ML18078A801
| ML18078A801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1979 |
| From: | Klosowicz P Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18078A800 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902050177 | |
| Download: ML18078A801 (4) | |
Text
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Report Number:
Report Date:
Occurrence Date:
Facility:
78-74/990 01/26/79 11/27/78 Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jers~y 08038 EVENT:
Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2; requires the reporting of Emergency Core Cool-ing System (ECCS) Actuations within 9_0 days of their occurrence.
To date, we have experienced eleven (11) such actuations.
The purpose of this report is to describe the circumstances surrounding Safety Injection No. 11.
Details of Safety Injections Nos._ 1 thru 10 are contained in Report Nos. ECCS/77-01, 77-26/990, 77-29/990 and 78-04/990 pre-viously submitted.
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION:
The referenced Westinghouse letter.documents the acceptability of fifty (50) Safety Injection transients at a RWST temperature of 40°F.
As the RWST temperature during this injection was 90°F, the transient does not approach the severity of the design basis transient and, as such, is acceptable.
REFERENCES:
a)
ECCS Actuation Report No. 78-74/990, Attachment 1 b)
Westinghouse Burl 3461 letter, dated 12/13/76,* Attachment 2 P.C. Klosowicz Prepared by ---------------------
SORC.Meeting No.
77-78 Generjitin 7902050\\71
ATTACHMENT 1 TO ECCS ACTUATION REPORT NO. 78-74/990 On November 27, 1978, failure of the lB Vital Instrument Bus Inverter initiated a reactor trip and activated all Channel-II protection inputs to the Solid State Protection System.
The failure also caused the loss of Channel II equipment indication, the loss of the B Safeguard Equipment Cabinet, and the loss of control power for the No. 11 and 12AF21 valves.
- The No. 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump did not start with low steam generator level after the trip.
with the No. 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump inoperable, the No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Putnp was feeding four steam generators through the No. 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump cross-connect valves, ll-14AFll valves.
With the No. 11 and 12AF21 valves failed closed, the. No. 13. and 14AF21 valves were fully open to maintain steam generator level..
When an equipment operator manually opened the No. 11 and 12AF21* valves, the increased feed flow cooled the RCS below 543°F.
Loss of the instrument bus resulted in all B Channel bistables de-en*ergizing to their tripped condition.
This satisfied the necessary (two of four) logic for a high steamline flow condition.
The valid low Tave coincident with the invalid high steamline flow met the protection system logic requirements to initiate the safety injection.
The multiple equipment failure and loss of indication caused by the loss of lB Vital Instrument Bus In-verter established the initial conditions leading to the safety injection." The effect of manual control of the Auxiliary Feed Pump discharge valves was not capable of being monitored in the Control Room in sufficient time to prevent the safety injection.
To provide further* information to help the Control Operator analyze problems which occur with this type of incident, lists of equipment which will be de-energized upon loss of electrical buses, have been added to the Station Plant Manual ~larm Book.
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- 9Jv;er Systems
- Mr. R. D..
R'f~pe Chief Mechanic:al Engineer E1ec:tric Engineering Oepartr.ent Publfc Service Electric & Gas Cc::itpany 60 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101
Dear Mr. Rippe:
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SALEM NUCLEAR GENEAAT!NG STATION UNITS NUMBER l ANO 2 Safety Injection (SI) Transient Oesian Basis During the recent pre-critical testing phase, the plant was subjec~ad to three (3) inadvertent Safety Injection (SI} initiation e'lents, which we understand resulted in scme water being injected into the Reactor Coolant Loop.
We also understar.d that t~e NRC has verbally asked for the design t\\~sient basis for Sa1Q~ for this ty~e of e¥ent
- While we have not specifically analyzed Salem for this type of transient, we are confident that our ongoing plant analysis associated with AS:*,E Section III mere than demonstrates that the recent three (3) SI's will have no detrimental *effect on Salem. Our ccnc:lusicn is based en the fol-1 o*..,ing ratic.nal e..
~e.have analyzed sufficient Section III pip.ir.g sys'te.'Tts including t>tping similar to yours with the 1-1/Z" SI nozzles to shew that fifty (5~) such SI e*1ents can be-accomodated \\1ithcut_ exc:!edir.g the ajjprcpriat: s:ress.
limits at the SI nozzle
- These analysis were based on t~e nozzles being s~bjected to a 40°F ~atsr transient which is probably far \\"terse than the actual transient.seen at Salem.
T:ie results of thesa analysis are in th~ pr~cess cf ?:ein;.fcr.:;a1 izad for suC.ilittals to the W~C.for Section !II plants.
ATTACHMENT NO. 2
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Thus fn sp.ite of the original Salem desfgn basis using 31.1 piping cedes which dfd not specifically require transient des1gn calculations fer the subject transient, we ~elfeve that our more recent analysis prcvi~as a sound basis for acceptability of the Salem piping..
- Very truly yours, WESTINGH9US£*ELE:CTRIC CCi\\FO?.AT!O?i
~{.bQw-J. P. Sluss, Manager Sale.'12 Project
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R. O. Rippe, JL D. J. Jagt, lL
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