ML18031A688
| ML18031A688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1986 |
| From: | Brooks C, Cantrell F, Patterson C, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18031A686 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-22, 50-260-86-22, 50-296-86-22, NUDOCS 8608180003 | |
| Download: ML18031A688 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1986022
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.
SO-259/86-22,
50-260/86-22,
and 50-296/86-22
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.
50-259,
50-260,
and 50-296
License
Nos.
OPR-52,
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens,
Inspection
Conducted:
June
1-30,
1986
Inspectors:
G.
L.
Pau
, Senior
Resi
nt
I
~/(s g(
Date Signed
C. A. Patt
son,
Reside
C.
R. Bro
s, Resident
Approved by:
F
~ S. Cantrell, Sectio
C
Division of Reactor Proj cts
Oa
e
igned
7/5 g
Oa
e
igned
0 te
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This
routine
inspection
was
in
the
areas
of operational
safety,
maintenance
observation,
surveillance
testing observation,
reportable
occurrences
and design modifications.
Results:
One Violation 10
CFR
SO Appendix B, Criterion III for design control
of cable pulling activities.
l8608180003
860728
4DOCK 05000259
REPORT DETAILS
Licensee
Employees
Contacted:
W.
C.
J.
G.
J.
P.
R.
L.
E. A.
J.
E.
R.
M.
T.
D.
T.
F.
D.
C.
J.
G.
M. J.
R.
D.
A. W.
R.
E.
Bibb, Site Director
Malker, Deputy Site Director
Stapleton,
Project Engineer
Lewis, Plant Manager
Grimm, Assistant to the Plant Manager
Swindell, Superintendent
- Unit Three
McKeon, Superintendent
- Unit Two
Cosby,
Superintendent
-. Unit One
Ziegler, Superintendent
Mairrtenance
Mims, Technical
Services
Supervisor
Turner,
Manager - Site guality Assurance
May, Manager
Site Licensing
Schulz,
Compliance
Supervisor
Sorrell, Health Physics
Supervisor
Jackson,
Chief Public Safety
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
licensed
reactor
operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
public safety officers, quality
assurance,
design
and engineering
personnel.
M. J.
May was
named Manager,
Site licensing.
Mr.
with General Electric managing startup operations
Plant,
Cleveland,
Ohio.
L.
S.
Richardson
was
named
Deputy Manager,
Site
responsibilities
were
with General
Electric
in
Engineering.
May's former position was
at the Perry Nuclear
Power
Licensing.
His previous
Licensing
and
Project
H.
P.
Pomrehn
was
named
new Site Director.
Mr .
Pomrehn,
a Bechtel
employee
on
loan
to
TVA, previously
managed
two reactor
plants
in
Korea with
a
capacity of 950 megawatts
per reactor.
He will assume
the Site Director's
duties
from
Management
Analysis
Company
employee
M.
C. Bibb during
a
transition period.
Mr. Pomrehn
plans to begin his full-time work at Browns
Ferry on July 14.
Exit Interview
(30703)
'he
inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on July 8,
1986, with the
Plant Manager and/or Superintendents
and other members of his staff.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings and took no exceptions.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup (259/84-26-18)
A preventive
maintenance
program
item has
been initiated to require
an annual
inspection of the containment
atmosphere dilution system foundation bolts.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation
(260/84-26-01)
Standard
Practice
BF-14.25
has
been
revised to require
second party signoff on the condensate
storage
and supply
system
as
well
as all safety-related
systems.
Also,
the
procedure
was'hanged
to address
proper clearance
procedures
to be followed for situations
involving unmarked valves.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup (259/84-26-13)
An item has
been
added
to the
laboratory shift supervisor's
tour -sheet
to check for pressure
gauges that
are reading
maximum or pegged.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup
(259/84-26-14)
Mechanical
Maintenance
Instruction
MMI-18 has
been
revised
to require that unattended
openings
in
fluid systems
be covered to prevent introduction of foreign materials.
This
item is closed.
0
5.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup (259/84-26-16)
The plant emergency battery
room
floor drains
and sinks were flushed.
A preventive
maintenance
item has
been
added to require quarterly flushing -of the drains.
This item is closed.
Unresolved
Items* (92701)
There is one unresolved
item in paragraph five.
Operational
Safety
(71707,
71710)
The
inspectors
were
kept
informed of the overall
plant
status
and
any
significant safety matters
related
to plant operations.
