ML18059A966
| ML18059A966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1994 |
| From: | Rogers D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9405030062 | |
| Download: ML18059A966 (30) | |
Text
~
consumers Power POWERINli NllCHlliAN'S PRDliRESS Palisades Nuclear Plant:
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert, Ml 49043 April 28, 1994 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington D.C. 20555 David W. Rogers Plant Safety and Licensing Director DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSEE DPR 20 - PALISADES PLANT - EXTENSION OF GENERIC LETTER 89-10, SUPPLEMENT 6 - IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE This letter submits a schedule extension to the final completion date of Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Testing And Surveillance," for the Palisades Nuclear Station. Palisades had previously committed to verify the capability of GL 89-10 safety related Motor Operated Valves {MOV} to perform their safety function by June 28, 1994.
In accordance with the guidance in GL 89-10, and Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, the revised schedule extends the completion of the MOV program implementation to six {6} months after startup from the next Refueling Outage.
The next refueling is currently planned for the spring of 1995 but may be extended based on operational considerations. This extension will allow completion of practicable and meaningful in-situ dynamic testing of the remaining MOVs with additional time needed for final assessment of the Palisades MOV program.
Justification for the proposed extension is attached.
~w,~
David W. Rogers Plant Safety and Licensing Director CC:
Administrafor RegiOn Ill, USNRC -
Resident Inspector Palisades Attachment 0200:31
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'9405030062' 940428 ',
i PDR ADOCK 05000255
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A CMS" ENERGY COMPANY
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 - License DPR-20 Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, dated March 8, 1994 At the request of the Commission and pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Commission's Rules and Regulations thereunder, Consumers Power Company submits our response to NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, "Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to additional Public Questions," dated March 8, 1994.
Consumers Power Company's response is dated April 29, 1994.
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the contents of this submittal are truthful and complete.
By £24t_ tf7_~
Robert A. Fenech, Vice President Nuclear Operations Sworn and subscribed to before me this 29th day of April 1994.
LeAnn Morse, Notary Public Berrien County, Michigan Acting in Van Buren County, Michigan My commission expires: February 4, 1997
ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 GL 89-10 EXTENSION JUSTIFICATION April 28, 1994 6 Pages
Introduction GL 89-10 EXTENSION JUSTIFICATION 1
In a letter dated December 20, 1990, we committed to the schedule and recommendations set forth in Generic Letter 89-10 for the Palisades Plant. It was also understood that if any future changes were required to meet these commitments, Consumers Power Company would submit these changes in writing to the NRC.
The purpose of this letter is to inform the NRC that an extension to the Generic Letter 89-10 implementation schedule is required to meet the objectives of the Generic Letter and 6 supplements.
In accordance with the recent guidance given in GL 89-10, Supplement 6, we are submitting an extension for the scheduled completion of the GL 89-10 implementation from June 28, 1994, until 6 months following the end of the next {1995} refueling outage.
An extension will allow Palisades time to complete dynamic testing in the 1995 Refueling Outage and provide sufficient time for final assessment of the Palisades MOV program to ensure the requirements and intent of GL 89-10 are met.
History Palisades has 38 safety related MOVs in its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
Since publication of IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor Operated Valves Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," and subsequently, GL 89-10, Palisades has devoted resources and expenditures to meet the requirements of both documents.
Prior to the issuance of GL 89-10, in-situ differential pressure {DP} testing of 20 MOVs had been completed in 1987 and 1988 under the guidance of IE Bulletin 85-03 using MOVATS diagnostic test equipment.
As a result of this DP testing, two {2} Hot Leg Injection Valves of a rising, rotating stem design were replaced during the 1990 Refueling Outage.
In accordance with Generic Letter 89-10 guidance, 5 MOVs were DP tested during the 1990 and 1993 Refueling Outages using Liberty Technologies Valve Operation Test and Evaluation System {VOTES} diagnostic test equipment.
However, due to the significant amount of MOV work that needed to be completed, a refueling outage in the summer of 1993 during peak electric load demands and the need for a complete core off load for some MOV DP testing, not all in-situ DP testing could be completed in the 1993 scheduled Refueling Outage {Ref. Attachment 2).
