ML18087A490
| ML18087A490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1982 |
| From: | Liden E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NFG-82-018, NFG-82-18, NUDOCS 8209300202 | |
| Download: ML18087A490 (2) | |
Text
e PS~G NFG 82-018 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department Ref. 1)
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)
NS-TMA-2162, 11/15/79 NS-TMA-2167, 11/28/79 NS-EPR-2509, 10/6/81 NS-EPR-3545, 1/20/82 September 20, 1982 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 Attention:
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 1 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
APPLICATION OF THE DROPPED ROD EVALUATION PROCESS TO THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATION STATIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 & DPR-75 UNITS 1 AND 2 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 In 1979, Westinghouse identified to the Core Performance Branch (References 1 and 2) a concern with regard to certain assumptions employed in the dropped rod accident safety analysis applicable to some Westinghouse NSSS designs.
This concern was derived primarily from the potential for an unanalyzed power overshoot while in automatic control following selected dropped rod events which did not result in a reactor trip.
The concern was applicable to all Westinghouse plants which rely upon the Power Range Neutron Flux -
High Negative Rate Reactor Trip to mitigate the consequences of the dropped rod accident.
Operating plants were notified of an Unreviewed Safety Question under 10CFR50.55(e).
Westinghouse recommended and you subsequently required certain operational restrictions above 90% power (either manual rod control or restricted rod insertion limits when in automatic rod control) to address this concern on an interim basis and to provide further evaluation.
lfo~I It is our understanding that a meeting (Reference 3) was held between members of the Core Performance Branch Staff and Westing-house to discuss the Westinghouse Dropped Rod Evaluation Process.
The Energy People 8209300202 820920 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P
PDR 95-2169 (4M) 3-82
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- September 14, 1982 This process demonstrated that the DNB design basis can be met for this Condition II event.
We have been notified by Westing-house that this evaluation process results in conclusions allowing removal of the interim operating requirements on rod control and insertion upon final approval by your staff.
It is also our understanding that an agreement has been reached between Westinghouse and members of the Core Performance Branch staff that the removal of operating requirements would take place after the NRC review of the information committed and subsequently submitted by Westinghouse in Reference 4.
This letter serves as formal notification that the Dropped Rod Evaluation Process documented to you in Reference 4 has been applied on Salem 1 Cycle 5 and Salem 2 Cycle 2.
The results confirm that the DNB design basis is met for the Dropped Rod accident.
Based upon this method it can be concluded that the interim restrictions on rod control and insertion are no longer necessary.
However, since explicit NRC approval has not been received to date, we will operate under the interim restrictions until formally notified by your staff.
We formally request that your staff review the material submitted to you as Reference 4 and subsequently remove the interim opera-tional restrictions.
Very truly yours,
/.fla /J.. a-c.--
- ' ~
E~ A. Liden, Manager
/
_/Nuclear Licensing & Regulation cc:
Mr. Lief Norrholm Senior Resident Inspector Mr. William Ross Licensing Project Manager Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission