ML18081B249
| ML18081B249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1980 |
| From: | Ross W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Butler W, Zwolinski J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18081B250 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003270085 | |
| Download: ML18081B249 (3) | |
Text
~.-
J '
u-
~
&n~IRIB!ITION:.
~et Fi 1 efjj]:) WRoss (2).
ORB#l Rdg-NRC PDR
~11UJARY
- 1 J * ~*
NRR Rdg Dr
~ets Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 -
NOTE TO:
W. R. Butler, Chief, Containment Systems Branch, Division of Systems Safety John Zwolinski, Containment Systems Branch, Division of Systems Safety THRU:
A. Schwenc_er, Ch.ief, Operating Reactors Branch #1, Division of Operating Reactors FROM:
W. J. Ross, Operating Reactors Branch #1, Division of Operating Reactors
SUBJECT:
REVIHJ OF CONTAINMENT PURGE AND VENT VALVE ISOLATION AT SALEM UNIT NO. l On August 22, 1979 a meeting of p~rsonnel from DOR, DSS, and.bPM was held to coordinate the review of containment isolation at Salem Units l and 2.
As the results of this meeting, DPM/DSS was designated to take the lead. for this topic for Salem-2 and to review valve operability for Salem-1.
In addition, DOR was to provide documentation of design changes made by the licensee/
applicant to prevent override of ESFs needed during a LOCA; however, DOR was to review the li.censee's evaluation for Salem-1.
I am using this note to inform you of the actions taken in ORB#l since the August 22 meeting.
- l. By letter of 8/30 PSE&G notified IE Region I that the 36 11 isolation valve~
at Salem-1 might have insufficient torque to shut during certain accident conditions (LER-79/55/01 P).
- 2.
By letter of 9/27 the staff requested the licensee to implement a va.l ve qualification program.
The licensee committed to.do so by letter of 10/26.
- 3.
By letter of 10/5 the licensee committed to keep the 36 11 valves closed in all modes except modes 5 and 6 and to block the 1-0 purge valves so that ful1 open will be 60° rather than 90°.
- 4.
By letter of October 30, the staff requested the licensee to implement the staff's "Interim Position" that is attached to this note (Attachment 1).
In its response by letter of November 21, the* licensee committed to meeting Items 2A and.2B except that opening of the36" valves is required to test the actuation circuitry as part of theISI surveillance program required in Tech Specs 4.0.5, 4.3.2.l.l, and 4.3.3.l. A position on this requirement is being sought from the Pl ant.Systems Branch of DOR.
The licensee has al so responded satisfactorily to our request to show how automatic closure s_ignals are not bypassed or *inhibited. Additional informat. ion related. t~
circuitry was requested by the staff in its December_5 letter an.d a-res onse fYI en")e; v
- -s 008*21 o o'8":>
~2-was received by letter of January 4, 1980.
The Plant Systems Branch has
~omple~ed it,s review of the potential for overrid_ing containment purge isolation and has developed the SER that is also attached to this ~ote *
(Attachment 2).
5, Supplemental (to the staff's 9/27 letter) information related to the demonstration of operability of purge and vent valves was telecopied to the licensee on 1/29/80 to be used in developing information to be required to meet the staff's tentative long-range position (Attachment 3).
In Operating Experience Memorandum No. 24 "Bypassing and Resetting of ESF Signals" DOR recommends that DSS implement in its review process the criteria to prevent overriding ESF s i gna 1 s.
I sha l_ l be happy to work with you in these matters as you complete the review of Salem-2 and complete the review of the operability of valves at Salem-1.
Attachments:
- 1.
Staff'~ l~terim Position
~. *psB Safety Evaluation.Report
- 3* Staff's Tentative Long-Range Position cc w/o attachments:
ADromerick
- £Reeves JZudans RKiessel Glainas JZwolinsk~
ASchwencef' OP arr WGammi-11 cc w/attachment No. 2:
R. Satterfield original $.igntd bf Bill Ross Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
~1u:::~:~:~~r~~i;-~ *
- ~
- ~;~~~~i-~a,/
- : :::::::::::: ::::.: :::::::::: :: :: : : : : :: :::::: :: :: : ::: :
- NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240
..... -tru.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING o*FFICE: 1979-289-369
- ----*---------H~-
- e. -
INTERIM.POSITION FOR"CONTAINMENT"PURGE AND VENT.VALVE OPERATION.PENDING"RESOlUTIOR.OF.ISOlATION"VALVE OPERABILITY
- Once the conditions listed below are met, restrictions on use of the containment purge and vent system isolation valves will be revised based on our review of your responses to the November 1978 letter justifying your proposed opera-tional mode. The revised restrtcttons can be establtshed $eparately for each
... -_ sys~em *.
- 1. Whenever the containment integrity is required, emphasis should be placed on operating the contai"nment in a passive mode as much as possible and on limiting all purgtng and venting times to as low as achievable. To justify venting or purging, there must be an* established need to improve working conditions to perfonn a safety related surveillance or safety related maintenance procedure.
(Examples of improved working conditions would include deinerting, reducing temperatur.e*, humidity*, and airborne activity sufficiently to pennit efficient performance or to stgnificantly reduce occupational radiation exposures), and
- 2. Maintain the containment purge and venr-isolation valves closed whenever the reactor is not in the cold shutdown or refueling mode until such time as,rou can show this:
- a. All isolation valves greater. than 3 11 nominal diameter used for containment purge and venting operations are opera..~.-under-the most severe desi*gn basis accident flow condition loading and can close within the time limit stated in your Technical Spec1ficati"ons,
- design criteria or operattng procedures.
The operabiltty of butter-fly valves may, on an interim basts, be demonstrated by 1tmiting the valve to be no more than 300 to soc open (900 betng full open). The maximum opening shall be detennined in consultation with the valve supplier~ The valve opening must be such that the critical valve parts wi 11 not be damaged by DBA-LOCA 1 cads and that the valve wfl l tend to close when the fluid dynamic forces are introduced, and
- b. Modifications, as necessary, have been made to segregate the contain-ment ventilation isolation signals to ensure that, as a minimum, at least one of the automattc safety injection actuation s_tgnals is un-inhibited and operable to initiate valve closure when any other isolation signals may be b,locked, reset, or overridden.
wonly where temperature and humidity controls are not in the present design.
- .,/