MOV related work which was performed in the 1993 refueling outage included three valve stem replacements, twenty torque switch replacements, -four gear and spring pack replacements, eight of Velan anti-rotation key replacements, and rotation of three valve operators to minimize the potential for spring pack hydraulic lock.
Justification Basis for extension of the Generic Letter implementation is to allow completion of practicable and meaningful in-situ DP testing of up to 22 remaining MOVs.
Using the guidance given by Supplement 6 of the Generic Letter on valve grouping, we are planning on performing actual DP testing of 13 of the 22 MOVs.
If the DP tests are determined not to be practicable and meaningful, the actual quantity of MOVs tested will be lower. Justification for any changes will be kept onsite per the requirements of GL 89-10.
GENERIC LETTER 89-10. SUPPLEMENT 6 REQUESTED INFORMATION NRC Requested Information The following information shall be submitted at least 60 days prior to the current commitment date to assist the staff in evaluating the licensee's justification for extending the GL 89-10 test program for capability verification and establishing appropriate audit and inspection plans and schedules.
(1) the completion status of licensee's GL 89-10 program as of the current*
commitment date:
CPCo Response 2
All MOVs in the Generic Letter 89-10 Test Program have been set up using VOTES diagnostic testing equipment during static testing to function at degraded voltage during their design basis condition.
The current completion status of both static and DP diagnostic testing of Generic Letter Program MOVs is shown in Attachment 2.
The following is an explanation of the information contained in Attachment 2.
- a.
MOVs that have been DP tested and/or will be grouped with similar MOV(s) that have been DP tested and require no further on-site or off-site DP testing are as follows:
- 1. M0-1042A Tested off site with accepta~le dynamic results.
- 2. M0-1043A Grouped with M0-1042A test data.
- 3. M0-3007 Tested on-site with acceptable dynamic test margin.
- 4. M0-3009 Tested on-site with acceptable dynamic test margin.
-5. M0-3011 Tested on..,site with acc_eptable ~ynamic test margin.
- 6. M0-3013 Tested on-site with acceptable dynamic test margin.*
- 7. M0-3062 Grouped with M0-3007, 3009, 3011, 3013 test data.
- 8. M0-3064 Grouped with M0-3007, 3009, 3011, 3013 test data.
- 9. M0-3066 Grouped with M0-3007, 3009, 3011, 3013 test data.
- 10. M0-3068 Grouped with M0-3007, 3009, 3011, 3013 test data.
- 11. M0-3082 Tested on-site with acceptable dynamic test results.
- 12. M0-3083 Tested on-site with acceptable dynamic test results.
- 13. M0-3189 Grouped with M0-3190, 3199 test data.
- 14. M0-3190 Tested on-site against DP only with acceptable test results.
- 15. M0-3198 Grouped with M0-3190, 3199 test data.
- 16. M0-3199 Tested on-site against DP only with acceptable test results.
- b.
MOVs that have been DP tested and have been verified back to original Thrust/Torque calculation requirements are as follows:
3 Only M0-3190 and M0-3199 DP tests performed in 1993 have been evaluated agai.nst DP test calculation guidelines of our VOTES testing procedure.
Due to insufficient flow available during the DP test, these tests could not provide proper validation of our Thrust/Torque calculation variables.
Industry data will be required to validate these variables.
MOVs M0-3007, M0-3009, M0-3011, M0-3013 DP tests performed previously with MOVATS diagnostic test equipment cannot validate the variables used in the Thrust/Torque calculations due to previous MOVATS inaccuracy issues. However, the margin from the calculated and measured quantities are being used in an analysis to validate acceptability for these MOVs to perform their design basis function {see item c below).
All other MOVs referenced in I.a. above that have been previously tested are currently being evaluated for validation of the variables used in the most recent Torque/Thrust calculations.
- c.
MOVs that have been DP tested and verified for proper setup using industry data are as follows:
Industry test data has been acquired for M0-3007, M0-3009, M0-3011, M0-3013, M0-3062, M0-3064, M0-3066, and M0-3068 to validate their current setu~. This evaluation is in progress.
- d.
MOVs listed below are the remaining MOVs scheduled as practicable and meaningful, for DP test completion in the next {1995) Refueling Outage;
- 1.
DP testing and grouping methodology per the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of the following Low Pressure Safety Injection System MOVs.
