ML18066A307

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Insp Rept 50-255/98-18 on 980824-0902.One Apparent Violation Identified & Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action
ML18066A307
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/01/1998
From: Grobe J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Thomas J. Palmisano
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML18066A308 List:
References
50-255-98-18, EA-98-443, NUDOCS 9810060168
Download: ML18066A307 (10)


See also: IR 05000255/1998018

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No:

License No:

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

.Location:

Dates:

Inspector:

Approved by:

9810060171 981001

POR

AOOCK 05000255

G

PDR

REGION 111

50-255

DPR-20

50-255/98018(DRS)

Consumers Energy Company

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant

27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway

Covert, MI 49043-9530

August 24 - September 2, 1998

R. L. Glinski, Radiation Specialist

Gary L. Shear; Chief, Plant Support Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant

NRC Inspection Report 50-255/98018

The purpose of this inspection was to review a transportation incident in which a Class 7

(radioactive) package, that was shipped as an exclusive use shipment on an open transport

vehicle, exceeded the NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) limits for radiation levels

on the external surface of the package. In addition, this review covered the implemer:itation of

transportation procedures, the preparation of shipping papers, and the performance of radiation

surveys conducted in support of this shipment. The following conclusions were reached:

An apparent violation was identified concerning the failure to transport a package of

radioactive material in accordance with 49 CFR 173.441, i.e.~ radiation levels on the

external surface of the package exceeded the stated regulatory limits. However, due to

indications that inherent problems with the cask may have been the cause for the

violation, the actual root cause of the violation could not be determined at the time of the

inspection. (Section R1 .1)

The shipping papers for the radioactive material shipment were prepared in accordance

with regulations, plant procedures and expectations. However, several aspects

regarding both survey and documentation practices for the shipment did not meet either

procedural requirements or management expectations, and the lack of normally

available personnel resources contributed to these deficiencies. (Section R4.1 ).

2

Report Details

IV. Plant Support

R1

Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1 .1

Radiological Controls for the Loading and Preparation of a Shipping Cask

a.

Inspection Scope (IP 86750)

The inspector reviewed the radiation work permit (RWP), radiological surveys, and

dosimetry data for the loading and temporary storage of a Type A shipping cask. The

inspector also interviewed plant personnel regarding the controls implemented during

this evolution, and the inspector interviewed plant and vendor personnel regarding the

radiation levels detected by the engineering vendor at their site upon receipt of the

package.

b.

Observations and Findings

On August 12, 1998, plant personnel removed a highly irradiated reactor surveillance

  • capsule from the spent fuel pool (SFP) and placed it into a Type A shipping cask. The

capsule had been previously placed into a specially designed holding basket and had

been allowed to decay for 114 days in the SFP. This particular task involved transferring

the capsule/basket from the SFP to the shipping cask, as the cask was suspended over

the SFP. The licensee ~ad contracted to transport this surveillance capsule to an*

engineering vendor for metallurgical analyses, and an experienced vendor

representative was onsite to aid in the proper loading of the cask.

A previous assessment by the vendor (based on the chemical composition of the

capsule, the neutron irradiation from its accelerated position in the vessel, and a 60-day

decay period) had estimated a maximum dose rate of approximately 106 millirem per

hour (mrem/h) at the centerline of the loaded cask. The initial surveys of the loaded cask

on the refuel floor detected a ma.xi mum dose rate of 110 mrem/h on contact. Based on

dose rates that were consistent with the vendor's estimation and the assistance of the

contractor, licensee staff concluded that the capsule/basket assembly had been correctly

loaded into the cask. The end plates were bolted onto the loaded cask, which was then

transferred to the shipping bay and secured onto the dedicated flatbed trailer. During

this evolution, the licensee expended 45 mrem whole body dose and less than 20 mrem

extremity dose, which were reasonable for the work accomplished.

