Text

Transcript of 800416 Hearing in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-78. Afternoon Session
	ML18082A277
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/16/1980
From:	; NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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UNITED ST'ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:

CONSIDERATION OF OPERATING LICENSE FOR SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, i.1UNIT NO. 2 Place: Washington, D. c.

D at e :

April 16, *19ao.

Pages:

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I ---------------------------------- x I I In the Matter of:

I I CONSIDERATION OF OPERATING LICENSE I

I i FOR SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING I STATION, UNIT ~o. 2 I

I -----------------------------------X Commissioners' Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C.

Wednesday, April 16, 1980 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, for presentation of the above-entitled matter, at 2:00 p.m.,

John F.. Aliear.ne, Chairman of the.Commission, presiding.

BEFORE:

VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner RICHARD T... KENNEDY, Commissioner JOSEPH HENDRIE, Commissioner PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 1"'"""'4'MCNAI. V_n.. RSAM I oes. he.

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P R 0 C E E D I N G S I I I

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I 2:00 p.m. I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

-- director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations regarding the NRC staff review of Salem 2, and to hear from him on his proposal.

Harold.

MR. DENTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me introduce the peopleat the table with I

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me.

Mr. Leif Norrholm the resident inspector; Manny Lici tra,!

the project manager.

I think you know all the rest of us.

. We have completed a review of the Salem 2 license for fuel load and low power operating license, and based on our review, we find that it meets the commission's requirements, and we recommend the issuance of a low power license.

There are several matters -- legal matters

pending, though, with regard to petitions.

I would like for Ed Chris~enbury to bring those to your attention first before we turn to the substance of the review.

MR. CHRISTENBURY:

Harold, Jim will take it --

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l MR. DENTON:

Or -- or Jim.. Excuse* me, Jim Murray!

will cover that.

MR. MURRAY:

We have three 2.206* petitions pending right now.

I'll give you the status of them in a 1--nout. l/_n.. R-rua. l.C.

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moment after I briefly describe them.

First is a petition in August -- it was filed in August by Mr. and Mrs. Coleman.

There were ten con-I I

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I tentions such as need for power,.fire protection inadequate, I cost benefit analysis did not consider conversion to gas or coal, Class 9 accident contention and so forth.

Then, in October Mr. and Mrs. Coleman filed another petition concerning the short nose sturgeo.l_'l impact on an endangered species..

And finally, just the other day, on March 25, the mayor of Lower Allaway Creek filed a petition under 2206 not requesting any hearing but suggesting or requesting -- demanding that the unit 2 deci-cision on ~- should await the litigation in unit 1 on the exact same issues.

He also indicated that there qught to be an environmental impact statement for the storage of spent fuel.

All of these decisions are currently pending.

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i I I There are different stages in the process before.the director.!

For example, the ten-contention petition that I mentioned at the outset is practically completed.

Harold actually signed it yesterday and is -- has referred it briefly to some people to take another look at one aspect of it.

The other petition on the short nose sturgeon was -- will be brought to conclusion shortly as a result of

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a receipt of a letter yesterday from the National Marine Fisheries-people who said everything's alright with the short nose sturgeon.

The mayor's petition really turns on the outcome I

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I grant his petition.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Could you save this until --

I gather you don't intend to return to the fisheries issue?

MR. DENTON:

We -- we are prepared to discuss it.

Yes, we have a letter from them.

Would you like to to hear a summary of the issues CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Yes.

Well, I'm familiar with the issue.

I'm interested in a summary of their position.

MR. DENTON:

Let me ask who in the --

A VOICE:

Dan Muller.

MR. DENTON:

Dan Muller who's been following this with the fisheries administration to I

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You may jus-t want to read the critic~l sentence out of the fisheries letter.

End of the second paragraph.

MR. MULLER:

Would that be sufficient if I just read the --

MR. MURRAY:

This biological opinion states 1-TrCooA~v-n.. ~-*ua. 1~

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that the activities identified above, namely,.*the operation of the -- the plants are not likely to jeopardize the continued existance of short nose sturgeons in the Delaware 1 River; nor are they likely to destory or adversely affect habitat that may be critical to short nose sturgeon in the Delaware River.

I I CHAIR.~ AHEARNE:

Do they make any recommendation$

of things that MR. MULLER:

Well, then they -- well, then they go on to say that it's contingent upon completion of the monitoring *pr.:ogram.. required EPA and continued operation of maintenance of the fish creating a fish return systems that are either in use or proposed to be used by the intact structures.

But the NRC must reiterate consultation if new information becomes available indicating a real or adverse impact on short nose sturgeon from construction or opera-tion of the four units, or if modifications are made in the opertion of the units which are likely to affect the species.

But we feel that on receipt of this letter effectively disposes of the issues*, except for obvious follo~p.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Thank you.

MR. DENTON:

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9 10 11 t.S 16 T7 18 19 20 21 I raise an interesting -- some interesting questions.

I would 1

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i like to discuss that one just a bit more in detail with you.

There's an ongoing hearing with regard to reracking of unit 1.

We* had reviewed in. the course of reviewing unit 2, the use of the new racks which are the subject of the hearing in unit 1.

The petition asked that we not permit the reracking of the -- the new racks that go in unit 2.

You would think that there might be a way to consolidate that j unit 1 hearing so that it considers both 1 and 2, and i

I we can't find a satisfactory way to* do that.

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the decision would be binding on both pools.

But apparently COMM. KENNEDY:

Why not pray tell?

Your logic was impeccable MR. DENTON:

Well MR. CHRISTENBURY:

Basically, there as you understand,* two --

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i A VOICE:. It's two -- *a question of law and 1. i out 1ne.

MR. CHRISTENBURY:

No.

As you know,. there are 2:2 the simple :answers are two separate and distinct proceed-

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And the -- this is an amendment to

, their operating license.

So, it is a separate and distinct

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I I proceeding from the Salem 2 which we have going ahead now.

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Now, obviously, there -- because the pools are identicial, there are ~ certainly there are similarities.

But in terms of.the notice that --

MR. KENNEDY:

I would think so.

MR. CHRISTENBURGY:

-- was issued, the type

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I of hearing that was given the petitions to.intervene, it is al I I separate proceeding that cannot be consolidated with a uncontested administrative matter that is proceeding along on the Salem 2.

MR. KENNEDY:

But -- thank you.

You are right it was a matter of law and not logic.

MR. HENDSIE:

Well, Ed -- Ed, let me ask; in dealing with the petition 2206 on unit 2, is there any-thing that prevents Harold from dealing with that petition in a way that -- well, let's see what he might do.

He might writeICD.a.ck: *a:nd *say,::~*~r..1,,m going,-t.o defer rul:ing.;on your petition until I have the results from l."

Or

.CHAIRMAN.AHEARNE:

And I will accept the results from unit 1.

MR. HENDSIE:

Or I grant in part and deny in part.

The part I grant is that we'll implement on 2 what-ever the result is on 1.

MR. DENTON:

We've identified at least three

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i options.

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Yes.

MR. DENTON:

-- options.

And one is to deny the petition totally and grant the new racks in unit 2, but that appears arbitrary and capricious when you've got one hearing going on in that.

So that MR. BICKWIT:

But legal.

MR. HENDSIE:

Well, it can't be arbitrary and capricious and l~gal.

MR. BICKWIT:

If it.can't be than it's not arbitrary.

MR. HENDSIE:

It must not be arbitrary and capricious.*

MR. KENNEDY:

But until determined so it's legal.

MR. DENTON:

Secondly, "I could grant the new racks in 2 but with the proviso that any conditions found in the unit 1 proceeding would naturally apply to unit 2 just automoatically."

But that's where you get into the_,--

problem the parties might not be the same, and you can't assure that it's the same process.

MR. CHRISTENBORG:.

General counsel and I dis-cussed this beforehand.

This option which has a, certainly a great deal of appeal on its face of sayin~, "I'm granting lllf'l"IJtMT10U.L Va-&nllll Rw I DEL )NC,.

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the expansion, but I will in effect condition that granting" CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

The one that has the most appeal on its face is to say that "I won't grant the expansion at the moment."

MR. DENTON:

Correct.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: "That I will wait until the unit 1 is completely*, and whatever that ends up with is a conclusion that's what will happen here.

That's the one that has the great appeal on its face.

I MR. CHRISTENBURY:

Well, that is certainly one i I of the three options that is discussed.

l MR. DENTON:

And the third option i.s to grant the petition and deny the reracking and wait until -- and then renotice this reracking in 2 after the unit' 1 hearing is complete.

MR. KENNEDY:

Then you get to have a hearing on unit 2.

MR. DENTON:

Right.

MR. KENNEDY:

Your your --

CHAIRMAN.AHEARNE:

Why can't you just --

MR. KENNEDY:

Your way is great but it gets two hearings for the price of one.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

No, no.

Why do you need the second hearing?

Why can't you just --

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Because the parties have a right to --

MR. CHRISTENBURY:

The amendment to their licensee.