Oai ly discussions
were
held with plant
management
and various
members of the plant operating
staff.
The inspectors
made routine visits to the control
rooms
when
an inspector
was
on
site.
Observations
included
instrument
readings,
setpoints
and
recordings;
status of operating
systems;
status
and alignments of emergency
standby
systems;
onsite
and offsite emergency
power
sources
available for
automatic
opqyation;
purpose
of temporary
tags
on
equipment
controls
and
switches;
alarm status;
adherence
to procedures;
adherence
to
limiting conditions for operations;
nuclear instruments
temporary
alterations
in effect; daily journals
and
logs;
stack
monitor
recorder
traces;
and control
room manning.
This inspection activity also
included
numerous
informal.discussions
with operators
and their supervisors.
t
"An Unresolved
Item is
a matter about which more information is required to
determine
whether it is acceptable
or
may involve
a violation or deviation.
General
plant tours were conducted
on at least
a weekly basis.
Portions of
the turbine building, each reactor building and outside
areas
were
visited.
Observations
included
valve positions
and
system
alignment;
and
hanger conditions;
containment
isolation. alignments;
instrument
readings;
housekeeping;
proper
power
supply
and breaker
alignments;
radiation
area
controls;
tag controls
on
equipment;
work activities
in
progress;
and
radiation protection controls.
Informal discussions
were held with selected
plant personnel
in their functional areas
during these
tour s.
Weekly verifications of system
status
which included major flow path valve
alignment,
instrument
alignment,
and
switch
position
alignments
were
performed
on the fuel handling
systems.
A complete
walkdown
of
the
accessible
portions
of the
fuel
handling
system
was
conducted
to verify system operability.
Typical of the
items
checked during the walkdown were:
lineup procedures
match plant drawings
and
the
as-built
configuration,
hangar s
and
supports
housekeeping
adequate,
electrical
panel
interior
conditions,
calibration
dates
appropriate,
system
instrumentation
on-line,
valve
position
alignment
correct,
valves
- locked
as
appropriate
and
system
indicators
functioning
properly.
In the course of the monthly activities,
the inspectors
included
a review of
the licensee's
physical security program.
The performance of various shifts
of the security force
was
observed
in the conduct of daily activities to
include: protect'ed
and vital areas
access
controls,
searching
of personnel,
packages
and vehicles,
badge
issuance
and retrieval, escorting of visitors,
patrols
and
compensatory
posts.
In addition,
the
inspectors
observed
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital areas barrier integrity.
On June
20,
1986,
the inspector
observed
the start of new fuel inspection
on
the refueling floor.
A'review of the applicable
procedures
lead to discovery
of
a hoist which
had
not
been
load tested.
General
Operating
Instruction
GOI-100-2,
New
Fuel
Operations,
contains
a signoff that
the
stationary
electric hoist is
inspected
as
required
by Mechanical
Maintenance
Guide
2301.
This hoist is
used
to place fuel channels
over the fuel assemblies.
The procedure
requires
load testing for new or modified equipment prior to
use.
No
record
could
be
found that
the hoist
had
been
load
tested.
Additionally,
Browns
Ferry
Standard
Practice
BF-14.24;
Cranes
and
Hoist
Maintenance,
Testing
and
Inspection;
requires
an
annual
load testing of
hoists to
125% capacity.
Upon learning of the hoist problem,
the licensee
took immediate corrective
action
to
load test
the hoist.
Also, other
equipment
used
during fuel
handling
was verified to have
been
tested
as
required.
No basis
could
be
found for the
annual
load test
and
the
BF-14.24
requirement
was
more'tringent
than the
MMG 2301 requirement.
The inspector
reviewed
the
new program established
to correct
problems
in
this area.
The
new
program
is
managed
by
a
crane
specialist
on site.
The
program
consists
of reviewing all plant procedures
governing
cranes,
hoists,
and
rigging
equipment
to
ensure
they
are
in
compliance
with
corporate
procedures,
ANSI,
OSHA standards,
and
A comprehensive
crane,
hoist,
and rigging manual
is being
developed
as
a
single
source
document
containing
all
site
requirements
pertaining
to
overhead lifts.
Included in this
manual will be
a
program
for training
operators,
riggers,
inspectors,
and maintenance
personnel.
Along with this
manual will be
a
comprehensive
preventive
maintenance
program
for all
cranes,
hoists,
and rigging equipment.
As part of this program
the licensee
has identified
a number of defective
hoists.