Radiation surveys of the cask and trailer bed, which were performed to determine the

appropriate radiological postings for the area, were consistent with the initial surveys on

therefuel*floor. On August, 14, 1998, the radioactive materials shipping supervisor

(RMSS) and a heal.th physi.cs. te.chnician. (He.I)-conducted a.more extensive survey of

the cask and truck/trailer in preparation for shipment. The dose rates at the truck cab

and at 2 meters from the lateral surfaces of the vehicle were within the regulatory limits

and were also consistent with the estimates provided by the engineering vendor.

3

However, the RMSS detected a single area on the bottom of the cask surface with a

radiation level of 170 mrem/h, which was verified by the HPT.

On August 17, 1998, the RMSS reviewed the shipping papers with the carrier, reviewed

the shipment surveys, and examined the material condition and placarding of the trailer.

After reviewing the instructions for this exclusive use shipment with the carrier, the

RMSS allowed the shipment to leave the site. This shipping cask (Serial No. TTC-5)

was an authorized Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 7 A Type A cask.

On August 18, 1998, the carrier delivered the shipment to the vendor's sub-contractor

facility, as this sub-contractor was to conduct the metallurgical analysis of the

surveillance capsule. However, the shipping papers specified that the engineering

vendor was to receive the shipment. In addition, the sub-contractor surveyed the cask

and found a discrete area on the external surface of the package with a radiation level

of 300 mrem/h, which was in excess of the regulatory limit of 200 mrem/h for an *

exclusive use shipment on an open transport vehicle. The sub-contractor contacted the

NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2), and then contacted the licensee.

The licensee immediately dispatched the RMSS and the site health physicist to the

sub-contractor's site to examine the cask and conduct a confirmatory survey. Prior to

reviewing the sub-contractor's data, the RMSS conducted a survey and identified an

area of approximately 10 centimeters (cm) in diameter'having radiation levels of 280-

380 mrem/h, which was consistent with the sub-contractor's measurements. This area

  • was approximately 0.75 meters from the 170 mrem/h area that was identified at the

licensee's facility. The RMSS also found the 170 mrem/h area and indicated that it

appeared to have moved several cm axially along the bottom of the cask .

10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that a licensee who transports licensed material outside the

site of usage, as specified in the NRC license, or where transport is on public highways,

or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, comply with the applicable

requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department

of Transportation in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189. 49 CFR 173.475(i) requires, in

part, that before each shipment of any Class 7 (radioactive) materials package, the

offerer must insure by examination or appropriate tests that the external radiation levels

are within the allowable limits in 49 CFR Parts 171-178. 49 CFR 173.441(a) requires, in

part, with exceptions not applicable here, that each package of radioactive materials

offered for transportation be designed and prepared for shipment, so that under

conditions normally incident to transportation the radiation level does not exceed 2

millisieverts per hour (mSv/h) (200 mrem/h) at any point on the external surface of the

package.

The existence of external surface radiation levels in excess of the applicable regulations

is an apparent violation of NRC and DOT requirements (EEi 50-255/98018-01).

However, interviews with the licensee, the engineering vendor, and with another nuclear

facility, indicated that there may be an inherent problem With the design and/or

manufacture of the cask, which could have been the root cause or a contributing cause

of the violation. During the removal of the basket/capsule assembly from the cask,

4

J

various personnel observed that very slight movements of the basket/capsule resulted in

significant fluctuations of the radiation levels on the surface of the cask, from 280

mrem/h to 190 mrem/h. In addition, another nuclear facility which had used this cask for

the same purpose in 1997 stated that their surveys detected two discrete areas on the

cask where there appeared to be streaming of radiation through possible voids in the

cask shielding. Finally, the engineering vendor stated that, based on the design of the

basket, basket holder, and cask, there was a potential for the basket/capsule assembly

to move up to 5 cm in the cask. Since the cask was mounted on the truck bed at

approximately a 10 degree angle, the inspector concluded that the basket could have

moved during transport, which would be due to cask design, and that the movement

could have contributed to the increased contact dose rates.

Based on the information stated above, the actual root cause of the violation (either

inadequate survey/preparation of the shipment or inadequate design/manufacture of the

cask) could not be determined at the time of the inspection. However, the licensee and

it's vendor were evaluating the cask and this incident to determine the root cause.

c.

Conclusions

An apparent violation was identified concerning the failure to transport a package of

radioactive material in accordance with 49 CFR 173.441, as the radiation levels on the

external surface of the package exceeded the stated regulatory limits. However, due to

indications that inherent problems with the cask may have been the cause for the

violation, the actual root cause of the violation could not be determined at the time of the

inspection ..

R4

Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C

R4.1

Poor Performance in Implementing the Shipping Procedure for Shipment 98-067

a. *

Inspection Scope CIP 86750)

b.

The inspector reviewed the applicable procedure (Procedure No. HP 6.20, "Radioactive

Material Shipments") and the shipping papers associated with radioactive material

(RAM) Shipment No.98-067 and interviewed supervisory personnel.

Observations and Findings

The inspector noted that the shipping documents required for this exclusive use

shipment were generally well prepared. The vendor performed the calculation for the

curie content of the capsule; the results were reviewed by licensee personnel; and the

inspector noted that the methodology was in accordance with industry practice. The

shipping papers contained the information required by 49 CFR 172 (waste classification,

- reportable quantity, physical and chemical form, radiation levels, emergency response - -- - - - - - -- --

information, volume, weight, total activity, and the 95% rule for listing radionuclides) and

were signed by authorized shipping personnel.

5

However. during the personnel interviews and the comparison of the shipping

documentation with the applicable shipping procedure, the inspector noted that several

aspects of this shipment did not meet procedural requirements or management

expectations.

In Section 5.1, the procedure stated that radiation levels in excess of 75% of the

applicable limits should be verified and documented on the appropriate container

survey form. After the RMSS detected the 170 mrem/h contact radiation level

(85% of the applicable limit), he instructed an HPT to verify the radiation level at

that single location. The environmental supervisor indicated that the RMSS

should have instructed the HPT to verify the entire cask survey. In addition, the

verification survey was not documented on the appropriate form.

Per Section 5.2, the environmental supervisor authorized the extension of the

maximum radiation levels on packages above the 75% administrative level, but

this supervisory authorization was verbal and not written. Although the procedure

required that the authorization be retained in the appropriate shipment packet,

this authorization was not retained with the shipment packet.

Per Section 6.13, the consignor (licensee) issued specific instructions in writing

for the maintenance of exclusive use shipment controls and included them with

the shipping paper information provided to the carrier. However, the licensee did

not keep a copy of the written instructions that were signed by the carrier for the .

licensee's records or for inspection review. This was a concerri as the carrier

delivered this shipment to the sub-contractor and not to the engineering vendor,

which was the consignee (receiver) on the shipping papers. Although no

violation of regulatory requirements was identified, the delivery of this exclusive

use shipment to an entity other than the listed consignee necessitated a revision

of the shipping papers and the procurement of a copy of the actual receiver's

license, to ensure the sub-contractor's authorization to possess this RAM.

Section 9.3.1 required a Bill of Lading for all exclusive use shipments, and 9.3.2

. required that the Bill of Lading include the transport index for each package in

Radioactive Yellow-II or Yellow-Ill shipments. However, the transport index was

not included on the Bill of Lading for this Radioactive Yellow-Ill shipment.

Attachments 4 and 7 of the procedure required the acknowledgment of any

survey data in excess of 150 mrem/h and/or 75% of the limits, respectively, on

these forms. Although the RMSS had detected and verified the existence of

170 mrem/h radiation levels on the surface of the package, he did not

acknowledge this on either of these attachments. The RMSS indicated that he

mistakenly thought that 175 mrem/h was the correct radiati~n level which

,_,

--*- -------eorrespcfffded to the 75% limit specified on these forms.

Although some of these instances did not meet procedural requirements, the RAM

shipping procedures were not required by the plant Technical Specifications (TS) and,

therefore did not c0nstitute examples of TS procedural violations. However, the

6

~*

inspector expressed concern that several instances of failure to comply with written

instructions or management expectations occurred with this shipment.

During the interview and document reviews, the inspector noted that the RMSS had

performed the radiation surveys and reviewed the data and shipping papers. Normally,

HPTs would perform the surveys and the RMSS would provide an independent,

supervisory review of the data. However, due to the lack of HPT availability during this

time, the RMSS conducted the surveys and reviews, thereby precluding an independent

review which may have identified some of these deficiencies to meet plant expectations.

C&RS supervision planned corrective actions to address the issues identified from this

transportation incident. These plans included the documentation of the reviews and use

of vendor procedures, required documentation for any verification surveys, written

authorization by a minimum of two supervisors to conduct a shipment with radiation

levels in excess of 80% of the regulatory limits, and revision of the procedures and forms

to reflect these changes. In addition, the C&RS staff obtained the services of an *

experienced transportation vendor to review shipping procedures and practices.

c.

Conclusions

Overall, the shipping papers for the RAM shipment 98-067 were prepared in accordance

with plant procedures and expectations. However, several aspects regarding both

survey and documentation practices did not meet either procedural requirements or .

management expectations, and the lack of normally available personnel resources

contributed to these deficiencies.

X1

Exit Meeting

The inspector presented these inspection findings to members of the licensee's management

during an interim exit meeting on August 26, 1998, and at a final ~eleconference exit meeting on

September 3, 1998. Plant personnel did not indicate that any information in this report was

considered proprietary .

7

1

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

"

M: Banks, C&RS, Manager

J. Beer, Technical Support Supervisor

R. Burdette, NPAD Examiner

B. Dotson, Licensing Analyst

G. Goralski, Configuration Control Manager

N. Haskell, Licensing Director

R. Henry, Radiation Material Shipping Supervisor

D. Malone, Licensing Manager

D. Malone, Engineering Manager

M. Menucci, C&RS Assessor

T. Neal, Environmental Supervisor

T. Palmisano, Site Vice President and General Manager

C. Plachta, Radiation Protection Manager, Radiological Services Supervisor

D. Rogers, General Manager Plant Operations

G. Szczotka, NPAD Manager

D. Smedley, Licensing Supervisor

D. Watkins, Duty HP Supervisor

J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades

IP 86750

Opened

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

"Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive

Materials"

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

50-255/98018-01

EEi

Failure to prepare a shipment of radioactive

material such that the radiation levels will not

exceed 200 mrem/h on the external surface of the

package. (Section R1 .1)

8

...

t

C&RS

cm

CR

DOT

EEi

HPT

mrem

mrem/h

mSv/h

RAM

RMSS

RWP

SFP

TS

ACRONYMS USED

Chemical and Radiological Services

centimeter

Condition Report

Department of Transportation

Escalated Enforcement Item

Health Physics Technician

millirem

millirem per hour

millisieverts per hour

Radioactive Material

Radioactive Material Shipping Supervisor

  • Radiation Work Permit

Spent Fuel Pool

Technical Specifications

9

'

  • PARTIAL LISTING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Technical Specifications Section 6.4 - Procedures.

Shipping Package for Radioactive Material Shipment 98-067.

Incident Response Team Report - Reactor Surveillance Capsule Shipment.

Condition Report C-PAL-98-1533.

Procedure No. HP 6.20, Revision 14, "Radioactive Material Shipments".

RWP 980230, Revision 0, "Load Cask with Surveillance Capsule".

Work Instruction Wl-RSD-R-013, Revision 1, "Surface Contaminated Object Shipments".

10