ML18036B166
| ML18036B166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1993 |
| From: | Zeringue O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9303010374 | |
| Download: ML18036B166 (8) | |
Text
ACCELERAT DOCUMENT DISTIQPUTION SYSTEM REGULAT Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9303010374 DOC.DATE: 93/02/22 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET g
FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZERINGUE,O.J.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
.Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards summary of NRC RAI 6 TVA response re proposed amend (TS-330) to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 6 DPR-68 to delete list of addi insps required to be performed on certain circumferential pipe welds.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: OR Submittal:
General Distributibn NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-4 ROSS,T.
INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DORS/OTSB NRR/DSSA/SCSB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OC/L FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 2
2 6
6 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HEBDONiF WILLIAMS,J.
NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1
1 NSIC 1
1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 24 ENCL 22
Tennessee Valtey Autnorrty, Post Otfice Box 2000. Decatur, Alabama 35609.2000 FEB 22 l993 O. J.
Ike" Zeringue Vice President, Brorrns Ferry Nuclear Ptant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos.
50-259 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS)
NO.
330 DELETE LIST OF PIPE WELDS UNITS lg 2r AND 3 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION As part of the staff's review of proposed amendment (TS-330) to licenses DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 to change the BFN TS for Units 1, 2 and 3
additional information was requested by NRC.
The enclosure to this letter provides a summary of the staff request and TVA's response.
If you have any questions, contact G. D. Pierce, Interim Manager of Site Licensing, at (205) 729>>7566.
Sincerely,
('~u<g4 0
J. Zerin ue Enclosure cc:
See page 2
9303010374 930222 PDR ADOCK 05000259 P
0 1
2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FEB 22 1993 cc (Enclosure)s American Nuclear Insurers Town Center, Suite 300S 29 South Main Street West Hartford, Connecticut 06107-2445 Mr. Johnny Black, Chairman Limestone County Commission 310 Washington Street
- Athens, Alabama 35611 Dr. Donald E. Williamson State Health Officer State Department of Public Health State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36194 Mr. J.
E. Jones General Electric Company 735 Broad Street Suite 1108 James Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637
- Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
ENCLOSURE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TVA BFN TS-330 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BACKGROUND TVA submitted a request for a TS change to delete, in TS'.6.G, the list o additional inspections required to be performed on certain circumferential pipe welds.
The subject welda are inside primary containment and were selected with respect to their distance from hangers or supports wherein a failure of the weld would permit the unsupported segments of pipe to strike the drywell wall or nearby "auxiliary and control systems".
TVA's commitment to perform these additional weld inspections was accepted by NRC in Section 5.2.2.
of the BFN Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated June 26, 1972.
The deletion of this list of welds from the TS would not remove the requirement to perform the weld inspections.
NRC RE VEST The staff requested additional information regarding the "auxiliary and control systems" protected by the additional weld inspections listed in TS 4.6.G.
Additionally, the staff requested a description of the mitigating devices that provide protection for the drywell wall.
TVA RESPONSE The selection of the welds listed in TS 4.6.G was based on engineering judgement.
from actual plant observation and review of drawings.
However, subsequent to the requirement for the additional weld inspections, BFN completed a pipe rupture evaluation program.
This program determined that there are no "auxiliary and control" systems in the drywell that would be affected by pipe whip from the subject weld areas and that BFN met the licensing basis of protecting the containment liner and the low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) syst: em.
Protection in the drywell from recirculation, residual heat removal, main steam, and feedwater piping breaks has been provided through a
system of whip restraints, jet deflectorsg and energy absorbing panels.
Direct effects of pipe whip and jet impingement were not evaluated in the drywell other than the primary containment liner and the LPCI system.
The design basis for critical systems (cable and instrumentation) in the drywell relies on physical separation and component arrangement factored into the design.
Prior to the restart of BFN Unit 2, TVA (1) verified the installation and functionality of protective devices inside the drywell for protecting the containment liner, (2) verified continued acceptability of mitigating measures undertaken for the LPCI system.
Field inspections indicated that the plant configuration. in the drywell conforms to the requirements of the original design basis.
The pipe rupture design basis inside primary containment was confirmed during the'Design Baseline and Verification audit conducted by NRC and documented in Inspection Report 50-259/260/296/89<<07.
ENCLOSURE (Continued)
For BFN Unit 2, TVA feels that the subject welds in TS 4.6.G no longer need to be inspected at the more frequent interval and removal from the TS, will allow the inspection procedure to be modified by the 10 CFR 50.59 process to delete the more frequent interval. It should also be noted that as BFN implements Impr'oved Standard Technical Specifications, the subject welds would be deleted.
'or Units 1
and 3,
TVA plans to perform a
similar verification of the installation of devices and mitigating measures, as described above for Unit 2, prior to the restart of each unit.
The subject welds will remain in the inspection procedureuntil the verification program is completed and confirms there are no "auxiliary and control systems" affected by pipe whip.
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