ML18093A323

Special Rept 87-6:on 870723 & 24,fire Barrier Penetration Seals Found Degraded.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Roving Fire Watch Established.Complete Review of All Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Will Be Conducted

ML18093A323
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/21/1987
From:	Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-6, NUDOCS 8708310010
Download: ML18093A323 (4)

Text

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~~~,1>-t' PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Compa11v P.G. Bo;,; E Haricocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 21, 1987

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 REPORT 87-6

. SPECIAL REPORT*

This Special. Report addresses fire barrier penetration impairments in Salem.Unit 1 and Unit 2. These impairments have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days *. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.~.2. It is being submitted within. thirty days of identification of the impairments.

• Sincerely yours, 0700310010 e~g~~ 72 J~

~µ9-M. Zupko, Jr.

~DR ADOC~ 0 PDR General Manager- .

Salem Operations

-MJP:pc Distribution The Energy People

. 95~2189 111 MJ 12-84

SPECI~L REPORT NUMBER At6 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11 - Identification of Fire Barrier Impairments; Repair > 7 Days Discovery Date: 07/23/87 Report Date: 08/21/87 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.87-293, 87-294, and 87-295 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 23, 1987 at 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br />, a Unit 1 fire barrier penetration seal was found degraded. The penetration is located between 64' and 84' elevations in the Auxiliary Building. An hourly roving £ire watch had been established for this area previously due to other fire protection deficiencies. Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, wete met.

On June 24, 1987, four (4) inadequately sealed penetrations, located in the vicinity of the Unit 1 impaired penetration were identified.

Investigation of seals in the mirrored location in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building revealed three (3) similarly inadequately sealed penetrations. In accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, an hourly roving fire watch was established in the vicinity of the Unit 2 inadequately sealed penetrations.

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

0 All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall' be functional."

Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire.

barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any oth-er report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the

-~ UNIT + SPECIAL REPORT 8~ DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30) days_outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

Not~ - Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2.

The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non~functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable".

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

~he cause of the Unit 1 degraded fire barrier penetration seal first found could not be positively determined. It had a foam type of seal which had loosened.

The cause of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 inadequately sealed fire barrier penetrations is inadequate design review. These penetrations were sealed with approximately four (4) inches of concrete during plant construction in 1971. Four (4) inches of concrete has not been shown to be adequate to provide a three (3) hour fire rating as is required for this fire barrier. In 1976, Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5.1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976", was issued. When PSE&G reviewed BTP 9.5.1, to ensure compliance, these penetrations were not identified.

It should be noted these penetrations are not visible from 84' Elevation and the height of the 64' Elevation ceiling is 18 feet, therefore, visual observation of these penetrations is difficult.

'ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairment is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a (both Units) to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barrier once the impairments were identified.

With the penetration impaired, it cannot be assured a fire in one area would not affect the adjacent fire area. Both areas contain detection and an independent suppression system in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected and extinguished before it could involve the adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

UNI~ 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8~ CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A one hour roving fire watch was established, in accordance with Technical Specific~tion Action Statement 3.7.11.a. Due to the nature of the design change, the repair of the penetrations could not be accomplished within seven (7) days. The penetrations will be sealed with three (3) hour rated seals as per design change packages #1 &

2EC-2285. Long term corrective action includes a complete review of all fire barrier penetration seals in order to provide tr~ceable identification of their adequacy as rated fire barrier seals.

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Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.87-065