ML18067A480

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Submits Correction to 970127 Ltr Submitted in Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions
ML18067A480
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/07/1997
From: Bordine T
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-96-06, GL-96-6, NUDOCS 9704160135
Download: ML18067A480 (2)


Text

Manager April 7, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT CORRECTION TO 120-DAY RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 96-06 On September 30, 1996, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions", which requested a summary report of actions taken within 120 days of the date of the letter. On January 27, 1997, Consumers Energy Company submitted that response. On March 21, 1997, Informational Licensee Event Report (LER)97-003, "Potential for Steam Voiding and Water Hammer in Containment Air Cooler System and for Overpressurization of Closed Piping Systems", was submitted.

During the review of LER 97-003, the number of lines that penetrate containment which !Sl were susceptible to overpressurization was determined to be incorrectly stateq in our January 27, 1997, response to GL.96-06. On Page 2 of Attachment 1 of our January 27, 1997, submittal, the statement was made that, "Two lines associated with the clean waste receiver tanks and a reactor cavity drain line were determined to be susceptible l =*

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I to overpressuriz~tion during a DBA." Again, on Page 4 of the same attachment, the

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statement was made that, "A reactor cavity drain line and two clean waste receiver tank lines were the only piping systems that penetrate containment that were found to be

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subject to overpressurization during a DBA temperature rise."

Four lines that penetrate containment were identified that were susceptible to I

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n overpressurization during a DBA. The line that was not identified in the January 27, 1997 submittal was the associated (in addition to the drain line) reactor cavity fill line.

Palisades Nuclear Plant

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2 This fill line is being controlled by procedure to ensure that the line is drained during operation. This is the same method used to control the reactor cavity drain line.

Although the number of lines were not identified correctly in the January 27, 1997 submittal, this was an oversight in the report and did not have any effect on the original analysis or resolution. The procedural control was instituted prior to the plant startup from the 1996 Refueling Outage for both the reactor cavity fill and drain lines, as reported in LER 97-003.

We regret any inconvenience this error may have caused.

SUMMARY

OF COMMITMENTS This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitme,nts.

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Thomas C. Berdine Manager, Licensing CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, NRR, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades