ML18030B167
| ML18030B167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18030B165 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-02, 50-259-86-2, 50-260-86-02, 50-260-86-2, 50-296-86-02, 50-296-86-2, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8603110219 | |
| Download: ML18030B167 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1986002
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/86-02,
50-260/86-02,
and 50-296/86-02
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N38 A Lookout Place
1101
Mar ket Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,
and 3-
Inspection
Co
Inspecto
nuary 13-17,
1986
Approved by:
J. J.
ake,
Section Chief
g'ering Branch
i ision of Reactor Safety
Date Signed
a ~i
s4'ateSigned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
entailed
35 inspector-hours
on site
in the
areas
of safety-related
pipe
support
and restraint
systems,
cable tray
support
systems,
and licensee
actions
on previous enforcement
matters.
Results:
Two violations
were
identified -
Inadequate
design
controls
for
safety-related
piping systems
(paragraph
5) and Inadequate
corrective
action for
RBCCW support
H17A (paragraph
6).
0
'. 8603ii02i9 866304
ADOCK 05000259
9
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
"R. Lewis, Plant Manager,
BFNP
"J. Swindell, Superintendent,
Operations/Engineering
"G. Hall, Design Service
Manager
- D. Nye, Design Services
"J. Rinne, Modification Manager
"J. Nebrig, Modification Manager
"B. Morris, Compliance
Supervisor
"L. Clardy, guality Assurance
"T. Carden,
Codes
and Standards
- H. Crisler, Office of Engineering
"C. Glidewell, Office of Engineering
B. Caldwell, Office of Engineering
S. Hopkins, Modifications
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included engineers,
technicians,
security
force members,
and office personnel.'"
NRC Resident
Inspectors
"G. Paulk,
Senior Resident
Inspector
"C. Patterson,
Resident
Inspector
"C. Brooks,
Resident
Inspector
Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on January
17,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated
in paragraph
above.
The
inspector
described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail- the
inspection
findings listed
below.
No dissenting
comments
were received
from the licensee.
(Open) Violation 260,
296/86-02-01,
Inadequate
design
controls for safety-
related piping systems,
paragraph
5.
(Open)
Violation
296/86-02-02,
Inadequate
cor~tive
action
for
support
H17A, paragraph
6.
(Open)
Inspector
Followup
Item
259,
260,
296/86-02-03,
Operability
evaluation
due to problems identified during licensee's
field inspection of
anchor bolts,
paragraph
7.
(Open)
Inspector
Followup
Item
259,
260,
296/86-02-04,
Determination
of
design
adequacy for typical pipe supports that were utilized in field-routed
piping, paragraph
8.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspector
during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
a.
(Closed)
Un'resolved
Item
259,
260,
296/85-41-03,
Verification of
Installed Concrete
Anchor Bolts for Cable Tray Supports.
This
item involved Phillips
Redhead
concrete
anchor bolts that
were
qualified in the design calculation for cable tray supports.
A
. ~view
of the corresponding
drawings
revealed
that three unit threaded
cinch
anchor bolts were specified for construction.
The licensee initiated
a
sampling
program
by selecting
50 baseplates
to determine
the
actual
installation of concrete
anchor bolts.
Results of the sampling
program
indicate that self-drilling anchor bolts (Phillips
Redhead)
were
used
on
the
seismic
cable
tray
support
installations.
This
item is
considered
closed.
b.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item
296/85-26-02,
Drawing
Control
for
Support
H17A.
This item involved
a pipe support in the Unit 3 reactor building closed
cooling
water
(RBCCM)
system
that
the
support
was
found
in
an
unacceptable
condition.
Of the four anchor bolts installed,
one
was
without
a nut
and
two others
were
wikh loose
nuts.
This
item
was
upgraded
to
a violation and was identified as Violation 296/86-02-02.
c.
(Open) Violation 259,
296/85-26-01,
Failure to Follow Procedures
for
Support Inspection.
As of January
15,
1986,
the licensee
identified
578 supports
in the
Unit 2 area
required
to have field inspections.
Of the
471
supports
inspected,
155 supports
are acceptable
and
195 supports
require further
evaluation.
The remaining supports
are in progress
for minor repairs.
The office of engineering
identified
418
suppor'ts
in the Unit 3
and
common area requiring
IEB 79-02 inspection.
All 418 supports
had
been
inspected
and repaired.
Support
inspections
in the Unit
1 area
have
not started
pending completion of the
necessary
corrective
actions
as
identified in the letter of licensee's
response.
This item remains
open.
4.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items were not identified during the inspection.
3
5.
Safety-Related
Pipe Support
and Restraint
Systems
(50090)
Unit 3 Design
Document
Review
The inspector
reviewed as-built drawings for support
H17A (node
260)
and
support
7-R312
(node
270) for conformance
to field installations.
These
two supports
were
used to secure part of the
RBCCW system.
The
corresponding
isometric drawing Nl-370-4R contained
four other supports
located
adjacent
to the
aforementioned
two supports.
The
inspector
noted that the licensee's
representatives
could find neither the design
calculations for the
above
supports
nor of the stress
analysis for the
above
piping
system.
The
inspector
further
reviewed
pipe
support
drawing
for the
Unit 3
system
which contained
nine
different detailed
pipe
supports
that
were
classified
as
seismic
restraints.
However,
none of the design
calculations
were available
for review.
The
licensee
called
the
Knoxv'ilie Design
Engineering
Office to determine if there
were
any design calculations
associated
with the
above
supports.
The licensee
also
searched
on site design
document
records
and
was
not
able
to
locate
any
of
the
design
calculations pertaining to the aforementioned
supports.
