ML18026B198
| ML18026B198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1984 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18026B197 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8409040200 | |
| Download: ML18026B198 (7) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.
108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-33 AMENDMENT NO.
102 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-52 AMENDMENT NO.
75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-68 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS.
1, 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION By letter dated April 9, 1984 (TVA BFNP TS 197) the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee or TVA) requested amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3.
The proposed amendments would allow extension of surveillance intervals, clarify various instrumen'tation requirements, and make corrections to reflect plant modifications and changes to regulations.
- 2. 0 EVALUATION Surveillance Intervals (Units 1, 2 and 3)
The definition of Surveillance Interval (Section 1.0.2) would be revised to
,allow extension of a surveillance interval by 25K with the limitation that three consecutive intervals do not exceed 3.25 times the single specified interval.
The BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-0123, Revision 3, served as the 'basis in assessing the conformance of the licensee's proposed Technical Specification change.
The Standard Technical Specifications, (and the associated Bases) are recognized by the staff as an acceptable implementation of the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.36.
We have reviewed the proposed change and find the licensee's proposed Technical Specification change to be consistent with Paragraph 4.0.2 of the BWR Standard Technical Specifications.
Therefore, we conclude that the change is acceptable.
Editorial Correction (Unit 1)
Technical Specification Section 4.1.C is presently placed between 4.1.A and 4.1.B.
It is proposed that 4.1.C be made a part of 1.A.
This will restore 8409040200 8408i3 PDR ADOCK 05000259 PDR
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alphabetical order without affecting the actual surveillance requirements and is therefore an acceptable change.
Primar Containment Isolation Due to Reactor Low Water Level (Units 1, an Table 3.2.A, "Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation" contains a remark which indicates that reactor low water level (538 inches above vessel zero) initiates primary containment isolation.
This remark requires clarification as there are seven groups of primary containment isolation valves and reactor water level at 538 inches initiates isolation of only three groups (2, 3 and 6) of the seven, as noted in the notes to Table 3.7.A, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."
A proposed change would clarify Table 3.2.A and is acceptable based on the fact that requirements would not be added,
- deleted, or modified by the change.
Main Steamline Radiation Alarm and Tri Set oints (Units 1, 2 and 3
Specification 3.2.A specifies a setpoint of "three times normal rated full power background level" for main steamline high radiation instrument channels serving containment isolation functions.
As discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.105, instruments should have a margin between the setpoint and allowable process value to allow for instrument drift during the surveillance interval.
A change requested by the licensee would not change the instrument channel
- setpoint, but would define the margin.
The margin proposed by the licensee is consistent with-Standard Technical Specifications.
Based on conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.105, this change is acceptable.
TIP Isolation (Units 1, 2 and 3)
The transversing incore probe (TIP) system is provided with automatic isolation.
The isolation valves are designated as Group 8, as indicated in Table 3.7.A of the Technical Specifications.
Initiating conditions for Group 8 isolation are high drywell pressure or reactor low water (538 inches).
TIP isolation on reactor low water or high drywell pressure is sufficiently diverse and reliable to meet the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4.
Proposed changes to the Technical Specifications 3.2.A, 3.7.D and 3.7.D (Bases) would correct descriptions of TIP isolation logic which are presently incorrect.
These changes are therefore acceptable.
RHRSW Pum Instrumentation (Units 1, 2 and 3)
Browns Ferry Units 1; 2 and 3 have shared residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) headers and emergency equipment cooling water (EECW)
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The headers are served by twelve RHRSW pumps; eight of which are provided with instrumentation for automatic starting.
The licensee has proposed changes to the Technical Specifications to correct errors in Table 3.2.B.
These changes will revise the pump automatic starting assignments to be consistent with the installed instrumentation as described in FSAR Figure 10.9.3, note 2.
These changes are therefore acceptable.
Reactor Pressure Indicator Ran e (Units 1, 2 and 3)
Table 3.2.F of the Technical Specifications indicates that the reactor pressure indicators have a range of 0-1200 psig.
The installed instruments have a range of 0-1500 psig.
The licensee has requested that Table 3.2.F be revised to indicate the actual instrument range.
Based on Regulatory Guide
- 1. 105 guidance regarding margin between process limits and instrument limits, a range of 0-1500 is acceptable.
The proposed change is therefore acceptable.
Air Lock Doors (Unit 2)
Air lock doors have been modified by adding strongbacks to permit testing by pressurizing the air lock to 49.6 psig (Pa) as required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
The licensee has requested changes to Technical Specification Section 4.7.A.2.g to reflect the revised test method.
The new test method is consistent with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Section III.D.2(b).
The requested change is therefore acceptable.
H 0 Monitorin S stem Isolation Valves (Unit 2)
In Amendment No. 82, Technical Specifications were revised to reflect installation of the Hays-Republic hydrogen-oxygen (H20
) monitoring system.
That amendment added a
new page 251A to Table 3.7.A, ")rimary Containment Isolation Valves," indicating that each sample line contains an inboard isolation valve and an outboard isolation valve.
The correct configuration is (as indicated in Unit 1 - Amendment No. 92) two outboard isolation valves.
Use of two outboard valves is consistent with Paragraph 5.2.3.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
The licensee has requested that page 251A be corrected to reflect the actual configuration.
This change is acceptable.
Testable Electrical Penetrations Units 1, 2 and 3)
The licensee has requested changes to Table 3.7.H, "Testable Electrical Penetrations,"
which would delete penetration "X-230 Containment Air Monitoring System" and add penetration "X-219 Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker."
Penetration X-230 is not a testable penetration.
Penetration X-219 is a testable penetration that was inadvertently omitted from the Technical Specifications.
These changes are acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S The amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and a change in a surveillance requirement.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
- 4. 0 CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
W.
Long Dated:
August 13, 1984
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