ML18057A346

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Summary of 900705 Meeting W/Util in Rockville,Md Re Request for Exemption from Section III.G.2 of App R to 10CFR50. Meeting Attendees Listed in Attachment 2
ML18057A346
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/20/1990
From: Brian Holian
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Zwolinski J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-71852, NUDOCS 9007260167
Download: ML18057A346 (26)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES

  • NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

~uly 20, 1990.

)

I ME~ORANDUM TO:

John A. Zwolinski, Assistant Director for Region III Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V & Special Projects THRU:

Robert C. Pierson, Acting Director Project Directorate III-I Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V I Special Projetts FROM:

Brian E. Holian, Project Manager Project Directcrate III-I Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V & Special Projects

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

~OF MEETING WITH CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES CONTAINMENT AIR ROOM APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REQUEST (TAC NO. 71852).

A meeting-was-held.at NRCHeadc{uarfers on July 5,-1990.-fodisc-uss)>alfsacfeis exemption request to section III.G.2 of A~pendix R to 10 CFR 50. In.July of 1984 Palisades requested an exemption to the minimum instrument separation in the containment air room.

A chronology of the containment air room instrument separation issue was provided by the licensee and is included as.Attachment L. provides a list of meeting attendees.

Palisad~s fire protection per~onnel presented their analys~s of a potential fire.in the containment air room.

Included H1 this analys.is was*:

1)
2)
3) a ~escript~on of the room (larg~ v~lume, well *ventilated),

a discussion of the likelihood and types of fires possible (cable tray fire is most credible), and a discussion of the consequences of the fire and its impact on transmitter accuracy (sufficient instruments are available for safe shutdown).

Palisades used the Hazard 1 fire assessment method. This computer software integrated fire model was developed by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Center for Fire Research. Attachment 3 provides an overview of the containment air room fire analysis. Attachment 4 is the licensee's analysis of the effect of a fire on safety-related *instruments in the containment air room.

9007260167 PDR ADOCI<

F 900720 05000255 PDC I

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  • Th~ staff agreed with the licensee that their review of combustible loading and temperature excursions in the containment* air room supports their exemption request from section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

Palisades fire protection personnel will. suppl~~ent their original exemption request with this additirinal information.

A~ditionally, the licensee \\rlill more fully address*the ability of the operators to safely shut* down the plant* assuming~ worst case: fire int~~

contai.nment air room.

It is a*nticipated that the staff review of this exemption request will be completed by September 1990.

.A",f>

Brian* L Holian,Project Ma.nager Project Directorate III-1

. Division of Reactor Pr9jects - JI!,

  • IV, V & Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*,
l. ::* ;:,.

DISTRIBUTION

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  • . EJo.r.dan.

i JCJifford BBurgess *.

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OGC RPierson

.,.I NRC Particip~nts

  • PM/PD3l:DRSP BHOLIAN ~~

7I17 /90

.91liJ/~r (A)D/PD3l:DRSP RPIERSON 7/ffr/90.

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The staff agreed with the licensee that their review of combustible loading and temperature excursions in the containment air room supports their exemption request from section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

Palisades fire protection personnel will supplement their original exemption request with this additional information. Additionally, the licensee will more fully address the ability of*

the operators to safely shut down the plant assuming a worst case fire in the containment air room.

It is anticipated that the staff review of this exemption request will bE completed by September 1990.

Brian E. Holian,Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V & Special Projects

. Office of Nuclear Reactor Re~ulation

. \\

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ATTACHMENT Chonology of Containment Air Booai Instrument Separation Issue J2AD DESCRIPTION 7/16184 CPCo l'&quests an exemption request from section 111.G.2 of Appendix R Instrument separation inside containment.

7120184 CPCo requests an exemption request from section 111.G.2 of Appendix R Cable separation inside containment.

  • 12128184 CPCo provides additional Information to the NRC relating to the Instrument Separation Issue. Requested by the NRC during the 10/5184 conference call.

7/23/85 NRC grants exemption request for Cable separation Inside the Containment Air Room.

. 10/4185 CPCo provides additional lnformatio.n relating to Instrument Separation Inside containment 6188-7188 Special Safety Inspection conducted by the NRC on Fire Protection I Appendix R compliance. The report mentions that an analysis Is to be done to show that It is not necessary to relocate redundant 1/11189 Oct-89

  • instruments for the containment air room.

11c..ut..S 'T'"c.

CPCo,;,withdraw1 the 10/4185 Containment Air Room 111.G.2 exemption request when exemptions for 111.G.3 and 111.L.2.d are granted.

General Office Licensing gets verbal indication from AWDeAgazlo our Project Manager for Palisades that the request&d exemption request will be denied. Notifies GWS and WLR at the plant.