Unit 2 Support Calculations
Review
The inspector
reviewed
design
calculations
for support
mark 9-R209 in-
the Unit 2
RBCCW system.
It was
noted
on
sheet
12B of the
design
calculations
that
an
incorrect
assumption
was
made
in calculating
anchor
shear
force.
The
shear
force
for
the
inclined
structural
attachment
should
have
been
3175 lbs.
The actual calculation
was based
on one-half of the
above
shear
force -or
1590 lbs.
Sheets
12A,
12B,
12C,
and
12D of the calculations
were
used for actual
installation.
There
was
no evidence that these
sheets
were adequately
reviewed
by
a
qualified
checker.
The
overall
design
calculations
for
the
above
support
appeared
to be less
than satisfactory
in terms of thoroughness,
clarity,
consistency,
and
accuracy.
Design
input,
references,
equations,
tables
and analytical
model
were
not
addressed
in
the
calculations.
C.
Unit 2 Design
Document
Review
The inspector
reviewed Unit 2
RBCCW system
support design calculations.
It was noted that portions of the design calculations
and sketches
were
not checked for the following supports:
R57
R204
R211
R216
R225
R232
R58
R205
R212
R219
R226
R233
R201
R208
R213
R221
R227
R238
R202
R209
R214
R223
R228
R203
R210
R215
R224
R229
Appendix
B of
10 CFR 50, Criterion III, requires
that
measures
shall
be
established
to assure
that regulatory requirements
and the design basis for
those
systems,
and
components
are correctly translated
into drawings
and
procedures.
These
measures
shall
assure
that appropriate
quality standards
are specified
and included in design
documents
and that deviations
from such
standards
are controlled.
The design
control
measures
shall
also
provide
for verifying or checking
the
adequacy
of design.
Results
of the afore-
mentioned
review indicate that the
RBCCW systems for Units
2 and
3 were not
designed
to meet
NRC requirements.
Accordingly, the safety-related
system,
as defined in TVA Design Criteria BFN-50-D707,
may not be assured
to perform
its
intended
function.
This
matter
is identified
as
Violation
260,
296/86-02-01,
Inadequate
design controls for safety-related
piping systems.
Within the areas
inspected,
one viol'ation was identified.
Corrective Action on Installed Support
The inspector previously opened
unresolved
item 296/85-26-02,
regarding
pipe
support
H17A in the Unit 3
RBCCW system.
This support
was found to be in an
unacceptable
condition.
Of the four anchor bolts installed,
one
was without
a
nut
and
two others
were with loose
nuts.
This condition
was
also
identified during the licensee's
program inspection
performed
on
July 14,
1980.
There
was
no document to
show that the support
should
have
been
deleted.
Design calculations
for the
support
and the piping
system--
could
not
be
found.
The
licensee
had
performed
a preliminary stress
analysis
to include-the
above
support
on December
16,
1985.
Appendix
B of
10 CFR 50, Criterion XVI, requires
that
measures
shall
be
established
to
assure
that
conditions
adverse
to
quality,
such
as
deficiencies,
and'onconformances
are
promptly identified
and
corrected.
The
licensee
had
not taken
any corrective
action
in terms of fixing the
aforementioned
support
which
was
identified
in
1980.
This
matter
is
identified as Violation 296/86-02-02,
Inadequate
corrective action for
support
H17A.
Within the areas
inspected,
one violation was identified.
Inspection of Concrete
Anchor Bolts for Seismic
Cable Tray Supports
The licensee
initiated
a
sampling
program to determine
what type of anchor
bolts were installed in the seismic cable tray supports.
This was due to
a
design
error that
resulted
in three
unit
threaded
anchors
being
specified
on the design
drawings
although calculations
were
based
on self-
dri lling anchor
bolts.
Results
of
the field -+rrspections
revealed
the
following concerns:
Two support locations called for six bolt pattern plates
and only four
bolt pattern plates
were installed.
Holes in the plate were consi,stently
oversized.
Gaps
between
the
bottom of the plate
and
the concrete
surface
were
excessive.
The recess
between
the top of the anchor bolt shell
and the top of the
concrete
surface
was excessive.
Thread
engagement
was less
than
minimum requirement.
The
above
problems
were
identified
during
the
equivalent
inspection.
The inspector
held discussions
with licensee's
representatives
regarding
the
above
concerns
which
may
require
further
evaluation
to
determine
whether
the
supports
can
serve their intended
function during
a
seismic
event.
The
licensee
acknowledged
the
concerns
and will perform
further evaluation.
This
matte".
ir identified
~s Inspector
Followup Item
259,
260,
296/86-02-03,
Operability evaluation
due to problems identified
during licensee's
field inspection of anchor bolts.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified
Design Evaluation of Typical Pipe Supports for Small Diameter Piping Systems
Browns Ferry significant condition report
(SCR)
Number
8543RO was issued
on
December
24,
1985.
This
SCR identified
a concern
that the design criteria
BFN-50-712
which
was
issued
on
November 29,
1972,
provide criteria for-
seismic installation of a field-routed small diameter piping.
The criteria
also
provide
load
combination
of dead,
thermal,
and
seismic
loads for
support
designs.
Design
criteria
BFN-50-713
which
was
issued
on
November
17,
1981,
provide
criteria
for
seismic
installation
for
field-routed
tubing.
The criteria
do
not. address
thermal
load
to
be
included in the design.
The licensee
could not find documentation
to verify
the
adequacy
of installation
for field-routed
piping.
Pending
further
evaluation
to
be furnished
by the licensee,
this matter is identified
as
Inspector
Followup
Item
259,
260,
296/86-02-04,
Determination
of design
adequacy
for typical
pipe
supports
that
were utilized in field-routed
piping.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.