ML18043A956
| ML18043A956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1979 |
| From: | Jabbour K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-04.C, TASK-03-05.A, TASK-06-02.D, TASK-06-03, TASK-3-4.C, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7908210161 | |
| Download: ML18043A956 (8) | |
Text
-,
Ooc~et No. 50-255 MEMORANDUM FOR; Dennis Crutchfie1d, Chief Systematic £valuati0n Program Branch, *urn~
FROM:
. SUBJ ET:
K. N~* Jabbour
.Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, OOR
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH -CONSUMERS POUER C01'iiP Al-JV Otl HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK rnsrnE CONTAINMENT FOR.PALI.SADES (SEP TOPIC II 1-5.A}.
Reµresentat i ves of the Nu'cl ear Regu 1 atory -CorrnTii ss ion ( tlRC), Consumers P0i1er Corrpany (CPCo) an11.EDS (consultant to CPCo) met in Bethesda to discuss the.:systematic Evaluabon*Program (SEP)'.Topic III-5.A,_ "Effects
- of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems. and Corrponents Insiae Containment",
on July. n, 1979. A list of atte.ndees i.s provided in Attachment.l.
- ~
. FollO\\'Jing.brief introductory discussions on tJ1e purpose of tne meeting, CPCo stated that there is* evidence that some *form of pipe oreak concept was consiaered dur{ng the Palisades design phase.
In addition, some separation was provide.a for electrical* instrumentation and e4uipmen~.
-ED~ representatives. made a. presentation on the Palisades plant. layout and i dent if 1 ed the high energy 1 i nes and safety-re 1 ated equipment inside containment.
Ti1ei-r presentation*is contained in ap*relililinary report.
. (Attachment 21 to be utilized primarily to i llus.trate the philosophy and I
methodology of the approach to be used by EDS in evaluating the etfect:i;*
of pipe breaks on structures, systems and _components inside contai mflent.
EDS.representatives also s.tateci that they will use either. the mechanistic or.effe.ct oriented approach for eadi separate pipe -run *., The r:s.ajor* items di~cussed are summarized in the follo\\>dng paragraphs*.
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MlC IOBM 318 (9-76) NllQI 0240
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u.e. OOV*ANM*NT PRINTING OP'.. ICBI 1971. *~*. 1*0.
- ~ 2 The NRC staff 'made the following statements concerning the effect oriented
- approach:
- 1.
The safety objectives are:
A.
To maintain a cool able core ge~metrY foi'lo\\tiing' any postulated*
'break.
B.
To maintain the capability of safe-plant shutdown (definition of safe* shutdown consistent with that of safe~ shutdown reviews).
- C.
To-maintain containment integrity.
The limits of 10 C-FR Part 100 will be applied in ~~termin.ing the
-acceptabil i_ty of the review.
\\ -
.. ~.
- 2.
It is of utmost i~portance that the consequence~ of each pipe break scenario be fully recognized and Understood before a decision WO.Ul d be _
made on any proposed resolut1on.
-Th~ ~taff further stated that pipe breaks should be considered at locations close to safety-related equipment (as stated in the enclosure to the NRC letter to KMC dated July 20, 1978):-
Consideratfon*must be given to the effects of larger pipe damaging smaller pipes and causing multiple failures of ptping; jet impingement and single fai_lure.
The m_et_hods of calculating the effects of jet 1mpingement are discussed in the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP),- *Section 3.6.2 or in the proposed ANS-58:2 (ANSI:,..Nl76) 1---i li l,
dated January 1979 *. Other. types. of enveloping solutions may be gerier-ated by the licen~ee and will be reviewed -by the.NRG staff. The single -
- failu_re criteria--to. be used.by the.NRC staff in their review will be that of ANS-51~7, Draft 4, Rev. l, November 1975, which states that the most limiting single failure \\'1111 be* taken in addition to the 0
initiating break and its effects.
The rriost _limiting sfogle failure can be taken either as a single active failure in the. short-tenii or'*
a-single active 2.!: p*assive failure in_ the 1 ong-term.
Short-term,-_
long-term and the nature of the passive failure,are defined in the*
standard. *
- 3.
- GeneraLDesign Criterion No. 17 and SRP.Section 3.6.* 1 (BTP APCSB 3.1) will *be _employed !'.'elating to loss* of offsite power; however, on a pl*ant-by-plant basis,,operational experience will be considered.