- a. M0-3008
- b.
M0-3010
- c.
M0-3012
- d.
M0-3014
- 2.
DP testing and grouping methodology utilizing the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of the following Auxiliary Feedwater System MOVs.
- a.
M0-0743
- b.
M0-0748
- c.
M0-0753
- d.
M0-0754
- e. M0-0755
- f.
M0-0759
- g.
M0-0760
- h.
M0-0798
- 3.
DP testing and *grouping methodology utilizing the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of the following Chemical Volume and Control System MOVS.
- a.
M0-2087
- b.
M0-2140
- c.
M0-2160
- d.
M0-2169
- e.
M0-2170
- 4.
DP testing of the following Engineering Safeguards System MOVs will be completed individually.
- a.
M0-3015
- b.
M0-3016
- c.
M0-3072
- d.
M0-3080
- e.
M0-3081 NRC Requested Information (2) for those MOVs whose capability wi77 n.ot be verified by dynamic testing by the current commitment date:
(a) for each valve: the valve type, size, safety function, design basis differential pressure and flow, and the available valve factor ( or similar capability measure), and a discussion of the relative risk significance of the valves involved; CPCo Response 4
MOVs whose capability will not be verified by dynamic testing by June 28, 1994 are referenced in the last column of Attachment 2.
Using individual or grouping test methods, MOVs that require testing are planned to be DP tested in the next {1995-} Refueling _Qutage_.
Note that 10 of the MOVs were previously DP tested in 1987 or 1988 using MOVATS diagnostic test equipment.
Due to MOVATS inaccuracies and retrievable data, these MOVS are expected to be DP tested again {individually or grouped, as practicable and meaningful} using the VOTES Diagnostic system to provide improved assurance of MOV capability.
As shown in Attachment 3, all Generic Letter 89-10 Program MOVs are referenced to show the equipment identifier, safety function, functional description, lower target thrust, "As-Left" control switch trip setting, size, design basis DP for open/closed and design basis flow.
Valve factors used are currently based on nominal MOV Program values.
In the attachment, MOVs are separated into two categories. Those considered important to the PRA results and those not important to the PRA results in this attachment.
The relative risk significance of the MOVs involved is included in Attachment 4, in a separate per valve grouping of the requested data.
NRC Requested Information (b) confirmation that the functionality of these MOVs has been established using the best available information; and CPCo Response All safety-related operators in the Generic Letter 89-10 Program have been refurbished or replaced since 1986.
PPACs (Periodic and Predetermined Activity Controls} maintain the functional capabilities of these operators by performing electrical and mechanical preventive maintenance at predetermined periodic intervals.
5 Using best available industry information, all the MOVs in the Generic Letter 89-10 Testing Program have been VOTES diagnostic static tested and set up to operate at their design basis function in a degraded voltage condition. Attachment 3 provides lower target (Minimum Required Thrust with safety factor} and the "As Left" control switch trip thrusts of each MOV.
Thrust/torque calculations are used to establish the minimum and maximum target settings of each MOV during VOTES diagnostic static testing.
Input into the minimum target setting includes design basis pressure with mispositioning and dynamic effects, and a safety factor that includes rate of loading, torque switch repeatability, MOV degradation, personnel error and VOTES equipment inaccuracies.
The maximum target setting incorporates the lower of valve survivable, operator survivable or operator capability to perform at degraded voltage less a safety factor consisting of torque switch repeatability and VOTES equipment inaccuracies.
NRC Requested Information (c) the schedule for completing both the MOV testing and any needed corrective actions.
6 CPCo Response Based on the test scope previously discussed and related MOV tasks (e.g.,
including thermal binding, pressure locking and high temperature motor effects), a MOV project schedule has been established to provide needed direction to ensure successful implementation of Generic Letter 89-10.
The schedule shows the details required to perform and complete the remaining in-situ DP testing that are practicable and meaningful in the next (1995) Refueling Outage.
As industry DP test data becomes available for similar MOVs in similar test conditions, validation will be performed of our MOVs to ensure proper MOV setup.
All baseline static testing of the 38 MOVs in the Generic Letter Test Program has been performed to ensure their design basis function during a degraded voltage condition.
