ML18026B007
| ML18026B007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1984 |
| From: | James O'Reilly, Preilly J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18026B006 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-84-032, EA-84-32, NUDOCS 8405210688 | |
| Download: ML18026B007 (4) | |
Text
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MAY 11 1984 NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS ANO PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260
& 50-296 License Nos.
& DPR-68 EA 84-32 As a result of the inspection conducted on January 16-19,
- 1984, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement
- Policy, 10 CFR Part 2,
Appendix C, several violations of NRC requirements were identified.
The violations involve two separate occur-rences of failure to adequately ensure safe operation of Units 1 and 3 at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
At 11:30 p.m.,
on January 6,
1984, Unit 1 was operating at approximately 12 per-cent power.
A decision had been made to reduce reactor power to clear an Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) high signal.
Selected rods were inserted using the'mergency In function of the Rod Out Notch Override (RONOR) switch to facilitate a rapid power decrease.
The RONOR switch bypasses the rod block function of the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS),
and the notch-wise limitations of the normal rod movement control switch.
A June 9,
- 1983, memorandum to the shift engineers from the assistant operation.
supervisor, titled "Use of RONOR Switch During Controlled Shutdowns,"
was the basis for using the RONOR switch during this power decrease.
The memorandum contained instructions contrary to those in approved
. procedures GOI 100-12 and OI-85 and contrary to the Technical Specifications.
The memorandum had not been reviewed and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) nor had it been approved by the Plant Superintendent for use as an operating proce-dure.
The purpose of such a
review by the PORC is to assure that proposed procedures meet safe operational and regulatory requirements.
During the power decrease, at approximately 11:38 p.m., the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) was also bypassed.
The RWM ensures adherence to the approved rod sequence which was violated when a control rod was inserted beyond.the RWM program position limit.
Apparently, the RWM was then
- bypassed, and a
second licensed reactor operator was assigned to verify the positioning of the control
- rods, but he failed to recognize that one of the control rods was inserted a notch beyond the control rod program position.
Technical Specifications require that, when operating below 20 percent power with the RSCS inoperable, or when the RWM is inoperable and a
second licensed operator is not verifying adherence to the control rod
- program, the reactor shall be shutdown immediately (manual scram).
Both the RSCS and the RWM are safety features designed to minimize the consequences of a rod drop accident above 50 percent rod density and less than 20 percent power.
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