ML18078A982
| ML18078A982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1979 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903130422 | |
| Download: ML18078A982 (12) | |
Text
b PS~G
- March 8, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c.
20555 Attention:
Gentlemen:
Mr. Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 3 Division of Project Management RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby submits sixty (60) copies of its updated responses to your requests for additional information numbers 5.66, concerning containment purge and pressure -
vacuum relief isolation, and 7.32, con-cerning environmental monitoring of Class lE equipment outside containment.
This information will be incorporated into the FSAR in an amendment to our application.
We are also transmitting for your review and approval, the test procedure for performance of a feedwater hammer test.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Enclosure 79031304:l..;l._
The Energy PeopiE"'
Very truly yours, 1?_/ht1:i!
R. L. Mittl General Manager -
Licensing and Environment Engineering and Construction REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY
QUESTION 5. 66 ~,.
~
The statement is made in Section 5.3.1.5 of the FSAR that a pressure vacuum release system is used during normal power operation to relieve containment pressure and the containment purge system is used during normal power operation to refresh the containment atmosphere.
Show that design of the contain-ment purge and pressure-vacuum release system satisfy the requirements of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CSB 6-4, "Con-tainment Purge During Normal Plant Operation."
Your response should address each paragraph and subparagraph of the BTP.
If you choose not to perform the analysis required by subparagraph B.5.A, we will permit only limited use of the purge system (no more than 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year) when the plant is in the startup, power, hot standby and hot shutdown mode of operation.
ANSWER The Pressure-Vacuum Relief and Containment Purge Systems are normally isolated (closed) systems.
These systems can be used during power and hot standby operations as required for the following functions:
- l.
Pressure-vacuum relief -
to maintain containment pressure in the range of -1.5 to +0.3 psig.
- 2.
Containment purge -
to a) refresh the containment atmos-phere in order to maintain doses to operating personnel within required levels during in-service and shut-down maintenance and/or inspections, and b) minimize the ac-cumulation of any long-lived radioisotopes
- These systems are not *on line* systems and are utilized only as necessary to provide the above stated functions.
Most of the items of concern in BTP CSB 6-4 are described in detail QS.66-1
- e.
in FSAR secti~ns 5.3 and 5.4, however, each paragraph and subparagraph of Section 5 of the aTP is addressed in outline format below.
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The purge a~d pr~1sure-vacuum
~'!*.
relief line isolation valves were purchased, manufactured and factory tested prior to the issuance of the NRC Branch Technical Posi-tion MEB-2, *pump and Valve Operability Assurance Pro-gram*.
The appropriate design, environmental and leakage parameters were adequately specified for these isolation valves.
The valves have undergone testing to verify leak tightness and operability during seismic events. The appropriate quality documentation was provided for the valves.
The valves will be tested periodically for operability and leakage in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Although not specifically referenced, the design and testing of the purge and pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves meet the intent of the NRC Branch Technical Position.
lb)
- Salem has two purge lines and one pressure-vacuum relief line penetrating the containment.
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The pu~ge vent lines are 36 inches in diameter and the pressure-vacuum relief line is 10 inches in diameter
- These lines, however, are not used for routine station operation.
The accident analysis (see Sa of this re-sponse) yields doses well within 10 CFR 100 guidelines.
05.fl6-2
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- The isolation valves and control system provisions for isolation meet the appropriate safety-related criteria consistent with containment isolation.
Containment purge system isolation is actuated by Phase A and high radiation signals.
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- Instrumentation and control systems are independent and actuated by diverse parameters.
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The purge and pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves are designed to close within 2 seconds.
The valves were tested at the factory and will be tested periodically in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Total isolation time, including the 2 second valve clo-sure, will not exceed 5 seconds if initiated by a high containment pressure signal (based on a design basis DECL rupture)
- Isolation time will not exceed 10 seconds if initiated by a high containment radiation signal.
Isolation is also initiated by a safety in-jection signal.
lg)
To insure isolation valve closure, the design, which includes the type, location, orientation, and configura-tion of valves and piping/ducting of the penetration and ventilation system, considers the potential problem of-debris becoming entrained in the escaping air and steam.