  • 11 /17/89
  • RWSmedley sends a letter requesting Plant Projects to provide him with Information on how we plan to 12112189 Jan-90 1/18190 1/20190 3/13190 4123190 513/90 617190 6119190 bring the containment Air Room into compliance.

-*~ -***

---*-~*---. -~~:* _-.

~--~

--***~

GWSleeper sends a letter to G.O. Licensing explaining the options_ and providing recommendation to install automatic suppression.

Conference call with the NRC indicates they would accept suppression as a method of compliance.

Project Record WBS 42109 Initiated for suppression system.

ESSA written to.get estimate for suppression system.

CPCo commits to* install suppression system.

  • Estimate received from ESS to Install suppression system.

New project manager for Palisades Is given a tour of the Containment Air Room. During the tour he agrees to take another look at the exemption ~uest provided CPCo develops more detailed information on the level of combustibles and possible temperatures the Instruments will see during a fire.

With a conference call CPCo presents preliminary data from a review of combustible loading and temperature excursions using Hazard I fire modeling software. Another conference call is set up to discuss these results with an NRC fire protection person.

CPCo again discusses this Issue with the NRC their fire protection person cannot support a timely review of any additional Information. CPCo will submit additional Information to support a possible extension of the commitment.

  • Page 1

NAME Brian Holian George Sleeper Dick Smt:dley Eric Dorbeck Bob Pierson T*im Rowe 11 David Notley JULY 5, 1990 P.TTENDEES L l ST ATIACHMENT 2 AFFILIATION NRC CPCo

  • CPCo CPCo NRC NRC NRC

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ATTACHMENT 3

~:"'~-----.consumers Power Company Containment Air Room Fire Analysis I OUTLINE

  • Description of Room
  • Assumptions
  • Likelihood of a fire.
  • Type of a fire.
  • Hazard I
  • Consequences of a fire.
  • Questions and Answers

""111111--------------- Plant Projects --~

Description of Boom

  • The cable trays in the room are lightly loaded. The majority of the cable trays located near the instruments contaln small gauge instrumentation cables.
  • The flow of air in the room Is from the louver at the 590' elevation and up the stairwell and through the door on the 607' elevation.

Instruments are located below the cable trays.

""111111---------------- Plant Projects--~

"*.,a;;

~:::"~-----.Consumers Power Company ASSUMPTIONS

1. A cable tray fire is the only type of fire that needs to be considered for the following reasons,:
  • Access to this area is severely limited during operations. Personnel entering containment dress and undress outside of containment. There are no "step-off" pads and no discarded Anti-Cs inside of containment during operation. Everything is stored or discarded outside of containment when the plant is operating.
  • Strict administrative controls dictate that all loose material be removed from containment prior to startup to prevent containment sump plugging and transient fires.

Since C:ontrols are in place to remove the risk of transient fires during operation and the only major fixed combustible is cable, a cable tray fire is the only fire that needs to be considered.

2. Fir~s that occur during plant operations are considered worst case since that is the time the instruments would be needed to safely shut down.
3. A worst case fire involves the cables in one channel of cable trays only. By the use of cable tray fire stops and other protective features and controls, it can be assumed that one train of instrumentation circuits will be free of fire damage for anticipated fires inside containment.

....._ _______________ Plant Projects --~

LIKELIHOOD OF A FIRE Two studies done looking at self-initiation of cable tray fires:

  • of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Safety Research at Sandia National Laboratories, 1975-1987.
  • Development and Results of a Test Program to Demonstrate Compliance with IEEE std. 384 and A.G. 1.75 Electrical Separation Requirements, IEEE Power Engineering Review, June 1987 CONCLUSIONS:

Fires resulting from self-initiation of cables in a cable tray are self-extinguishing and do not propagate to adjacent cable trays.

..,..... _______________ Plant Projects --~

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TYPE OF EIRE 0

WORST CASE FIRE 0

0 RAPID FLAME SPREAD vs. SLOW FLAME SPREAD ALL CABLES IN ONE CHANNEL BURNING AT ONCE STANDARD APPROACH wou1 D MOST LIKELY NEED AN EXTERNAi IGNITION *souRCE CONSEQUENCES OF A FI RE

  • MODEL THE MAIN PART OF THE ROOM
  • MODEL THE ST AIRWAY AREA
  • OUTPUT TEMPERATURES AND ELEVATIONS
  • COMPARE LAYER ELEVATIONS WITH INSTRUMENT ELEVATIONS
  • VERIFY ADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN*