Any corrective actions that will be taken in the future are either to improve MOV reliability or increase the available thrust margin. A schedule extension of six (6) months after startup of the next Refueling Outage allows adequate time to complete DP testing and perform corrective actions in the 1995 Refueling Outage, and obtain and evaluate industry test data that correlates to our MOVs for validation of proper setup and perform a final assessment of the MOV program.
ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION TESTING STATUS April 28, 1994 3 Pages
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION TESTING STATUS Pg 1 of 3 SAFETY PREY lOUS VOTES MOVATS VOTES DP TEST MET DP TESTS SCH RELATED MOV#
STATI'C TEST DP TEST DP TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR 1995 REFOUT M0-0743 1990 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0748 1992 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0753 1990 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0754 1992 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0755 1993 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0759 1993 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0760 1990 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-0798 1990 1987 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 5 M0-1042A 1993 1989 YES/NOTE 1 M0-1043A 1993 NOTE 1 M0-2087 1993 YES/NOTE 6 M0-2140 1993 YES/NOTE 6 M0-2160 1993 YES/NOTE 6 M0-2169 1993 YES/NOTE 6 M0-2170 1993*
YES/NOTE 6 M0-3007 1993' 1988 YES/NOTE 4 M0-3008 1990 YES/NOTE 2 M0-3009 1993 1988 YES/NOTE 4 M0-3010 1993 YES/NOTE 2 M0-3011 1993 1988 YES/NOTE 4 M0-3012 1990 YES/NOTE 2 M0-3013 1993 1988 YES/NOTE 4 M0-3014 1990 YES/NOTE 2
PREY IOUS VOTES MOY#
STATIC TEST M0-3015 1990 M0-3016 1990 M0-3062 1993 M0-3064 1993 M0-3066 1993 M0-3068 1993 M0-3072 1993.
M0-3080 1994*
M0-3081 1994 M0-3082 1993 M0-3083 1993 M0-3189 1993 M0-3190 1993 M0-3198 1993 M0-3199 1993 COMMENTS:
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION TESTING STATUS MOVATS DP TEST 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 VOTES DP TEST 1991 1991 NOTE 7 1993 NOTE 7 1993 DP TEST MET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA YES/NOTE 4 YES/NOTE 4 YES/NOTE 4 YES/NOTE 4 YES/NOTE 3 YES/NOTE 3 YES YES YES YES Pg 2 of 3 DP TESTS SCH FOR 1995 REFOUT YES YES YES YES YES
- 1.
NOTE 1 - M0-1042A was flow tested extensively off site at Wyle Labs at full design basis pressure. Licensee Event Report 89-025 concluded that M0-1043A could be grouped with the M0-1042A DP test results for proper setup. M0-1042.
is not practicable to DP test onsite at Palisades.
- 2.
NOTE 2 - DP testing and grouping methodology per the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of these Low Pressure Safety Injection {LPSI)/Shut Down Cooling MOVs in the 1995 Refueling Outage.
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION TESTING STATUS Pg 3 of 3
- 3.
NOTE 3 - DP tests performed in 1987 and 1988 met the acceptance criteria of their test procedures during that period.
However, due to MOVATS inaccuracies and retrievable data, MOVs specified are expected to be DP tested again
{individually or grouped, as practicable and meaningful) using the VOTES diagnostic system to provide improved assurance of MOV capability.
- 4.
NOTE 4 - High Pressure Safety Injection {HPSI) MOVs M0-3007, M0-3009, M0-3011 and M0-3013 had acceptable dynamic tes~!
margin and are u.sed in a pending grouping analysis to verify proper setup of the Redundant High Pressure Safety Injection MOVs M0-3062, M0-3064, M0-3066 and M0-3068.
- 5.
NOTE 5 - DP testing and grouping methodology per the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of these Auxiliary Feedwater MOVs in the 1995 Refueling Outage.
- 6.
NOTE 6 - DP testing and grouping methodology per the considerations referenced in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6 is expected to be used for DP testing of these Chemical Volume and Control MOVs in the 1995 Refueling Outage.
7 NOTE 7 - Identical valves M0-3190 and M0-3199 were DP tested in the 1993 refueling Outage.
Information from these tests is expecte~ to be used in a future grouping analysis to validate M0-3189 and M0-3198 switch setup.
