ML18043A533

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Responds to NRC .Will Limit Containment Purges to Cold Shutdown & Refueling Conditions Until Info Is Provided Re Containment Isolation Valves.Also Concludes That Safety Actuation Signal Circuits W/Manual Override Are Acceptable
ML18043A533
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/01/1979
From: Hoffman D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7903120240
Download: ML18043A533 (1)


Text

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consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue,.Jackson, Michigan 49201

  • Area Code 517 788-0550 March 1, 1979 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -

CONTAINMENT PURGING DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION Ref: (1) Letter D P Hoffman to D L Ziemann Dated December 28, 1978 In response to your "Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation" letter dated November 29, 1978, Consumers Power Company agreed to limit containment purging (other than during cold shutdown or refueling conditions) to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year (Reference 1).

Reference 1 also stated that we would provide information concerning the ability of our containment isolation valves to close under postulated design basis accident conditions by March 1, 1979.

Consumers Power Company is unable to document, at this time, that these valves will close under postulated design basis accident conditions.

Therefore, we will limit containment purging to cold shutdown and refueling conditions until appropriate documentation is available or analyses have been completed.

Your letter of November 29, 1978 also requested that we review the design of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature to ensure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signals, that sufficient physical features are provided to facilitate adequate adminis.trative controls, and that the use of each such manual override is annunciated at the system level for every system impacted.

We have completed our review and conclude that manual override of one safety actuation signal will not cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signals, that sufficient physical features exist to facilitate adequate administrative controls and that the use of each manual override is annunciated at the system level for every system impacted.

David P Hoffman (Signed)

David P Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC JGKeppler, USNRC 7 9 0 3 1 2 0 ?-t.f 0