...,... ________________ Plant Projects--~

e

~~~-----.consumers Power Company HAZARD I

. WHAT IS HAZARD I HAZARD I is a fire hazard assessment method with associated Computer software and is the most comprehensive such integrated model growth for fire hazard assessment today.

HAZARD I was developed by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Center for Fire Research. It was first offered for routine use in the summer*

of 1989..

HOW DOES HAZARD I WORK EAfil.

  • fire And ~ke ]'ansport FAST is a zone-type fire model, which calrulates temperature, smoke and gas levels in
  • each of two layers (upper and lower) and the height of the interface between them, in each room.

DATA INPUT with FAST_in CALCULATIONS with FAST REVIEW DATA with FASTPLOT

...,... _________________ Plant Projects --~

8 88 88 EL.603°8' A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A... A A....... A....... A EL 601' s-EL 599' 7'

~

EL 598' 5" CABLE TRAYS :::;:dC 8 8 8 8 8 B 8 8 8 8 8

8

  • a 8

8 8 a 8 8 8 a a EL590' F

...,... ________________ Plant Projects __ _,,,,.....

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ATTACHMENT 4 EA*

GWS-90-002

~CONSUMERS.

  • ~POWER MICHl6RN'S PR06RESS Palisades Nuclear Plant Engineering Analysis Work Sheet Sheet __ 1 __ of......,.--1_7_

Title Analysis of the affect of a fire on safety related instruments in the Containment Air Room.

INITIATION AND. REVIEW

IRev, Description Initiated By Date o

Original Issue GWSleeper 6/26/90 Initiator Review Method Check ( t1' )

Appd Alt Det Qual By Cale Rvw Test Technically Reviewed By Date Reviewer Appd By Reference/Comment*

OBJECTIV~

The purpose of this analysis is to show the impact a fire in the Containment Air Room would have on safety related instruments.. loeated in that room. This analysis will show that the aff~

  • -on the instruments will be*small enough such *that,sl.ifficient*instruments*will be*avallable to~'-~-: - "

safely shut down the plant.

ANALYSIS INPUT

1. Hazard.I Fire Assessment Method, Version 1.0 National Institute of Standards and Tec.hnologv.. May 1989.
2. Various pla~t-drawings shOwing,roo~ iayout, equi,pme~t locations, ronduit, cable and tubing
  • routings.
3. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection.Engineering, Copyright 1988, Page 2-14.
4. NUREG/CR-5384, SAND89-1359, A Summary of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Safety Research at Sandia National Laboratories. 1975-1987.
5. EPRI NP~ 1881, Categorization of Cable Flammability Intermediate-Scale Fire Tests of Cable * *
  • Tray Installations.

.6. Generic.Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fi_re Protection Req~irements, APril 24, 1986

7. Licensing correspondence pertaining to the Containment Air Room.
    • 8. Development and Results of a Test Program to Demonstrate Compliance with IEEE Std. 384 and R.G. 1. 75 Electrical Separation Requirements, IEEE Pow~r Engineering Review, June 1987~
<<. Cf) CONSUMERS Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET EA*

GWS-90-002 POWER POUIERIN6 Sheet 2

  • of 17 Rev# ____

o ___ _

ASSUMPTIONS 1.. A cable tray fire is the only type of fire that needs to be considered for the following reasons:

  • Access to this area is severely limited during operations. Personnel entering containment
  • dress and undress outsi.de of containment. There are no "step-off" pads and no discarded Anti-Cs inside of containment during operation. Everything is stored or discarded outside of eontainment when the plant is operating.
  • Strict administrative controls dictate that all loose material be removed from containment

. prior to startup t_o prevent containment sump plugging and transient fires.

Since controls are in place to remove the risk of transient fires during operation and the c;mly major fixed combustible is cable, a cable tray fire is the only fire that needs tq be considered. *

2. Fires that occur during plant operations are considered worst case since that is the time the instruments woulcj be needed to safely shut down.
  • , *3. A worst case fire involves the cables in one channel of cable trays only~ By the use of cat:>le tray fire stops and other protectiv~ feature_s ~nq 9qnt.r9Js..,Jt9~11.be assumed.that one.train of.

-* instrum.eiitatiqrldrcuits-wil(be free of fire da;tiage for-anticipated tires insi<fo cor'.rtainment. -.. -