ATTACHMENT 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS April 28, 1994 2 Pages
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS Page I of 2 The valves listed below are in order of importance to the PRA results.
Lower As-Left Design Design Safety Dir Target CST Valve Basis DP Basis Valve Open/Close Description of Function Thrust Setting ~ Size Open Close Flow 9,
MO-I042A Q Q POWER.OPERATED RELIEF ISOLATION I3,4I8 I5,765 DD Gate 4"
2585 2I87 8I lb/sec MO-I043A Q Q POWER OPERATED RELIEF ISOLATION I3,4I8 I6,720 DD Gate 4"
2585 2I87 8I lb/sec M0-3080 Q Q HPSI NORMAL INJECTION I6,3I6 I9,738 Fl ex Gate 6" I248 I248 680 gpm M0-308I Q Q HPSI REDUNDANT INJECTION MODE I6,33I I9,986 Flex Gate 6" I248 I250 680 gpm M0-3007 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP IA 8738 11,380 Thr.Globe 2" I64I I239 370 gpm M0-3009 Q N HPSI ro REACTOR COOLANT LOOP I8 8738 ll,5I5 Thr.Globe 2" I64I I24I 370 gpm M0-30II Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A 8738 I0,645 Thr.Globe 2" I64I I24I 370 gpm M0-30I3 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 28 8738 11, 743 Thr.Globe 2" I64I I236 370 gpm M0-3062 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 28 I2,948 I3,9I6 Thr.Globe 2" 2683 I240 370 gpm M0-3064 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A I2,948 I3,680 Thr.Globe 2" 2683 I238 370 gpm M0-3066 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP I8 I2,948 I5,38I Thr.Globe 2" 2683 I239 370 gpm M0-3068 Q N HPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP IA I2,948 I3,030 Thr.Globe 2" 2683 I239 370 gpm M0-2I60 Q N SIRW TO CHARGING PUMPS ISOLATION 2390 3733 Flex Gate 3" IOI 39 I33 gpm M0-3015 N Q SHUTDOWN COOLING INLET I4,262 25,I48 Flex Gate I2" 266 254 4I20 gpm M0-30I6 N Q SHUTDOWN COOLING INLET I4,285 29,744 Flex Gate I2" 266 255 4I20 gpm M0-0743 Q Q AFW S/G E-50B ISOLATION 11, I63 I3,777 Flex Gate 4" I479 I527 800 gpm M0-0748 Q Q AFW S/G E-508 ISOLATION I0,868 I2,925 Flex Gate 4" I294 I324 800 gpm M0-0753 Q Q AFW S/G E-50A ISOLATION 11, I 72 I4,529 Flex Gate 4" 0
I529 800 gpm M0-0754 Q Q AFW S/G E-50A ISOLATION I0,874 I3,648 Flex Gate 4" I294 I325 800 gpm M0-0755 Q Q AFW S/G E-508 ISOLATION I0,868 11, 076 Flex Gate 4" I294 I324 800 gpm M0-0759 Q Q AFW ~/G E-50A ISOLATION I0,878 I2,385 Flex Gate 4" I294 I326 800 gpm M0-0760 Q Q AFW S/G E-50A ISOLATION ll,I72 I5,I99 Flex Gate 4" 0
I529 800 gpm M0-0798 Q Q AFW ~/G E-50B ISOLATION 11, I68 I4,985 Flex Gate 4" I479 I528 800 gpm
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOY SETUP/PRA STATUS Page 2 of 2 The valves listed below were not important to the PRA results.
