ML18030B154
| ML18030B154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18030B152 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-03, 50-259-86-3, 50-260-86-03, 50-260-86-3, 50-296-86-03, 50-296-86-3, GL-84-11, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, NUDOCS 8603040375 | |
| Download: ML18030B154 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1986003
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/86-03,
50-260/86-03,
and 50-296/86-03
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N38
A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
3
Inspection
Conducted:
January
13-17,
1986
Inspector:
J. L.
Approved by:
J. J.
B ak
,
ection Chief
Engine ri g Branch
Divis on of Reactor Safety
ate Signe
c(
Da
e Signed
SUMMARY'cope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection entm led 35 inspector-hours
on site
in the
areas
of observation
examinations,
review of
radiographic film, followup
on
items of noncompliance
and unresolved
items,
followup on IE Bulletins, and followup on inspector identified problems.
Results:
Two violations
were identified - Failure to follow procedures
for
housekeeping
in radiation
and contaminated
areas
- paragraph
5.a.
and Failure to
follow procedure
for removal of temporary
attachments
on recirculation
system
pipe spool piece - paragraph
5.b.
BE 0S040m5
8~0228
ADQCK 05000259
8
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- R. L. Lewis, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
(BFNP), Plant Manager
- J. R. Nebrig,
BFNP, Modification Supervisor
- B. C. Morris, BFNP, Compliance Supervisor
- R. Latimer, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Supervisor
- 0. L. Butler, ISI Technical
Section
Engineer
- E. D. Crane,
ISI Programs
Section
Engineer
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
engineers,
technicians,
and
office personnel.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
- G. L. Paulk, Senior Resident
Inspector
- C. A. Patterson,
Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on January
17,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
above;
The inspector
described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the
inspection
findings listed
below.
No dissenting
comments
were received
from the licensee.
(Open) Violation 260/86-03-01,
Failure to Follow Procedures
for Housekeeping
in Radiation
and Contaminated
Areas - paragraph
5.a.
(Open) Violation 260/86-03-02,
Failure to Follow Procedure
for Removal of
Temporary Attachments
on Recirculation
System
Pipe
Spool
Piece - paragraph
5.b.
(Open)
Unresolved
Item 260/86-03-03,
Radiographic
Evaluation of Defects Fail
to Indicate Basis of Acceptance - paragraph 6.b.(2).
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee
Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
(92702)(92701B)
Units 1, 2,
and
3
(Closed)
Violation
259,
260,
296/82-33-01,
Inadequate
Nondestructive
Examination Procedure.
TVA's letter of response
dated
November 24,
1982
has
been
reviewed
and determined
to be acceptable
by Region II.
The inspector
held discussions
with the ISI project supervisor
and examined
the corrective
actions
as stated
in the letter of response.
The inspector
concluded that
TVA had determined
the full extent of the subject
noncompliance,
performed
the necessary
survey
and follow-up actions to correct the present
conditions
and
developed
the necessary
corrective actions
to preclude
recurrence
of
similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of
response
have
been
implemented.
(Closed)
Violation
260,
296/84-11-01,
Reactor
Vessel
Support
Skirt
Examination.
TVA's letter of response
dated
May 24, 1984,
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable
by
Region II.
The
inspector
held
discussions
with the
ISI project supervisor
and
examined
the corrective
actions
as stated
in the letter of response.
The inspector
concluded that
TVA had determined
the full extent 6f the subject
noncompliance,
performed
the necessary
survey
and follow-up actions to correct the present
conditions
and
developed
the
necessary
corrective actions
to preclude
recurrence
of
similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of
response
have
been
implemented.
(Closed) Violation 259/84-31-01,
Failure to Establish
gC Hold points
and to
Use gualified Visual
Examiners for Performing
Dimensional
Verification on
Critical Systems,
Structures
and Components.
TVA's letter of response
dated
October
19,
1984,
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable
by
Region II.
The
inspector
held
discussions
with modifications
project
engineer
and
examined
the corrective actions
as
stated
in the letter of
response.