  • This_ has been agreed to by the NRC Staff and documented i.n our exemption request dated

. 7/23/8.5.

ANAL'[~:s r

This analysis for a fire in the Containment Air Room.is organized as follows:*

1. Description of Room
2. Likelihood of a'fire~

3: Type of a fire.

4. Consequences of a fire.

Descrjptjon of Room I

The room is oddly shaped with a 13 1/2 foot high ceiling. Total volume is approximately 14,420 cubic feet. The walls, floors and ceiling are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete. The northeast corner contains a metal staircase. The stairs go up only. The area is well ventilated.

Air flow is out of the room.

The cable trays in the room are lightly loaded. The majority of the cable trays located near the instrume~ts contain small gauge instrumentation cables.

Table 1 has a listing of the cable trays in this room along with their loading obtained from the circuit and raceway schedule:

Reference/Comment Reference 7

.... C>> CONSUMERS POWER POUJERIN6 MICllll:RtJ'S PRO&Rf'U Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Table 1 RACEWAY CABLE SIZE <inches)

LENGTH

%FILL. CABLEVOU GAUGE HEIGHT WIDTH (Feet>

Ria ht CP226 (A)

AWG14 4.00 6.00 25.00 18.10%

0.75 CV226 (A)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 25.00 6.10%

0.25 CP216 (L)

AWG12-14 4.00 6.00 40.00 11.90%

CV216 (L)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 40.00 11.10%

CV224 (R)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 25.00 10.30%

0.43 CP224 (A)

AWG12-14 4.00.

6.00.

25.00_

17.10%

0.71 4CP224 (A)

AWG14 4.00 6.00 22.00 2.30%

0.08 4CV224 (A)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 22.00 3.70%

0.14 CP214 (L)

AWG12-14 4.00 6.00 20.00 11.90%

CV214 (L)

AWG14-16 4.00 6.00 20.00 18.50%

CP212 (L)

.AWG12-14 4.00 6.00 20.00 n.90%

CV212 (L)

AWG14-16 4.00 6.00 20.00 22.10%

CP222 (A)

AWG12-14 4.00 6.00 20.00 17.10%

0.57 CV222 (A)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 20.00 16.00%

0.53.

4CP222 (A)

AWG14 4.00 6.00 16.00 2.30%

0.06.

~~y"222 (_~)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 16.00 9.20%

0.25

---* -~ *.**:..

3CP212 (L)

AWG12~14 4.00 6.00 14.00 1.20%'

3CV212 (L)

AWG14 4.00 6.00 14.00 14.40%

CP202 AWG2-14 4.00 12.00 25.00 18~20%

. 1.52 CP204 AWG2-14 4.00 12.00 23.00 16.70%

1.28 4CV180 (A)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 10.00 0.50%

0.01 CV180 (R)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 6.00 5.90%

0.06 CV170 (R)

AWG*it; 4.00 12.00 12.00 3.00%

0.12 4CP210 (R) *. AWG14 4.00

.6,00o 6,00 1.70%

0.02 4CV210 (A)*

AWG16 4.00 6.00 6.00 9.30%

.0.09 CP210 (R)

AWG1/0-14 4.00 16.00 5.00 25.00%

0.56 CV210 (A)

AWG16 4.00 16.00 5.00 8.60%

0.19 3CP214 (l)

AWG14 4.00 6.00 11.00*

1.20%

3CV214 (L)

AWG16 4.00 6.00 17.00 13.10%

Total volume 1n cub1c feet*

7.62 EA*

Sheet Rev#

JME Ccuft)

Left 0.79 0.74 0.40 0.62

. 0.40 0.74 c

0.03 0.34 1.52*

1.28 0.03 0.37 7.25 Figure 1 shows a 3-D perspective of the room with approximate locations of the raceways.

The flow of air in the room is from the louvre at the 590' elevation and up the stairwell and through the door on the 607' elevation.

Figure 2 with views A through F is a plan view of the room with the approximate locations of the various instruments in this room.

GWS-90-002 3

of _....:...17'----

o Reference/Comment

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.CONSUMERS POWER PDUIERIN6 62 590' Figure 1 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT CONTAINMENT AIR ROOM CABLE TRAYS OPENING TO THE REST OF CONTAIN MEN

~

603'-6" EA-GWS-90-002 Sheet 4

of _1_7 __

Rev# ----'-o __ _

Reference/Comment Reference 4 AIR INTAKE TO ROOM

.. *9 CONSUMERS POWER POUIERIN6 MCC No. 15 MCC No.16 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT CONTAINMENT AIR BOOM EA*

GWS-90-002 Sheet 5

of _....:..;17'---

Rev # ___

....;;.o __

Reference/Comment

...... E.___..~... -1"-=-6' Transformer No.15 Transformer No.16 Reference 4 43'-

i..e:-___

...;_ ___________ 42*-o* -------------------.....,;;..t"I Figure 2

...,... G CONSUMERS POWER POWER/NS e

e Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET

.EA*

GWS-90-002 Sheet 6

of ~

1~

7_

Rev# ----"'0:-----

Reference/Comment Figure 2 (Contd)

LT-0 SSA

~~

LT-701 PT\\