Lower As-Left Design Design Safety Dir Target CST Valve Basis DP Basis Valve Open/Close Description of Function Thrust Setting llRg Size Open Close Flow M0-2087 N Q VOLUME CONTROL TANK ISOLATION 2542 376I Flex Gate 4"
114 55 I33 gpm M0-2I40 Q N BORIC'ACID FEED PUMP ISOLATION 2568 3459 Flex Gate 3"
I26 116 93 gpm M0-2I69 Q N BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED 2556 462I Flex Gate 4"
118 6
93 gpm M0-2170 Q N BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED 2556 2827 Flex Gate 4"
118 6
93 gpm M0-3008 Q N LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP IA 'I4,368 I20,536 Thr.Globe 6"
I287 22I 2400 gpm M0-30IO Q N LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP IB I4,368 6I,477 Thr.Globe 6"
I287 22I 2400 gpm M0-30I2 Q N LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2A I4,567 113, 998 Thr.Globe 6"
I287 220 2400 gpm M0-30I4 Q N LPSI TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 2B I4,368 I33,328 Thr.Globe 6"
I287 220 2400 gpm M0-3072 Q Q CHARG~NG TO SAFETY INJECT ISOL I2,077 I5,407 Thr.Globe 2"
2790 2807 I25 gpm M0-3082 Q Q HPSI HOT LEG INJECTION MODE 5710 7208 Plug Globe 2"
2682 I250 340 gpm M0-3083 Q Q HPSI HOT LEG INJECTION MODE 5724 8933 Plug Globe 2"
I244 I255 340 gpm M0-3I89 Q Q P-67A. SUCTION FROM SIRW/SUMP I9,204 22,746 Solid Gate I4" 230 23 4800 gpm M0-3I98 Q Q P-67A SUCTION FROM SIRW/SUMP I9,204 20,609 Solid Gate I4" 230 23 4800 gpm M0-3I90 Q Q P-67B SUCTION FROM SOC 22,752 24,338 Solid Gate I4" 282 23I 4800 gpm M0-3I99 Q Q P-67B SUCTION FROM SOC 22,752 23,302 Solid Gate I4" 282 23I 4800 gpm NOTES:
I.
Lower target thrust includes the Minimum Required Thrust to operate at design basis pressure with a additional safety factor that includes rate of loading, VOTES equipment inaccuracies, valve degradation, spring pack/torque switch repeatability and personnel error.
- 2.
As-left Control Switch Trip (CST) references the last static VOTES diagnostic test performed for valve thrust at torque switch trip.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Design Basis DP includes mispositioning and momentum effects (water hammer).
Design Basis flow is a maximum flow rate rather than the flow rate which correspond to the maximum Design Basis DP.
Valve Factors are assumed 0.4 for gate valves and I.I for globe valves.
Lower target thrust and CST setting is in lbs. and design basis DP is in PSID.
ATTACHMENT 4 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SET/UP PRA STATUS April 29, 1994 13 Pages
Valve IO:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
Valve IO:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
Valve IO:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOY SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-1042A Power Operated Relief Isolation Double Disk Gate 4"
Page 1 of 13 The rtsk significance of the PORV isolation valves is 8.1%
of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of
- 47.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of both valves using the common cause term for both valves failing to open.
Open:
2585 PSID Closed:
2187 PSID 0.4 The MOV may be required to open for energy removal during an extended loss of feedwater.
In the event that the PRV-1042B or PRV-1043B were to stick open the corresponding MOV would be required to close to prevent a loss-of-coolant accident.
MO-l043A Power Operated Relief Isolation Double Disk Gate 4"
The risk significance of the PORV isolation valves is 8.1%
of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of
- 47.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of both valves using the common cause term for both valves failing to open.
Open:
2585 PSID Closed:
2187 PSID 0.4 The MOV may be required to open for energy removal during an extended loss of feedwater.
In the event that the PRV-1042B or PRV-1043B were to stick open the corresponding valve would be required to close to prevent a loss-of-c6olant accident.
M0-3080 HPSI Normal Injection Flex Gate 6"
The risk significance for the HPSI Normal Injection Mode MOV is a contribution of < 1% to the core damage frequency and a
- Risk Achievement Worth of - 7. -The-importance of this MOV_
to the PRA is for its failure to remain open.
Open:
1248 PSID Closed:
1248 PSID 0.4 MOV is required to open for cold leg injection.
MOV is required to close to split flow between the hot and -
cold legs and to prevent pump runout.
Valve ID:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
Valve ID:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
Valve ID:
==
Description:==
Valve Type:
Valve Size:
Relative Risk:
Design Basis DP:
Valve Factor:
Safety Function:
GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3081 HPSI Redundant Injection Mode Flex Gate 6"
Page 2 of 13 The risk significance for the HPSI Redundant Injection Mode MOV is a contribution of < 1% to the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of - 7.
The importance of this MOV to the PRA is for its failure to remain open.