The licensee we are granting now would only permit them to build a spent fuel pool::.:.:*.: that is not reracked.

When we then later on --

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I I I I ' I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

.Can't you grant them a license : I to build a spent fuel pool with a racking to be determined by the outcome of the unit 1 hearing?

MR. CHRISTENBURY:

All right.

This is the issue that Mr. Bickwit and I discussed.

I think it has -- there are arguments certainly on both sides of it.

I don **t think the ~nswer is absolutely clearly.

There are. ques -.

tions that are raised as to whether in effect you are in fact consolidating two matters that are not permissably consolidated whether you are in effect -- or where you have been simply only noticed one proceeding, and you've only given opportunities for hearings with regard to one proceeding whether you are in fact proceeding to grant amendments as to -- as to 2.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Another case of the applica-tion of our ultimate weapon.

MR. DENTON:

Well, you can see why it was -- I have not been able to reach a decision yet.

I have not yet lllfTaloM~ v_,,.. RUUC>>Hllti. he.

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11 reached a decision among these alternatives.

MR. KENNEDY:

You have answered my question totally and left me-speechless.

MR. HENDRIS:

Let's see.

What's wrong --

MR. KENNEDY:

That's unusual.

MR. HENDRIS:

What's wrong with option 2 again?

MR. KENNEDY:

I'll let the MR. HENDRIS:

In terms of -- of the -- we have to keep our numbering straight here.

MR. DENTON:

From a logic standpoint, technical review say -- cite* that's what I would appeal -- appeal is -- appeals to me is to make the unit 2 do whatever the unit 1 board decides.

Well, apparently that deprives potential interveners in the unit 2 case of that -- of having participated in that unit 1 board's decision.

MR. KENNEDY:

Which is important if they are different from those who are in the unit 1 decision.

MR. HENDSIE:

That may be, you know, a matter of deep sorrow, but I point out that I was not able to participate in the hearings that went into the passage by the Congress of the Internal Revenue Act back in the beginning of the century, and I've been paying on the damn thing ever since I started to earn anything.

And I understand I don't have any right to.go back and say, "I l.,,.,....TrCN&L v...... TrM Ruwwwaues. J~

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12 want those hearings reopened*"

I don't see why if people who come at this late stage on unit 2 now have anymore right than the 2206, and if you deny it and simply say that it's denied, then you will take account of the unit 1 decision in due time and any further consideration on: the plant I don't see why tjley deserve any better than that..

MR. CHRISTENBURY:

I think with regard to the three options in discussion with Harold, it's certainly what we were going to solicit here today, which we have bountifuily received, are the thoughts of the -- the three~ And I think in light of this go back and score both legal options and practical approaches.

Well, I'm glad you recognize the distinction.

i' COMM. KENNEDY:

It would be.helpful.if we could sort. of merge them.

MR. DENTON:

We'll pursue that.

Let' us move i

on now to more complex matters.

I COMM. KENNEDY:

Something we can really get out I

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I COMM. HENDSIE:

The application of our regulation~

is*actually the most complex matters, at least, that I find it to be.

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MR. DENTON:

Denny Ross will make the presentation.*

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on the other parts of the Salem review.

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MR. ROSS:

That's a tough act to follow, but let's have slide 1, please *.

The unit at Salem 2 is a four-loop Westinghouse plant. It's at Salem County, New Jersey on a 7

A VOICE:

Same as a

MR. ROSS:

Sir?

9 A VOICE:

The same as Salem l?

10 1 l MR. ROSS:

The power level differs by about 20 megawatts in the area of the steam cycle.

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

But other than that the same?

1.S MR. ROSS:

Right.

Tc And it's on the east bank of the Delaware River.

Ti The nearest substantial city is Wilmington, about 18 miles 18 away9 Roughly a 100,000 people.

And it's 30 miles 19 Southwest of Philadelphia.

20 It has a large dry containment, two and a half 21 million cubic feet.

We're_ going to emphasize a half a dozen near I

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OL items, and then two or three of non-TM! issues.

Ones that have attracked the most -- over the last few months.

Okay.

Let's go to the next slide.

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How far is it from our -- how I

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Dover?

I i I MR. ROSS:

If you look. in -- we have a basic SER.

It's this orange book.

NO REG 0517, and I think --

MR. DENTON:

The plant is --

MR. Ross*: -- it'll give us --

MR. DENTON:

The plant is well within, I know, the 500 people per square mile criteria.

I be1ieve it's on the order of a couple hundred people.

MR. ROSS:

The nearest residence is three miles away.

So it's -- well, we'll look up the population of Dover and the distance&

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

My question.is on the assump-tion that that's about --

MR. ROSS:

In scale it looks like about 25 i I miles.

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-- 25 miles.

MR. ROSS:

25 miles is what it looks like.

If it's in our SER wetll find it.

Leif, do you know how far MR. NORRHOLM:

I don't know --

MR. ROSS:

Here's the map in front of you on 2..£ the screen. It's an approximate map showing ".the loca-

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Several portions of the near term OL relate to I I management and technical conference matters.

We sent an i

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I interoffice team to the site on the early March -- March 5th and 7th.

And in our SER, Part 2, this is Roman Numeral Paragraph Bl.-

We reviewed shift manning,.organization and management criteria, safety engineering group, licensee dissemination of operating experience, and applicant NRC communications.

All of these are in TOL, or near tex:rn operating license items.

We also discussed there the resident inspectors, which i.is a NTOL item also.* And as Harold said, the: senior resident is here at the table..

The i terns I j us. t mentioned we concluded the NTOL list has been met.

I would like Larry Crocker of the NRR staff to discuss a few aspects.

So, Larry, if you would come up to the table.

MR. CROCKER:

If we can have the next slide, please.

We did review the organization"management with PSE&G, and basically what we were looking for was to make sure that they did have an integrated organizational arrangement with clear management control and separate lines of authority and communication.

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16 Our findings are as shown on the slide.

They do, in fact, have what we consider to be an integrated organizational arrangement under their senior vice presi-I

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the operational control of the plant under him, but also the engineering support organization.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

How many plants does he have?

MR. CROCKER:

The Salem plants are there.

They also have CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Hope Creek.

MR. CROCKER:

-- Hope Creek.

And there are some foss11 plants also reporting under this same chain.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Is there a senior person whose responsibilities are nuclear?

MR. CROCKER:

Mr. Eckert, who is the senior vice president~.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Well, no, he has the nuclear fossil.

MR. CROCKER:

He has that, and underneath CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I 1m wondering the next level below is there a nuclear MR. CROCKER:

Underneath him in the plant management chain there's Mr. Snyder, vice president for production, who -- reporting to him is

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

But he would also have I nuclear fossils?

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MR. CROCKER:

He also has bo_th.

And then Mr. Librisee who also ha*s _ both.

And you finally get down to the manager of the Salem station.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

So, therels n9body between, the individual plant managers -- there is no one above them who is, say, responsible for nuclear side?

MR. CROCKER:

Not for just nuclear, no, sir.

Now, this did bother us a bit..

We mentioned it in the SER.

There's a* chance there for dilution of management attention we felt.

However, we talked to the corporate officials during our visit.

We found that they do in fact have a very heavy emphasis of the nuclear side.

And it appears that the fossil plants sort of pretty much run themselves.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Would you expect them in talking to you to --

MR. CROCKER:

I would expect them to empn~size that when we're talking about it, yes.

But we did in fact feel this was the case.

They have, for example, meetings on virtually a daily basis to bring any problems of the plant up to the corporate management attention to make sure they're aware of the problems and know what's 1-'nCIOoW. Vll:lllU'MM Rooooa. I~

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going on and what are the solutions here that are proposed.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Harold, are you in general trjring to encourage utilities to, particularly if they have several plants, to establish some senior person to MR. DENTON:

Yes.

Yes, we are.

And you may recall the last application review they had just -- just moved in that direction.. I -- I like the idea of having at least one person who is only nuclear, and who is high up in the management chain. It's hard to fault an organiza-tion if they have both and they have nuclear experience.

I guess the kind I don't like is where all the people above t~e plant manager are fossel -- have fossil experience and no nuclear.

But* I'm definitely trying to encourage bringing nuclear all the way up to the vice* president level with both engineering and generation *.

MR. CROCKER:

We have part of this a draft criteria, I believe, you have seen before that we are working on.

And this is emphasized in there as well that we are looking for ultimately an organization that is primarily a nuclear coming down the line.

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that in fact the emphasis that PSE&G corporate management is putting on the nuclear end of the business is sufficient to give* us a reasonably warm feeling that they are aware of 1-TICNA&. V-mo Rooc;oa. hoc:.

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what's going on and will maintain control over it.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Well, senior officers also have experience in the line. It's not as though they were --

MR. CROCKER:

This is true.

I mentioned --

COMM. KENNEDY: *--a fossil plant managers.*

His past experience -- Eckert is --

MR. CROCKER:

I mention Mr. Eckert as he has more than 20 years experience in the nuclear business.