'751C LT-\\05 PT-0\\A.

PT-Oi02C PT-Or * ~-Oi2D LT-~ 8 8 8 8 8 8

~-

~LT-0751C.

LT-0~

LT-02 EL.*601'

!ID IA

.PT~52A PT]752C Pt752B riT* 7520 0

L~:075{.A

_ LT:OJ52C

  • .. L]f752B..:;~~D

. 8 B* 8 8 I

~.

Reference 4

    • PT-0704

~FT-0704 0 ~.

FT-0703 r1<~

PT-~

FT~

EL 590'

©

~~I

~I04B LT-703 LT075~. ~LT-0103 PT-07~1 ~

LT-0704---.._

0

. ~. y 7510

~ ~

EL 600*

ELEVATED

~

PLATFORM ~

:---::----E_L600'

/8~

PT -01 OSA PT -01058 EL. 590' EL. 590' II D

Right channel Left Channel

EA*

GWS-90-002

  • @>)CONSUMERS POWER POWERIN6 MICHll:RAl'S :-::.. ""'IE~~

Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet 7

of _..._.1 z..__

Rev# ____

o.;...._ __ _

8 8 I

.;4 I

./

CABLE TRAYS~

8 8 8

. a***

F Likelihood Of A Fire Figure 2 (Contd) 8 8 8

g-*-*g 8 8 EL. 603 '6" i*

EL. 590'

  • -One aspect o(this iSsue. is *the likelihood of a fire. ou*ring *plant operation.extemarsc>urces"of ignition are extrem~ly unlikely. This leave~ the possibility of a self initiated cable tray fire.

l'.

As a result of fire research.it has been found that for #12 AWG cables currents of from 120 to 130 amperes were required to induce open flaming. In full-scale testing, the intense period of fire activity persisted for between 40 and.240 seconds after which rapid reduction to.

self-extinguishment of the fire was observed. In no case* involving electrically initiated fires in rated low flame.spread cables was propagation of the fire beyond the tray of fire origin observed.

In other tests conducted, locked rotor amperes (LRA) were applied to test cables to judge their impact on target cables. One of the design criteria for the test program was that the worst-case electrically induced fault WOL!ld be on a motor feeder circuit, because the majority of large loads, and the more potentially damaging ones, are motor loads. The most credible worst-case fault would b13 the sustained application of locked rotor amperes (LAA) to the test cables. This type of fault was selected because it is a typical condition, it can be postulated as having an extended duration, and its magnitude is large enough to cause damage to the fault cable and adjacent cables. To select the test cable, typical plant cable feeder sizes were tabulated along with the corresponding maximum LRA for each feeder, and the corresponding motor pigtail conductor size. Based on preliminary screening test data, a relationship was developed between LRA durations and fusing (open circuit) of the motor pigtail conductors. Using this rel~tionship in.

conjunction with data obtained from the screening tests, the worst-case fault cable was selected, and was used in the subsequent configuration tests. The selected worst-case cable was the cable with the highest temperature at the time its corresponding motor pigtails fused (open circuited).

Reference/Comment Reference 4 EL. 599' 7" EL. 598' 5" Reference 4 Reference 8

. G CONSUMERS Palisades Nuclear Plant e ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET EA*

GWS-90-002 POWER

~

POWERl/'116 MICH/l:RN'S PllOSRESS Sheet 8

of 17 Rev# ____ o ___ _

The tests demonstrated that when ignition occurred, the fire never propagated to an adjacent target cable even when both were touching. The fires that occurred were self-extinguishing when the electrical fault was interrupted. The amount of smoke created by the overload was extremely dense ahd would be readily detected by the plant fire detection systems.

The majority of the cable trays in the vicinity of the instruments contain only instrumentation cable which is fused to prevent the high currents necessary to ignite the cable. Should the fusing still allow high currents it is unlikely that surrounding cables or cable trays would be affected. Also the smoke generated would activate the detectors very early into a problem.

Type Of A Ere.. _..

From the previous section it can be seen that the most likely type of fire would be a small self-**

extinguishing fire that would generate a lot of smoke.

For the purposes of analy*sis, we will assum.e a much worse fire the type of which would be most likely initiated by an external source.

The type of fire was determined using an equation developed by B.T. Lee in-a study conducted in 1985: This--research indicates that the 'peak full scale*heat release rate(q) can be predicted according to bench scale heat release measurements

. 'ft e II

'ts = 0.45

  • qbs
  • A where the b~nch scale he~t release value (~~) *is the peak measured under irradiance conditions of 60 kW/sq m, and A is the exposed tray area actively pyrolyzing. The active pyrolysis area, in turn, is estimated based on the type of cable and its bench scale heat release rate which can be obtained from Figure 2-1.18 of the SFPE Handbook of Ere Protection Engineering, which gives dA/dt as* a function of <\\,~. Thus, at any given time t, A

dA A(t) = o + T

  • t Using a conservative number 400kW/sq m for the bench scale heat release rate (322 is the mean for the ones listed) and 1.0sq mlmin. rate of flame coverage (obtained from Ref. 3 Figure 2-1.18); The fire shown in Table 2 was generated:

Reference/Comment Reference 3

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e

  • . e CONSUMERS e

Palisades Nuclear Plant EA*

POWER ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet POWERIN6 Rev#

Table 2 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 30.00 0.28 0.8521 0.6001 106.66 60.00 0.55 1.6357 1.1001 195.54 90.00 0.80 2.4109 1.6001 284.41 120.00 1.06 3.1861 2.1001 373.29'.

150.00 1.32 3.9613 2.6001 462.16 180.00 1.58 4.7365 3.1001 551.04 210.00 1.84 5.5117 3.6001 639.91 240.00

. 2.10 6.2869 4.1001 728.79 270.00 *..

2.35 7.0621 4.6001 817.66 300.00 2.61 7.8373 5.1001 906.54 330.00 2.87 8.6125 5.6001 995.41 360.00 3.13 9.3877 6.1001 l,084.29 390.00 3.39 10.1629 6.6001 l,173.16 420.00 3;65 10:9381

. *'1.1001

  • .1,262.M*

450.00 3.90 11.7133 7.6001 1,350.91 480.00 4.16 12.4885 8.1001 1,439.79 510.00 4.42.

13.2637

~.6001 1,528.66 540.00 4.68 14.0388

-9.1001 1,617.54 600.00 5.20 15.5892 10.1001 1,795.29 630.00 5.45 16.3644.

10.6001 l,884.16 660.QO 5.71 17.1396..

11.1001

_ l,973.04 780.00 6.75 20.2404 13.1001

. 2,328.54 900.00 7.78 23.3412 15.1001 2,684.04.

1,080.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 1500.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 This represents over.76 feet of 12 " wide cable tray with 50% fill involved in a fire. The volume at the end of the fire exceeds the total volume of either right or left channel cable trays in the Containment Air Room. This is considered a worst case fire. A slower burning fire is more likely, however a slower fire would not produce as high a temperature as a faster fire.

Conseguences of a Flre

  • Now thatwe have looked at the room configuration and at wh~t we consider is a worst case fire, we can try to assess the impact this fire will have on instruments the operators need to safely shut down the. plant.

What we expect will happen is that hot air from the fire will travel along the ceiling and go up the stairway without having a negative impact on necessary instruments. To verify this we will use a fire modeling program called Hazard I developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

GWS-90-002 9

of 17 0

Reference/Comment

EA*

GWS-90-002

'~ G CONSUMERS POWER l'DUIER/N6 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet 1 O of __

17 __

Rev# ___

_;o~---

The first step in using Hazard I to validate our theory of what happens for a fire in the Containment Air Room is to input the necessary paramaters into the program.

We will do this in two parts. First we will look at the niain part of the Containment Air Room, then we will look at the stairway. Each area will be modeled separately..

The first paramater we input is the physical dimensions of the main part of the room. Figure 3 below shows what this room looks like to the computer. Vent 1 represents the stairway going up.

Next we input the fire shown in table 2. Both the Heat Release Rate and the Area of the fire are input into Hazard I.

FjgUre 3

  • The fire is located in the center of the room at a height of 9.8 feet.

1*3* -6" The ceiling floors and walls are all 6~ thick concrete.

Ambient conditions:

Internal= 100 degrees F

. External = 120 degrees F Reference/Comment

EA*

GWS-90-002 G

CONSUMERS POWER POWERING Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet 11 of --=-1..:...7_

Rev# ___

_;.o __

The results of running this fire model are shown in graphs 1 through 4. As can be seen from these graphs, there is a layer of extremely hot air near the ceiling, that extends down two feet during the worst part of the fire.