- 4.
Credit for operator action will be conside~ed on a case-by-case basis once the ssenari~s ~ave been' developed.
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N1C FORM 318 (9*76) NRCM 02.0
- U.8. QOVBRNMBNT ~RINTING O~FICB!. tt11
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- 7°18
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The -NRC staff also made the following st:atements on the mechanistic
/
approact~:
- 1.
A minirrum of two intermediate breaks should be -postulated for each piping run in_ addition-to terminal ends *as stated in Regulatory
- Guide 1.46 and NRC Standard Review Plan 3.6.2.
Interrnec.Jiate breaks should be separated from each other and the terminal *ends by a.
change in di_rection.
If "the.piping run has only one _change or 110
-change in direction, only one i nterrnedi ate break shou 1 d' be pos tu-
. l ate<l. -
- 2.
In applying criteria _for postulating pipi; breQk effects on structure.s, systems and co1ilJonents.inside containment, it is*acceptable to apply_
the criteria presently utilized for Class 2 and 3 high energy piping systems (i.e. BTP*MEB 3-l) to pipfng systems designed and analyzed in accordance*with d31.l since *the ~esign and stress criteria for such
- .sys.terns are equivalent.
- J.' The stress crit-eria as stated in the enclosure to the tJRC letter to KMC_ oated July 20, 1978, are acceptable.-
- 4. The licensee may reference the safe shutdo\\'m review for a pos_tulated
- . break and tlie NRC staff wi 11. review.its app 1 i cabil i ty to this' effort.
The licensee requested that augmented in-service inspection {ISI) be cons i tlered as a means to rni ti gate the consequences of ttle postu 1 ated pi,pe breaks \\'Jhere retrofitting or addi~g rest;raints is inlJractical.
At the conclusion* of the* ll'leeting, the l.ic~nsee stated *that their pre-liminary* effort (i~e. break.locations determined and effects of breaks*
at those locations) \\'Jill be completed prior to tt1e end of September~
- Ha11eve r, the. f i na 1 _ re so 1 u ti on_ of th~ unacceptable Pipe-br:eak-effects and/or ~he metl1ods of mitigating the unacceptable effects will not be avaiJable by the end o'f September *. The licensee suggested a* meeting at
- that time.
JIJiiNl-6.i§na~ ii
Attachment:
-As stated OP'PICS..
Kahtan N,; Jabbour Systemat.ic Evaluation Program Branch.
Division of O~erating Reactors eURNAMS..
1r u.a. oovBANM*NT PRINTING OPP'IC*s ** -,, - *** *,,.
D6cket No.
50-25~
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 6, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Dennis Crutchfield, Chief Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, DOR FROM:
K. N. J abbou r Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, DOR
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY*
ON HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR PALISADES (SEP TOPIC III-5.A)
Representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission (NRC), Consumers P<Mer ColJ1)any (CPCo) and EDS (consultant to CPCo) met in Bethesda to discuss the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic III-5.A, "Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Corrponents I.nside Contaimrent 11 on July 11, 1979.
A list of attendees is provided in Attachment 1.
Following brief introductory discussions on the purpose of the meeting, CPCo stated that there is evidence that some form of pipe break concept was considered during the Palisades design phase.
In addition, some separation was provided for electrical instrumentation and equipment.
- EDS representatives made a presentation on the Palisades plant layout and identified the high energy,lines and safety-related equipment inside contai.nment.
Their presentation *is contained in a preliminary report (Attachment 2) to be utilized primarily to illustrate the philosophy and methodology of the approach to be used by EDS in evaluating the effects of pipe breaks on structures, systems and corrponents inside containment.
EDS representatives als.o stated that they will us.e either the mechanistic or effect oriented approach for each separate pipe run.
The major items discussed are summarized in the following paragraphs.
- The NRC staff made the following statements concerning the effect oriented approach:
- 1. The safety objectives are:
A.
To maintain a coolable core geometry following any postulated break.
B.
To maintain the capability of safe plant shutdown (definition of safe shutdown consistent with that of safe shutdown reviews).
C.
To maintain containment' integrity.
The limits of 10 CFR Part 100 will be applied in detennining. the acceptability of the review.
- 2.
