ML18046B076

Describes Work Completed to Date at Facilities Re SEP Topic VIII-4,electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment. Schedule for Completing Remaining Evaluations Also Described

ML18046B076
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades, Big Rock Point  File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	11/16/1981
From:	Vincent R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-08-04, TASK-8-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8111200805
Download: ML18046B076 (13)

Text

-

consumers:;.

Power**

cnmpany General Offices: 212 Wan Michigan _Avenue, J8Cicson, Mlchlgen 49201 * .15171.788~1550 November 16, 1981.

~**

Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att Hr Dennis ~! Crutchfield, Chief l .~' *rf\~(Dv~\

~? fit\JL\ . -~.1 Operating Reactors Branch No: 5

• QJ. . 1 9 i98i IP .

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,N. 0* \JN!JC~t,1o.ll

. *ll~uv-1011.1 .:}.

• Washington, DC 20555 - * . ,. . ,* j 0* u.s. co;Ah\IS!i .**. ):--,1 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20. - PALISADES PLANT . *** '\_/;,: . , * ~'-~/

DOCKET 50-155 LICENSE DPR: BIG ROCK POINf'"P'tANT . . ~I/ :___: ".\..- .

• SEP TOPIC VIII-4,

• ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF . '

• i ._:!I \ 1 Ci':/

. _'.!'HE. REACTOR COITTAINMENT . .

By>lett~rs. da~e~ M~-~ch'.**26, \~a1 and Mar.ch 31~*,198J for .Paiis~des.arid'Big Rock,

. respectively,: the NRC stated that atidit. ~calculations had failed to establish .

. .. .~*

the' adequ'acy of secondary fault current protection 'for' contai.nment electrical penetrations_, *This: did not imply- that. the installed primary and secondary

• fault-current protection was inadequate, but that a: lack of information:,. etc, did not put"the matter to rest. In response to these doncerns, Consumers .

Power Company* determi~ed that detailed evaluations of. at least ::power and ..

• control.circuits were in order. Consumers Power*Company_letter.dated June 15, 1981 described the planned evaluation program for* Palisades and 'provided.

• expected completiOn dates. Since the typical ~Iectrical . penetration

. configuration at Big. Rock. is somewhat different from Pal.isades, and since our in'tent' was to perform any necessary Big Rock analyses after the Palisades work is comple'ted, a specific submission.for.Big Rock Point has not previ~usly been made.. A~ you will note,. however, a substantial *amount of work has already been .completed on. Big Rock Point'. .

. \ . . . . .* . ,

This **letter. serves t,o describe *the work completed to date .on both Plants, .

discussi:!s some Big Rock Point characteristics which should g~eatly reduce .the number of individual pe1ie'l:ration analyses :to be performed, and provides 'wh.at

..is be_lieved to be a .re'al:i.stic .schedule for completion o.f. the. remaining work ..

. WORK COMPLETED TO *DATE

. To date, approximately 2,500 engineering man-hou~~ ~have been. expended in the

. effort to evaluate the secondary (backup). overload protection for circuits

• which penetra'te containmen:..

• This includes work done on* both Plants. .,t}o3S-

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Direct.or, Nuclear Reactor Regulation

• 2 Palisades Plant'

• November 13,

• 1981

. -For the power *circuits at Palisades, the maxiinum steady-state short circuit current has been calculated utilizing such information as:* (1) cable lengths and conductor sizes and (2) maximum prefault voltage conditions established by

.