And he's very much aware of the problems that are down there; what is lurking in the woodwork; and he's interested in it.

And we will --

MR. DENTON:

As we've mentioned before, the real "proof will *be in the pudding" how they perform.

And it's in the operation of unit 1, and we'll be following the operation of unit 2 just routinely.

Perhaps the residenu would like to comment on his views of the manage-ment for unit 1 operations.

MRa NORRHOLM: Well, I've prepared some material on unit l's history.

I MR. DENTON:

Would you -- if you can put one of those mikes on.

MR. NORRHOLM:

Oh, sorry.

I have prepared some material on' the unit 1 operating history, which might be usual to look at.

I do

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20 agree, though,. that the organization appears to be able to handle *it.

There** is a great emphasis on the nuclear side of the generation in the company.

It is balanced toward the nuclear as opposed to the fossil.

Would you care to look at that history now, or do you want to MR. DENTON:

No.

Let's. hold off a minute.*

MR. NORRHOLM: Okay.

MR. CROCKER:

Well, we did find*what we felt were very *effective lines of communication from management down through* the plant and to the technical support ele-ments, and among.the operational and support elements.

I mentioned these virtual daily management meetings at the corporate level where they they get the reports from the plants so that the corporate officers are involved and know what's going on, and we felt the personnel involved in the management chain are very, very well quali-fied.

And on the basis of all of this, our conclusion was that the corporate management is sufficiently qualified and involved to assure a continual understanding of plant conditions and safety considerations.

I think it's the next slide, please.

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24 21 We also looked into the matter of the onsite safety engineering group.

Our graph criteria are calling for an independent group of four or. five people* to be located onsite and to provide in effect an overview of the safety-related activities.

The report somewhere in the off site structure to make sure that we do have a thorough safety review of the plant.

What the applicant,.. or the licensee initially proposed was to beef up his plant operating review committee with a permanent staff.

Our initial reaction to this was it would probably.accomplish the purpose we were looking for, however, after reconsideration we decided that it wasn't quite that.

And the licensee has now committed to a team of five engineers that will be located onsite to form an independent review function.

These people will have expertise in nuclear engineering, heat transfer, mechanical engineering, and instrumentation and control. It will report off site. It ought to be in place by fuel load.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

When will they report?

MR. CROCKER:

I am not sure right now where they're ~-they'll be at the corporate level, but I do not know to whom.

Will any COMM. GILINSKY:

Will they be assigned full time

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2S to this group, or this is a part-time activity?

MR. CROCKER:

It's a full time assignment.

MR. LICITRA:

As to regard to the question as who they report to, I've been informed that they'll be reporting to Mr. Herb Heller who is manager of the nuclear operations at the corporate office.

COMM. KENNEDY:

There is a manager of nuclear operations.in the corporate office?

MR. CROCKER:

Yes, sir.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Where is he in that chain that you spoke of?

MR. CROCKER:

He is not in the chain.

He sits off to the side of the actual chain.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Sorry I asked.

MR. CROCKER:

He does have the responsibilies for the plants, but he is not in the actual command chain of the plant up to the senior vice president.

COMM.. KENNEDY:

Interesting title.

He is a manager of nuclear operations, whatever they are, within the confines of his office room.

Okay.

Thank you.

MR. CROCKER:

Can we have the next-* slide, please.

The.other thing we looked at was the matter of shift manning.

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Now, wait.

MR. CROCKER:

Yes.

Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE~. Wha~. -- this manager of nuclear operations, his function -- this group is now reporting to him.

What -- Harold, when the process of establishing this group was placed in as a requirement, what was the concept that you had of having it report off site?

MR. DENTON:

It would be a diverse channel of communications..

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

To whom?

1

MR. DENTON:

I-- it *would go. I thought. to the I technical side -- technical arm of the company--the I engineering department as opposed to the power generation department.

So, it should be :the group is responsible for understanding the safety of the process as opposed for understanding the production of kilowatts.

And 19 the companies are organized so differently that I -- I'm 20 not sure where*'.ihis -~

21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

This sounds like that.

MR. DENTON:

-- this person goes.

MR. CROCKER:

Harold, this is not MR. DENTON:

Well, it ought -- let me go on.

25 It should be someone who is sufficiently high in the chain 1-TTOIAI. "_.,,.. ;:u,oi,; ua. lic.

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i 24 of command to be able.to influence decisions that he thinks are important to safety.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

But it also, I think; from l your context is it -- it should go into a senior person I i in the engineering side.

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Yes.

And it should reflect the l engineering understanding and long-term committment to safety improvement.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Okay.. Now'. is that --

MR. CROCKER:

That is not the case here.

Mr. Heller is on *the production side of the house, not the engineering side.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I guess it would be -- and if we put in this kind of a requirement to set this up, and we have that kind of philosophy I think --

MR. DENTON:

Let me reassess where these people report to.

I had assumed that they reported to the same kind of groups as we had in past reviews.

MR. ROSS:

One difficulty that's shown up in this area is that we -- in fact, the NTOL list recognizes that we have an ad hoc interoffice team do this.

And we're building the rules and the criteria as we went case by case.

And in fact, even Sequoyah has only a committment, I

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and we too, of course, to dependency of the low power testing.

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Yes.

I understand that, Denny.

But I think Harold has described the -- the function, at least, it certainly -- that tracks with what rremember the description of what this group and its functional role is.

MR. ROSS:

Right.

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

And its utility then has.

. I to be it reports in at the right place.

And it just doesn't I sound like it's reporting into the place that matches it.

MR. DENTON:

Let me commit to review that-.-who they report to--and if necessary will have a report to someone else if it's in order to satisfy -- I think if it doesn't report to the right place, it doesn't satisfy our.objectives.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Tnat's it.

I mean, then it just becomes another regulatory requirement but not having a real useful purpose.

MR. CROCKER:

Well, the next item we looked at then was the shift manning.

When unit 2 does get into full operation, it will have -- the combination of the two units will have two senior reactor operators, both of whom would have to be dually licensed.

There will be I-~

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four reactor operators--two for each control room--fotir auxiliary operators--two for each of the units--and a health physics technician.comprise the shift compliment for the two units.

At this point in time they do have. some problems with total number of licensed operators.

Right now there are only eight senior reactor operators licensed for both units, four control operators licensed for both units.

I i I As a result of this, for the modes 5 and 6 i operation for unit 2, which is the full shutdown and the early fuel load, we have agreed with ~- with the licensee we.would let them operate with one senior*reactor operator I

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plus two reactor *operators on unit 1; backed up, of course,

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Didn't we just recently finish putting out s9me words on our shifts and all that stuff?

Some guidance MR. ROSS:

It's on an IE circular and it's also will be part of the overtime -- overtime.re!'striction would be part of the license.

MR. CROCKER:

Would be in the license.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Well, but now you have the --

SRO's are working a 12-hour shift.

MR. CROCKER:

Well, fuel loading will last a l_,,our.. v_,,,. Rm11AS. INC.

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couple of weeks.

Leif, how long do you think --

MR. LICITSA:

But that's for operating.

MR. CROCKER:

Well, no, no.

MR. LICITSA:

Right there. It says unit 1 operating.

lSRO asterisk.

SRO works 12-hour shifts.

MR. CROCKER:

We have -- so far as I know, AD0-2 has no prohibition against a 12-hour shift.

MR. NORRHOLM:

That's correct.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a maximum.

MR. CROCKER:

You can go up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

MR. NORRHOLM:

And it also establishes --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Am I misreading this?

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is the normal operating MR. CROCKER; For --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

for unit 1 on this --

MR. CROCKER:

For this early period of time, yes.

They intend to go to a 12-hour shift.

MR. DENTON:

We intend to impose the same requirements on overtime in the unit 2 license that we have in the previous licenses.

And then the I&E and -- and some other bulletin, I guess, controls unit 1

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Are you saying that this standard practice that we are -- that we think is appropriat~

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MR. DENTON:

No, sir.

I think they're on demand.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

It does look that way.

MR. DENTON:

They will be bringing some addi-tional candidates.for examination in early May.

And depending on how many of those pass, if all of them pass, I think they'd be up to a normal compliment.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Wait a minute, Harold.

You say you think they're on demand.

MR. DENTON:

On demand for operation of power.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

But Salem 1 will be at power; won't they?

MR. CROCKER:

Salem 1 there's no problem with that, sir.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Wait a minute_

Excuse me.

MR. DENTON:. Let's go back to what we wanted.

We wanted one senior reactor operator, you remember, in every --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I know.

But not one senior reactor operator.no matter how tired he is.

MR. DENTON:

NO.

That's true.

I -- when I looked at this, it'~ my assumption I I I

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that while some SRO's will work 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , they will all fall!

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I 29 within our overtime restrictions, but they won't exceed the total.

So they can't do this very often.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Is*this -- my reading of it was that the standard is going to be with unit 1 operatin is the SRO's will work 12-hour shifts.