Open:
124.8 PSID Closed:
1250 PSID 0.4 MOV is required to open for cold leg injection.
MOV is required to close to split flow between the hot and cold legs and to prevent pump runout.
M0-3007 HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop IA Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 1 injection MOV is
<< 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open:
1641 PSID Closed:
1239 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
M0-3009 HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop lB Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 1 injection MOV is
<< 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open:
1641 PSID Closed:
1241 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOY SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3011 HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Throttle Globe 2"
Page 3 of 13 The risk significance of the HPSI train 1 injection MOV is
<< 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open 1641 PSID Closed:
1241 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
M0-3013 HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 28 Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 1 injection MOV is
<< 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5. These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open: 1641 PSID Closed: 1236 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
M0-3062 Redundant HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 28 Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 2 (redundant) injection MOV is << 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5.
These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open: 2683 PSID Closed:
1240 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to-the-PCS function.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3064 Redundant HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Throttle Globe 2"
Page 4 of 13 The risk significance of the HPSI train 2 (redundant) injection MOV is << 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5. These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open: 2683 PSID Closed:
1238 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
M0-3066 Redundant HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop lB Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 2 (redundant) injection MOV is << 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5. These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open: 268~ PSID Closed:
1239 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS function.
M0-3068 Redundant HPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop IA Throttle Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI train 2 (redundant) injection MOV is << 1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 5. These values were based on an assumed common mode failure of all of the valves using the common cause term for all valves failing to open.
Open: 2683 PSID Closed:
1239 PSID 1.1 The MOV opens during a loss of coolant accident to provide makeup to the PCS -function..
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOY SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-2160 SIRW to Charging Pumps Isolation Flex Gate 3"
Page 5 of 13 The risk significance of M0-2160 is << 0.1% of the core damage frequency and a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.4.
Open: 101 PSID Closed: 39 PSID 0.4 The MOY opens during a loss of coolant accident to align SIRW tank to charging pump section.
M0-3015 Shutdown Cooling Inlet Flex Gate 12" The risk significance for the shutdown cooling letdown MOY is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of this MOY to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open:
266 PSID Closed:
254 PSID 0.4 The MOY must close to prevent loss of coolant and isolate primary coolant from shutdown cooling piping and LPSI pumps.
M0-3016 Shutdown Cooling Inlet Flex Gate 12" The risk significance for the shutdown cooling letdown MOY is minimal.
It contributes<.0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of this MOY to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 266 PSID Closed:
255 PSID 0.4 The MOY must close to prevent loss of coolant and isolate primary coolant from shutdown cooling piping and LPSI pumps.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-0743 AFW S/G E-508 Isolation flex Gate 4"
Page 6 of 13 The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of -1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1479 PSID Closed:
1527 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
M0-0748 AFW S/G E50B Isolation Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1294 PSID Closed:
1324 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator fo~ a tube rupture.
M0-0753 AFW S/G E-50A Isolation Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open:
0 PSID Closed:
1529 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-0754 AFW S/G E-50A Isolation Flex Gate 4"
Page 7 of 13 The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1.
The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1294 PSID Closed:
1325 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
M0-0755 AFW S/G E-508 Isolation Fl ex Gate 4"
The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1294 PSID Closed:
1324 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
M0-0759 AFW S/G E-50A Isolation Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1294 PSID Closed:
1326 PSID 0.4 The MOV's safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-0760 AFW S/G E-50A Isolation Flex Gate 4"
Page 8 of 13 The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation valves is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open:
0 PSID Closed:
1529 PSID 0.4 The MOV"s safety function is to remai~ open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
M0-0798 AFW S/G E-508 Isolation Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance for the steam generator flow isolation MOV is minimal.
It contributes< 0.1% to the core damage frequency and have a Risk Achievement Worth of - 1.1. The importance of these valves to the PRA are for their failure to remain open.
Open: 1479 PSID Closed:
1528 PSID 0.4 The MOV"s safety function is to remain open to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and to close to isolate the steam generator for a tube rupture.