• load *tfow cases. Given such information, the Pll61 computer models of each

' plant were used to calculate short circuit currents *for each circuit at two points; just inside the containm~nt power penetration and-at the-terminals of

• each. power circuit load. * *

• .: Upon eliminating all circuiu requ~red: to remaiii. operational* for. the entire accident duration (30 days) and that are (or* will be) _entireiy environmentally qualified for service (letter D M.Crutchfield to DP Hoffnian*dated March 26,

• 1981 states *that single circuit breaker protectiOn for_ Class lE circuits or non-safety circuits containing 0nly* components that are qualified to Class 1E requirements is acceptable provided that each*component of a circuit is qualified to the accident environment),* the evaluation of the overload *

• -;** .protection for the power circuits at Palisades commenced. The evaluation proceeded by plotting circuit breaker, conductor, penetration .and fault

_current* on time vs current graphs. * - Time vs current curves for each

• .penetration size were calcula'ted using Formula #1 contained wi'thin NRC TERs transmitted by let:ters da'ted July 1, . 1980 for Big Rock Point and July 11, 1980.

for Palisades . *

• Manufacturer fs time vs current curves w~re ob'tained and us~d:-to draw the:

circuit breaker' characteristics.__ The ml!X-imum three-phase, zero~iinPedance ..

• . fault

• currerit. was drawn. for ;.faults* on* tlie *conta~ent s'ide -of the penetration

• and at the load.* The graph:; were then .. analyzed to determine* if: both the * . * *

.' _. . primary and secondacy protective devices would clear.the fault.or overload condition prior to penetration damage .. -_ As . a result of this analysis; it was de'termined on a preliminary basis that.thirty-two power circuits that pene-

. trate - containmen:t may not have adequate secondacy (backup) *protection from circuit faults on overloads. It .should be rioted~ however, that the-need .to

_ actually upgrade the secondary overload protection for.* these. circuits is being further evahiated at _this time. _.A number of these Circuits: feature loads that are no.t: required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. and are auto-matically disconnected* from their power source upon receipt of an accident signal. Other circuits either are, or. can be,* disconriected *from_ their power .

sources whenever containment integrity is. required.. ' '

• . Three alternatives were. evaluated to provide secol].dary '_protection ft;;1r. *the -

aforementic:me4 .thirty.;.t:tJO power circuits. One *option was'.* to utilize a replacement breaker with attached current limiters. However, the .

charac'teristic curves of the* limiters did not give protection .-for* all* levels of current.' Another consideration was to. employ a second breaker with

• .. ,_*. thermal-magnetic characteristics . . Itha.s'.been detei'mined that two iii-series

~ ... breakers do provide both levels of protec'tion. However, a 'field -investigatio:D:

has indicated there is very little sp'ace to add. secondary breakers in the

• existing motor .control centers. The third opt.ion is to utilize. various.

protec'tive- fus.es. The BU.Ssmmm "Fusetron° fuse was* plotted on- the . .

. coordinal:ion graph ~d does provide secondary. protection aS required.*. This.

dual elemen't. :fuse was selected for its. ability to provide motor.* running as

- well as branch-. circuit protection. for all levels of current ..*These' fuses

• • ocll81-0174a-43~120.

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9*

• Director, Nuclear Reactor *:Regulation *', 3.

Palisades Plant*

. -i.: Nov.ember .13, 1981:

could be added but*would. requil:-e .field modification of the individual motor control center cell buckets.

As can be seen in Attachment IH ~ the power circuits are divided into three tables which identifies them as either acceptable, environmentally qualified or.unr~solved. Those power circuits that are listed as unresolved (on a preliminary basis) include discussions of .devices which have been verified as capable of providing adequate primary *and secondary overload*protection. *rt

• • must be emphasized, however, .that these lists have been .extracted from. an .

• interim project status report, and do not reflect. all available information. .

• For. example,* circuits which ar*e normally de-energized ot are automatically de- *

• energized in an accident situation are still listed as unresolved. Similarly,:

several circuits listed as unresolved are, or will be; qualified for the accident environment. This table is included solely to illustrate the approach which is being taken.

Regarding the control circuits at Palisades, one-line diagrams have been.drawn:

that illustrate each control circuit and its relationship to a supply feeder.

This enables determinations to be made as to which control circuits have

• similarities such as common feeder breakers, fµses.orsourcesof power supply .

. In addition, field data has been obtained from fuses and breakers in cases

-where drawin~ information was. incomplete. Presently,_ the manufacturers 'o*f the existing secondary protective devices are being *.contacted for: data regarding

.* the** devices' time vs current characteristics. Pnce obtained; these character-

.. istics will be plotted on: time vs current coordination graphs: siinilar to those developed .for the power* circuits.*_ i>enetrat.ion, conductor and *primary protec- .