Where the containment purge and pressure-vacuum relief penetrations are not connected directly to a 05.66-3
e e
filtered ventilation system and are terminated in the free containment atmosphere, the openings are faced down to preclude debris from entering the system.
All the valves are either contained within the piping/duct lines or have a 1-inch expanded metal mesh basket around them.
- 2)
The Containment Purge System is not intended for humidi~y and temperature control within the contain-ment, but was designed to perform the functions pre-viously described.
- 3)
The Containment Ventilation System (FSAR Section 5.3) utilizes fan coolers for temperature and humidity con-trol.
The Iodine Removal System (internal cleanup) is used to remove gaseous iodine and particulate activity from the containment atmosphere.
- 4)
The isolation valves are testable for operability and leakage in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Sa)
The response to Question 14.13 provides a dose analysis for a LOCA during containment purge.
This analysis utilizes very conservative assumptions, including an iodine spike.
The analysis results in doses well within 10 CFR 100 guideline values.
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The system design includes provisions to protect struc-tures and safety-related equipment.
All equipment necessary to perform automatic isolation of the con-05.66-4
tainment purge and pressure-vacuum relief lines is ex-ternal to the containment (except the inhourd isolation valves) and would not be affected by a LOCA.
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The analysis of ~-~ouble ended pipe rupture (see response to Question 14.17) indicates less than 0.2% of the Reac-tor Coolant System mass would be released from the con-tainment prior to isolation.
This will not adversely affect ECCS performance.
Sd)
The allowable leak rate is specified in the Technical Specifications.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the design of the Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief Systems satisfies the requirements of BTP CSB 6-4
- QS.66-5
OUESTION 7.32 With regard to all Class lE equipment located outside the containment building, we require assurance that the environment is maintained within the temperature range for which the equipment is qualified to operate.
In those locations where the temperature could exceed that for which the 'Class lE equipment is qualified, we require that you provide a temperature monitoring system.
The system should at a minimum meet the following requirements:
(1) The control room should receive an alarm when the temperature range has been exceeded.
This alarm shouln be provided by instrumentation which:
{a}
is of high quality
{b}
is checked to verify its functional capability by plant technical specification requirements, and (c}
is powered from a continuous power source or is redundant with separate channels and power sources.
(2) The operator should have a method of maintaining a con-tinuous record of the temperature during the time that the temperature range is exceeded.
Based on the monitoring system, the applicant shall report the occurrence of temperature exceeding the equipment qualification range as an abnormal occurrence to the NRC.
In addition, the applicant shall provide the results of an analysis to demonstrate that the excess temperature has not degraded the involved Class lE equipment below an acceptable level for continued plant operation.
ANSWER All areas outside of containment which contain lE equipment are provided with environmental control systems to maintain a specified range of temperatures.
These systems have been designed with sufficient redundancy in controls and actuated equipment to assure that the specified environmental limit of equipment can be maintained during any mode of plant operation or shutdown.
Q7.32-1 M P79 12 07
All of these systems are described in Chapter 9 ofthe FSAR; the basic design criteria of each system is to remove the heat buildup caused by operation of the equipment in the specific areas.
During periods of equipment shutdown, the temperatures in the areas are not expected to exceed the qualified limits of the lE equipment.
All of the areas served by these systems which contain lE equipment are provided with temperature monitoring and/or control devices which provide high-temperature alarms in the control room.
The status of ventilation equipment operabil-ity is also monitored by control room devices which assure operator knowledge of the vent systems' operability.
The alarms can be used to provide a continuous record of the temperature in the areas of concern and will also provide useful data for any subsequent analysis of lE equipment capability if required.
The instrumentation used for control and alarm functions is of sufficient quality to operate reliably in the environ-ments at their installed locations and is capable of being checked periodically for its ability to perform its intended function.
Power supplies used in the environment control and monitoring systems are provided with redundancy which is compatible with the requirements of each system's safety function.
Q7.32-2 M P79 12 08
The design provisions described above provide assurance that the lE equipment will not be subjected to environments which exceed the qualification levels of the lE equipment.