Out of 46 hoists tested,
3X failed the load test at
an
average
of
50 percent of their rated capacity.
The hoists that failed were
TUGIT brand
lever
operated
hoists
supplied
by
Dresser
Industries
Crane
and
Hoist
Division.
The test results
were
as follows:
a.
3/4 ton - model
R234
1500 lbs. rated capacity - tested
4 failed 1-
(800 lbs.)
b.
1 1/2 ton - model
R291 - 3000 lbs. rated capacity'
tested
11 - failed
4 - (1000 - 2000 lbs.)
c.
3 ton
model
R292
6000 lbs. rated capacity
tested
19 - failed
17
(4000 lbs.)
d.
6 ton
model
R295
12000 lbs. rated capacity
tested
12 - failed 9
(6000 lbs.)
These
hoists
were furnished with vendor certification that
they
had
been
load tested to
125% capacity.
The load regulators
on the defective hoists
were
adjusted
per
the
vendor
instructions
and
passed
a
load test.
The
licensee
plans to test all
new hoists prior to placing
them in service.
The
licensee
has determined this not to be
10 CFR 21 reportable.
The
inspector
initiated
a
review of
a
TVA gA audit conducted
March 24,
1986
April 4,
1986.
Four major areas
of weakness
were identified.
b.
C.
d.
Commitments
made
to
and
were
not
being
implemented
in a timely manner.
Requirements
of NUREG-0612 that
should
have
been
implemented
were not
currently being met by the plant.
Previously
identified deficiencies
with control
of
plant
rigging
equipment
are recurring.
Plant
instructions
that
implement
upper-tier
TVA requirements
in
support of NUREG-0612 were not fully adequate.
This audit, identified
deviations
from previous
NRC commitments
concerning
This area. will remain unresolved
pending
a complete
review of the
gA audit and control of heavy loads.
(259/260/296/86-22-01).
6.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant
maintenance
activities
of
selected
safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in
accordance
with requirements.
The following items
were
considered
during
this
review:
the limiting conditions for operations
were
met; activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures;
functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were
performed prior to returning
components
or
system
to
service;
quality
control
records
were
maintained;
activities
were
accomp'lished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used were properly
certified;
proper
tagout
clearance
procedures
were
adhered
to;
Technical
Specification
adherence;
and
radiological
controls
were
implemented
as
required.
Maintenance
requests
were
reviewed
to determine
status of outstanding
jobs
and
to
assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors
observed
the
below listed maintenance activities during this report period:
a.
Diesel-Generator
Fuel Oil Tank Cleaning
b.
Cable Pulling Activities (Discussed
in paragraph
9)
c.
Residual
Heat
Removal Injection Valve Maintenance
d.
New Fuel Unloading (Discussed
in paragraph
5)
No violations or deviations
were identified in the
above
areas
except
as
discussed
in paragraph
9.
7.
Surveillance Testing Observation
(61726)
The
inspectors
observed
and/or
reviewed
the
below listed
surveillance
procedures.
The
inspection
consisted
of
a
review of the
procedures
for
technical
adequacy,
conformance
to technical
specifications,
verification
of test
instrument
calibration,
observation
on the conduct of the test,
removal
from service
and return to service of the system,
a review of test
data,
limiting condition
for operation
.met,
testing
accomplished
by
qualified personnel,
and that the surveillance
was completed at the required
frequency.
a.
Surveillance
Instruction (SI) SI-4.3.A.2.d,
Control
Rod
Operability
0
b.
SI-4. 11.A.1.e,
Testing of Fixed Water Nozzles for Blockage
c.
General
Operating Instruction GOI-100-2,-New Fuel Operations
d.
Mechanical
Maintenance
Guide
MMG
2301;
Inspection,
Testing,
and
Maintenance of Monorail Systems,
Underhung
Cranes
and Overhead Hoists.
e.
Browns Ferry Standard
Practice
BF-14-24;
Cranes
and Hoist Maintenance,
Testing
and Inspections
Items
a
and
b were
two SIs
that
had
been
reviewed
by the Surveillance
Instruction
Review Project.
With the
aid of General
Electric contract
personnel,
a review of all SIs is being conducted
to verify the instruction's
technical
accuracy.
However,
SI-4. 11.A. l.e
data
sheets
were
still
confusing.
It was not clear which signoff applied to which procedural
step.
This was the subject of a previous violation in report 86-06.
The licensee
took action to revise the data
sheets'o
violations or deviations
were identified in this paragraph
8.
