ML18093A394
| ML18093A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1987 |
| From: | Miltenberger S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N87178, NUDOCS 8709300299 | |
| Download: ML18093A394 (4) | |
Text
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
..... *- I. '
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Steven E. Miltenberger Vice President -
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4199 Nuclear Operations SEP 2 4 1987 NLR-N87178 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272/50-311 COMBINED INSPECTION NO. 50-272/86-30; 50-311/86-32 Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby submits this letter in response to the concerns expressed in the subject inspection report.
Responses to each of the identified concerns are contained in Attachment 1, which contains Safeguards Information that is required to be protected from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21.
Should you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, Attachment WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES HANDLE THIS DOCUMENT AS DECONTROLLED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION 970924 970930029C~* 0 5000272 pDR ADO ~
pOR Q
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
. c.
Document Control Desk 2
C Mr. T. T. Martin, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region I Mr. w. T. Russell, Administrator Region I Mr. D. C. Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. T. J. Kenny Senior Resident Inspector Mr. G. w. Rivenbark USNRC Licensing Project Manager Mr. R. w. Borchardt USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. D. M. Scott, Chief (cover letter only)
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Department of Environmental Protection 380 Scotch Road Trenton, NJ 08628 WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES HANDLE THIS DOCUMENT AS DECONTROLLED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION SEP 2 4 1987
SAFEGUA FORMATION FINDINGS OF NR MBINED INSPECTION NUMBER 50-~72/86-30 AND 50-311/86-32 FINDING:
2.c(l)
The operations organiz.ation has not developed procedures for safety related systems and equipment which establish a priority of actions, follow-up actions to be taken or areas to be searched following a threat of sabotage, a suspected sabotage or an actual sabotage event.
Operations provides individuals to be part of the sabotage search teams without any guidance or thought toward priorities.
The primary responsibility of these individuals appears to be to locate other devices and to identify equipment.
They do not perform valve lineups or circuit breaker checks.
The security organization determines the a~es to be searched and priorities although operations can request area priorities.
Vital areas are not prioritized.
2.c(2)
The operations organization has not provided operator guidance for shutting down the plant following a suspected sabotage or actual sabotage event.
Major inconsistencies were found between operators on when they would begin or consider reactor shutdown following a sabotage event or external threat or attack.
2.c(3)
The operations organization has not developed guidance of policy regarding under what conditions the control room should be abandoned following an external attack and what actions should be completed prior to abandonment.
The security procedures require the operators to lock the entrance to the control room when notified of an external attack.
The operators interviewed were not aware of this procedure.
RESPONSE
The Emergency Classification Guide (ECG) and the Security Contingency Plan (SPC) and Procedures will be revised to include the following:
- 1.
The SPC will include a priority list of areas to be searched when the threat does not identify a specific~
location.
When a location is specified, the area will be searched first, then the areas on the list.
In each area, major flow path valve alignments and major equipment breaker checks will be performed.
Follow-up actions will include a second area search/valve alignment check.
Further, valve and breaker line-ups will be checked by operators at increased frequency until the event is terminated.
- 2.
Emergency Plan Procedures will be revised to include specific guidance on the duties and actions of search/inspection team members.
The. procedure will specify that the operators will determine the priority of areas and the equipment within areas to be searched.
- 3.
Operators will be made aware of above-referenced procedure changes via the Operations Department Newsletter.
The above items will be accomplished by June JO, 1988.
Applicable Emergency Plan Procedures will be revised to require the Senior Shift Supervisor to consult with the Emergency Duty Officer on the issue of plant shutdown following the onset of a security event.
Procedures will also require shutdown of the plan when a General Emergency is declared as a result of a security event.
These changes will be completed by June 30, '1988.
The decision to abandon the control room under all circumstances is made by the Senior Shift Supervisor.
However, plant operating procedures for evacuation of the control room will be revised to specifically include security events.
This will be accomplished by 11/30/87.
The control room door is always locked and alarmed.
Therefore, no further action is required.
Page 1 of 2
\\..
~
!Ji;
.\\:°"'
I i'
SAFEGUAR ORMATION.
FINDINGS OF NRC MBINED INSPECTION NUMBER 50-272/86-30 AND 50:_311/86-32 FINDING:
2.c(4)
Neither operators or security management have established a priority list to identify vital areas to protect in the event of an externai attack.
It was found that security establishes the areas to be searched and the order of search.
Operations tends to take a passive role.
2.c(S)
After an area is searched, it is not marked' and/or sealed to prevent or detect unauthorized entry to avoid wasted effort in additional searches.
2.c(6)
The training organization.has not provided training in operator responsibilities and actions in case of such events.
The training staff feels that, in recent years, reactor operators responsibilities have been reduced and transferred to other organizations such as Maintenance, I&C, Health Physics and Security.
They feel that operators now perform an overall managerial function, but are not required to be knowledgeable of all details.
They rely on each department performing its intended function with operations maintaining overall cognizance of the activities.
As a consequence, the security-operations interface has never been addressed by the operations organization.
RESPONSE
Regarding area searches, refer to the response to item 2.c(l).
Regarding the priority of areas 'to be protected in the event of an external attack, the NRC approved Artificial Island Security Contingency Plan requires that the security force "inhibit the intruders from further
~
Therefore, our initial protection strategy ;-
is to prevent access to any vital areas by covering likely, ground level avenues of approach to vital areas (which are identified in. security procedures) and to respond to specific areas when
- possible threat is identified.
In most cases, due to the configuration of the vital areas and the necessity to perform other response
. activities during *an emergency event, it is not practical -
to seal areas following search.
However, Security does not closely track the progress of the search and keeps the Operational Support Center (OSC) Coordinator informed.
This will be formalized through revision of Security Contingency Plan Procedures.
A Sec1frity representative will be assigned to the OSC to coordinate and track the search effort.
This change to the Security Contingency Plan will be completed by June 30, 1988.
The Nuclear Training Department and the Nuclear Security Department will develop and conduct training on the Security Contingency Plan for licensed operators which will address the security/operations interface.
This training will be developed by June 30, 1988 and.will be incorporated into the annual licensed operator emergency plan training requirements~
SAFEGUARD INFORMATION DETERMINATION NAM~ri TITLE~~
ORGANIZATION/lfef(J.~~
DATE 2J;tlff Page 2 of 2
- 'i
~
~:,I