ML18087A571
| ML18087A571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1982 |
| From: | Liden E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.03, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8211100268 | |
| Download: ML18087A571 (3) | |
Text
PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department October 21, 1982 Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing
- u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014
Dear Mr. Varga:
TMI ACTION PLAN ITEM II.K.3.3 REPORTING RELIEF VALVE FAILURES AND CHALLENGES SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 The following information is provided in response to your letter dated April 19, 1982.
There have been no pressurizer safety valve failures or challenges for either Salem Unit 1 or Unit 2.
There have been, however, power operated relief valve failures on both of the Salem Units.
Salem No. 1 has had no failures of the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) that have led to or resulted from operational transients.
There have been failures associated with leakage through PORV's (lPRl and 1PR2) on June 16, 1981 and June 30, 1981 and one case on January 6, 1982, where 1PR2 could not be manually operated.
In all of the above cases the valves were isolated using the motor operated isolation valves.
Upon isolation, the valves were disassembled and inspected and steam cutting of the valve cages was determined to be the cause of the leakage.
In the case where the PORV could not be operated, binding was found to be the cause which prevented operation of the valve.
The binding was due to galling between the valve plug and the cage.
In all cases, the valve plug and cage assembly were replaced.
In each case of failure, after repairs were completed, the valves were tested, found satisfactory, and returned to service.
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ADOCK 05000272 PDR The Energy People 95-2169 (10M)
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 10/21/82 Salem Unit 2 has had both challenges and failures of the PORV's.
The PORV's on Unit 2 are comprised of 2 sets of valves.
The high pressure PORV's (2PR1 and 2PR2) and the shutdown or low pressure Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Valves (2PR47 and 2PR48).
There have been no cases where the high pressure PORV's have been challenged.
However, the low pressure POPS valves were challenged on May 15, 1981.
On this occasion during calibration of the controls for the pressurizer spray valves, the spray valves were fully closed and pressurizer pressure increased from 330 to 360 psig.
This occurrence initiated operation of the POPS and the RCS was restored to its normal pressure of 330 psig.
There have been numerous occasions of the POPS valves leaking-by.
As a result, these valves were isolated by closing the motor operated isolation valves (2PR6 and 2PR7) on October 3, 1981 and have been maintained shut since that time.
During the upcoming refueling outage all four valves (2PR1, 2PR2, 2PR47 and 2PR48) will be disassembled and the cause of the leakage repaired.
Concerning the reporting requirements referenced in your April 19, 1982 letter, neither the Unit 1 nor 2 Technical Specifications requires a prompt report for challenges to or failures of the pressurizer relief valves or challenges to the pressurizer safety valves.
However, 30 day reports are required as stated in section 6.9.1.9.
A failure of a pressurizer safety valve would be promptly reported under section 6.9.1.8.e.
Additionally, section 6.9.1.6 of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications requires inclusion in the monthly operating report, documentation of all challenges to the pressurizer PORV's and safety valves; Unit 1 Technical Specifications, section 6.9.1.6 will be modified to agree with the Unit 2 requirements.
Technical Specifications sections 3.4.10.3 for Unit 2 and 3.4.9.3 for Unit 1 require that, in the event the POPS operates to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a special
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10/21/82 report be prepared and submitted describing the circum-stances initiating the transient, the effects of the transient on the system and the corrective actions required to prevent recurrence.
Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us.
- w. J. Ross Very truly yours,
/fgu,~
7~A. Liden, Manager
/
Nuclear Licensing and Regulation
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NRC Licensing Project Manager L. Norrholm Senior Resident NRC Inspector