COMM. HENDSIE:

It can't be.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Well, fine if it can't be.

But that's what I thought it COMM. HENDSIE:

Not as. a long-term proposition.

We've established -- we've looked at overtime CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:* Joe, I understand that.

I'm asking, though, is --

COMM. HENDSIE:

What he keeps saying is this is until they get some more people licensed which is a month away or so.

MR. DENTON:

And they've got to meet the over-So, this is the minimum.

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time working requirements period.

Whereas they -- they may not have to do this but every I I I

third shift or something in order to keep it going.

I COMM. HENDSIE:

You know, you can't very well set an overtime limit standard which a* company may need

J to utilize for limited periods of time.

And that's the ii reason you've established it.

And then if somebody comes in and say, "I'm going to conform to that;" you ht"l'"*-nou.&..._,_,,.. Rl>OR I UEL boc.

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Just as soon as --

COMM. HENDSIE:

So the 12~hour shift is not an i ; expected nonnal operating mode for the personnel of the I

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PSE&G; right?

MR. CROCKER:

That is correct.

they --

COMM. HENDSIE:

How's that?

And as soon as I

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-- can get other operators licensed, 1

i they will be on a five-shift operation like the rest of

I the industry.

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The next speaker, by the way, is going to give the date and the time that these exams will be given.

And his guess is -- as to the outcome on the numbers that might pass based on his knowledge of them.

I think in direct answer to your question, if they were going to work to the limit of our overtime restriction for a long period of time, then I think we'd all b_e upset.

I would be.

MR. DENTON:

Now ~-

MR. ROSS:

But they're not proposing that, so MR. DENTON:

I think it's a fact that we've now required *NSRO in each control room at all times, and

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while these two are. continuous, they are -- there is a barrier -- I guess a glass barrier between them so we don't treat them as the same control room as we have in some instances.

MR. ROSS:

And so compared with North Anna they need. one -- one extra licensed RO per shift.

And then the people at -- they should be examined next month on both units will help both units.

But the diversion of the unit 1, unit 2 people, the unit 2 the minute they start loading fuel is what gives the temporary overtime problem to unit 1.

. MR. HANRAHAN:

Some of it arose from not enough people passing the exam.

MR. CROCKER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I was going to get to that.

MR. ROSS:

I think it's a combination of things.

And I thing you ought to hear from Paul Collins when itis turn as* to why they' re in this shape.

There are several factors involved, not just qualifications.

MR. DENTON:

Well, this is one that we have discussed--this issue--with the management of the company.

And we had concerns that they were just understaffed and -

in general for a two-plant operation.

We brought up with them questions of health physics coverage, auxiliary l~*nCM&a. v-n111 Rl><IN* ~

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33 operators.. This happens to be the main one from a licensing standpoint.

COMM *. GILINSKY:

What would be regarded* as a reasonable compliment for this low-power testing phase?

MR. Ross:

The total licensed people?

" COMM. GILINSKY:

Yes.

MR. ROSS:

Well, they're sharing the -- in essence, the SRO.

16? Let's see.

A VOICE:

Three shifts?

MR. ROSS:

About four shifts for -- if they're under low power testing.

We have to break it in two pieces.

Do you want -- you want two RO's per shift because you need to count the SER -- avoid counting the SERO twice.

And they should be carrying, I'd. say, five shifts. It would be ten RO's.

The problems is like other plants if they have a preponderance of SRO's they may be using some of them as operators rather than SRO's.

So, I'd say about 15 people; wouldn't you think?

COMM. GILINSKY:

Per plant?

Per --

MR. ROSS:

Per -- right.

MR. DENTON:

Well, if you go the NRC policy and say there.are six people to run both units per shift, and five,* you get thirty people total to -- would be the

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full staffing with an RO*anc;i two RO's in each control room.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

How many do they have?*

Your SER.

This has unit 2 numbers.

MR. ROSS::-;

Before we enter the low power test program, they're going to have more than is on this sheet.

So, as on North Anna the problem is getting the unit 1, unit 2 interchangeable operators because of the flexibility of -- is very limited when the guy can only run unit 1.

MR. DENTON:

So we will permit this situation to exist only --

MR. ROSS:

That's correct.

MR. DENTON:

Whe~e it --

MR. ROSS:

Which is --

MR. DENTON:

And during that time you don't have to -- you don't have the same demands on the control room.

It's more having the SRO out in the loading area.

MR. ROSS:

The bottom entry on this slide, by the way, does point out that each of the licensed people has prior PWR experience. It varies.

But everyone of them has had some experience.

COMM. *KENNEDY:

I want to go back to something you said.

You said this will apply -- this situation will apply only to mode 5.

I guess I misunderstood then what the footnote 2 stars is.

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Well, it applies to 5 and 6.

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Five is more flexible than six.

I It's decending over.

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Okay..

Okay.

Before we -- this is I

f I one of the management technical areas that was in part 1 l

' of the NTOL list concerned the presence of an NRC inspector 1

1 resident.

He is here and I want him to discuss several I matters, including the status of the plant, unit 2 ~ and I

l also what's happening at unit 1 over the last several years. j I So -~

1 Ii MR. DENTON*

I wonder if we couldn't go ahead I i I with operators.

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Ross~=-, Okay.

But, LeEf is going to comment also on the licensed.operators' status.

MR. DENTON:

Oh. Okay.

Fine.

MR. ROSS:.

So, while he's getting started, we'll get Paul Collins up here and MR. DENTON:

Sure.

MR. RO.SS:...

Do you want your slide?

Tom, go to 6A.

Back MR. NORRHOLM:

Relative to unit 2, from the a construction and testing standpoint it is virtually ready for fuel load.

What I have on the slide up here is 1--noo.u. V-n.. R-*DEL he.

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a brief of the operating history of unit 1.

The license was issued on August -- in August 1976.

It went critical in December and finished the startup test program in June.

It went commercial.

They did experience several extended outages--two of them dealing with turbine modifications and failure of plating in the low pressure turbine.

The resident inspector was assigned in July of 1978.

COMM. HENDSIE:

I'm glad to see none of that's happened since we got a.resident onsite.

Good work out there on that, Herb.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: *Was that resident you?

MR. NORRHOLM:

Yes, it was.

Another outage of about a month in duration due to a reactor cool ~ump seal failure and several attempts to repair it in 1978.

I put that safety injection in there just to indicate that's the last one they've had.

But they've had eleven inadvertent safety interjections on unit 1.

Their record run to date was 62 days.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Harold, how does that stand on -- on the average for a plant over this *period of time MR. DENTON:

I don't recall.

I haven't looked SC&1TM ~

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COMM. GILINSKY:

I wonder if you would have any general comments about the responsiveness of the licensee to Commission instructions and regulations and general attentiveness to keeping things shipshape.

MR. MONNHOLM:

I would have to say that the licensee is attentive and cooperative.If we ask them to provide us information or look into a particular technical area, they will give it their best shot.

They are some':':

times a bit tardy in getting finished, but they do a good job *when they're done.

MR. DENTON:

Paul?

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Yes.

I Going down the qualifications 1

of these people as applied to the 79~330(e) we find that they are in about the same shape as the North Anna people primarily.because they have been operating the Unit 1.

Previous experience forthe senior operators; all of the people who pass the examination meet the requirements.

They've all received shift training.

All the instructors used have or have held the senior licenses.

They've gone to the Indian Point simulator and performed specific exercises relating to Three Mile Island and Natural Circulation and items of those natures.

CHAiruitAN AHEARNE:

How close a match is Indian 1-TICIMAI. V-'"111 RWIDIS. INC.

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~..R. COLLINS :

They are four loop pl.ants, but that's about it.

The control rooms are entirely different; completely different which I'll get to the simulator examinations.

The increased scope of the examinations; the questions on thermo-dynamics and heat transfer were in there, bu't they *weren't in a separate categ0ry.

These -exams, written exams, were given prior to the implementation of 330{e).

Simulator examinations for the same reasons we didn't examine the North Anna people apply here.

We just don't have a control room that comes close enough for us to feel that we could give a meaningful examination on.

I might add that the public service has ordered or is in the process of contracting for a Salem simulator as well as a Hope Creek simulator so this problem with disappear in a couple of years when that is constructed and in operation.

The passing grade for the examination was in-creased to 70 percent in each category; and 80 percent overall.

And we have permission to inform management of the results so that the operators can be put into the requalification program.

CHAIP~1AN AHEARNE:

Let me go back one, if I could.

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On the simulator, you say that they are going to or probably will order a simulator.

Is that -- do we make that a requirement, or is* that something that they commit to it?

MR. COLLINS:

That's not a requirement.

The industry is well aware of the position on the use of simulators for training.

They know that we are going to examine eventually examine everybody on simulators.

Because of the amount of time that the simulators are going to be in use,: many utilities I think there are about.18 orders out already -- 'have decided that it's better to buy their own simulator than to use the others.