The inspector
concluded that
TYA had determined
the full extent
of the subject
noncompliance,
performed
the necessary
survey
and follow-up
actions
to correct
the
present
conditions
and
developed
the
necessary
corrective
actions
to preclude
recurrence
of similar circumstances.
The
corrective
actions
identified
in
the letter
of
response
have
been
implemented.
(Closed)
Violation 259/84-31-02,
guality
Assurance
Breakdown
in
Work
Performed
on Unit
1 Overlay Repair Welds.
TVA's letter of response
dated
October
19,
1984,
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable
by
Region II.
The
inspector
held
discussions
with modifications'roject
engineer
and
examined
the corrective
actions
as
stated
in the letter of
response.
The inspector
concluded that
TVA had determined
the full extent
of the subject
noncompliance,
performed
the necessary
survey
and follow-up
actions
to correct
the
present
conditions
and
developed
the
necessary
corrective
actions
to preclude
recurrence
of similar circumstances.
The
corrective
actions
identified
in
the letter
of
response
have
been
implemented.
(Closed)
Violation 260/85-33-01,
Visual
and
Ultrasonic
Examination
of
Overlay
Repair
GR-2-15
Were
not Adequately
Controlled to Insure
a
Meaningful Examination.
TVA's letter of response
dated August 19, 1985,
has
been
reviewed
and determined
to
be acceptable
by Region II.
The inspector
held discussions
with the ISI project supervisor
and examined
the corrective
actions
as stated
in the letter of response.
The inspector
concluded that
TVA had determined
the full extent of the subject
noncompliance,
performed
the necessary
survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions
and
developed
the
necessary
corrective actions
to preclude
recurrence
of
similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of
response
have
been
implemented.
(Closed)
Unresolved
item 259, 260/81-07-04,
ISI Schedule.
TVA's Browns Ferry
ISI schedule
has
been
incorporated
in Tables
A, 8,
C,,
0
5
E to the ISI
program
(SI-4.6.G
Rev.
7, dtd 2-8-85).
This program outlines details for
planning
and
performing
the first
10 year
inservice
nondestructive
examinations
of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
(ASME)
Code,
class I,
2
and
3
components.
This
program
incorporates
Units I, 2,
and
3 into concurrent
cycle (letter to
NRC
LOO-801231-705)
beginning
July I,
1980.
By extending
the
inspection
interval
one year
(IWA-2400), the
fO month
inspection
cycle will begin
July I, 1981.
4.
Unresolved
Items
~
Unresolved
items
are matters
about
which more information is required to
determine
whether it is acceptable
or may involve violations or deviations.
New unresolved
items identified during this
inspection
are
discussed
in
paragraph 6.b.(2).
Independent
Inspection Effort - Unit 2"
The inspector
conducted
a
general
inspection
of the reactor building to
observe
activities
such
as
housekeeping,
welding, material
identification
and control
and material storage.
'a
~
Housekeeping
and Material Storage
TYA's Operational guality Assurance
Manual, Part II, Section
1.2 states
that:
"housekeeping
encompasses
all activities related
to control of
cleanliness
of facilities, cleanliness
of material
and equipment, fire
prevention,
fire protection,
control
of
access,
protection
of
equipment,
radioactive
contamination
control,
and
storage
of solid
radioactive waste."
Examples
of
poor
housekeeping
in
the
areas
defined
above
were
identified by the inspector.
Listed below are
the specific locations
and discrepancies
observed:
(I)
Unit 2,
dress
out
area
on
second
floor of reactor
building:
Anti-C clothing, clean air respirators,
tape
and trash
observed
on
floor and
benches.
This
area
was
examined
at the start
and
completion
of the
work shift with
no
apparent
improvement
identified.
(2) ,Unit 2, drywell access
room:
Trash
on floor throughout
access
room,
however,
one
area specifically roped off and
posted
as
a
"Highly Contaminated
Area,"
had
an
unusual
amount
of dirt,
grinding dust,
used grinding wheels, tools,
and several cigarette
butts
on the floor and
on supports
in the area.
The inspector
held
discussions
with the
drywell
health
physicist
and
his
supervisor
to determine if they were
aware that personnel
may
be
smoking in a highly contaminated
area or what would happen to the
loose contamination if a air hose
was to break in this area.
