ML18093A433
| ML18093A433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1987 |
| From: | Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-7, NUDOCS 8710140150 | |
| Download: ML18093A433 (3) | |
Text
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e PS~G Public Secv1ce Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, [\\Jew Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 06, 1987 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 87-7 This Special Report addresses the circumstances surrounding.
inoperability of the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps.
This report is being submitted within fourteen days of the occurrence in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.
MJP:pc
-Distribution 8710140150 e7t,gg~72 PDR ADOCK 05 PDR s
Sincerely yours, J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-Salem Operations
.t' SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 91 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Automatic Actuation Feature For Both Fire Pumps Deactivated Due To Fire Main Rupture Event Date:
09/23/87 Report Date:
10/06/87 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.87-358 and 359.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Unit 1:
Unit 2:
Mode 1 Mode 1.*
Reactor Power Level 77%
Reactor Power Level 100%
Unit Load 850 MWe Unit Load 1140 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On September 23, 1987 at 0743 hours0.0086 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.827115e-4 months <br />, the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps was deactivated.
A Pile Driver Crane had collided with a post indicator valve (1FP246) resulting in significant fire protection water loss.
Subsequent low pressure caused both fire pumps to start.
Due to the amount of water loss, the.Fire Water Tank level became a concern and the fire pumps were turned off and placed in manual operation.
Fire Protection personnel were stationed at the Fire Pump House to start the fire pump(s) as necessary.
Technical Specification 3.7.10.1.c requires operability of the automatic actuation feature.for both Fire Pumps at all times.
If this feature is not operable, then the following must be done per Acti_on Statement 2.b:
"With both.fire suppression water systems inoperable:
- 1.
Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- 2.
Submit a Special Report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2; a}
By telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b}
Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission.no later than the first working day following the event, and c)
In writing within 14 days following the event, out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."
The Technical Specifications and Action Statements are identical for both Salem Units.
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT ~7 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of this event was personnel error.
Major construction work, by contractors, is in progress in the vicinity of valve 1FP246.
In this area, work tolerances to other structures are very close.
Due to engine noise, the crane operator could not hear the warning by directing personnel.
The crane operator did observe the directing personnel hand signals but could not stop the crane before it nudged into th~ post indicating valve.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The operability of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located in either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
The Fire Suppression System consists of a water distribution system, spray and/or sprinklers, C02, Halon and fire hose stations.
The
.collective capability of the Fire Suppression. Systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.
With the automatic actuation feature for both Fire Pumps inoperable, the station fire protection system was degraded.
During this time period, the pumps were in manual operation and Site Protection Department personnel were stationed in the Pump House to actuate the pumps, if required.
The Site Protection personnel were in constant radio communication with the Shift Supervisors Office and the Fire Station.
The Fire Pumps were returned to fully operable status within approximately one (1) hour when the 1FP246 valve was isolated.
Therefore, this occurrence involved no undue risk to the health and safety of the general public.
The area affected by isolation of the post indicating valve was the "B" Building.
The sprinkler system within this building was inactive until the eventual repair of the valve.
No safety related equipment
- or systems are located in this building.
This report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.b Section 2.c requirements.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The post indicating valve was repaired and returned to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Additional.corrective action includes relocation of the fire protection system piping and post indicating valve away from the construction*area.
PSE&G has re-emphasized with the construction contractor the importance of protecting PSE&G equipment by ensuring good work practice~ are maintained.
MJP:pc SORC Mtg.87-080 Y..,,fdJ~ ~
General Manager -
Salein Operations