and atmospheric pressure 62.4 lb/ft3 6p is the pressure loss across the crack, 50 psi The crack area was calculated as:

REF: (SRP 3.6.1, BTP ASB 3-1, APP.B) where:

tw is the pipe wall thickness, 0.500 in d is the pipe inside diameter, 35 in so, Ac = 4.375 in2 = 0.0304 ft2 and, Vc = 1(0. 03t>l{Jj ;J.(32. "J:qtlt4)(so)

= 2.619 cfs The volumetric flow rate was converted to gpm flow rate:

Oc = 1176 gpm It was assumed that three of eight floor drains in the area with 88.9 gpm capacity each were operable. So, the flood rate was computed as:

Qf = 1176 - (3) (88.9) = 909.3 gprn, or Vt = 121.6 cfm

• It was assumed that the flow ceased within 30 minutes. That is, operator response required actions outside the control room.

Implied in the assumption is a single active failure of automatic isolation.

The flood volume was calculated to be:

Vf = (121.6)(30) = 3647 ft3 The floor area had been calculated as 4137 ft2, so, the flood level is calculated to be:

hf. = = O.BB ft A safety margin of 15% was applied to determine a maximum flood level of:

hf = 1.01 ft With check valve V453 inoperable, the following "worst case" scenario is considered.

A crack develops in the SSWS piping upstream of MOV V452 and downstream of the RACS heat exchanger isolation valves. The internal flooding source is isolated within 30 minutes which assumes an active failure of automatic isolation. However, an additional active failure of MOV V452 is considered which is not considered correctable in the short term.

The above referenced Bechtel calculation also considered a pipe crack in inlet piping to the shell side of RACS heat exchanger.

Pertinent crack flow parameters were:

c = 1, for conservatism Ac = l.25E-2 ft2 Ap = 101 psi

= 61.7 lb/ft3 (120°F RACS temperature, conservatively f larger than SSWS maximum temperature)

The resultant flow out the crack was computed to be:

Q Ve = 1.539 cfs, or Oc = 690.9 gpm

With the assumption of three effective floor drains, the flood rate was computed as:

Qf = Oc - 3(Qa)

= 690.9 - 3(88.9)

• = 424.2 gpm, or Vf = 56.7 cfm The flood volume for a 30 minute interval until isolation was calculated as:

Vf =

• 30(Vf)

= (30)(56.7)

= 1701 ft3 The flood level was calculated to be:

l°fOI ft3 hf :: llf3~ ff2. = o. 41 ff-With a 15% safety margin, the maximum flood level was calculated to be:

hf= 0.41 ft The Bechtel calculation results may be conservatively used as the internal source flood level in the considered scenario because the Ap across the crack in the calculation was 101 psi where as the maximum pressure in the pipe considered is 35 psig.

Following isolation of the internal source, the external source flood rate is calculated on the basis of the following parameter:

C = 1, for conservatism Ac = l.25E-2 ft2 6p = 15 psi (assumed) p = 61.7 lb/ft3 for conservatism The resultant flow out the crack is computed to be Ve = '(o.olz.i:;)/~3:;)..1+)(1LN)lso) 4l.~

~.

Ve = 0.593 cfs, or Oc = 266.3 gpm which is slightly less than the drainage flow rate:

Oct = 3(88.9) = 266.7 gpm in which case the rooms would drain down slowly.

The assumed pressure loss of 15 psi across the crack is compared to the gravitational head between the cooling tower basin and the presumed crack location:

Assuming 95°F water:

f """~ = '"~.Ob lb /-F+

3 The pressure is:

"P = fwA~ LA~)

• f,~.ob(zs)

=~*. LSSJ.. ¢ : ti ~i With a lower pressure external source, the draindown rate would increase.

So, it may be concluded that the flooding consequences from an external source are not as severe as that which was previously evaluated from an internal source.