ML18059A962
| ML18059A962 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1994 |
| From: | Sinclair M DON'T WASTE MICHIGAN |
| To: | Zwolinski J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9404290303 | |
| Download: ML18059A962 (5) | |
Text
,J.
Mr. John Zwolinski, Assistant Director for Region Ill Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C., 20555
Dear Mr. Zwolinski:
5711 Summerset Dr.
Midland, MI 48640 April 20, 1994 This is in response to your letter of March 25, '94. I would like to clarify, with specificity, the facts that surround many of the issues that you have described in general terms in your letter.
You listed a number of allegations that I had made before the Final Rule was promulgated on April 7, '93 on the first page of your letter. You -refer to the numbers of NRC's responses to those allegations in the Final Rule in the footnote of page 2 of your letter. I will explain why those responses are inadequate in each instance, and why they should be the subject of an adjudicatory hearing. These allegations and my evaluation of NRC's responses are as follows:
- 1. The casks were untested. NRC's response ip #35 is inadequate because it does not take into account the statement made by F. Sturz of the NRC in aletter to J. V. Massey, the vendor of the cask, in the Revision of the Proposed Certificate of Compliance (July 8, '92) that says: "This preoperational test is viewed by the NRC staff as necessary because the fuel clad temperatures predicted by the vendor is only 4 degrees F. below* the design criteria for off-normal conditions. Also, the concrete temperature is very close to the design criteria under the same conditions." It also turned out that Consumers Power Co. did not have the type of fuel that the NRC was prescribing for that test load on site of the first MSB--it was of a lower temperature. (See Consumers Power Co. comments, Sept. 9, '92) Therefore, a verification* of the heat removal capacity of the VSC system has yet to be made. _This important function of this cask must be tested at yet another site that has higher temperature fuel, as, for example, at Point Beach.
Response #37 was not adequate because an NRC inspection of the construction of the casks on site
.after most of them were built-prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Compliance--found that the construction workers did not know they should be following a code and did not know what the ACI code was. (Inspection Rept. dated 6122/92) Furthermore, in a comment by Band W Fuel Co., it was pointed out that the NRC staff had failed to identify a significant safety issue, i.e., closure welds of the interior metal basket holding the fuel are not sufficient to meet the structural strength requirements of ASME Sec.
Ill, pressure vessel. The response further states that the NRC <lid not rely on the VSC-17 tests in Idaho far approval of the cask, but a letter from Gordon Gunderson of the.NRC (NLJS-129) states that the cask designer did use the information in the VSC-24 design. We need to knb~ what the implications are of n Q rr.,0. r; Ht
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Page Two NRC's refusing to use the results of that test in Idaho, and the fact that vendor did use these results in the design of the VSC-24 cask.
2> The manufacturer had refused to endorse use of the *casks for the storage of spent fuel. NRC's Response #70 is inadequate because it does not bear out that NRC made any effort to find out the reasons why Pacific Nuclear, the original designer and manufacturer of the VSC-24 cask, divested itself of all interest and participation with Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associates (now Sierra Nuclear) and the VSC-24 cask design. In its Jetter on this matter to C. Haughney of the NRC, the company offered to give reasons, saying, "Please let us know if you would like any additional information related to the divestiture." The NRC made no such inquiry and therefore, NRC's response that it "is not aware of any safety, negligence, liability or legal concerns" for the divestiture is simply a seif-serving statement, ba_sed on mere speculation and no investigation.
- 3. The NRC had failed to pre;pare an environmental impact statement on the action.
NRC's response #61 claims that all potential environmental impacts were fully considered in an Environmental Assessment (with a finding of no significant impact). This was inadequate since this envirof1mental assessment was largely based on NUREG-0575, Final Generic fllvironmental Impact
- Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Fuel, 1979. At that time, the impact of
- a national dry cask storage could not be assessed since the Department of Energy was only beginning its investigation of the use of dry cask storage for commercial operators. Adding the VSC-24 as a generic
- cask to the list of approved casks was a major Federal action that can significantly affect the human environment. Alternatives to continued generation are different today than in 1979. Economic alternative energy sources, demand-~ide management, and fossil fuel combustion plants other than coal fired plants are avai fable today that argue for a new comparison to be made of the economics of nuclear power and
- alternative energy sources. The increase of spent fuel storage at reactor sites nationwide has significant economic and environmental impacts that should have been considered. The recent indepth studies of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State of Michigan of high risk soil erosion areas in the Gr~t Lakes region should have been reviewed.
- 4. The only public hearing NRC was willing to have was without legaj force. NRC's response that their staff technical reviews and public comments are sufficient to address all public health, safety and environmental issues overlooked the fact that there are significant site specific issues at the Palisades site that were identified as requiring an adjudicatory hearing. The fact that the NRC has now hired two experts.
to review the conditions ofthe site and the storage pad confirms that our views were correct.
- 5. The NRC. by allowing construction of casks to begin prior to the issuance of a "certificate of compliance." had failed to follow its own regulations. We have already showri that this breach of its own rules led to serious quality control problems in the construction of the casks (see #1 response above). We also note that about a month after the Final Rule was issued and 2 casks were already loaded, the vendor, J. V. Massey, wrote to the NRC and stated he was now ready to take up safety issues that. the NRC had
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Page Three Stated needed review in Aug. of'92, during the comment period, and months before the Final Rule was issued in April, '93. At that time ( Aug., '92), Massey had stated that he preferred to have the casks approved "as is" so the work at Palisades could be completed in speedy fashion, and he would be glad to attend to these safety issues later. The NRC agreed to that course of action. In other words, the safety of the casks were to be attended to after the casks were built and loaded.
