ML18066A748

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Submits RAI Re IE Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel,Over Fuel in Reactor Core or Over Safety- Related Equipement
ML18066A748
Person / Time
Site: Palisades 
Issue date: 12/11/1996
From: Schaff R
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Bordine T
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M95619, NUDOCS 9612160410
Download: ML18066A748 (4)


Text

(

I

\\.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mr. Thomas C. Bordine Manager, Licensing Palisades Plant WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555--0001 December 11~~1996 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI. 49043

SUBJECT:

PALISADES PLANT - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO BULLETIN 96-02, "MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL, OVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR CORE, OR OVER SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT" (TAC NO. M95619)

Dear Mr. Bordine:

The NRC staff has evaluated the responses to Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," and found that some licensees without single-failure-proof cranes have analyzed or are planning to analyze postulated spent fuel storage cask and transportation cask drop accidents to establish design basis accidents for their facilities.

Typical cask drop analyses for in-plant cask movement have addressed the effects of a drop on plant equipment and/or cask integrity. Those analyses have assumed that the cask was in its final condition with its structural lids bolted or welded in place and that the fuel remained in the cask at all times, though the integrity of the cask might be breached during the cask drop.

However, since most cask lids are not secured until after the casks are removed from the pool, it is conceivable that a cask could be dropped back into the spent fuel pool or adjacent area in a tipped-over orientation. This could possibly result in dislodging the cask lid, or dislodging the cask lid and ejecting some or all the spent fuel elements onto the top of the spent fuel racks, the floor of the pool, or adjacent areas.

This accident scenario involves the potential for dropping the cask during movement from the spent fuel pool to the area within the plant building where activities such as drying, inerting, and final securing of the.. c~s*I< lid are completed. Offsite dose effects are not expected from a cask drop and tip-over event in which there is a loss of both the cask lid an~,..fuel confinement.

However, the effect of such an event on the operation of the facility needs to be assessed.

For example, evaluations may need to determine if any vital plant areas are rendered inaccessible and if operations or maintenance activities would be significantly hampered.

Such evaluations would involve, but are not 1 imited to, the cask and crane des.. i gns, the load paths, and the extent to which the licensee can demonstrate its capability of performing actions necessary for safe shutdown wit~. plant damage resulting from a postulated cask drop and tip-over event~and in the presence of radiological source term.

To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power {in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), please provide the following:

9612160410 90650120012155

~DR ADOCK

~~~. __

NRC llf CEN1Bl COPY

,*1

. \\*,,.

Oil.

~~

T. C*. Bordine

. ~ December 11, 1996

.1.

An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario described above is not credible at your facility, or

2.

If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the cask lid and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool.

This load drop/consequence analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the cask movement for the time immediately following the* accident. Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.

An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other parts of the facility (e.g., the spent fuel pool) is bounded by previous load drop analyses.

This letter contains information collections that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0012, which expires June 30, 1997.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is covered by the original estimate of 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> per response for responding to Bulletin 96~02.

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

Please provide your response within 60 days of the date of this request for information.

If you need clarification of the staff's request, please contact me at (301) 415-1312.

Docket No. 50-255 cc: See next page Sincerely, Original signed by Robert G. Schaaf, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DOCUMENT NAME:

G:\\WPDOCS\\PALISADE\\PAL95619.RAI To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box:

"C~. = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" =*Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE PM:PD31 LA:PD31 NAME RSchaaf:

DATE 12/ Cl /96

DISTRIBUTION FOR PALISADES RAI ON BULLETIN 96-02 DATED:

Docket File (50-255)

PUBLIC PD3-l Rdg J. Roe E. Adensam (EGAl)

R. Schaaf C. Jamerson P. Ray OGC ACRS L. Miller, Riii December 11, 1996

t'

.-o_,_

Mr. Thomas C. Bordine Consumers Power Company cc:

Mr. Thomas J. Palmisano Plant General Manager Palisades Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 Mr. Robert A. Fenech Vice President, Nuclear Operations Palisades Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 M. I. Miller, Esquire Sidley & Austin 54th Floor One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. Thomas A. McNish Vice President & Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351 Jerry Sarno Township Supervisor Covert Township 36197 M-140 Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Palisades Plant 27782 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 Pa 1 ;*sades Pl ant Drinking Water and Radiological Protection Division Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 3423 N. Martin Luther King Jr Blvd P. 0. Box 30630 CPH Mailroom Lansing, Michigan 48909-8130 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N. W.

Washington DC 20037 Michigan Department of Attorney General Special Litigation Division 630 Law Building P.O. Box 30212 Lansing, Michigan 48909 August 1996