ML18093A446

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Special Rept 87-5:on 870917,fire Barrier Identified as Inadequate.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Penetrations for Both Units Will Be Evaluated & Sealed as Required.W/
ML18093A446
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/1987
From: Zupko J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-5, NUDOCS 8710220003
Download: ML18093A446 (4)


Text

PS~G Public Service E!echic and Gas Cornpanv Salem Generating Station October 13, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conm1ission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-5 This Special Report addresses a fire barrier penetration impairment which has not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days for Unit 2 and Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-272).

This _report satisfies the reporting requirements of Techp.ical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2-.

It is being submitted within thirty (30) days of identification of the impairments.

MJP:pc Distribution Sincerely yours,

~~9-J. M. Zupko, Jr..

General Manager-Salem Operations 8710220003 871013 PDR ADDCK 05000311 S

PDR

SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 87-5 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generatip.g Station - Unit 2

~ublic Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

e.

'l'ec°hnical Specification 3. 1*.11 - Identification of Fire Barrier Impairments; Repair > 7 Days Discovery Date:

09/17/87 Report Date:

10/13/87 This rep~rt was initiated by Incident Report No.87-360.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 17, 1987 at 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />, a PSE&G task force, established to review and evaluate Salem Stations compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 50 Appendix R, identified a Unit 2 fire barrier to be inadequate.

The Control Room horseshoe console is located over a penetration in the Control Room slab.

A metal trough is provided in this penetration through which electrical cabling passes.

This trough does not provide the required three hour fire rating between the Control Room and Relay Room fire areas.

Since the Control Room is manned 100% of the time and a continuous f i~e watcih is statione~

in the Relay Room below the Control Room (due to other fire protection concerns) the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, are met.

Subsequent inves_tigation of the comparable Unit 1 fire area penetration *revealed it to also be inadequate.

Technical Specification 3.7.11.a is met due to similar reasons as stated for the Unit 2 area.

Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers}, in fire zone boundaries, pro.tecting safety related areas shall be OPERABLE.."

Action Stateme~t 3.7.11.a states:

"With one ( 1) or more of* the above required fire barrie-r penetrations inoperable, within one (1) hour either establish a

~ontinuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the.affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, in lieu of any _other report required by Specific~tion 6.9.1,

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 87-5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd) prep~re and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30} ftays outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans a~d schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) ~o OPERABLE status."

Note the Unit 1 _Technical Specifications are identical with tbe Uni't 2 -Technical Specifications except that the term "functional" is substituted with "OPERABLE".

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the inadequately sealed fire barrier penetration for both Units is inadequate design review.

The configuration of the electrical troughs and floor plates have existed since-their installation which occurred pri~r to 1976 when Branch Technical Position- (BTP) 9.5.1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July li 1976", was issued.

When PSE&G

_reviewed BTP 9.5.l, to ensure compliance, these penetrations were not identified.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately re~arded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

This desigri feature minimizes the possibilitj of a single fire-involving two or more fire areas of the facility.

The penetration fire barriers -ar_e a passive element in the facility fire protection progr~m and ar~ subject t6 periodic inspections.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant io Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairment is greater-than seven (7) days.

The -fire watch requirements of Technical Specification Action Statemen-t 3. 7.11. a for the inadequate fire barrier are sufficient as discussed in the "Description of Occurrence" section.

Since the fire barrier for both Units is inadequate, it cannot be assured a fire in one area would not affect the adjacent fire area.

Both areas contain detection and an independent suppression system in addition to the continuous fire watch.

Therefore, it is.reasonable

_to assume.that a fire in either area would be detected and extinguished before it could involve the adjacent*area.

This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Due to the nature of the design change, the repair of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 penetrations could not be accomplished within seven (7) days.

The penetrations will be evaluated by PSE&G and sealed as required.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 87-5 CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(cont'd)

Long term corrective action includes continuance of the PSE&G Appendix R Task Force review of fire barrier penetrations.

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.87-082

(~J_ ~9-Ge~~a~nager -

Salem Operations