Reportable
Occurrences
(90712,
92700)
The below listed licensee
events
reports
( LERs) were reviewed to determine
if the
information
provided
met
NRC
requirements'.
The
determination
included:
adequacy
of event description,
verification of compliance with
technical
specifications
and
regulatory
requirements,
corrective
action
taken,
existence
of potential
generic
problems,
reporting
requirements
satisfied,
and the relative safety significance
of each
event.
Additional
in-plant reviews
and discussion
with plant personnel,
as appropriate,
were
conducted
for
those
reports
indicated
by
an
asterisk.
The
following
licensee
event reports
are closed:
LER No.
296/86-05
Date
2-15-86
Event
Random Relay Failure in
Refuel. Zone Exhaust
Radiation Monitor Results
in a Containment Isolation.
- 296/85-14
4-29-85
Containment Isolation
Initiation.
260/86-05
4-03-86
Engineering
Safeguards
Actuations During Surveillance
Testing.
260/86-03
2-26-86
Reactor Protection
System
Trip Because
of Transfer
Switch Being
Bumped
Due to
Personnel
Error.
260/86-04
4-18-86
Engineering
Safeguards
Actuation 'During Relay
Maintenance.
- 259/86-02
1"08-86
Reactor Protection
System
Circuit Protector
1Al Trip
on
an Unidentified Cause.
The inspector
noted
on June
17,
1986, that
was to be updated
by June 6,
1986,
but the
revision
to
the
LER could
not
be
located.
Discussions
with
plant
personnel
revealed
the
revision
had
not
been
completed.
The revision was submitted June
24,
1986.
No additional trips
occurred
during
the
seventeen
week
monitoring
period.
The
event
was
considered
random.
9.
Design Modifications
(37700)
Cable Pullin
Problems
0
On
June
16,
1986,
the
resident
observed
electrical
modifications
in
progress
in the plant's Unit 2 auxiliary instrument
room involving the
pulling of electrical
cables
as specified
in workplan 2047-85/ECN
P0126
( Install
ATU Inverters,
Transmitters,
and Install
and Calibrate
Trip Units).
The
inspector
noted that
the
cable
pulls
were
being
conducted
in accordance
with the procedure
that was originally issued
during original plant design
(General
Specification 3).
On January
15,
1986,
the
licensee
had
revised
the
cable
pull
specification
requirements
to meet concerns
at the Watts Bar facility in keeping with
industry standards.
The licensee
had
implemented
the
new specification
(General
Specification
38) at all facilities with the
exception
of
Browns
Ferry.
The specifications
were
to
be
implemented
at
Browns
Ferry only
on future
design
modifications.
Failure
to
adequately-
specify
appropriate
quality
standards
on
the
current
design
'odifications
and fai lure
to control
the
cable
installation
known
deviations
were noted
as
a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion
III. (259/260/296/86-22-02).
The witnessed
workplan installation
referenced
the craftsman
to plant
instruction
MAI 13 for the installation of cables.
The inspector
found
several
deficiencies with regard to this instruction
as listed:
( 1)
Specific requirements
on
loops to
be
formed for multi-conductor
cables
were not provided.
(2)
Specification of material
to be used for pulling was not listed.
(3)
MAI 13 did not require
any pull force monitoring techniques
as
required in G-38
'he
above
i'nstruction
deficiencies
will
be
noted
as
an
inspector
follow up item. (259/86-22-03)
Actions taken
by the
licensee
during this report period
include the
following:
June
16,
1986
June
17,
1986
NRC identified concern
TVA pl aces
Hold
on
cable
pul 1 ing at
Browns
Ferry.
June
20,
1986
TVA design
engineering
sent
memo to all plant
sections
specifying
the
use
of
General
Specification
38.
gC
~ veri fied
no
cable
instal
1 ations
in
progress.
gC
began
writing instruction
to
assure
future modifications are
installed per
G-38.
June
24,
1986
NRC/TVA meeting
in Region II to discuss
cable
pulling
concerns
and
review
proposed
corrective
actions.
Site Director at
Browns
Ferry committed to insure
new cable
pulling
speci Acations
are
implemented with adequate
training
and
gC verification
before
cable
pulling is resumed.
b.
Drawin
Control Trainin
Session
The inspector
attended
a training session
concerning
the
new drawing
control
system
on June
23,
1986.
The
session
covered
the history of
the drawing control
problems
and
new procedures
for regaining control
of the change
process.