Next slide.

This is the balance of the items on : SEC'! 330 (e} tha.t really are not applicable to SECY 79-330(e}.

However, all of the senior operators did hold a license on Unit 1, and they meet the requirements -- those that were licensed.

They had been training people on using a simulator.--the hot applicants.

We have a class of Unit l examination scheduled as of 5/19.

All of those people have gone to the simulator.

We do plan to audit their training programs.

They do plan to retrain on simulators.

We do pian *to administer the requalif ication 1-'nCllUI. V-n... Ruouua. he.

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examinations, and the last two are totally out of the utilities' hands

CHAI~...AN AHEARNE:

Bob, you could talk a little bit about what is the -- you just finished talking about the fact that there were a number of opera:tors who hadn'.t quite yet gotten qualified for this Number 2.

Wha*t is the schedule now that you have for --

MR. COLLINS:

Our schedule calls for giving four* re-examinations for the people who fail the exam on Unit, two operator and two senior operator examinations.

At the same time; this is all the week of February 19 --

excuse me *.

May 19.

Eight RO exams on Unit 1 and t~

senior exams on Unit 1.

We do have additional Unit 1 and 2 examinations scheduled some time in June.

The size -- I'm not aware of the size of the class.

MR. ROSS:

The resident did tell us that there may be one of the licensed people leaving the company soon, and even if all four of these people get their licenses in May, it could be marginal until the June class becomes available.

So we'll just have to watch that.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Could you talk a little bit about the examination you had? It mentioned that in llfTUIMATIClllAL V_n.. Ruomua le.

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your document::that two SRO' s and four operators failed the Salem Unit 2 examination.

MR. COLLINS:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Unit 2 and Unit 1 are --

MR. COLLINS:

Identical machines, yes.

The CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Now, you go on in this --

or someone goes oh *in this footnote to mention that the SRO's who failed the Unit 2 examination will not perform licensed duties at Unit 1 until they complete the accelerated training and have been re-examined, et cetera.

t MR. COLLINS:

Correct.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

But the conclusion that I would reach is that the.operators who £ailed will be allowed to continue.

MR. COLLINS:

No, I'm sorry.

That was just an oversight on our part.

Anybody who fails our exam on the second unit will not perform licensed duties on the first --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Okay.

So the net.result of taking the exam was to have six operators removed from that pool?

MR. COLLINS:

Yes, yes.

And unfortunately one who passed left the company.

We lost out there, too.

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GILINSKY:

How many passed the previous l"""'°"TlelooMu. v-n... lbro41oa. he.

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MR. COLLINS:

Eight.

Eight seniors and four operators.

COMM. GILINSKY:

Well, where will this May re-examination leave them?

They can't on everyone of them passing?

MR. COLLINS:

I can't speculate on whether all of them will pass or not.

No.

I couldn't I have had very little input into the ship staffing. It's not really my responsibility to go into the overall --

MR. ROSS:

I think he '*s looking for a body

.count.

COMM.

.GILINSKY:

But even if they had --

MR. COLLINS:

Oh, body count.

MR. ROSS:

Just a body count.

MR. COLLINS:

Then if everybody who takes the examination passe~, they'll end up with ten senior operators with licenses good for both units; six operators with licenses good for both units; 22 units senior operators and 19 unit one operators.

COMM. GILINSKY:

So were there 16 for the two?

MR. COLLINS:

Yes.

MR. DENTON:

That sounds like the --

MR. ROSS:

They used everyone of the ones tnat INTVll'U'l'lCMA&. 'I-Tl* RZJ<M1 U4S. ltoC.

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45 PAGE i'fC). ----

were --

MR. DENTON:

That sounds like that would be the minimum requirements for five shifts.

And they would have an adequate number for one.

MR. ROSS:

Paul pointed out that some of the Unit One people are Unit Two trained.*

So while it may look like a very :large number, they are not all on shift CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Yeah.

But the point is that at that point, you would have 16 qualified on Two and you would.have 41 qualified on One's.

But the ~arge.number of 41 isn't transferrable until* they go through that--

MR. COLLINS:

Pass the exam, yes.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Now, it's not -- it's just an aside question.

It appears that you had nine people who

-- nine reacto*r operators who attempted to pass from Unit One who attempted to pass the examination.

Five out of nine.failed.

MR. COLLINS:

Four failed.

One resigned.

One who has passed resigned.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

No, it says nine operator applicants; four passed.

Well, irrelevant.

Whether the one passed -- passed and left.

Four or five out of nine passed which mean that four or five out of nine failed.

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46 MR. COLLINS:

Four out of the nine failed.

The other man really -- he passed but he left the company.

I guess we should have said that they had four people licensed on Unit Two.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Would that lead one to con-elude that if you tested the remaing batch of Number One operators, you shou*1d expect about 50 percent of them to fail; and if so, is that cause for concern?

MR. COLLINS:

Under the new criteria, yes.

We are suffering a much larger denial rate if you look at the people here.

Two of the 9perators that failed under the new criteria would have passed under the old criteria.

MR. ROS.S:

I believe we said numbers like :that last fall.

Remember when we were talking about the operators, that that's the kind of numbers you would expect.

MR. DENTON:

It's not axiomatic that it would turn out that way.

If the company had a good training program so that -- if they had really focused on these*

areas, it wouldn't stay at the same low rate.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

You'll be watching carefully this requalification exam and such?

MR. COLLINS:

Yes.

MR. ROSS:

Next slide, please.

I want to discuss llCTVll'&A~._._.,,,. Rvou ua. IMC.

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briefly the.shift technical advisors.

This is requirement l(a)l.1. It's located in part -- discussed in more detail in Part 2.

1980 is the year of interim shift technical advisors, and by January '81, operated plants are supposed to have permanent.

They have committed to an adequate shift technical advisor program *. Jerry Holman of the Operator*;" Licensing Branch was on a special task force looking at, among other things, this items, and Jerry will proceed on this.

MR. HOLMAN:

Okay.

What they did -- we had we had two different dates, as you know.

It was the January 1 '80 date to put on a shift.technical advisor, but not necessarily have them fully trained.

And then the January 1 '81 date for the fully trained advisor.

Public Service has taken graduate engineers and broken them up into two groups.

There's an interim group that is in-service right now.

They will and they started in March.

They'll* be in-service till the end of this year.

They received a four-week training program to bring them to speed.

However, their backgrounds in plant operation are a minimum of a year of experience.

Now, the permanent -- designated permanent STA's serve on-site from January to March at which time 1-T'IOW. v-..".. R1Joor11ue.. he.

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48 the interim people took over.

The permanent designees are now in a 35-week training program conducted under the auspices of Westinghouse.

They will conclude that-.prior to the end of the year, and of January 1, 1981, we will have the fully trained, permanent shift technical advisors all being graduate engineers.

MR. ROSS:

Okay.

Thank you, Jerry.

Next slides, please.

Emergency Planning this is the last of our -~ pardon'me -- next to last of our TMI items.

The s~eaker in detail will be Jack Rowe of NRR.

The bottom line is we found that the plans up -- operatibon up to five percent were acceptable.

A little bit of discussion, I think, would be useful from Jack.

MR. ROWE:

We reviewed the emergency planning for the Salem site.

And we have used as a guideline the following three things that have been agreed to jointly by the Commission and by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

That would be that they have to meet current criteria of Appendix C, Part 15.

They have to meet the regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide l.101, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Reactors.

And then they also have to enjoy concurrence based on the guide for concurrence: the NUREG 75-111 and INT'1191*TIOIAL. YIRUT1M ROCAID& INC.

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I i i the Supplement Number 1.

Next slide, please.

We found, based on our review of the on-site plans that they meet the requirements of Appendix C.

They also meet the regulatory positions, statements of Reg Guide 1.101.

In respect to the off-site plans, they have re-viewed by the Federal Interagency Regional Advi~ory Committee, frequently known as the RAC.

And in September of '77, the New Jersey plan received concurrence, and in June of '77, the Delaware plan received concurrence.

Based on a letter from the Federal Emergency Management Agency on March 12, the concurrence of these plans is a significant basi~ to grant the low pqwer license for this facility.

In a l.etter to the applicant dated March 28, we have brought to his attention where his proposed plan does not meet the interim criteria, NUREG 0654 that was published in January.

He has yet to respond to that particular letter.-

Those highlight those things which must be done for full-power license.

We have also highlighted requirements that must be addressed for full-power l.icensing in the Safety Evaluation Report.

MR. ROSS:

Next slide.

We reviewed the Salem 2 Control Room, and in general, we found this control room 1-TIOUI. "-'"

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up to low-power testing, through the low-power testing.

I A few items need correction before going above five percent.,

But this is a much better --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Two's control re.om was the

.same *as one.

MR. ROSS:

I believe so; that's correct.

MR.* DENTON:

I don't think you said positively.

MR. ROSS:

Well, I was interrupted.

I was going to say that our consultants had been to* about ten control

.rooms, and *this, by far was the shiniest light we had seen from them.

