ML18038B734
| ML18038B734 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1996 |
| From: | Machon R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9608190105 | |
| Download: ML18038B734 (12) | |
Text
'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION 'NBR:9608190105 DOC.DATE: 96/08/12 NOTARIZED.:
NO DOCKET g
ACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50'-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station,.Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MACHONiR.D.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
C
SUBJECT:
Responds to NRC 960719 ltr re violations noted in insp rept 50-259/96-07,50-260/96-07
!'0-296/96-07.C/A:stopped
- test, removed two members of security force (MSF) from duty
!'ounseled a retrained MSFs re package searches..
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: General
('50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3-PD INTERNAL: ACRS
~QD ILE CEN NRR
.D CH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN2'ILE 01 EXTERNAL: LITCO BRYCE,J H
NRC PDR COPIES ZTTR ENCL 1
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2 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME WILLIAMSiJ.
AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO'RR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRPM/PECB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIP1ENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!
CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 19 ENCL 19
'Q J
Tennessee vasay Avtncnty. pest Gfrce Bcx 20cc Deca;r.r. Aacar, z 3Ã>c9.2ccc R. D. (Rick) Macron Vee Pres@ant. Brovms Ferry Hccrear Pant
'August 12, 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Appendix C
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
NRC ZNSPECTZON REPORT 50-259~
50-260~
50-296/96-07 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VZOLATION (NOV)
This letter provides our reply to the subject NOV transmitted by letter from Paul E. Fredrickson, NRC, to Oliver D.
- Kingsley, TVA, dated July 19, 1996.
This NOV involved a failure to follow,procedures during a security access search.
TVA admits the violation..
The enclosure provides our response,to the NOV.
No commitments are made in this letter. If you have any questions regarding this reply, please contact Pedro Salas at (205) 729-2636.
Sincerely,
~~yzr.w R.
D.
chon Enclosure cc:
See page 2
t 9608190105 960812 PDR ADOCK 05000259' PDR Z(po 8))
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U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2
August 12, 1996 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Mr. Mark S., Lesser, Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road
- Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. J.
F. Williams, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockvi;lie Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety P.
O. Box 2257 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 ZNSPECTZON REPORT NUMBER 50 259
~
50 260
~
50 296/96 07 REPLY 'TO.NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)
RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION "During an NRC inspection conducted on June 17-20,
- 1996, a
violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,'UREG-1600, the violation is listed below:
Paragraph 5.6.1, Revision 0, dated July 28, 1995, of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) requires that the 'Hand-carried items shall be searched by a Member Security Force (MSF)
(either physically searched by hand or electronically searched by x-ray devices) prior to entrance to the PA for unauthorized
- firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items that could be used for radiological sabotage,.'aragraph 3.4..1, Section 101, Revision 5,, dated April 23,
- 1996, Physical Security Instruction Manual, requires that
'Items that are not clearly visible on the x-ray monitor will be physically searched prior to entry into the PA.'aragraph 3..4.5, Section 101, Revision 5, dated April 23, 1996, of the Physical Security Instruction Manual, requires that
'Upon discovery of unauthorized material while performing searches of personnel, vehicles or packages, the search MSF -shall implement immediate and concurrent measures to neutralize the possibility of a threat, to include but not limited to:
Deny the person and/or the material access to the PA.
Notify the CAS and the appropriate security supervisory personnel...and take possession/control of the unauthorized material.'ontrary to the above, on June 18, 1996, during a test two members of the security force failed to detect a firearm that was clearly visible on the x-ray and even though they
~aentified part of ~ne firearm while 'hand-searching the
- packages, they failed to take actions to neutralize the possibility of a threats This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III).."
d
TVAtS REPLY TO THE VIOLATION 1.
Reason For The Violation 429 2.
This violation was caused by personnel error.
Specifically, members of the security force (MSF) responsible for conducting access searches failed to perform a thorough search and did not detain individuals in accordance with Security procedures.
During a.test,,
a gun was disassembled and placed in two backpacks which had numerous other metal parts in them.
These backpacks were then placed for searching on the x-ray machine.
The MSF operating the x-ray machine observed an object in one of the backpacks that resembled a piece of the disassembled gun.
At that time, the x-ray machine operator took one of the backpacks and handed the second backpack to an assisting MSF.
- However, the x-ray machine operator only performed a
cursory search of the first backpack and did not find two parts of the disassembled gun that were in the backpack.
Additionally, the assisting MSF, while searching the second
- backpack, found a spring to the gun.
The spring was then taken to a Security supervisor.
The supervisor told the assisting MSF to follow procedures.
The MSF performed a
thorough search of the backpack but failed to control the unauthorized material and did not properly detain the individuals.
During interviews with the assisting search officer, it was determined that the failure to control the individuals and the unauthorized material was due to the fact that the individuals were members of an Operational Safeguards Readiness Evaluation Regional Assist Team assigned to BFN to test security equipment.
The individuals had been inside the protected area several times during the day with these backpacks.
Because of their position and the assisting officier's familiarization with the individuals and their backpacks, the assisting officer did not perceive this event as a threatening situation.
Therefore, the assisting officer did not strictly enforce access control requirements.
TVA considers these actions unacceptable and has taken correctiv'e actions as discussed in Section 2 below to prevent recurrence of this type of event.
P't>>
Corrective Actions Taken And Results Achieved The test was stopped.
The MSFs were questioned about what corrective actions should have been implemented.
Based on their verbal answers, it was apparent that both MSFs knew the actions they should have taken.
They then acknowledged E-2
il
0 that their actions were not in accordance with Security procedures.
These two MSFs were removed from duty.
The two MSFs were counseled and retrained on package searches as identified in the Security Training, and Qualification Plan to include challenging all individu'als regardless of their position or assignment at BFN.
Additional administrative corrective actions were taken against the MSFs involved in this event.
TVA will provide training which will enhance the abilities, of MSFs to recognize/detect unauthorized material during searches at the protected area boundary as well as actions to be taken if unauthorized material is identified.'his enhancement is designed to heighten the awareness of package searches performed by MSFs.
TVA plans to complete this training by August 30, 1996.
3.
Corrective Ste s That '[Have Been Or] Will Be Taken To Avoid Furt er Vio atxons No further corrective actions are required to ensure full compliance with federal regulations.
4.
Date When Full Co liance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved when the two MSFs were removed from performing package searches and retraining was completed.
This action is an enhancement.
TVA does not consider it a regulatory requirement.
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