'tor time vs current 'characteristics w'~ll _also be plotted .on the. graphs to

. determine which *circuits -require additional protection .. ** * - *

• . Analysis of the* instrumentation circuits will follow* a similar progression UIJ,less an engineering anaiysis can show that,the energy.transmitted through these circuits is so small that the containment penetration is in no way*

jeopardized even during overloaded conditions with inoperable circuit *

• protection.

• using the approach discussed above, the maximum fault clirrents for the power circuits at Big Rock Point. have.also been calculated. Any additional evaluati9ns. for Big. Rock Poi:ilt, however, .will not, commence until 'completion of.

• the _Palisades evafoation*. . *

. .j _For scheduling. purposes, *it.-is being assumed that the* evaluation for Big Rock

'*'j*

Point will be conducted in .a* manner similar. to that described above for,

• .. Palisades .. As discussed below, however,_ design -differences between Big* Rock and ,Palisades suggest that extensive analyses will prol;>ably not be warranted.

• Special Big Rock Point Char~cteristics .

.~ .

' i' Several factors suggest that detailed.fault current evaluations *are.unneces-

~:*: : sary for.*-Big Rock Point. The. combination of simultaneous events* which could possibly lead to large sustairi.ed fault currents through electrical

. penetrations l.s, in itself, highly unlikely., . The first event must be an oc1181-0174a~43-120

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• Director, Nuclear Reactor*Regulation

• • • • • a

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Palisades* Plant November. 13, 1981 incident such as a main .steam line break *or' LOCA which creates an adverse environment inside containment. Second, that environment must result in the failure. of cables" or* components iliside *cc>ntainment. Third, the* failures must '

be short circuits which are assumed to be.equivalent to bolted.faults just inside containment~

.. ~

Fourth,. the installed.circuit protective: devices must completely fail to

.operate. Fifth, the resulting*fault ctirrents would.have to overheat and fuse

'the conductors through both the inner .and outer conductor. penetration seals.

Finally, in order for* offsite effects .of. anY consequence, the* initiating event would also nave to result in major core* damage, _with no credit taken for con*

tainment, filtering or deposition of the radioactive material in the rooms or.

building areas which house the electrical penetration cannisters.

The Big Rock Probabilistic Risk Assessment ,(submitted to the NRC by letter dated March 31, 1981) addressed the consequences of various accidents with containment failures in detail. By far the most significant contributor to the probab.ility of containment isolation 'failure was a failure of the 24"

• ventilation isolation valves or the MSIV to close. Because of the small core size at Big Rock, however, the consequences of conta.iliment iso.lation failures simultan,eous with core damaging accidents are mtich, less severe than the more typical larger plants such as those addressed in WAsH-1400.

• As sUmn1ar.ized in Sections* 1.6 and 1.7.of the PRA, no,acute fatalities are predicted and only approximately .. 59. latent fatalities are predicted over the. fo;ty-year period following a* postulated core damaging acci'qerit with a,' containment isolation'

:..i. ' failure.*. This figure for latent fatalities' is of little, if. any:' statistical' sign.ificance. The *sign.ificance* of an .electrical penetration failure* due to. .

. failed. conductors is *even* less* because of* the very 'small leak.* path which could

.result~ This _leak path is clearly insignificant when compared with the 24" ventilation lines.

Notwithstanding the above discussion, one other Big Rock Point feature makes it extremely unlikely that the penetration conductors themselves could fail..

Since: Big Rock Point was design.ed so ,that the conductors through the contain-*

ment electrical penetrations are generally larger than the connected field~run cables, it* is expected.that_the penetrations would not.fail even i f damaging

. fault currents were .present. The field *cables would be expected to fail well before sign.ificantheating of the penetration conduc1;or occurred, thereby acting as a .fuse to protect the penetration. At Big Rock Point, the larger

.penetration conductors generally extend.teri:*to twenty feet outward*f~om the

. -containment at which point _they connect. to the smaller fieid cables.

