Text

Forwards Response to Section Iii.G of App R to 10CFR50 Re Fire Protection Plan
	ML18025B817
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry, Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/30/1982
From:	Mills L; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	GL-81-12, NUDOCS 8207060127
	Download: ML18025B817 (443)
	v • d • e

INTRODUCTION BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX R SECTION III.G EVALUATION The modifications made during the recoverv from the March 22, 1975, fire were intended to provide protection azainst the loss of more than one division of safetv equipment in the event of a fire. The modifications included nhysical moving of certain electrical conduits, the application of a fire resistant cable coating, and the addition of extensive fire protection systems. These changes and the plant's original separation criteria for Class 1E circuits as outlined in our FSAR are consistent with the philosophy outlined in section IXI.G.1. However, to be able to respond fully to section III.G and Fire Protection Rule Generic Letter 81-12, TVA performed a detailed analysis to compare the Browns Ferry safe shutdown systems and their associated .circuits for compliance with section III.G. TVA contends that Browns Ferry', upon completion of identifed modifications, will satisfy the intent of the requirements of section III.G.

The safe shutdown analvsis and the manner in which it was performed is discussed in Attachment 1. The required shutdown equipment and time frames in which it is required is identified in Attachment 2. An analysis of circuits which can become associated with safe shutdown circuits is presented in Attachment '3. Attachments 0 and 5 discuss the electrical modifications, administrative controls, and fire protection modifications required to bring Browns Ferry into compliance with section III.G. A discussion of the impact on safety due to proposed modifications is presented in Attachment 6. Attachment 7 identifies the exceptions to the requirements of section XII.G and'rovides justification for each exemption requested. The request for additional information made by the NRC in Enclosures 1 and 2 of,'eneric'Letter 81-12 is presented in Attachment 8. l . is the implementation schedule for modifications described in Attachments 0 and 5.

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ATTACHMENT 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS l-l E5216 5.01

1.0 SCOPE The following document summarizes the definitions, limiting safety conditions, separation criteria, requirements and assumptions, and procedure used to perform the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant safe shutdown analysis considering a fire as the initiating event.

2 .0 DEFINITIONS 2 1 Associated Circuits Those safety-related and non-saf ety-related circuits that are not directly required to perform a safe shutdown function but have either:

1. A common power source with a shutdown circuit where the power source is not electrically protected from the shutdown circuit by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or

2. A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability, or

3. A common enclosure, cable tray, conduit, panel, or junction box with a shutdown circuit and:

a. Are not electrically protected from the shutdown circuit by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices, or

b. Will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.

2.2 Postulated fire A fire that is assumed to occur in a specific area of the plant. The origin of the fire and the combustible materials involved are not defined.

2.3 Safe shutdown The process of bringing all three reactors from

. power operation to hot shutdown and then cold shutdown.

2.4 Hot shutdown A stable plant condition where all three reactors are subcritical and have average coolant temperatures above 212'F.

2.5 Cold shutdown A stable plant condition where all three reactors are subcritical and have average coolant temperatures below 212'F.

2.6 Fire area An area completely enclosed by fire-rated barriers.

2.7 Fire zone A subdivision of a fire area.

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3.0 LIMITING SAFETY CONDITIONS The .safe shutdown analysis determines the plant modifications required to ensure the following damage limits are not exceeded as a result of a single postulated fire:

3.1 Electrical cables and associated circuits of a minimum set of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown must be maintained free of fire damage.

3.2 Electrical cables and associated circuits of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may be damaged. However, the damage must be limited so that a minimum set of equipment can be repaired or made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months using onsite capability.

3.3 Electrical circuits of equipment necessary for mitigation of design basis events may be damaged.

4.0 SEPARATION CRITERIA The following means of protecting the safe shutdown capability from postulated fires are acceptable:

4.1 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating, or 4.2 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet if there are no intervening combustibles and if fixe detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the area, or 4.3 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating if

~ fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the area around the barrier.

5.0 REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 5.1 The only unacceptable consequence of a fire is the inability to safely achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions ~

5.2 All three units are operating at 100 percent power when a fire is postulated.

5.3 A postulated fire is not considered inside Primary Containment since it is inerted with nitrogen during power operations.

5.4 A postulated fire is assumed to occur in any other area containing electrical circuits necessary for safe shutdown, whether or not the area contains permanent combustible materials.

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5.5 The zone of influence of a postulated fire is bounded by the largest area defined by the separation criteria of section 4.0.

5.6 Safe shutdown circuits and associated circuits are assumed to be damaged if.-they are in the zone of influence of a postulated fire.

5.7 No failures other than those directly attributable to a postulated fire will be considered.

5.8 No design basis events are considered concurrent with a postulated fire.,

5.9 Equipment required for safe shutdown during a postulated fire must be capable of being powered by onsite emergency power systems.

5.10 Equipment required for safe shutdown during a postulated fire need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis event criteria.

5.11 Cables whose exposed surfaces are coated with flamemastic or are enclosed in conduits are not considered an intervening combustible for the purposed of meeting the separation criteria

, of section III.G.2.

5.12 For the first hour of a postulated fire, manual actions by operations personnel are limited to manipulation of controls located in the Main Control Room or Backup Control Stations.

5.13 After the first hour of a postulated fire, manual actions by operations personnel may include manipulation of equipment located anywhere in the plant.

5.14 During a post fire shutdown, the fission product boundary integrity must be maintained (e.g., no fuel clad damage, no rupture of any primary coolant boundary, no r upture of the containment boundary).

6.0 PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING ANALYSIS 6.1 Determine the functions required to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown.