M0-2087 Volume Control Tank Isolation Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance of the Volume Control Tank Isolation MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open:
N/A Closed:
55 PSID 0.4 The safety function of the MOV is to isolate the normal letdown flow to the charging pump suction as a result of a LOCA so that the only pump suction is from the SIRW tank
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOY SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-2I40 Boric Acid Feed Pump Isolation Flex Gate 3"
Page 9 of I3 The risk significance of the Boric Acid Feed Pump Isolation MOV ts insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of I.O.
Open: I26 PSID Closed:
N/A 0.4 The MOV must open upon safety injection signal to allow flow of boric acid to the charging pumps.
M0-2I69 Boric Acid Gravity Feed Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance of the Boric Acid Gravity Feed MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: II8 PSID Closed:
N/A 0.4 The MOV must open upon safety injection signal to allow flow of boric acid to the charging pumps.
M0-2170 Boric Acid Gravity Feed Flex Gate 4"
The risk significance of the Boric Acid Gravity Feed MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of I.O.
Open: 118 PSID Closed:
N/A 0.4 Th& MOV must open upon safety injection signal to alJow flow of boric acid to the charging pumps.
M0-3008 LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop IA Throttle Globe 6"
The risk significance of the LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop IA MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of I.O.
Open: 1287 PSID Closed:
N/A I. I The MOV opens during a LOCA accident to provide makeup to the PCS.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3010 LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop lB Throttle Globe 6"
Page 10 of 13 The risk significance of the LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop lB MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 1287 PSID Closed:
N/A 1.1 The MOV opens during a LOCA accident to provide makeup to the PCS.
M0-3012 LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Throttle *Globe 6"
The risk significance of the LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2A MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 1287 PSID Closed:
N/A 1.1 The MOV opens during a LOCA accident to provide makeup to the PCS.
M0-3014 LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2B Throttle Globe 6"
The risk significance of the LPSI to Reactor Coolant Loop 2B MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 1287 PSID Closed:
N/A 1..1 The MOV opens during a LOCA accident to provide makeu~ tB the PCS.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3072 Charging to Safety Injection Isolation Throttle Globe 2"
- Attachment 4 Page 11 of 13 The risk significance of the Charging to Safety Injection Isolation MDV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 2790 PSID Closed:
2807 PSID 1.1 The MDV must open to inject boric acid into the PCS via the safety injection piping in the event that the charging line inside the containment building is inoperative.
M0-3082 HPSI Hot leg Injection Mode Plug Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI Hot leg Injection Mode MDV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 2682 PSID Closed:
1250 PSID 1..1 The MDV is required to open to support hot leg injection and to remain closed to support cold leg injection.
M0-3083 HPSI Hot leg Injection Mode Plug Globe 2"
The risk significance of the HPSI Hot leg Injection Mode MDV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Ope~: 1244 PSID Closed: 1255 PSID 1.1 The MDV is required to open to support hot leg injection and to remain closed to support cold leg injection.
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GL 89-10 SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3189 P-67A Suction from SIRW/Sump Solid Gate 14 11 Page 12 of 13 The risk significance of the P-67A Suction from SIRW/Sump MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 230 PSIO Closed:
23 PSID 0.4 The MOV remains open to provide a suction flow path from SIRW tank or containment sump to the LPSI pumps.
(Valves are required to close to prevent diversion of flow during shutdown cooling operation.}
. M0-3198 P-67A Suction from SIRW/Sump Solid Gate 14 11 The risk significance of the P-67A Suction from SIRW/Sump MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 230 PSID Closed:
23 PSIO 0.4 The MOV remains open to provide a suction flow path from SIRW tank or containment sump to the LPSI pumps.
(Valves are required to close to prevent diversion of flow during shutdown cooling operation.}
M0-3190 P-67A Suction From SOC Solid Gate 14 11 The risk significance of the P-67A Suction From SOC MOV is insignHicant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 282 PSID Closed:
231 PSID 0.4 The MOV must open for SOC operability and must close for proper SOC alignment.
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GL 89-iO SCHEDULE EXTENSION MOV SETUP/PRA STATUS M0-3199 P-678 Suction from SOC Solid Gate 14" Page 13 of 13 The risk significance of the P-678 Suction from SOC MOV is insignificant. It contributes 0% to the core damage frequency and has a Risk Achievement Worth of 1.0.
Open: 282 PSID Closed:
231 PSID 0.4 The MOV must open for SOC operability and must close for proper SOC alignment.