To provide a stronger basis for this hypothesis, Consumers Power.Company has performed a. series of laboratory tests to.,prove the feasibility of this phenomenon. Attachment *1/.2 provides. the. Introduction and Summary sections of a report which documents these prel'iminari:tests. 'As can be seen in the sum-mary, a 1;.12 awg control wire was spliced; to a f/.8 wire and the spliced cable was then attached. t~ a *high *current power supply for. overload testing.. I.ii ...

all, six spliced connections were overload tested.

• Each of the six tests were

• conducted *utilizing a different level of current in an attempt *to simulate *a wide; range of faults. In each .test; the :#f.12 awg wire "fused" open *to

• oc1181-0i74a-43-l20 i .

.  :~.

Director,.Nuclear Reactor Regulation *s

• Palisades* Plant November 13, 1981 disconne~t the large~ #8 wire from.the power: supply. As can be s~~n in the summary~ the t*emperature of the fi12 wire was approximately one order of magnitude greater than that of the /;8 wire when the fF12 "fused" open. The

• . maximum temperature of the neoprene jacketed #8 wire was recorded in the second test as only 213°F. This is approximately 37°F less than the typical maximuui continuous rating.for neoprene (the penetration conductor at Big Rock Point is typically #8 atig, neoprene jacketed). Of.particular interest is that during each of the six tests, the #12 wire fused in the free. length between the taped splice and the end terminal.

• Th*ese preliminary overload. tests fulfilled their purpose by verifying that the .

"fusing" of a smaller diameter conductor to protect a larger diameter conductor is feasible. To continue this overall fusing evaluation, a survey is presently underway to determine* the quantity and types of smaller diameter field conductor to larger diameter penetration conductor.connections that actually exist at the plant. *Once determined, a more controlled overload test will he conducted, if necessary, to more closely approximate the actual plant installations. The expected schedule for this additional test, if determined necessary; is discussed below.

For a plant such as. Big Rock Point, use of novel approaches to verifyirig the adequacy of the existing plant is very important~ The small plant size dictates that extensive devotion.of limited-resources toward "pure"* .

engineering .treatment of issues s.tich as i=his SEP; Topic. is neither cost-effective nor warrarited by.the neglig;ible improvement poss{ble: in overall

plant safety. ** * * * ** * . **

Schedule For Remaining Evaluations

• Attachment 3 provides the expected schedule for the. balance of the activit_ies planned under this SEP Topic. This.schedule reflects a much larger.effort than originally envisioned.

The or.iginal plan was based on the incorrect- *assumption that the control and.

instrumentation circuits could.be categorized into*four or five similar groups

• at the outset of th~ project. It was expected that.this categorization would eliminate the n_eed to closely evaluate each arid every circuit. As a result, the entire evaluation (for both plants) was expected to be completed-in the first quarter of 1982. As 'the project developed, however, it b_ecame apparent*

that* an early categorization of contro 1 and instrumentation circuitry .was very difficult, if not impossible. Each circuit .was unique in its physical 'imd

• electrical characteristics and required individual evaluation. The estimated*

• .dates of completion for all circuit evaluations are new *targeted at September 1, 1982 for .Palisades and August 1; 198~: for Big Rock Point.

• It should be noted that the:schedule reflects'twovery important ~onsidera-

. tions: (1). the engineeri.Iig effort expended to date and (2) .the longest*

pr~bable duration pr:Lor to completion. Regarding the first of these ..

considerations, it can be seen that a number of activities have'already,been completed. .The engineering effort to date, as. represented* by those activities whose' dates' ~appear ill parentheses,. has beeri one of* considerable. magnitude. : ' '

ocll81-0174a-43-120

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Director, Nuclear.Reactor Regulation_ -6 Palisades ~lant-November l'.l, 1981 The activities shown as completed in the sched~le represent an accumulated total of approximately 2,500 engineering man-hours and participation by at least six departments withing the Company.