The deficiencies -- this is Mr. Dino Scaletti from the Sta£f -- are relatively minor.

And so the team came back relatively happy for a change with a control room.

MR.. DENTON:

I think this is a case where the fact of licensee mock-up a control room prior to con-struction, engaged human-factor personnel in laying out the control room originally even though it was done some number of years ago, has paid off in a control room that today is fairly up to standards as compared to some that we've seen in the past.

Is that a fair summary, Dino'?

MR. SCALLETI:

That is correct.

A great deal of work went into development of the control room and the layout of the panels.

In response to a request from 1...,_.. noui.,,_TIM R-tUEL I..::.

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COMM. KENNEDY:

Excuse me.

Are these two control rooms identical?

MR. SCALLETI:

They are the same.

Yeah.

They are virtually identical.

Correct.

Personnel from Public Service did their own control room review on it.

The report was submitted to the Staff on or about March 6 of this year.

In general the report was comprehensive.

It identified many of the items, the deficienc.ies that the Staff identified during their control room review.

NRC and the Essex Corporation conducted our audit, review audit, on March 19 through 25.

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bers of the NRC staff from Instrumention and Control Group, ' i and the Essex Corporation.

The review consisted of detailed inspection of the control room panel, interviews with the operators and walk-throughs of selected emergency procedures.

May I have the 35 mm slide, please?

In general, we found the control room to be well-designed, to promote effective and efficient operator actions; on the left of the console on the horseshoe is the safeguards panel.

Left of center of the center con-sole, and the nuclear instrumentations and rod controls l~'l'lOIAI..,,_.,,M R-*ua. hoc.

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to the right of the center console of the steam generator; feed water controls; and also on the right-hand side of

.the console is the power distribution system.

.The enunciators are -- over enunciators are all clearly visible from within the console.

The first dial enunciators which are highlighted in red are designed to

. prorrote rapid diagnosis of system-upset conditions.

In general --*a very well laid out control room.

May I have the next slide, please: The next 35 nun slide, please.

The grouping of controls are well.integrated *.

Each grouping of control is clearly labeled with a white

-- black on white label; as you can see as pressurizer release tank, rear tank indicates.

All of the switches and the vertical meters are all modular.

They are all removable from the console.

May I go back to Slide 12, please?

We found the control room to be acceptable for low-power operations.

We did, however, find.some deficiencies which we felt should be corrected prior to exceeding the five percent power level.

The first was enunciator audible alarms.

The audible alarms average three to five DB above ambient conditions.

When the emergency airconditioning comes on, that increases the ambient level from three to five DB.

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A lamp test feature: the console has no lamp test feature.

We feel that one should be installed.

The procedures: we found that type size was too small and there was excessive referencing within the immediate operator actions of the emergency operating procedures.

Vertical meter failure: these meters are designed to fail mid-'scale when the power supply fails.

Labeling of the -- I'm sorry-* I'm talking from Slide 13.

Right.

The deficiencies -- pardon me.

The labeling, component labeling is done with magnetic labels.

And we feel that there would be a chance for- **a label to be misplaced, to come off, and that would enhance operator's probability of making an error.

Next slide, please.

COMM. KENNEDY:

They are di.rections, are they MR. SCALLETI:

Pardon?

COMM. KENNEDY:

The ones you just covered?

MR. SCALLETI :

Right.

The corrections which we have agreed to --

MR. DENTON:

Well, I think that since you've covered them so thoroughly the first time, I wouldn't CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Let me ask a couple of questions about the socalled. minor deficiencies.

MR. SCALLETI :

pardon?

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Let me ask a oouple of questions1 about the minor deficiencies socalled.

MR. SC.ALLET.I:

Yes.

- CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Is it -- how unusual is it for no breathing apparatus to be provided?

MR. SCALLETI:

Well, the control room is -- the control room that can be self-contained with emergency airconditioning.

They are in the process of ordering five Scott air packs for each control room which would

be installed in the control room.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Okay.

So that because your*:;;

document had said t.hat you wouldn't have instrumentation I

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I of corrections to designed deficiencies until. the detailed I control room design review is*.-.completed.

But the air packs will be --

MR. SCALLETI:

The air packs -- many of the deficiencies identified in the SCR, in the Essex review are in the process of being corrected.

MR. ROSS:

Let's go to the next slide, please.

We'll have Ron Bamble.

MR. BAMBLE:

Thank you.

What we thought we'd do is of fer the Commission a tutorial session on under-clad cracking as it has been experienced and observed in the last several actions in Sequoyah, North Anna and INftJt*.. *'nelul. "-'""" RIJICIM 1 UEL he.

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MR. DENTON: *well, I had hoped -- let me inter-rupt.

I had hoped this session would be where we could say, now, this was a vessel made in the U.S.

No cracks were found.

It wasn't like the other one. It didn't quite turn out that way.

CHAIRMAN ABE.ARNE:

Hal, I think you ought to recognize that what the sessions are is the kind of cracks found at this reactor are.

MR. DENTON:

Yes.

MR. ROSS:

You want to* skip -~ want to focus just on the we aren't going to discuss the subject in general.

I don't see why we don't as long as we're here.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Oh, yes.

Oh, no, no.

I didri'~t mean --

MR. DENTON:

I was a.fir aid.y.o.u*.~wer.e saying riot : t bother.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Oh, no.

I was just commenting that I dontt think at at least any of us at this stage expect no cracks. It's just which kindsof cracks have they found this. *time.

MR. ROSS:

Okay.* We're going to go back to square one a little bit to define some terms.

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MR. DENTON:

And a lot of this we've covered before, Ron, so you might hit it lightly in the first few.

MR. BAMBLE:

Okay.

As was mentioned, we're just trying to give a summary of the underclad cracking and pull it all together here after we have -- after we do have some experience now with examination of four four recent plants.

I just basically want to go through the history of *some of the cracking mechanisms.

Our experience, ultrasonic examinations and our evaluations at the current time of what we found.

Next slide, please.

Again, just to orient everyone, this is the

-- these are the nozzles in question. It says outlet nozzles.there, but we really are.inspecting both the inlet and outlet nozzles on the vessels.

Next slide, please.

Again, just to orient people, the top graph shows the close-up of the nozzle ?lnd the cladding.

The clad is show -- cladding is just circumferential strips that are applied alon9 the length of the nozzle.

This slide shows the cracks on the top figure which indicates the depth, and the bottom figure shows the -- a longi-tudinal section, or a view of the -- from the inside of l"""""nco..u. 1/--nM ~-I DEL he.

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the vessel looking at the cracks.And the two-types of cracks that we're trying to describe are the reheat I

cracks indicated by the straight lines, and the coldcracks I are indicated by the straight* lines with the circles around I them.

Now, there are<three things you might notice in this figure.* The reheat cracks are all aligned in cir-cumferential rows.

And they tend to occur at the clad deposition interface.

And that happens because of the excessive heat that that zone sees.

Essentially he sees he-at twice as the clad is.

deposited.

The cold cracks are random in nature.

That again is due to the mechanism that causes the cracking.

It's caused by hydrogen lack of -- inability of hydrogen to diffuse through metal, and that's a random procedure.

The cracks are all oriented, regardless of cause, in the axial direction.

That is to say that the lines there indicate that the crack length.

Next slide, please.

Well, just a very brief description of history.

The reheat cracks were first found in riozzle forgings clad in Europe around 1970.

There were several fabricators at the time who were using processes that would produce reheat cracking near R~tterdarit, Babcock & Wilcox, General Electric, I-~

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So they are both European and U.S. manufacturers.

The potential for reheat cracking exists in almost all vessels clad before 1973.

Based on a lot of destructivej examination at the time, back in the early '70's, it was I I

determined that these cracks* are generally -- not generally 1 but the maximum crack size was an eighthiiof an inch deep by a half-inch long.

And that is generally been confirmed by what we've seen in the UT results recently.

Cold cracking was found in nozzle forgings clad in Europe.

Again, this was very recent:

back in 1979.

there are two effective.fabricators: Rotterdam and Franaton.

And the effected plants in-the United States are Prairie Island 1 and 2, Sequoyah 1, McQuire 2, and Katawba 1, Wadspor 1 and 2, and offshore power.

And Sequoyah and Wadspor 2, I guess, have been inspected.

And additional work has been done on off-shore power by Westinghouse.

Based on the destructive examinations done by the French on some European vessels and again confirmed by the results that we have here recently, in the vessel nozzle the deepest crack is about a quarter of an inch, and the longest crack is three-quarters of an inch.

There were also some cracks found on a steam I-~

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generator t'li::esheet clad by Frankintone, and those cracks were a little deeper.

They were a half-inch deep by one-and-one-quarter inch. ~long.

And this is one of the reasons why there was concern for cold cracking.

This was the first incidence on the tube sheet where something greater than about a quarter of an inch:\\

was found.

Next slide, please.