In the event of an unforeseen situation which might cause an un-acceptable environment, the lE equipment exposed to such a situation will be evaluated for its ability to continue operation in an undegraded fashion and the event will be considered as an abnormal occurrence which is to be reported to the NRC.
Q7.32-3 M P79 12 09
1.0 TEST OBJECTIVE SUP 80.l APPENDIX G FEEDWATER HAMMER TEST l.l To demonstrate that the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system, following a plant trip at power, will not cause unacceptable feedwa~er hammer..
2.0 REFERENCES
2.l Government Contact Memorandum, June 13, 1978 Caller -
E.A. Liden, PSE&G Project Licensing Manager Agency Personnel Involved:
R. Stright, NRC Licensing Project Manager 2.2 PSE&G Drawings 205336-A-8763, Salem Unit II Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Diagram 3.0 PREREQUISITES
~~--3.l The reactor has been operating at power and is going to be tripped.
4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS
--~--4.l The Test Engineer has conducted a briefing with all personnel involved in the test.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS S.l The plant is at normal operating pressure and temperature.
6.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
~~--6.l The steam generator feeding modifications must prevent visible piping damage under the imposed transient.
7.0 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT NONE a.o DATA COLLECTION 8.1 The data to be collected will be the observations of personnel in the NORTH and SOUTH penetrations in the area of the tie between the auxiliary and main feedwater lines and in the containment on elevation 130 in the area of each steam generator.
9.0 PRECAUTIONS 9.1 Observers should station themselves in positions that allow observation of their assigned areas but offer protection in the event of a severe transient.
Sal~m Unit 2 Page 61 of 62 SUP BO.l
1.0 TEST OBJECTIVE SUP 80.l APPENDIX G FEEDWATER HAMMER TEST 1.1 To demonstrate that the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system, following a plant trip at power, will not cause unacceptable feedwa~er hammer..
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Government Contact Memorandum, June 13, 1978 Caller -
E.A. Liden, PSE&G Project Licensing Manager Agency Personnel Involved:
R. Stright, NRC Licensing Project Manager 2.2 PSE&G Drawings 205336-A-8763, Salem Unit II Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Diagram 3.0 PREREQUISITES
~~~-3.l The reactor has been operating at power and is going to be tripped.
4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS
~~~4.l The Test Engineer has conducted a briefing with all personnel involved in the test.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5.1 The plant is at normal operating pressure and temperature.
6.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
~~~6.1 The steam generator feeding modifications must prevent visible piping damage under the imposed transient.
7.0 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT NONE a.o DATA COLLECTION 8.1 Th~ data to be collected will be the observations of personnel in the NORTH and SOUTH penetrations in the area of the tie between the auxiliary and main feedwater lines and in the containment on elevation 130 in the area of each steam generator.
9.0 PRECAUTIONS 9.1 Observers should station themselves in positions that allow observation of their assigned areas but offer protection in the event of a severe transient.
lO.*O DETAILED PROCEDURE 10.l This section provides a procedure fo~ testing the steam generator feed ring modifications.
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______ 1.
Following the pla,lt~rip adjust Auxiliary Feedwater Flow generator to 220 gpm (approximately 110,000 lbm/hr).
to each steam
~------2*
Maintain this flow until the feedwater ring in each steam generator is covered (11% narrow range indication).
~------3*
Adjust Auxiliary Feedwater Flow as required to allow restoring the steam generator water levels above the LOW LEVEL alarm setpoint (25% narrow range indication) while limiting plant cooldown below 547°F.
ll.O PROCEDURE COMPLETION AND COMMENTS ll.l Observers Report No indication of water hammers was observed during the imposed transient.
North Penetration Date South Penetration Date Steam Generator 21 Date Steam Generator 22 Date Steam Generator 23 Date Steam Generator 24 Date 11.2 Comments 11.3 Senior Shift Supervisor~---------------~-- Date ________
~
Test Engineer Date ________ _
QA Surveillance Date ________ _
11.4 Changes in the SPM required as a result of this test have been noted and necessary corrections initiated.
Operating Engineer.
Date Salt!m Unit 2 Page 62 of 62 SUP 80.l