- 6. The casks were to be inspected visually rather than contimplly monitored. Responses # 17 and
- 18 in the Final Rule confinn the fact that the NRC requirements for monitoring the VSC-24 do not comply with their rule that requires the licensee to be able to determine at all times whether corrective action needs to be taken to ensure safe storage. We have already pointed out that the NRC failed to identify the fact that the closure welds for the MSB do not meet the structural strength requirements of the ASME code. (Response #1 above) Furthermore, NRC assertions in the past that there would be no degradation mechanism that would cause reactor parts to fail have been glaringly wrong-considering the *
. corrosion of steam generators and pressure vessel embrittlement within just a fraction of the licensed operating time period. A Pacifi~ Sierra Report st.ates that corrosion rates are exacerbated by irradiation where metal cannisters are placed in a wet climate--and that is the case on the shore of Lake Michigan.
- 7. The casks were to be located 150 yards from Lake Michigan. NRC's response #12 is not supported by the indepth studies of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer of that area indicating the high
~sion*potential of that area of Lake Michigan's shoreline. It does not take into account an indepth study made for the Michigan Low-level Radioactive Waste Authority whose consult.ants found that no nuclear reactor site in the state of Michigan was suitable, including the Palisades site, for the co-location of a Jow-Jevel radioactive waste facility as required to meet the needs of the Midwest compact of states. If Michigan's reactor sites are not suitable fora low-level radioactive waste facility, how can they possibly be suitable for a high level nuclear waste storage facility?
In addition, on page 2 of your letter, I should like to emphasize that my telephone comments to Mr.
John Jacobson of NRC's Region III staff that the concrete pad was built on "shifting dunes" in July, '93, was not the first time I had brought this up. I had pointed this out repeatedly in previous statements.and in my comments long before the Final Rule was issued. It was a major reason why I was so interested in details on the construction of the storage pad in that area and its ability tO hold 25 casks each weighing 130 tons over a long period of time. We have not been able to find this infonnation. We appreciate the action the NRC has taken to examine the site and to get this infonnation for the public.
While I did not ask about the conseq_uences of an earthquake in the area, I have noticed that Consumers Power Co. is required to make an annual status report for Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities (IPEEE) which includes development of seismic hazard curves as well as soil failure evaluation. In their Sept. 1, '93 Ietter to the NRC on this subject, they state that their originaJ schedule for this was to be completed by the end of the first quarter of 1993, but they would not have it done until the end of October. In other words, this was not done in time to be
Page Four useful for the completion of the Final RuJe. Their soi] faiJure evaluation was also behind their orlgiki ___
scheduJe.
Also, your letter states three reasons why you believe there is no undue risk by the use of the casks,,
at this time. You state that the casks have been evalwite<ho assure their safety if tipped over. However, a Feb. I, '94 letter from F. Sturz of the NRC to J. Massey, the vendor, states, "A tip-over is not an acceptabJe occurrence and must be prevented." Please provide me with the documents that evaluate the casks' safety if tipped over, and whether the NRC position on this has changed since Feb. 1, '94, and for what reason.
Second, your letter states that the "casks have been evaluated to assure safety if all vents are b1ocked, as, for example, if the casks were to be enveloped in sand." Please send me the documents for this evaJuation. Why have the vents at all, since they represent a hazard, if the cask can operate safeJy if they are blocked?
Your letter states that "any erosion of sand under the pad would be a very sJow process and would be readily detectab1e." Please supply documents for this evaluation. Generally speaking, a slow process of erosion is not readily detectable, but a rapid one is. How does the NRC evaluation of the erosion process in this area compare with the studies that the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers has made which indicates substantial erosion can take place in that area in the next several decades?
In your reference to "new questions" being raised in this letter, I am assuming you are referring to NRC's evaluation of the cask site and pad and to Consumers Power Company's additional technical efforts. Please provide me with all the correspondence and any other documentation that is associated with how these "new questions" were initiated. To what extent are DOE and EPA responsibilities being brought into this decision?
The letter from Consumers Power Co. that you included with your letter states that it was recognized that "before the VSC-24 cask would be approved for use under a general license, it would be analyzed and its functional capability would be evaluated linder the most stringent seismic criteria for most
. location_s in the United States". Was this, in fact, done by the NRC? If so, why is the vendor now asking for changes in ~ismic design for a revised VSC Safety Analysis Report? (Sierra Nuclear letter to NRC, Nov. 11, 1993)
In addition, Consumers states that they will provide data to demonstrate that, in the event of a design basis (0.2g) seismic event, "the surrounding sand would not engulf the cask and prevent their ventilation function". This seems to contradict NRCs position, stated in your letter,. that the NRC has already determined that the casks will be safe if all vents were blocked, for example, if they were enveloped by sand. We need documentation for all of these matters.
It is disturbing that all evaluations for the pad to maintain its structural ability and the ability of the dunes slopes to remain in place under all possible conditions were not done before the casks were
Page five approved and allowed to be loaded, as Consumers Power Co. now states they are in the process of
,., determining.
Small earthquakes, high winds, and atmospheric changes are known to cause seiches which have*
occurred in the Great l.akes--some have occurred on Lake Michigan. But there are well-known, more frequent and well-documented phenomena in the Great Lakes' dunes areas that are called "blow-outs".
They can occur as the result of heavy storms and high winds over the Great Lakes, and they can greatly change the external shape of the dunes. Many have occurred on the shore of ~e Michigan~ _(See I.A.
Dorr and D. F. Esch man, Geology of Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1984) No one can predict where seiches or "blowouts" will occur.
Many thanks for your concerns on this important matter.
bG?a..*~1..;~,
M;yp:si;air, PhD Co-chair, Don't Waste Michigan