Well, again, just very briefly, some of.the causes of cracking.

The cladding process itself is an applicat~on of preheat to the vessel base ~etal prior to cladding and then deposition of the clad on to the base metal; and then postheat.

And the idea of the preheat and postheat,. 1.again, is to allow hydrogen to diffuse.

The reheat cracking is typified by a single clad layer, and a single clad layer often produces a very high heat input.

And this high heat input causes cracking in a local degraded zone at the interface of the adjacent clad depositions.

And as I mentioned before, this causes the cracks to all be in line at that interface location.

Remedial measu~es are people have gone to multi-clad layers because if you use multi-clad layers, you can decrease the heat input on any one clad layer.

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60 reheat cracking.

The cold cracking, as I mentioned, is tust the lack of creating a post-clad deposition temperature.

It does not allow the hydrogen to be diffused.

Remedial measures are to try to maintain that pre and post-clad temperature.

The temperatures are generally around 250 for pre-heat1ng and 400.degrees for* post-heating.

Next slide*, please.

Well, this summarizes our inspection results for four plants.

And the first was Sequoyah 1,. and in I I I I I

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Sequoyah 1, based on heat treatment and clad-deposition I

process, we would have ~redicted that there was a potential I I

for reheat arid cold cracks in Sequoyah 1.

Our ultrasonic I examination results indicated that, in fact, there were cracks in each nozzle.

And as best we could identify they were definitely reheat cracks and possibly cold cracks.

Cold cracks are difficult to identify because you can only tell by the orientation, and it's random.

It's very difficult sometimes.

Wadspar 2 -- we would have predicted the potential for cold cracks, but when we ran the inspection, there were no cracks detected.

North Anna 2 had the potential for reheat cracks.

There were many cracks detected in the nozzle during the I-~

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The last plant was Salem, and for Salem it was manufactured in the United States.

We would have predicted that there are no reheat or cold cracks in the Salem I

vessel.

The* inspection results show that there were crac*ks I in four of the six nozzles.

However:, we are unable to identify the cracking mechanism because the heat treatments say we shouldn't have either cold cracks or reheat cracks.

And we're not I i I I

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I sure whether we had them anyway or whether there's a third I mechanism.

We just don't know.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Do you see any pattern to the cracks?

MR. BAMBLE :,

No, not that we can -- not that we can distinguish.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Do you have any sense of depth length?

MR. BAMBLE:

Again, the depth in Salem is.

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maximum crack length a half an inch.

Certainly, no large cracks.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

In depth is then --

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MR. BAMBLE:

Well depths -- for cracks this small depth can't really be measured accurately, but we would estimate that it woul_d certainly be no more than half a length -- a quarter inch at most.

Next slide, please.

Based on the inspection results that we have to date, we've come to some conclusions, and the first con-clusion is that we *really haven't been able to establish an exact correlation between crack presence.and crack mechanisms.

And that's based on the fact of inspection of

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Watts Bar where we expected to see some cracks.

We saw none.

In an inspeqtion of Salem where we expected to see nothing, and we.did, in fact, see cracks.

So we felt that we really can't draw an exact corre~ation between heat COMM. GILINSKY:

Well, let's see. Why did you expect 1hem in one case and notr.the other?

MR. BAMBLE:

Well, in Watts Bar we expected cold cracking because we felt that the heat treatment that was applied was not sufficient to prevent cold cracking.

CO.MM. GILINSKY:

So you reviewed the history of the heat treatment MR. BAMBLE:

Yes.

CO.MM. GILINSKY:

And on the basis of that you I-'"-'. V-TIM RO<MfDIS. IMC.

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drew conclusions about the likelihood of cracking?

MR. BAMBLE:

That's right.

On Watts Bar, we would have predicted cracking and after review of the heat treatments on Salem, we would have predicted we did not have cracking.

In fact, on both po+/-nts we got the opposite results..

COMM. KENNEDY:

Do you have a research effort underway to see if mechanisms can be correlated with the existence of cracking in given circumstances?

MR. BAMBLE:

No, sir, I think what. the results suggest to us is that we would *like to continue to do inspections on nozzles of plants where we do not expect to have either reheat or cold cracking.

And we propose to do inspections for two or three more plants that are fabricated in the way we wouldn't expect to see cracking, and if we continue to see cracking, then I think we're suggesting that some sort of research program or metal-lurgical examinations be undertaken, then, to see if there is, in fact, a.third mechanism or maybe we just don't understand the first two well enough.

So we would like to do some more inspections on this.

COMM. KENNEDY:

You think it's too early to initiate such review?

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That's right because I think with the sensitive methods we 're using, I would.n 1 t be surprised to see cracks in any vessel that we inspected, particularly cracks of this size.

They are really not that large.

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We 1 re going to have to review -- we *1 re going *to especially. I i

want to inspect the plants where we would say based on current knowledge, *we would not expect cracks.

COMM. GILINSKY:

How well can these ultrasonic methods define the cracks?

MR. BA?imLE:

The methods are quite sensitive.

a matter of fact, they wer_e developed by the Germans back when reheat cracking was first discovered back in the early '70's, and they are tailored specifically to find cracks of this nature and this. size in there.

And we have had our consultants review these techniques, and they assure us that it can do a very accurate job in finding small flaws such as this.

COMM. GILINSKY:

That means what?

That you're finding what -- 90 percent of the cracks of that size or what?

MR. BA?imLE:

We feel that that method is quite reliable for finding cracks of that size.

Yes.

At the same time, though --

COMM. GILINSKY:

And that size being?

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In the order of a half inch long in length.

Tl:le method, as I mentioned before, is deficient:

in that it cannot define the depth of the crack; only the length.

COMM. GILINSKY:

And you think you're finding essentially all of those cracks?

MR. BAMBLE :-

Yes.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Or at least the ones that are that large.

COMM. GILINSKY:

Well, that!s what I meant.

MR. BAMBLE:

Well, yes.

I say a half inch large. It has detected cracks that are a quarter inch I

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Typically, these things run a quarter of an inch or three-eighths long.

The maximum we've seen is a half inch. _So we have a lot of experience where it's detected things as small as a quarter inch or three-eighths.

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COMM.* GILINSKY:

Jumping to your next point, at point,. they are all well within the Section 11 allowables.j And the Section 11 allowables are about four-tenths of an inch in length.

So these are -- I'm sorry -- in depth.

I'm sorry.

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COMM. KENNEDY:

But we don't know how deep they are, do we just mathematically postulate i:if they're no more than an half inch long they are not more than "x" deep?

MR. BAMBLE:

No.

On these particular plants all we know is the length.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Yeah.

MR. BAMBLE:

But there has been a lot of work on reheat cracking back in the early '?O's, and a lot of work by the French recently on cold cracking to do destructive evaluations where they have actually taken these cracks out of real nozzles and made measurements of the depths destructively.

And they find that the maximum length is a half inch, and the maximum depth on the cold cracking is a quarter of an inch.

And the maximum depth on a reheat cracks was found to be about an eighth of an inch.

So we have a lot of experience based on destructive examina-tion.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Yeah.

What I'm saying we're assuming that sense the length of the crack is not more than a half inch, that they're -- or it's within --

MR. BAMBLE:

Yeah.

Right.

The mechanism that you would have for cracking -- it would be highly unlikely 1-TICIOIAL. V_n.. Rwaoa'INC.

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you would ever have a crack that's more than -- have a depth longer than half its length.

So if we found things that are maximum of one-half inch long, it's very unlikely there would be any larger than one-quarter inch deep.

CHAIRMAN AHEAR.l\\J'E:

What would you figure it would be then to take a sample and go to destructive testing'?

MR. BAMBLE:

Well, as I mentioned before we would like to do* inspections on two or three more plants where we would predict we would not have cracking, and if we continue to find cracking, then we would feel that destructive testing of some type and/or some sort of additional programs necessary to determine whether we I

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have a third mechanism.

Or as I mentioned, we don't under-I stand the first two, perhaps, well enough.

COMM. KENNEDY:

Or that the techniques are simply telling you that it's been there all the time and really can't be prevented.

MR. BAMBLE:

Yes, that's -- well, that's certainly possible.

I would never be surprised to see cracks of this size in any vessel that we inspected.

COMM. GILINSKY:

Now, when you say a crack is say half an inch, that's plus or minus what'?

MR. BAMBLE:

I can't really say.

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COMM. KENNEDY:

Well, I misundersbood.

MR. Bru.IDLE:

When we say a half an inch COMM. GILINSKY:

What's the uncertainty in that.

COMM. KENNEDY:

No, no, he said -- I thoilg:ti:t* he said that's. the reason I didn't understand him.

I thought he had said -- not.-- they hadn't seen any*. more than a half inch long.

MR. BAMBLE:

Yes.

I think you're asking the question about.the uncertainty of the ultrasonic examination result.

COMM. GILINSKY:

Yes.

MR. BAMBLE:

Okay.

