ML18038B597
| ML18038B597 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1996 |
| From: | Machon R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9601170326 | |
| Download: ML18038B597 (14) | |
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CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9601170326 DOC.DATE: 96/01/ll NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MACHON,R.D.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECZP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
DOCKET 05000259 05000260 05000296
SUBJECT:
Forwards response to NRC 951212 ltr re violations noted in insp repts 50-259/95-60,50-260/95-60
& 50-296/95-60.
Corrective actions:personnel ungagged valves s verified that valves operated as designed.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
ZE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Znsp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3-PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRPM/PECB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 EXTERNAL: LITCO BRYCE,J H
NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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2 1
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1 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME WILLIAMS,J.
AEOD/DEIB ILE CENTE RR DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN2 FILE 01
- NOAC, COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
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1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!
CONTACT THE DOCUMENT'ONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT. 415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DXSTRXBUTIOiV LXSTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 20 ENCL 20
0
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Tennessee valley A~lrerty, pcs: G"cs Bcx 2Ccc, Deanery, Racer. z 35609 20CO R. D. (Rick) Machon Vce PrMecl. Brea,a Ferry'a~.
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January 11, 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos.
50-259 50-260 50-296 BROWN8 PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC IN8PECTION REPORT 50-259~ 50-260'0-296/95 REPLY TO NOTICE OP VIOLATION (NOV)
This letter provides our reply to the subject NOV transmitted by letter from Mark S. Lesser, NRC, to Oliver D. Kingsley, TVA, dated December 12, 1995.. This NOV involved two examples of.failure to follow procedure.
TVA admits the violation.
The enclosure provides our response to the NOV.
There are no commitments provided in this letter. If you have any questions regarding this reply, please contact Pedro Salas at (205) 729-2636.
Sincerely, R.
D.
hon Enclosure cc:
See page 2
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'P60ii70326 960iii PDR ADOCK 0500025'P 8
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2
January 11, 1996 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Mr. Mark S. Lesser, Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road
- Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. J.
F. Williams, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852
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ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT {PFN)
UNITS 1~
2 g AND 3 ZNSPECTZON REPORT NUMBER 50-259'0-260~
50-296/95-60 REPLY TO NOTZCE OP VIOLATZON {NOV)
RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION "10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Configuration
- Control, an activity which affects quality. by ensuring correct and proper system equipment alignment for a given set of plant operating conditions, is accomplished by implementation of the requirements of Site Standard Practice SSP-12.2, System and Equipment Status Control.
SSP-12.2, Step 2.0.A, requires control and maintenance of correct unit system equipment configuration in accordance with the positioning and alignment checklists identified in Appendix A.
The SSP also states that unit staff shall maintain proper unit configuration control through the use of appropriate plant instructions.
Contrary to the above, activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with documented procedures in the following instances:
1 ~
On October 30, 1995, four scram discharge volume (SDV) vent valves and four drain valves were found to be gagged open and not in the position prescribed in the equipment alignment checklist. This condition had existed since some time after October 15, 1995.
2 ~
On November 6,
1995, the unit scram discharge volume high level scram switch was found in the "bypass" position and not in the position described in operating procedures.
This condition had been present for a period in excess of two days.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1)."
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TVA~S R LY TO E VZOLAT ON EXAMPLE 1 ~
Reason Fo The V elation TVA has not determined why the scram discharge instrument volume (SDIV) vent and drain valves were gagged open.
TVA believes the valves were not repositioned through willful misconduct, but rather by not understanding how the valves worked due to the uniqueness of the valve design.
On October 30, 1995, the Unit 3 reactor mode switch was placed in the Shutdown position as a pre-requisite for containment integrated leak rate testing.
When the switch was placed in the Shutdown mode, the Unit 3 reactor scrammed as expected.
However, all eight Unit 3 SDIV vent and drain valves failed to close as designed.
Subsequently, the vent and drain valves were found to be mechanically blocked or "gagged"
- open, which prevented the valves from closing.'fter the valves were unblocked/ungagged, they operated as designed.
TVA formed an Incident Investigation (II) team to investigate this event.
The team performed an extensive review of completed work and testing documents, researched computer data printouts, and interviewed plant personnel to identify any activity that may have impacted the position of the SDIV valves or required/resulted in the valves being in the "gagged" position.
However, the team found no personnel with knowledge of the valves (mis)position, or procedures or work documents which would have positioned these valves.
2 ~
o ec ve Action Taken A d Results chieved Upon discovery of this event, Operations personnel ungagged the'alves and verified that the valves operated as designed.
To a'lert plant personnel to the unique operating characteristic of these valves, TVA has attached tags to the valve handwheels and placed operator aids on the valves.
As.
an enhancement, TVA has also placed similar operator aids on other valves with unusual operating characteristics.
3 ~
Corrective Ste s That Have Been Or Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations No,further corrective actions are necessary.
,The SDIV vent and drain valves have handwheels, which are mechanical stops.
The "gagged" open position is in the counterclockwise direction, and the "ungagged" position is in the clockwise direction.
The vent and drain valve handwheels were found in the fully counterclockwise position, which blocked the normally open valves in the open, position.
This renders the valves incapable of closing as designed.
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Date en Pul o
liance Rill Be Achieved TVA is in full compliance.
8 R
P 0 TH V 0 ZON EXAMPLE 2 ego o
o ton This event was caused by personnel error.
In accordance with procedural requirements, the unit operator should have placed the bypass switch in the "normal" position following completion of ongoing testing activities.
Contributing to this event was lack of attention to detail.
Following mispositioning of this switch, several unit operators and senior reactor operators assigned to Uni.t 3 failed to detect the mispositioned switch.
On November 3, 1995, the Unit 3 reactor mode switch was changed from the Refuel mode to the Shutdown mode in preparation for the containment integrated leak rate test.
When the switch was placed in the Shutdown
- mode, the Unit 3 reactor scrammed as expected.
Following the scram, the bypass switch was placed in the bypass position to reset the scram.
However, after the scram was reset and the scram discharge volume was drained, the switch should have been placed in the normal position.
After the valve was mispositioned, several operations shift changes occurred.
These shift changes involved three different operations shift crews (both unit operators and senior reactor operators).
Each of these crews should have detected the mispositioned valve during board turnovers.
2 ~
Corrective Actions Taken And Results Achieved TVA has taken appropriate disciplinary actions with the unit operators and senior reactor operators who were on shift during the time the 'switch was mispositioned.
Immediately following identification of this event, TVA added a note to the Operations Daily Instructions to inform operations personnel of this event and its significance.
Additionally,,
TVA directed that beginning November 7, 1995, the Shift Operations Supervisor conduct a panel walkdown on both Units 2 and 3 with the appropriate unit operators or assistant shift operations supervisors.
These panel walkdowns will continue until operations personnel demonstrate the appropriate questioning attitude and concern for plant status control.
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'Cor ec ive Ste s That Have Bee Or ill Be Taken To Avoid Purthe V
t o
">I% has planned Lwo additional enhancemen".s to licensed operator training programs.
- First, TVA plans to revise the operations requalification training program to include this event as part of required reading.
- Second, to test operator recognition and correction of mispositioned components, TVA plans to revise the operations training program by including mispositioned components or indications of mispositioned components in simulator training scenarios.~
Dat e
Pul om iance Will Be Ac eyed TVA is in full compliance.
These actions are not regulatory commitments.
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