The
supervisor
stated
that the cigarette
butts
probably
had entered
the access
room from the
second floor as
a result of removing the
ceiling plugs.
The inspector
inquired as to how long it had
been
since
the
plugs
had
been
moved
and
discovered
that this
had
occurred several
months prior.
The health physicist also stated
that the housekeeping
conditions
observed
in the access
rooS had
been reported
several
times
and
no
action
had
been
taken
to
have
the
area
cleaned.
TVA's
BFNP
Standard
Practice
No. BF-14.3 requires all assigned
areas
to be
inspected
at least
once
a month for housekeeping
requirements
and
documented
on
a
Form 96.
(3)
Onit
2 drywell:
Among items
observed
laying on the floor was
a
partially filled aerosol
can of highly flaomable
DUBL CHEK,
Cleaner/Remover
60.
This item was
observed
laying
on the floor
during the inspector's
morning entry
and at the completion of the
work shift.
TVA's
BFNP Standard
Practice
No. BF-14.36 states
that,
"Aerosol
cans
shall
be stored
in flammable-liquid storage
cabinets
or in an area
away from all sources
of heat
and each
area
where
flammable
or combustible
liquids are stored
or dispensed
shall
be
marked, with danger
signs
stating
no
smoking
or
open
flames."
(4)
Unit
2 drywell:
Vertical
run of 6-inch reactor water clean
up
(RWCU) pipe at point where
RCWU connects
to the 20-inch residual
heat
removal
(RHR)
system.
examination
had
been
performed
by
BFNP quality control examiners
on welds located
on
a platform above
the point where the
RWCU connects
to the
RHR.
The examiner
had
completed
the examination,
however liquid penet-
rant material
was left running
down
RWCU piping two platforms
below the
examination
area.
procedure
No. N-PT-1 requires,
in part, that after final examination,
the
test surface shall
be cleaned with one of the approved cleaners."
Items listed in paragraphs
5.a. (1) thru 5.a.(4)
were reported
to
the licensee
as
examples
in violation 50-260/86-03-01,
Failure to
Follow Procedure
of Housekeeping
in Radiation
and
Contaminated
Areas.
b.
Welding and Material Identification and Control
(55050)
The inspector
observed
two fillet welds
each approximately 1-inch long
welded on a pipe spool piece
between recirculation
system welds
GR-2-54
and GR-2-55.
C.
The fillet welds
appeared
to have
been
associated
with some
form of
temporary
attachments
that
had
not
been
removed
in accordance
with
TVA's General
Specification
G-28 or
TVA's
BFNP, Modification and
Addition Instruction ¹22.
The inspector also observed that one of the
had
been
welded
on the spool
piece longitudinal weld seam.
This
installation practice is not condoned
by the
BFNP welding department.
The inspector
held discussions
with
a welding department
supervisor
and
a field engineer
to determine
what activity would have
been
needed
for the temporary attachments.
The above discussions
revealed that
no
temporary
attachments
had
been
authorized
for installation
on this
pipe.
The inspector
reported
this
item
as violation 260/86-03-02,
Failure to Follow Procedures
for the
Removal of Temporary Attachments
on Recirculation
System
Piping
Spool
Piece.
However,
during
the
inspector's exit interview with BFNP management,
the inspector
informed
the licensee
that closure of this item will be based
on the licensee
determining
the
source
of this welding
and taking corrective action
that will prevent
unauthorized
welding
and
possibly
the
use
of
incompatible materials.
During
the
inspector
surveillance
of the
reactor
building,
the
medical/fire
alarm
was activated.
However,
the inspector
could not
hear the public address
(PA) system.
The inspector also observed
that
no one
was responding
to the alarm.
Licensee
personnel
were questioned
at
the radiation
control
points" on the first and
second
floor to
determine if they
had
received
additional
instructions
that
the
inspector
may have missed.
However, the inspector
found that
none of
these individuals
had
heard
the
PA system.
The individuals questioned
by the inspector
considered
this normal and, therefore,
no longer take
the
alarms
seriously,
unless
someone "comes
and
gets
them.