It is of utmost importance that the consequences of each pipe break scenario be fully recognized and understood before a decision would be m~de on any proposed resolution *. The staff further stated that pipe.
b.reaks should be considered at locations close to safety-related equipment (as stated in the enclosure to the NRC letter to KMC dated July 20, 1978). Consideration musi be given to the effects of larger
- pipe damaging smaller pipes and causing multiple failures of piping, jet impingement and single failure. The methods of calculating the effects of jet impingement are discussed in the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 3.6.2 or in the proposed ANS-58.2 (ANSI-Nl76) dated January 1979.
Other types of enveloping solutions may be gener-ated by the licensee and will be reviewed by the NRC staff. The single failure criteria to be used by the NRC staff in their review will be that of ANS-51.7, Draft 4; Rev. l, November 1975, which states that the most limiting single failure will be taken in addition to the initiating break and its effects. The most limiting single failure*
can be taken either as a single active failure in the short-tenn or a single active or passive failure in the long-tenn.
Short-tenn,~
long-term and the-nature of the passive failure are defined in the standard.
- 3.
General Design Criterion No. 17 and SRP Section 3.6. l (BTP APCSB* 3*l) will be employed relating to loss of offsite power; however, on a plant-by-plant basis, operational experience will be considered.
- 4.
Credit for operator action will be considered on a case-by-case*
basis once the scenarids have been developed.
- . ~
.** ' t
I.
- The NRC staff also made the following statements on the mechanistic approach:
- 1.
A minirrum of two intermediate breaks should be postulated for each piping run in addition to terminal ends as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.46 and NRC Standard Review Plan 3.6.2. Intermediate breaks should be separated from each other and the terminal ends by a change in direction. If the piping run has only one change or no*
change in direction, only one intermediate break should be postu-1 ated.
- 2.
In applying criteria for postulating pipe break effects on s.tructures, systems and COIJl>Onents inside containment, it is acceptable to apply the criteria presently utilized for Class 2 and 3 high energy piping systems (i.e. BTP MEB 3-1) to piping systems designed and analyzed in accordance with B31.l since the design and stress criteria for such
- systems are equival@Tlt.
- 3. The stress criteria as stated in the enclosure to the NRC letter to K~C dated July 20, 1978, are acceptable.
- 4.
The. licensee may reference the safe shutdown review for*a postulated break and the NRC staff will review its ap~licability to this effort.
The licensee requested that augmented in-service inspection (ISI) be considered as a means to mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe breaks where retrofitting or adding restraints is ilJl>ractical.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the licensee stated that their pre-1 imi nary effort (i.e. break locations determined and effects of breaks at those locations) will be cofll>leted prior to the end of September.
H<Mever, the final resolution of the unacceptable pipe break effects and/or the methods of mitig~ting the unacceptable effects will not be
- available by the end of September.
The licensee suggested a meeting at that time.
Attachment:
As stated K ahtan N. Jabbour Systematic Evaluation Program Branch Division of Operating Reactors
- .I
- --~.
DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING SUMMARIES
- ~ecket
. NRC PDR Local PDR TERA SEPB Reading NRR Reading H. Denton E. Case L. Shao*
D. Eisenhut R. Vollmer W. Russell B. Grimes T. Carter T. Ippolito R. Reid G. Knighton V. Noonan A. Schwencer
- o. Ziemann
- o. K. Davis (2')
G. Lainas J. Scinto, OELD OI&E (3)
ACRS (16)
,.,-r Licensees
~*
NRC Participants D. Knuth C
R. Schaffstall, KM W. Beckius, CPCo R. Marusich, CP.Co H. Fields, CPCo P. Mac Dona 1 d, *EDS W. Ritsch, EDS M. Gross, EDS M. Wittlesey,.EDS K. Jabbour P. Di Benedetto*
R. Kiessel Mr. David Bixel Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Jo Wetmore
- J. Shapaker
- c. Hofmayer
~ackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue
- Jackson, Michigan 49201 fl\\Yron:M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, tllinois 60611 Kalamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street
- Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006
... ~'
Consumers Power Company
- w. Beckius R. Marusich H. Fields EDS P. MacDonald
- w. Ritsch M. Gross M. Wittlesey
- NRC K~ Jabbour P. DiBenedetto R. Kiessel ATTACHMENT 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES JULY 11, 1978