The lower layer of air in the room is significantly cooler than the upper layer. In addition, the wall temperature (which is where most of the instruments are mounted is also significantly cooler than the upper layer air temperature.

3000

~ 2000

~* -

Q) en ca Q)

-~-1000.

ca Q)

I 400' 0

300 Q)

J

~

Q) 200

a.

E CJ)

I-100 0

0.

0 HEAT RELEASE 1 u

' 2000.0 3000.0 4000.

Graph.1 Time (s}

UPPER LA YER TEMPERATURES U Air Temp.

1 U Wall T ~mp.

......... ~....................

1000.0 2000.

o r*

( )

N = 1 Graph 2 ime 5

3000.

0 4000.

Reference/Comment

EA*

GWS-90-002

_'. ff>) CONSUMERS POWER POWERING Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet 12 of _1_7_

Rev#

O

() *-

. Q).

  • ~ *-

' ca

Q) a.

E Q)

65.

0 60.0 55.0 50.0

\\.

LOWER LAYER TEMPERATURES*

J-45.0

.. -........ ~... *...

_: ** "','.~*-,=* 4Q.Q,* * *. *.,_ --*------------.* *1**-*L'AirTertrp:--' * * -

1

  • L Wall Temp.

35.01...-----1...--__,_ _ __. ____ __.. _ __,_ __ __

-E --

..c C>

  • a;'

\\

-: 603' Q) j

' 601.'-6"

. 0.0

,, 1000:0 2000.0 3000.0 4000.0 N = 1 Graph 3 Time (s) *"

LA.YER HEIGHT.:~~

---1 u Ceilin El. 603'-6" 600'.L...-----....L-------'--------L-------'

0.0 1000.0 N = 1.

.. 2000.0 Time (s)

Graph.4 3000.0 4000.0 Reference/Comment

,~...,}

EA*.

GWS-90-002

. G CONSUMERS

':I.

POWER.

Pali~ades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET Sheet 13 of _1_7 __

POIJJERIN6 Rev# ___

___;;.o ___ _

Now that we have modeled the main part of the room, we can model the stairwell area.

Again, we input the physical dimensions of the stairway. Figure 4 below shows what the stairway looks like to the computer. Vent 1 represents the opening to the main part of the rooni. Vent 2 represents the opening to the rest of containment.

Next we input the fire shown in table 2. Even though the fire will be in the main section of the room we will assume it is all contained in the stairway. Again, both the Heat Release Rate and the Area of the fire are input into Hazard I.

The other inputs to Hazard I were the same as the previous model.

  • I I

I

./

I I

- ~ i -,_- --

I,.

I I

The fire is located against a wall at

_ a height of 9.8 feet.

- I -

34'

)~'/--_--:--~----.;...,~r~

I.

./

I 2o*

10'.

-*I

. Figure 4 VENT2 6.5' The results of running this fire model are shown in graphs 5 through 8. As can be se.en from these graphs, the layer of hot air, extends down to above elevation 607'.

The lower layer of air in the stairwell is significantly cooler than the upper layer. In addition, the wall temperature (which is-where the instruments are mounted is also significantly cooler than the upper layer air temperature).

Reference/Comment

~

. \\C. *.*

  • ; G CONSUMERS

'1.

POWER

~*

POUJERIN6 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET HEAT RELEASE EA*

GWS-90-002 Sheet 14 of 17 Rev#

O Reference/Comment 3000---~~-

1 -u-----~~~~-------------~--~--

2000 1000 0. 0.

.. 1 ooo.o 20*00.o 3000.0 4000.0

.c.*."*N=*1- * ***

.*:--~-T_ime *(s)* -~*'*

Graph 5

_._ 0 UPPER.LA YER TEMPERA TURES soo--~~~~--~~~~---.-~~~~--.,--~~~----.

-~ Wall Temp.. *.-*

400

(.) -

Q)

300 16 Q) a.

~ 200

~

100 0

0.0 1000.0 2000.0 3000.0 4000.0 N = 1.

Time (s)

Graph 6

- -. ~

(.)

50.0 Q)

J

~

Q) a.

'E Q)

I-45.0 40.0 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET LOWER LA YER TEMPERATURES 1 L EA*

GWS-90-002 Sheet 15 of __

17_

Rev#

O Reference/Comment

. ~.35 :o**L..*-*

..... __._1 ~_

.. c_L_w_. c;i_l_l_T_em_......

P*_. ---..... -.....

623'

-E

-619'-6"

.r:.

.Q>

Q)

~ 616' Q)

-\\12'-6" 609' o.o 1 ooo.o*

  • 2000.0 3000.0 4000.0 N =.1. Graph 7 Time (s)

LA YER HEIGHT

---* 1 u.

Ceilin El. 624' 605'-6" L...i.....----~---------------

0.0 1000.0 N = 1

  • 2000.0 Time (s)

Graph 8 3000.0 4000.0

,:' '.. "G CONSUMERS

  • ~.~

.~

POWER POWERIN6 Palisades Nuclear Plant ANAL VSIS CONTINUATION SHEET EA*

GWS-90-002 M/CJlll:RN'~ PROSRE~~

Sheet 16 of __

1_7_

Rev#

O Reference/Comment Now that we have a good idea what the temperatures will be at what elevations in the Containment Air Room and stairwell, we can see how many instruments will be affected.

In the main part of the room, equipment below elevation 601' 4" will be in the cooler part of the room. In the stairway, equipment below elevation 607' will be in the cooler part of the room.