The
inspector left Unit
2 reactor
building
and
went to the
resident
inspectors
office and discovered
that the alarm
was for a fire in the
Unit 2 reactor building.
The inspector also discovered that
NRC has
an
open
item with the
licensee
on this matter
based
on
a previously
observed
event.
This item was discussed
in detail with BFNP management
during the exit meeting.
However,
the licensee's
position is that
a
response
team
could get
personnel
out of an
area
before
they could
become
victims of an unusual
event
is not
a position
shared
by the
inspector
and defeats
the purpose of 'alarms.
Resolution of this item
wi 11
be
handled
by the present
open
item and the resident
inspectors
awareness
that this discrepancy
has
not been properly addressed
by the
licensee.
Within the areas
examined,
no violations or deviations
were observed
except
as noted in paragraphs
5.a.
and 5.b.
above.
6.
Nondestructive
Examination (Unit 2)
During the
week of January
13-17,
1986,
the licensee
did not perform any
inservice
inspection
examinations.
The inspector,
however,
was able to
audit examiners
by observing liquid penetrant
examinations
on safety-related
piping
where
arc strikes
had
been
removed
and
by reviewing previously
accepted
radiographic film on Unit 2 piping welds.
The applicable
code for
the examinations
observed
is the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
(ASME) Code,
Sections
V and XI, 1974 edition with addenda's
through
summer
1975.
a.
Examination
(57060)
Procedure
review
(2)
The inspector
reviewed
the licensee's
procedure
No. N-PT-l, Revision 6, "Liquid Penetrant
Examination
Using the
Color Contrast
Solvent
Removable
Method," to determine if the
licensee's
examination
procedure
had
been
qualified
and
was
consistent
with the applicable
code requirements
in the following
areas:
specific
types of penetrant
materials
used,
materials
analyzed
for sulfur and total
halogens,
pre-examination
surface
cleaning,
minimum drying time specified,
dwell times specified,
method for removing
penetrant
prescribed,
method of developer
application,
time period specific before final interpretation,
light intensity prescribed,
and acceptance
criteria specified.
Observation of liquid penetrant
examinations
The inspector
observed
the 'Tiquid penetrant
examinations
on weld "
joint numbers
DSRHR-2-9
and
KR-2-37.
The examination
included
approximately
2 inches
of base
metal
on each
side of each weld.
The entire
weld areas
were
examined
because
so
many arc strikes
had
been
removed that it became difficult to separate
the
ground
areas.
The inspector
observed
the examination to determine if the
examiner
performed
the following procedure
parameters
correctly:
surface
preparation/cleaning
method,
penetrant
application,
minimum dwell observed,
temperature
of surface within procedure
qualification, penetrant
removal, drying time, developer applica-
tion, developing time, evaluation of indications,
and post exami-
nation cleaning
was performed.
Within this area of examination,
no violation or deviation was observed.
b.
Radiographic
Examination
Procedure
review
The
inspector
reviewed
the
licensee's
radiographic
procedure
No. N-RT-1, Revision 3, "Radiography
Examination of Nuclear
Power
Plant
Components,"
to ascertain if the procedure
was approved
and
consistent with the applicable
code requirements
in the following
areas:
weld surface
condition,
type of material
radiographed,
material
thickness
range,
type of radiation
source,
effective
focal
spot or effective
source
size, film type,
minimum source
distance,
type
and thickness
of intensifying screens
and filters,
film density
1 imits,
use
of
locati on
markers,
geometrical
unsharpness
limitations, and selection
and
use of penetrameters.
Review of radiographs
The inspector
reviewed radiographic film for the following welds:
Weld Joint
Identification
DSRWCU-2-7
DSRWCU-2-4
2-TWL-9-10x1
2-TWL-1-10X1
DSRHR-2-5
DSRHR-2-5A
Size
6" diameter
x .432" thickness
6" diameter
x .432" thickness
2" diameter
x .218" thickness
2" diameter
x .218" thickness
24" diameter
x 1.50" thickness
24" diameter
x 1.50" thickness
The inspector
reviewed the above film to verify the following:
Penetrameter
type, size,
placement
Penetrameter
sensitivity
Film density, density variation-
Fi 1m identification
Film quality
Weld coverage
Interpretation of radiographic indications
During the above review, the inspector
noted that the film readers
sheet
for completed
weld No.
