ML18087A718
| ML18087A718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1983 |
| From: | Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8303160234 | |
| Download: ML18087A718 (6) | |
Text
Richard A. Uderitz Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 935-6010 March 8, 1983 Vice President -
Nuclear Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Program Region 1
- u. s. Nuclear_Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Starostecki:
REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FAILURE NO. 1 UNIT SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-272 This letter supplements our letter of March 1, 1983 to the Director - Division of Licensing which provided documentation of our investigation and proposed corrective actions related to two incidents on February 22 and 25, 1983.
On those occasions the Salem Unit 1 reactor trip breakers failed to open upon receipt of an automatic trip signal from the reactor protection system.
In both instances, the manual trip was used to shut down the unit.
Subsequent meetings between the NRC Staff and PSE&G have resulted in requests for additional information.or clarification in a number of areas.
The attached report provides our position on issues related to the events of February 22 and 25, 1983.
Based upon our analysis of these events, we believe implementation of the corrective actions discussed in this letter and in our March 1, 1983 letter will preclude recurrence of these events and provide confidence that Salem Unit 1 can be safely returned to service.
Sincerely,
/td-~
Attachment CC:
Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR Mr. Leif J. Norrholm NRC Senior Resident Inspector
.~ 8303160234 830308 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S
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PSE&G POSITION ON ISSUES RELATED TO REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FAILURES SALEM UNIT 1 FEBRUARY 22 AND 25, 1983
- 1.
Safety Classifications of Breakers The Reactor Trip Breakers are a part of the Reactor Trip System which is designed to automatically trip the Reactor.
The PSAR indicates that these breakers were to be designed to the criteria defined in Proposed IEEE "Standards for Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems."
The FSAR and UFSAR identify the Reactor Trip Breakers as being designed to IEEE-279-1971 "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
In addition, the FSAR and UFSAR indicate that the breakers are designed to meet the intent of IEEE-344-1971 "Seismic Qualification of Class I Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
There has been no change in classification of this equipment since the original design of the Salem Generating Station.
- 2.
Identification of Cause of Failure As indicated in our letter of March 1, 1983, PSE&G has identified the cause of the failure of the Reactor Trip Breakers to be lack of proper lubrication on the under-voltage trip attachment.
- 3.
verification Testing The following preoperational verification program will be completed prior to returning the trip breakers to service.
The manufacturer will electrically test each undervoltage trip attachment on a test breaker twenty-five times.
After installation of the undervoltage trip attachment, the reac-tor trip breakers will be tested a minimum of ten times in accordance with Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2.
After instal-lation into the appropriate breaker compartment, a response time test of the breaker, actuated through the SSPS, will be performed.
- 4.
Revised Surveillance and Maintenance Procedures Surveillance procedures associated with the Solid State Protection System have been revised to increase the fre-quency of surveillance testing on the reactor trip breakers from 60 days to 30 days until further experience is gained.
- The procedure for maintenance, inspection and testing of the reactor trip and bypass breaker has been issued.
PSE&G embarked on a managed maintenance program in July 1982, the purpose of which is to throughly review and update the preventative maintenance program for certain components and systems.
For these components and systems, all existing maintenance procedures will be reviewed and revised if necessary.
- 5.
Operating Procedures The procedure used for Reactor Trips has been revised to direct the operators to immediately initiate a manual reac-tor trip whenever there is a Reactor Trip demand indication present on the overhead annunciator or reactor protection status panel.
The procedure has also been modified to provide additional steps for dealing with failure of the reactor trip breakers to open.
- 6.
Training Effectiveness While we believe that our operators had an adequate under~
standing of the Solid State Protection System and reacted properly, additional training will be conducted prior to startup to re-emphasize and strengthen their understanding of the Solid State Protection System and the significance of associated alarms and indicators.
This training will be in addition to the regular requalification training program which will also emphasize these subjects.
- 7.
Master Equipment List Prior to restarting Salem Unit No. 1, appropriate personnel will be indoctrinated in the purpose and use of the Master Equipment List (MEL).
The copies of the MEL currently in use for maintenance and procurement will be reviewed to ensure that each set is complete.
In addition, a program has been undertaken to review and reissue the MEL.
This program will include a detailed review of the MEL data to determine completeness and to validate the classification of data contained therein.
Any errors or omissions will be corrected.
Following valida-tion, the MEL will be reissued as a controlled document with instructions on its purpose and use.
Instructions will also be issued to users of the MEL to redefine the mechanism for obtaining classification for any items not included in the MEL.
Also, a procedure will be developed to provide instructions on updating the MEL and the fre-quency of the updating.
This effort will be completed by May, 1983.
- 8.
Maintenance Work Orders The administrative procedure for the control of Station Maintenance will be revised to include a Quality Assurance review of all Work Orders designated non-safety related prior to performing the work to ensure proper classif ica-tion.
Indoctrination of appropriate personnel in the use of the procedure will be conducted prior to startup.
- 9.
Timeliness of 50.72 Reporting The importance of adhering to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 is being reemphasized to operating personnel.
In addition, the procedures, personnel training and communi-cation systems are being reviewed and modified to assure that notifications are made within the required time periods.
- 10.
Post-Trip Review A formalized Post-Reactor Trip/Safety Injection review pro-cedure has been established.
The procedure establishes requirements and criteria that must be met prior to start-up.
The procedure also establishes personnel responsibili-ties, identifies the review process, and identifies the documents and records to be examined.
The procedure addi-tionally specifies the approval requirements and the author-ization tha~ is necessary prior to startup.
\\
- 11.
Vendor Supplied Information Copies of all previously issued Westinghouse NSID (NSD)
Technical Bulletins and NSID (NSD) Data Letters have been obtained on a controlled copy basis from Westinghouse.
A review will be made to ensure that applicable documents are incorporated into station procedures where appropriate by July 1, 1983.
Future issues of these documents will be reviewed by engineering and formally issued to the Station.
A review will be made to determine that PSE&G has controlled vendor manuals for all major safety system equipment, and to request such manuals from the vendors where necessary.
In addition, a review will be performed to ensure that all ven-dor manuals in use are incorporated under a controlled system.
- 12.
Quality Assurance Through a recent reorganization, all personnel in the Opera-tional Quality Assurance Organization are in the process of being relocated to the site.
This change will result in increased involvement by Quality Assurance personnel in the functions of the Nuclear Department.
Greater emphasis will be placed on verification of Quality Assurance program implementation through increased observation and monitoring.
- 13.
Post-Maintenance Testing The station procedures that establish requirements to ensure safety related equipment is tested prior to its return to service after maintenance and/or surveillance activities are being reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure adequate emphasis on quality assurance, test/retest and interdepart-mental communication requirements.
3/8/83 D+11 ~*~-.
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