Regarding the *second consideration; the schedule does *reflect the longest probable duration:prior to completion.* Proposed. completion dates were selected assuming that all circuits will require individual evaluation as has been the case to date*. It should be noted, however, that whatever justifiable means may be available to reduce the number of circuits to be- evaluated and thereby shorten the project will be considered ~d employed if_ at all possible. * * * *

• F'.or the Palisades *Plant, the schedule accurately reflects the scope of the remaining work_ planned. For Big Rock, however, this schedule presumes that the same type of analytical approach will be employed on a circuit~by-circuit basis as it is for Palisades. We do not presently intend to conduct this type of evaluation. Instead, current plans are to continue our survey to catalog the. penetration/field cable size combinations which are actually installed, and then,~ if necessary, conduct additional overload tests to ensure that all combinations are appropriately considered. As. noted in the schedule; these additional tests.are* targeted for completion.by April 1, 1982. If the results of :these tests show that the smalle_r field cables do adequately protect the penetrations, this topiC.will be* considered.to be.adequ~tely resolved._ A_

decision on whether or not_further engineering analyses might be appropriate will .

be made after the . final . test. results .have. been. evaluated .. ' '~

• Robert A Vincent Staff Engineer CC Director, Region III, USNRC

- NRC*Resident Inspector-Palisades ocll81~0174a-43~120

Attachment i

• Page* 1 of 4.

.' .. .. ~

~*i

• ~ ~. *-~ PALISADES PLANT .

.-.*.*i' SAMPLE CATEGORIZATION OF EVALUATION RESULTS FOR POWER PENETRATIONS Table 1 ACCEPTABLE POWER PENETRATIONS

.1. Feeder to MCC #9 2~ Pressurizer Power Relief Valve*M0-1042B

3. Primary Coolant Pumps PSOA-D

4. Primary Coolant Pump PSOA-D Differential Relay Circuit 5* Pressurizer Heater Trans former XlS & 16 Table 2 ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POWER PENETRATIONS.

1. Hydrogen Recombiner M69A & B

2.

• Pressurizer Relief Valve M0-104.2A & M0-1043A

• 3 . . HP Injection Valve Mo:..3007, M0-3009, M0-3011* &. M0~3o13 *

4. *.LP* Injection* Valve M0.*3008, .M0*3010, Mo.:do12 & *M0-30i4

• 5. Primary Loop SD Cooler .valve* M0"-3015: & ~10-30.16

6. Containm.ent Cooler Recirc Fan VlA-4A

• Table 3 UNRESOLVED POWER PENETRATIONS

l.

• Fuel Transfer Machine

. --~

• Recommendation - Replace existing feeder breaker, WHSE type FA30_50 *with a WHSE type FA3015 'or FB3015 ~-*. Add a secondary protective fuse to.all three phases between.feeder breaker and penetration. * *

• Fuse ~ 3* Bussmann Type*FRS15

.~

• _ Fliseblock - 1 3P, 600 V,

• Scr~w Teruil.nal* Bussmann No 1B0026

2. . Misc D c Lighting Re~omniendation -*Add a secondary. protective fuse to.both the positive and.

• negative feeder circuits .between 'existing feeder breaker and penetration. . .

.Fuse Bussmann Type, FRN15

• ._.J,

.. Iiull81-0l 7 4b-43-120

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Attachment* *1

• '.Page 2 of 4

i. '

l. Fuseblock - 1 2P,

• 250 V, Screw Terminal Blissmann No 1B0002

3. HP Injection Va,l.ve M0-3062, M0-3064 and M0-3066 Recommendation - Add a secondary protective fuse* to all three phases between feeder breaker and penetration.

l Fuse - 3 Bussmann Type FRS15

~.

Fuseblock ** 1 3P,

• 600 V, Screw Terminal Bussmann No* 1B0026

4. HP Injection Valve M0-3068*

Recommendatioxi, - Add a secondary protective fuse to all three phases between feeder breaker and penetration.

Fuse

• 3 Bussmann Type FRS15 .

