ML18058B951
| ML18058B951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1993 |
| From: | Hsia A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Slade G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TAC-M87057, NUDOCS 9308200083 | |
| Download: ML18058B951 (4) | |
Text
r Docket No. 50-255 Mr. Gerald B. Slade Plant General Manager Palisades Plant Consumers Power Company 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043
Dear Mr. Slade:
August 3, 1993 DISTRIBUTION
-.::Docket -Fil e NRC & LPDRs JRoe JZwolinski WDean JRHall CJamerson AHsia BMcCabe, Riii WShafer, Riii LPhillips, 8/E/23 SLWu, 8/E/23 JDavis, 7/D/4 GHornseth, 7/D/4 MParker,. SRI OGC ACRS( 10)
RLerch, Riii
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PALISADES PLANT REGARDING RECENT FUEL FAILURE EVENT (TAC NO. M87057)
Based on the information gathered by the Augmented Inspection Team (All) and the subsequent daily briefings, the NRC staff has determined that we need additional information to assess your actions in response to the recent fuel failure event at the Palisades plant. The enclosed list of specific questions and the technical areas for you to address were verbally conveyed to Mr. J. Kuemin of your staff on July 29, 1993. These questions will be the subject of a conference call between the NRC and your staff to be held shortly. Following that call, you should provide written responses to the enclosed questions, and responses to any related questions that arise during the call. Based on the outcome of the conference call, we will advise you of the need for a meeting or additional discussions with your staff to resolve these issues.
We note that one of the conditions of the July 8, 1993, Confirmatory Action Letter specifies that a management meeting be held between the NRC and your staff prior to plant restart.
Please contact me should you have any questions regarding this request.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, Original signed by Anthony H. Hsia, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-1
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Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information
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- 1-a. JL OFFICE LA: PD31 A PD:PD31 NAME DATE COPY OFFICIAL R 1i8' I 1
Mr. Gerald B. Slade Consumers Power Company cc:
M. I. Miller, Esquire Sidley & Austin 54th Floor One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. Thomas A. McNish, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Jerry Sarno Township Supervisor Covert Township 36197 M-140 Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 Mr. David W. Rogers Safety and Licensing Director Palisades Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission Resident Inspector Office Palisades Plant 27782 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043 Palisades Plant Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section Office Division of Radiological Health Department of Public Health 3423 N. Logan Street P. 0. Box 30195 Lansing, Michigan 48909 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N. W.
Washington DC 20037 Alora Davis Corrmitment Tracking System Coordinator Palisades Plant Consumers Power Company 27780 Blue Star Memorial Hwy.
Covert, Michigan 49043-9530 July 1993 I
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PALISADES FUEL FAILURE ISSUES TECHNICAL AREAS TO BE APPRESSED BY PALISADES:
Mechanical Design
- 1.
Details of the inspections performed to date, including results and conclusions. Plans for other inspections.
- 2.
Justification for the selection of the L-bundles as replacement bundles. Detailed L-bundle design and core configuration and its impact on core physics and thermal hydraulic performance.
- 3.
Grid spacer spring retention forces as a function of core residence or burnup.
Thermal Hydraulic Design Localized axial flow and cross flow conditions as a result of the replacement assemblies and the knowledge gained through root cause analyses.
Missing Fuel Recovery
- 1.
Accountability of the missing debris (pellets, cladding, spacer strip and spacer spring).
- 2.
Disposition of the located debris.
- 3.
Potential impact of any remaining debris on startup and operation.
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
- 1.
The proposed bundle reconstitution method does not appear to be consistent with the Siemens Report ANF-90-082, Rev.I, wherein the replacement rods should have Zircaloy cladding and the same dimensions as the fuel rods. The staff is interested in the effect of the oversized stainless steel rods on the potential fretting of adjacent rods and the relaxation of spacer springs.
- 2.
Please provide the available spring retention data to the NRC or provide a schedule for that information.
- 3.
The plan to install stainless steel rods in the L-bundles is not consistent with the inspection data from the 1-21, 1-24, and H-31 bundles.
In light of the above, your current plan to replace two fuel rods at each corner that is not facing the core shroud with stainless steel rods does not appear to be conservative. Please provide justification for the stainless steel rod replacement design.
- 4.
How will the use of stainless steel rods stop the fretting?
- 5.
What is the impact of the increased core flow experienced after the SG replacement as related to flow-induced vibration and fretting?
- 6.
Provide justification for rotating the bowed assemblies so that the bowed area is facing the control blade instead of the core shroud.
What assurance do you have that the bowed assembly will not impede the movement of the control blade? Provide the clearances between the assembly and the core shroud and between the assembly and the control blade as well as the estimated amount of assembly bow.
- 7.
Provide justification for not conducting a metallurgical analysis on the failed fuel rod to determine or confirm the failure mechanism as well as the condition of the fuel pellets.