ML18082B380
| ML18082B380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2018 |
| From: | Office of New Reactors |
| To: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| kallan p/415-2809 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18082B374 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML18082B380 (5) | |
Text
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 134 AND 133 TO THE COMBINED LICENSE NOS. NPF-91 AND NPF-92 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MEAG POWER SPVM, LLC MEAG POWER SPVJ, LLC MEAG POWER SPVP, LLC CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS.52-025 AND 52-026
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 31, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18031B142), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,
(licensee) requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amend the combined licenses (COL) for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, COL Numbers NPF-91 and NPF-92, respectively. The requested amendment proposes to include changes to COL Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS) related to fuel management. Specifically, the requested amendment proposes improvements to the TS for Rod Position Indication, the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM), Power Range Neutron Flux, and Mechanical Shim Augmentation.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The NRC staff considered the following regulatory requirements in reviewing the licensees proposed LAR. 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.C.6 states that after issuance of a license, Changes to the plant-specific TS will be treated as license amendments under 10 CFR 50.90.
10 CFR 50.90 addresses the application for amendments of licenses, construction permits, and early site permits. As discussed above, a change to COL Appendix A is requested, and thus a LAR (as supplied herein) is required.
10 CFR 50.36, Technical specifications (TS) impose limits, operating conditions, and other requirements upon reactor facility operation for the public health and safety. The TS are derived from the analyses and evaluations in the safety analysis report. In general, TS must contain: (1) safety limits and limiting safety system settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13 - Instrumentation and Control, requires instrumentation to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 27 - Combined Reactivity Control Systems Capability, the reactivity control systems shall be designed to have a combined capability, in conjunction with poison addition by the emergency core cooling system, of reliably controlling reactivity changes to assure that under postulated accident conditions and with appropriate margin for stuck rods the capability to cool the core is maintained.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 28 - Reactivity Limits, the reactivity control systems shall be designed with appropriate limits on the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase to assure that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents can neither (1) result in damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary greater than limited local yielding nor (2) sufficiently disturb the core, its support structures or other reactor pressure vessel internals to impair significantly the capability to cool the core.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The proposed changes to COL Appendix A, TS are related to fuel management. Specifically, the requested amendment proposes changes to:
A. Revise TS 1.1, Definitions, and SR 3.1.4.3, Rod Group Alignment Limits, to extend applicability to both stationary and movable gripper coils.
B. Revise TS 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication, to clarify the actions to be taken in the event rod position indication is not OPERABLE. A note is proposed to be added to Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.7.1, Surveillance Requirements, stating the SR is not be required for rods determined to not meet Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.4. Additional consistency updates are proposed. A note is being added to SR 3.1.4.1 stating that the SR is not required to be performed for a rod associated with inoperable Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) or demand position indication.
C. Revise SR 3.2.4.1, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Verification, and TS 3.2.3 LCO Note 4 to refer to the power range channel by its full name Power Range Neutron Flux channel.
D. Revise TS 4.2.2, Design Features, Control Rod and Gray Rod Assemblies, to clarify that Gray Rod Cluster Assemblies (GRCAs) in conjunction with Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) are used to augment mechanical shim in both normal and load follow operations.
3.1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes In TS 1.1, definition of Reactor Trip System Response Time, and SR 3.1.4.3 the word stationary is removed from stationary gripper coil because these TS sections apply to both the stationary and the movable gripper coils since both types of coils will be engaged and holding the rod when the rod is not moving. The staff finds this change acceptable since it reflects the actual design and removes ambiguity.
The current language in TS 3.1.7 does not appropriately reflect that the DRPI functioning at half accuracy provides the necessary rod position information and is considered to be OPERABLE.
The proposed TS changes clarify the DRPI half accuracy condition is sufficient for the DRPI to be OPERABLE, consistent with the capability of the DRPI to provide the necessary rod position information. The staff finds this change acceptable since it provides clarity on DRPI capability and accurately reflects the requirements for DRPI to be OPERABLE.
The proposed revision to TS 3.1.7 Required Action (RA) A.1 and C.1 requires use of incore detectors to verify rod position when one or more DRPI(s) per group is (are) inoperable, using incore data and offline core calculation tools. The Online Power Distribution Monitoring System (OPDMS) relies on operator input or the DRPI to determine rod position, so an inoperable DRPI should not be verified by OPDMS. The staff finds this change acceptable since it corrects TS Required Actions; the remedial actions required of the operator to allow continued operation until DRPI operability is restored.
The addition of the notes to SR 3.1.7.1, reading, Not required to be met for DRPI associated with a rod that does not meet LCO 3.1.4, Rod Alignment Limits, and to SR 3.1.4.1, reading Not required to be performed for rods associated with inoperable DRPI or demand position indication, are consistent with SR 3.0.1 which states that surveillances do not have to be performed (nor met) on inoperable equipment. The staff finds these changes acceptable because the notes are added for clarity regarding the ability to satisfy surveillance requirements.
In TS 4.2.2, Design Features, it is clarified that that GRCAs in conjunction with RCCAs are used to augment mechanical shim in both normal and load follow operations. The proposed change aligns the modes of operation described in the TS to the modes of operation described in the approved WCAP as referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) discussions and WCAP-16943, Enhanced Gray Rod Cluster Assembly Rodlet Design. The staff finds this change acceptable because it accurately reflects GRCA and RCCA capabilities during normal and load follow operations.
The channel name power range channel is revised to Power Range Neutron Flux channel in TS 3.2.3, LCO Note 4, and in SR 3.2.4.1 note 1 for name clarification only, and the staff finds this editorial change acceptable. In addition, other acceptable editorial changes have been incorporated into this TS amendment for clarification purposes.
The proposed changes involve changes to the COLs, Appendix A, plant-specific TS. For the reasons described above, the staff finds that the revised TS continue to meet the requirements in 10 CFR 50.36 and are acceptable. It was also determined that the proposed changes clarify but do not affect conformance with GDC 13, 27 and 28 differently than described in the plant-specific DCD or UFSAR.
3.2 Evaluation Summary As discussed in the evaluation above, the staff finds the changes proposed by the licensee meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 and the GDC 13, 27 and 28 and, therefore, are acceptable. In addition, the proposed TS Bases changes are consistent with the TS changes.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations in 10 CFR 50.91(b) (4), the Georgia State official was consulted of the proposed issuance of the amendment on February 28, 2018. The State official had no comment.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (Federal Register, 83 FR 8509, dated February 27, 2018).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Under 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the technical evaluation presented in Section 3.0 above, the staff has concluded that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the staff finds the changes proposed in this LAR are acceptable.
7.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Request for License Amendment (LAR 18-005): Fuel Management Related Technical Specifications, January 31, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18031B142).
- 2. Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6 and Tier 1, Revision 5, March 12, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17172A218).
- 3. AP1000 Design Control Document, Revision 19, June 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A500).
- 4. Combined License NPF-91 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (ADAMS Accession No. ML14100A106).
- 5. Combined License NPF-92 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (ADAMS Accession No. ML14100A135).
- 6. WCAP-16943, Enhanced Gray Rod Cluster Assembly Rodlet Design, Advanced Topical Report Safety Evaluation, dated May 5, 2012.