We have asked people to re-view that, and we don't have the definite number, but our NVE consultants\\say that this is -- procedures would provide a conservative estimate of the length.

That they are doing things that make whatever length they estimate a conservative estimate.

So I think whatever crack we indicate the length of, we've bounded that crack, and I just can't give you a number.

COMM. GILINSKY:

You don It think it '*s any bigger than that.

MR. BAMBLE:

That's right.

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69 COMM. KENNEDY:

And therefore, no deeper than that.*

MR. BAMBLE:

And therefore no deeper.

Certainly the depth is a conservative estimate.

The half point is a very conservative estimate of this type crack.

And then finally as I mentioned the code acceptance standards would have a depth qf.4 inches.

And therefore, these cracks are all -- anything we've detected are* all acceptable for service.

COM:.1\\1. KENNEDY:

And there is a regular re-examination program to look for any change in those cracks or identification for new ones?

MR. BAMBLE:

Yes.

We've required Sequoyah and North Anna 2 and probably require Salem,. *.al though we haven't finished with Salem yet, to do an inservice examination using techniques that can find cracks of these small dimensions.

MR. ROSS:

Torn Dunning, why don't you come up --

A couple of electrical matters that --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Excellent summary by the way.

Thank you.

MR. ROSS:

The plant was recently put under a confirmatory order with respect to compliance with some questions on Bulletin 79-27, one of a number of plants.

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70 PAGZ... Q. __

I think Mr. Statterfield, when we talked to you about*

Sequoyah, pointed out that Westi~ghouse plant ha*s some intrinsic benefits with respect to loss of the non-class l(e) bus and control *room instruments in general.

We're prepared to discuss that and a related perhaps related electrical feature is also environmental I

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I And Mr. Dunning of the Instrument Control Systems I

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Branch can discuss both of these although as far as by percent we are satisifed with these data.

Tom.

MR. DUNNING: *Well, as Denny mentioned, l(e)

Bulletin 79-27 was issued as a result of concerns re-sulting from the. OCONEE 3 event back on November 10, 1979.

Also similar concerns were raised due to the recent Crystal 3 -- Unit.3 event.

The Bulletin requires that the applicant evaluate the effects of the loss of power to instrumentation controls syst*ems.

- And specifically we requested that a proposed design modifications and changes in emergency procedures to better cope with these such events.

Since we hadn't response to this Bulletin to date, the Office of Inspection Enforcement has issued a confirmatory order to the applicant to respond by July l, 19 8 O *.

COMM. KENNEDY:

What accounts for his failure 1-~

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to respond?

At this stage in his process* when he's most 2

anxious and has repeatedly said so(to get his plant on 3

the line, one would have thought he would be jumping

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Do we know why he has not --

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MR *. MONNHOLM:

The licensee -- the applicant did respond.

But pointed out the size of the job to do it properly would take longer than we had given them.

And the order essentially says we need something soon.

And therefore the date July 1.

But there was a response, but it asked for more time.

COMM-. KENNEDY:

Okay.

MR. ROSS:

This applicant, I believe, was one of eighteen --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

How much more.time?

MR. ROSS:

Well, what did they ask for?

I believe they asked for 1 October, did they not?

MR. MONNHOLM:

Yes.

MR. ROSS:

And they were given july according to the order.

MR. DENTON:

I think to go on down that slide, it's important to point out'that the same kinds of con-siderations apply to this plant that apply to its

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I sisters that we discussed.

MR. ROSS:

Right.

MR. DUNNING:

Yes.

As was the case with Sequoyah and North Anna 2, our evaluation indicates that the Westinghouse design is less acceptable to these*

events since it relies on protection system channels for I I I

Al*so, redundant protection system measurement control.

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I channels are indicated in the control room, and this provides information on plant status.

So, therefore, a single power failure won't cause I the loss of all status indication for recovery from these types of events.

Thus, we concluded that operation up to five percent.power was acceptable and we're going to address the resolution of this item before escalation of power above those levels.

Next slide, please.

As a part of review of environmental qualification documentation for the Salem plant, we've looked at a number of different types of electrical equipment.

As a result of this review we've identified two areas requiring further action.

The first deals with part and transmitters.

These transmitters are used in the containment to measure primary and secondary system pressures, levels and flow rates.

These transmitters were qualified under

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a generic Westinghouse qualification program in accordance

. with IEEE 323 1971, the 1971 version of the standard.

These test demonstrated that the transmitter performed within specification limits when exposed to design basic event conditions.

The tests also showed that they were -- if they were exposed to conditions more severethan those postulated that while the in-struments continue to function, the instrument accuracy could be degraded.

Thus,; we concluded that.there was. not an adequate demonstrated margin for these instruments.

While these transmitters do meet our basic requirements, we believe that additional margins are desirable as defined in current standards and therefore, in this. !Case, will require replacement of these units at the end of the second fuel** cycle.

Basically, here we're looking for instruments that -- because these have an importance from a post~

accident recovery sense that we feel that the highest quality instruments should be used in these applications.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

We are requiring them.

Why are we waiting after the second fuel cycle?

MR. DUNNING:

-- instrument deliveries take up to six months, *nine months for deliveries so it's 1-T'IClf<AI. v-n.. Rtr<:M*ues. tic.

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just the time of getting them available so that they can them installed and getting the qualifications com-pleted on them with those instruments.

Probably be pretty tight to do it in one year.

MR. DENTON:

Well, it's effectively to meet the

'71 -- the expected to give them reasonable assurance of performin'g.

MR. DUNNING:

The second area deals with the main coolant temperature sensors which were also qualified under a generic Westinghouse test program.

These instruments were -- our ~emperature sensors were qualified to a radiation dose of ten to the eighth rads.

We concluded that this value was adequate for the integrated dose that the sensors would be exposed to considering both normal operation for one year and a post-accident period.

Since these sensors are located in the main coolant loops, they see a high level of radiation during normal operation.

We have required that these sensors be replaced at each refueling outage until they are all requalif ied to a higher radiation dose to include 40 years of normal operation plus the post-accident conditions.

Finally, the evaluation of environmental l~*'l"IOW. 'I-TIM RuacMtats. INC.

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qualification for Salem plant has been conducted over a number of years during which our requirements have been changing.

Therefore, we requested that the applicant co.nduct a review of his environmental qualification program in accordance with the recently issued interim staff position on environmental qualification.

This is given in doc*ument in NUREG 0588.

Specifically, he is to address any deviations with the Staff positions, and justify that these differences are not significant.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I would have thought they would have been against DOR guidelines..

MR. DUNNING:

Well, for the operating plants, we had put together --

CHAIRMAN.MIEARNE:

Given the description we just heard.

MR. DUNNING:

-- initially the DOR* guidelines for those that were in the licensing process, and we've been more directly involved with those guidelines in DSS than we were with DOR preparing their guidelines which we're going to go out into inspection and be used by different groups.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Have I missed something?

Is 588 the DOR --

588 is not the DOR value?

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1 MR. DUNNING*:*

No, 588 is not the DOR CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

We just heard this big presentation on -- that 588 is appropriate at the design stage, but once you reach the operating stage,, the DOR guidelines are app:ropriate.

So I don't understand why for Salem 2 the DOR guidelines aren't appropriate rather than 588?

MR. DUNNING:

Well, I guess you could use the DOR guidelines as a springing document initially.

.even as it was explained yesterday.. Once they get to the point of identifying different problems, one of the documents that they were going to use to resolve items that were questionable was NUREG 0588 which covered the current position with respect to both the 71 standard and 1974 standard of the basic IEEE standard document.

MR. SATTERFIELD:

I think the important point is the one that Tom just mentioned.

The OR guidelines are intended primarily as a screen tool. It was a point that I think we tried to make a couple of times yesterday that just for. a few reactor reviews such as we're doing in DSS, we didn't feel it was necessary to send those DOR guidelines along.

We got started in our reviews back in August of last year.

The guidelines weren't developed until around' 1-TIOU&. 'l-nM ~D041DEL IMC.

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So we didn't want to forward those guidelines along to the licensees at that stage.

I think the reviews as was explained yesterday for the operating reactors are gorung to eventually rely on NU_REG 0588 so the reviews ought to be essentially identical.

MR. ROSS:

Last slide. on the fire protection.

This is documented in Appendix E, and the bottom line is as you can see from the slide at point number 4, there are no open items.

We concluded that the fire protection system is adequate.

There are a few more modifications in process, but we have essentially bowed out on the fire protectio:Q. program.

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This completes out direct presentation.!

MR. ROSS:

I guess I would note that we had forwarded a draft to licensee last week.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Questions?

I find the unusual situation that Commission has a quorum but --

I guess I have no questions either. I'll let Harold go ahead.

COMM.. HENDRIE :

Is sue it.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Fine.

Thank you.

This meeting is closed.

We will have in a moment a short affirmation session.

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COMM. HENDRIE:

It's not closed.

It's over.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Those of you who wish to stay for our (Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., April 16, 1980, the hearing was adjourned.)

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