The safety related instruments in the Containment Air Rooom were looked at to see if enough instruments would be available to safely shut down the plant. In looking at the instruments, not only was the instrument elevation looked at but so was the elevation of the process tubing and cable. Table 3 was developed to show the results of this evaluation.

Table 3 Inst./ Tube Conduit Conduit In.. ot Layer?

Eauioment ID Descriotion Elevation Elevation Number Route Inst/Tube Conduit ttt((~rrrrrrrrrr r r rrrrrrrrtw.f i~~iM~rn~~¥t~~Jt:jf trrrrrrrrrr rrrrr rrrrrr~

e.:r:;(it.S:tc:::: Steam Gen. A Pressure 600'-9"

. 599'-3" C0737 3CV212,214 No No

""::l;T.:~ts.1~*.

-:* Steam Gen. A Level 600'-9" 599*.3*

C0741 3CV212,214 No No PT-0752C Steam Gen. 8 Pressure 600'-9" 599*.3*

C0727 3CV212 No No LT-0752C Steam Gen. 8 Level 600'-9" 599*.3*

C0729 3CV212 No No

i:t.~i.stA:::: Steam Gen. A,W.R. Level

-** 600~-9*

6Q4=~H~::::.. C4083-- - -CV212,214,216 *

- No.-

No

tt:~i~~::: Steam Gen. 8 W.R. Level 600'-9"
  • ~~~~~~~::::

C4085 CV212,214,216 No No

i:.:r:;(i\\~2'.::::: Pressurizer Wide Range Level 601 ',.S" 599*.3*

FLEX CV212,214 Yes No PT-0104A N. A. Pressurizer Pressure 600'-9" 599*.3*

3C0181 3CV212 No No PT-0105A W. A. Pressuriier Pressure 600'-9" 599*.3*

???

3CV212 No No

(~ff ff f ~(~ff ff rrrrf ~~rf~~rrrr~~t~ti~~~~~~~m~~::::::====>=~~====t.~tr~r~(tt?rr~~~~rf f rrf r ff f rr~

PT-07510 Steam Gen. A Pres~ure 601'-6" 602'-0" C0740 4CV210,222 Yes Yes LT-07510 Steam G(3n. A level

.599'-3" 602~-Q'!.

C0742 4CV210,222 No Yes PT-07528 Steam Gen. 8 Pressure 599'-2" 599*.3*.

C0724 CV210,222.

No No LT-07528 Steam Gen. 8 Level 599*.2*

599*.3*

C0276 CV210,222 No No

t¥:~t.s:is:::: Steam Gen. A W.R. Level 599'-2"
si3~:s~:::::

C04082 CV210,222,224,226 No Yes.

tt~:?.~e:::: Steam Gen. 8 W.R. Level 599'-2"
  • ss3:~~:::::

C04084 CV210,222,224,226 No Yes LT-0103 Pressurizer Wide Range Level 599'-2" 599'-3" C0746 CV210,222,224 No No PT-01048 N. A. Pressurizer Pressure 599'-2" 599*.3*

3C0180 4CV210,222, 224 No No PT-01058 W. A. Pressurizer Pressure 599'-2" 599'-3" C1460 4CV210 222 224 No No Located In Main Part of Room -1 I

Located In *Stairway

-1:::::::::::::::::::::::;::1 All these instruments are environmentally qualified which means they have been tested to survive a LOCA or MSLB. The temperatures seen in the lower layer of air are significantly lower than a LOCA or MSLB. Therefore, instruments located in. the lower layer will operate satisfactorily.

As can be seen from the table there are some instruments that have.either conduit, process tubing or instruments themselves in the hot layer of air. These instruments will be addressed individually as follows:

>;**~._.' @>) CONSUMERS f. ;;.~ !~

POWER Palisades Nuclear Plant ANALYSIS CONTINUATION SHEET EA*

GWS-90-002

.fli*

  • t' POUIERIN6 Sheet 17 of _1"'"'"7 __

Rev#

O

  • MIC.Hlt:RN'!f PRD&R,ff LT-0102 LT-0102 has instrument tubing that extends into the hot layer. This is not a problem because this level transmitter is a differential pressure transmitter. Since both legs of the transmitter tubing see the elevated temperature, the net result on the transmitter accuracy will be negligible.

PT-0751 D, LT-0751 D PT-0751 Dis located in the hot layer itself, LT-0751 D has its cable extending into the hot layer. These are not a problem because the instruments for the other steam generator are available, and this is adequate to safely shut down.

LT-07578. LT-07588 These instruments have cables that extend up into the hot layer in the stairwell area.

These are not a problem because the fire postulat~ in the stairwell area is significantly higher than what is possible. Therefore, it is more than likely that these instruments will still be available. In addition, the operators still have other Steam Generator Level instruments available and other indications as to the adequacy of the Steam Generator

. function should these actually fail.*,_.. - --.. *---

. '..* *--"'" - c.*

CONCLUSION This analysis has shown that the affect of a fire in the Containment Air Room on the instruments will be small enough such that sufficient instruments will _be available to safely shut down the plant Reference/Comment

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