4,
In the past
TVA design
personnel
in Knoxville worked from as-designed
drawings
and
as-constructed
drawings
were
used
at
the plants.
As
design
changes
were
implemented
the
as-constructed
drawings
were
updated to reflect the design
changes.
Both Knoxville and Browns Ferry
initially used
a single drawing for all. three units.
However,
as only
one unit was in
an
outage
at
one time,
the plant changed
to unitized
drawings
as modifications were
made to
a single unit.
But, Knoxville
retained
a single
set
of drawings.
As engineering
change
notices
(ECNs) were processed
problems resulted.
For example,
the following shows the change
process
that was in place:
Knoxville
Browns Ferr
Drawin
Revision ¹
ECN ¹
Unit One
Unit Two
Unit Three
A
A
A
(License Basis)
Unit one is modified by
ECN ¹5 and the drawings were
revised
such that each
had
a unique revision number
different from all other revisions.
The revised drawings were sent to Knoxville which
retained only the latest revision
and eliminated
revision
B of unit one.
Next, unit three enters
an
outage
and is modified by
ECN 6.
6
B
D
E
The revised drawings were sent to Knoxville which eliminated
units one
and two drawing revisions.
As
more
revisions
were
made,
more
confusion
resulted.
As
attention
was devoted to keep
Browns Ferry operating
and building other
plants,
the document control problems
were never resolved.
Additionally,
a
number
of
were
processed
out of sequence.
An
'assumption
made in each
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
(USQO)
for each
ECN was that all previous
ECN's were completed.
This was not
the case.
Thus,
an indeterminate
number of USQDs
may be invalid.
As of June
2,
1986 all as-constructed
and as-designed
drawings
were
frozen at the latest revision.
A new
system of drawings called
con-
figuration controlled
drawings
(CCO) is being established.
After a
system
has
had
a walkdown, the as-constructed
drawing will be revised
to reflect the actual plant corrfiguration and
a
CCO revision zero will.
be issued.
Next, the design engineers will resolve all the differences
between
the design drawings,
as-constructed
drawings,
and various plant
modifications.
Resolution of these
items results
in
CCD revision
one
which should
be
an accurate
document of plant configuration.
Resolution of these differences
is
a major effort involving hundreds
of
engineers
and contract
personnel.
Additional modifications
and
even
- removal
of
some modifications
worked out of sequence
may result
from
the review.
Modifications in progress
on unit two
on June
2,
1986,
will have to be
reviewed
again
and system
walkdowns repeated
prior to
the unit startup.
It is conceivable
that
some modifications
now in
progress will have to be removed.
Applicable plant procedures
related to the program are
as follows:
I
Browns Ferry Standard
Practice
BF 2.5,
Drawing Control
Site
Director
Standard
Practice
SDSP
9.1,
Handling
Drawing
Oi screpanci es.
SOSP 9.2, Configuration Control Drawing
SOSP 9.3,
Design
Change
Supplement
Control
10
10.
Model
Shop (37700)
During this report period
TVA made
a management
decision
to delete
the model
shop
from the
Browns Ferry facility site.
The residents
have
toured
the
model
shop area for a number of years
in the monitoring of workplan review
activities,
torus modifications,
and
ALARA planning.
The
model
shop
has
typified over this period
the excellence
of craftsmanship,
professionalism
in the workplace,
and cooperative
demeanor
that
should
be the goal of the
Browns Ferry site
as
a whole.
All craft foremen
the residents
have
spoken
with over this period
have
indicated
the significant help provided
by the
model
shop in work plan activities
and
ALARA planning.
The resident staff
will continue
to
note
management
decisions
at
the
site
in regard
to
maintenance
planning.
This item was discussed
with the
Browns
Ferry Site
Director and the
TVA Manager of Nuclear
Power
in separate
meetings
during
this report period.
11.
Regulatory
Performance
Improvement
Program
(RPIP)
The responsible
section chief reviewed the status of RPIP and actions
taken
by TVA to implement specific items
as required
by
NRC Confirmatory Or'der
84-34
dated
July 13,
1984.
This
evaluation
included
a
review
of
procedure/instructions
developed
to
implement
the
specific
action,
and
discussions
with personnel
involved.
Based
on the above review,
the following items are closed:
Short Term Item
3.6
4..1
Provide training oa regulatory, compliance.
Organizational
establishment
and approval.
Lon
Term Item
Permanent
plant facilities.
M
I
IP