Fuseblock - 1 3P, 600.V, Screw Terminal Bussmann No 1B0026.

5. Primary Coolant Pump PSOA*D. - - - - - - - - -

. .

• Recommendation - Add tJ.. seco~daey

• protet:t.ive* fuse *to* all* t~ee phas~s .

.. /'" between feeder :breaker .. and penetration.

• Fuse

• 3 Bussmann . Typ*e FRS 15 Fuseb lock* - 1. 3P, 600 *V,

• Screw *Terminal BU:Ssmann

• No 1B0026 *

6. Shield Coolant Pump P77A & B

. _Recommendation - Add a secondary protective fuse to all_ three phases*

between feeder breaker and penetration.

Fuse' - 3 Bussmann Type FRSlS ** *

• Fuseblock - 1 3P, 600 v, Ser~ Terminal Bussmann No 1B0026 **

7. Coolant.Pump Bearing Lift Pump P80A-D Re.:ommendation - Add a secondary* protective fuse to all three phases

• "l

• between feeder breaker and penetration.

• Fus*e '." 3 Bussmann Type FRS15

• Fuseblock - *1 3P ,*. 600 V,* Screw. Terminal* Bus.smann

.. No 1B0026 *

~ .\

nu1181'."0174b-43-120

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• . ~

• ~

• .e

• Attachllient l Page*3 of 4

8. Bearing Oil Lift Puinp P81A-D Recommendation - Replace existing feeder breaker; WHSE magnetic type FB21550 with a WHSE thermal magnetic, Type FB2100. *Add a secondary protective fuse to both positive and .

negative feeder-circuits. between*replacement feeder breaker and penetration.

Fuse - 2 Bussmann Type FRNlOO Fuseblock - 1 2P, 250. V, Box Terminal -Bussmann No 1B0018

9. Primary Cooling Pump Backstop Pump P83A Recommendation - Add a secondary protective fuse to all three phases

... :.; between feeder* breaker and penetration .

Fuse - 3 Bussmann Type FRS15 Fµseblock - 1 3P, 600 V, Screw Termiilal Bussmailii

• No 1B0026

10. Primary Cooling Pu.mp Backs1:op pump P84A Recommendation;.. Add a secondary protective* fuse to all three phases between *feeder breaker* and penetratipn.

Fuse - 3 Bussmarin.Type FRS15

• Fuseblock ~ F 3P, 600 V; Screw Terminal Bussmann No 1B0026

• 11. Containment Cooler Recirc Fan VlB-4B Recommendation - Add a secondary protective fuse to all three-phases between feeder breaker *and penetration.

• Fuse - 3* Bussma.ml Type FRS~O FUseblock - t 3P, 600 V, .Box T~rminal Bussmann No .1B0035

12. Purge :Exhaust Fim V35 *

• Recommendation - Add a secondary protective. fuse to all three phas'es .

• • between feeder. breaker and. penetration. .*

' *~ Fuse - 3 Bussmann *Type FRS15.0 .*

Fuseblock - . r 3P ,. 600 V, Box Terminal* Bussmann N:o 1B0041

. nu1181-0174b-43-120

.Attachment l *

• Page 4.of 4

.. :~-1 .

13. Control Rod Drive Mech Fan V49A& B Reconimendation - Add a secondary protective fuse to all ~hree phases between feeder breaker and penetration.

Fuse - 3 Bussmann Type*FRS60 .

• .:t.

Fuseblock - 1 3P, 600 V, Box Terminal Bussmann No 1B0035 14: Pressurizer Shed Cooling Fan V61C Recommendation - Replace existing feeder breaker, WHSE Type FA3030 with a WHSE Type FA3015 or FB.3015. Add a secondary protective fuse to all three phases between feeder breaker and penetration.

Fuse - 3 Bussmann Type FRS15 Fuseblock - r 3P, 600 V, Screw Terminal Bussmann No 1B0026

15. Lighting Transformer X.37 Recommendation Add a secondary protective fuse to all tlireeO:phcaSes between feeder breaker and penetration. ., *

• Fuse - 3 B-qssmarin Type FRS10.0

. Ftiseblock - 1* 3P, 600 V, Box Terminal Bussmann No 1B0041

16. Emergency Lighting Transformer X.39.

• Recommendation - Add a. secondary protective fuse to all thr_ee phases between feeder break.er ~d* penetration.