DSRHR-2-5A indicated that
each film
segment
was rejected
and the authorized
Nuclear Inspector also
had
not
signed
the
sheet.
The inspector
was
then
shown
a
sheet
entitled
"Weld
DSRHR-2-5A
RT Defect Evaluation,"
however,
the
only conclusion
reached
on this sheet
was that the indication was
a defect that
was
not located
at the
pipe I.D. the
ASME Code,
Section
XI, Article
IWA-3000 states
that;
"Where
acceptance
standards
for a particular
component
or examination
category
are
in the
course
of preparation,
evaluation
shall
be
made of any
indications
detected
during any inservice examination that exceed
the acceptance
standards
for materials
and welds specified in the
Section III edition applicable
to the construction
of the
com-
ponent in order to determine disposition.
Such disposition shall
be subject
to review
by the enforcement
authori ty having juris-
diction at the plant site."
The defect that the inspector observ-
ed
was over
30 inches of lack of fusion.
The inspector
informed
the
licensee
that
he would like to
see calculations
ipdicating
that the weld was acceptable
for use-as-is.
The licensee
stated
that, these results
were not available at the
BFNP, but would have
to be sent
from Chattanooga,
This item was reported
as
Unresolved
Item 260/86-03-03,
Radiographic
Evaluation of Defects
Fail to Indicate Basis of Acceptance.
Within the areas
examined,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
IE Bulletin (92703) Units
1
8
2
(Closed)
IE Bulletin 83-02, Intergranular
Stress
Corrosion Cracking
(IGSCC)
in Large
Oi ameter
Recirculation
System
Piping at
BWR Pl ants.
TVA has
completed all actions
required
as reported in TVA letters
to
NRC, Serial
No. A27-840522-016
dated
May 22,
1984 for Unit
1 and Serial
No. L44-850305-812
dtd March 5,
1985 for Unit 3.
All subsequent
licensee
actions
addressing
IGSCC should
be in accordance
with Generic Letter 84-11.
Within the area
examined,
no violations or deviations
was identified.
Inspector
Followup Items
(92701B) Units 1, 2,
and
3
(Closed)
IFI 259,
260,
296/83-41-04,
Verification of Adequacy of Rompas
Blocks.
The
inspector
reviewed
records
which verified
the
angular
measurement
marks
and side drill hole location
on rompas
block S/N TVA-4.
Comparisons
had
been
made
between
rompas
block
S/N 6028-83
which
had
a
certificate of compliance
from the vendor
and
rompas
block S/N TVA-4
which'as
manufactured
by
TVA and
found to
be within tolerance.
The inspector
also verified that
TVA had
a certificate of. compliance for each
rompas block
used in the ISI program.
(Closed)
IFI 259,
260,
296/85-18-03,
gualification Records
for Inservice
Inspection
Personnel.
This
item dealt with an inspector's
concern
that
a computer printout for maintaining of ISI examiners
certification in lieu of having
each
examiners
qualification folder at
a
specific site. 'VA's position for using
a 'computer printout in lieu of
personnel
qualification folders
was
based
on the required mobility of their
examiners.
An examiner
may
be required to go to several different sites
in
one
week
because
of
a certification specialty.
This creates
significant
problems
administratively in maintaining certification folders current at
each
site.
TVA proposed
to
keep
the official folder at the
Sequoyah
Training Center.
The training center would notify the supervisor of the ISI
division of a change
in an examiner certification utilizing a
TVA Form 1453
(PD-11-83).
The ISI division supervisor will be responsible
for maintaining
. the printout current
and for ensuring that each site gets
a current printout
monthly.
The printout will indicate
each
examiners
certification,
any
limitation to that certification,
date certification expires
and date
eye
re-examination
is
due.
TVA's method for ensuring
that fully certified
examiners
are
used for ISI examinations
appears
adequate
and this item is
considered
closed.
Within the areas
examined,
no violation or deviation
was identified.