Fuse*- 3 Bussmann Type FRS60

.*.>*.~.

. Fuseblock -- 1 3~, 600 V, Box Terminal Bussmann No 1B0035 l

• • • • 1*

null81-0174b-43~120

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• , *~ . ,e,

• A~tachment ,#2

,*Page l o~, 30-

• Consumers .Pover: Company

. !ET' ProJect l.38lOlOl8028B .

0 DEVEI.OPMEIIT OF TEST PROCEDU!?'E: AUD P::lEL!?-!!?YAilY T!ST!!:d FOR

. "OVERLOAD OF S:.J*'.PLE B!G ROCK POil~T E!ZCTR!CAL PE::~ruNl'IOri

. CONNECTIOU COI-:SIST!::a CF #12 FIELD cor:tUC'l.'OR SPLICED. TO G8 PE?!ETRATIOrf COUDUCTOR Req'.Uested by:

Report Date:

Report by:

INTRODUCTIOU This exploratory test was to develop a. test. procedtire to evaluate the effects of

• tault current on the- #8 wire in the contaim:ent penetration** canisters* at the Big Rock.Point Nuclear Plant, that fault current*b~ing J.l.::iited by- the #12

• control wire. . . . .

SUMMARY

Ma.X/ldn- ... " '

'CUrrent .- * * * *Time , : *~nhm?: Tem"Oerature *?-~ea.sured.

Amceres AC RI':S Seconds #12 Wire . #8 Wire

. -7**'

l i350/362 4.5Sec: . l.12o°F:. 150°F 2 :300/125 8 Mins *20.5 .Sec

• 189;°F + 213°F 3  ; . 1975/4"00 . .. 2.0* sec 1830°F .* .175°F

'l& '

;'i.50/250 .- 31 .4 Sec 1548°F 150°F-.

5 ..250/2'50 Z.9.9 Sec .l855°F. 144°F 6  : 1915/491. 1 *.42 Sec l761°F 178°F In each. test, the *112. vire. fa.ilea in the free ienGth betve~n the taped s:pli cc

• and the end tcminaL 'rei:pcrnture variations are a* .factor of. the dista..~cc *be-tveen the. thermocouple an*d* the mel ti.rig place. . . . . .

• Recorder. charts are reproduced in the "Test Data"* section.~+/-" ~ I .

this

'report.- ' ,* .

• ,\ ,-

ACTIVXTIF.S RELATED TO SEP TOPlC ViU-lt A~tachment 113

,r*

0 11 ELECTRicAL PENETRATlONS or* THE fltACTOR CONTAINMENT" COMPLETED'AND PROPOSED COMPLETION DATES TONR 7V-81 .

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• B4."* Evduatfon of Independence and.~~.~.a.rabiU_t;v:.ro.r ~ri!"~Y..:~an~.......... _. ~!.YO~_ :-*~~1/82 . 6/1/82 .* N/A 1

• • N/A. * !I/A*

Se<?.onda.r:( Overload. PJ:o~ecto_rs * .- . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . ... . **-***-*.* .. _.. _.. __ . . _.._... *.*---*-**-* ...... *.  !:-~~-" **-**j..-~--=--~~ !.-.**-*=:~~~-* ..*:. *-~.~~:--

. AC'l'!Vtift.ES RELA'l'Eb TO SElP. TOP:i:(J V:i:tt*4

:l!!LECTRICAL' PEWEi'RATtoNs OF 'l'HE ~Ad'i'OR CONTA1NMENT 11 r. .: .:

COMPLETED.AND ~ROPOSEO.-coMPLET!ON DATJ!:S

• 'i'ONR 71-.81

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Bli. Evaluation of Independence ahd Separability for Ptima.r1* and **

6/1/82

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