6.2 Produce shutdown logic diagrams that define minimum systems that can perform required safe shutdown functions and satisfy section 4.0.

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8' 6.3 Group specific rooms or buildings into fire areas where a postulated fire requires the availability of similar safe shutdown equipment.

6.4 For each fire area defined in 6.3, identify one ox more paths through the Shutdown Logic Diagrams that will satisfy each required shutdown function. Identify one path if the required systems are located outside the fire area under consideration.

If a function could not be satisfied with equipment located outside the fire area, identify redundant paths consisting of widely separated equipment inside the fire area.

6.5 Develop functional criteria that define the required equipment for the shutdown paths identified in 6.4.

6.6 Identify power and control cables for:

1. The equipment identified in 6.5 that is directly involved in performing required safe shutdown functions, or

2. Associated cables that are not adequately isolated from the safe'shutdown cable.

6.7 Mark the routing of the cables defined in 6.6 on cable tray or conduit drawings in such a manner that one can distinguish between redundant circuits.

6.8 Identify all interactions of redundant shutdown equipment whose circuits did not meet the separation criteria of section 4.0.

1 6.9 Determine whether the redundant shutdown circuit interactions are to be:

1. Corrected by cable rerouting, or

2. Corrected by separation of redundant circuits by fire rated barriers, or

3. Corrected by addition of protective devices, or

4. Corrected by relocation or addition of equipment, or

5. Justified by analysis, or

6. Any combination of the above.

6.10 Determine if additional fire suppression and detection systems redundant shutdown circuit interaction areas.

were needed in the 1-5 E52165. Ol

ATTACHMENT 2 FUNCTIONAL CRXTERIA 2-1 E52165.01

I. SCOPE The functions required for safe shutdown of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant are identified in shutdown logic diagrams, figures I.a, I.b, and I.c.

The methods of accomplishing these functions and the timing of the required operations are addressed in this criteria.

For the purpose of the safe shutdown analysis, the plant is divided into the following fire areas:

Reactor building/diesel generator building (RB/DGB) Includes all areas of the diesel generator buildings and reactor buildings with the exception of the shutdown board rooms.

Shutdown board rooms (SBRs) Each SBR is considered separately, figures 1.d through l.k.

Control building (CB) Includes all areas of the control building with the exception of the battery board rooms.

Battery board rooms (BBR) Includes the battery and battery board rooms 1, 2, and 3, figures 1.1 through l.n.

Turbine building/intake pumping station (TB/IPB) Includes all areas of the turbine building and the intake pumping station.

Existing compartmentation was utilized in the selection of these fire areas. Each area, with the exception of the BBRs, is enclosed by an equivalent 3-hour rated fire barrier. The BBRs are enclosed by 1-1/2-hour rated fire barriers.

The fire area boundaries were selected so that comparable actions are needed to safely shut the plant down for a fire anywhere in the area.

II. CRITERIA All times identified in the following discussions are measured from the initiation of fire shutdown procedures and not from the start of the fire.

Operating personnel are expected to use normal procedures to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition when a fire is detected. The equipment outlined in this document will be available for use following emergency procedures if operating personnel determine that the normal procedures cannot be completed due to fire induced equipment failures.

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A. ,Time Less Than One Hour (Figure I.a) 1 . Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Integrity

a. RB/DGB, SBR, BBR, or TB/IPS Fixe Control of a minimum set of valves is required to maintain RCS integrity during a fire. Table II.A.l lists the individual valves, their mode of operation and their required position. By ensuring the RCS will be isolated, other system requirements can be minimized.

b. CB Fire A minimum of one valve per process line (i.e., inboard or outboard) as listed in Table II.A.l must be controlled at the backup control stations 'with a fire in the CB.

2. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Rater Inventory Control

a. RPV Depressurization System Figure I.A indicates that an air supply is requixed for (S/R) valves during the first hour. This air the'afety/relief supply will consist'of the ADS accumulators or the Dxywell Control Aix receivers. This is a passive system, therefore, no other consideration is required.

(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire A minimum of four S/R valves per unit must be capable of being operated from the main control room (HCR) and no S/R valves may spuriously operate except at their pressure setpoints. See table II.A.2.a for a listing of the valves xequired and their respective mode of operation.

(2) CB Fire Back-up contxol must be provided for a minimum of four S/R valves per unit with the remaining valves being adequately isolated from the CB to prevent spurious actuation. Refer to table II.A.2.a for the specific valves required.

(3) SBR Fire Each SBR is considered as a separate fire area as shown in figures I.d-I.k. Board rooms A, C, and E are divided into two separate fire zones as follows: One zone will encompass the panel 25-32 and the closest distribution board (labled Al, Cl, 2-3 E52165.01

and El respectfully in the SBR analysis) while the other zone will include the whole room excluding panel 25-32 (labled A2, C2, and E2 respectfully in the SBR analysis). Refer to figure I.d, I.f, and I.h for the above descriptions.

The requirements for the S/R valves for all board rooms except Al, Cl, and El are the same as those discussed in section II.A.2 .a.(1) .

For board rooms Al, Cl, and El, it is possible that some S/R valves can spuriously operate. By having a maximum of seven S/R manual control circuits in one fire area, the assumption is made that no more than four of the S/R valves will operate simultaneously.

Figure II.A.2.a.(3) illustrates RPV water level as a function of time with four S/R valves operating to depressurize the vessel and one Core Spray System and one RHR system automatically making up vessel inventory. It is evident that more than adequate inventory makeup is available to reflood the core and then keep the core covered. Therefore, a maximum of seven S/R valve manual control circuits may be grouped together provided a minimum of one, Core Spray System and one RHR System (2 pumps) will function automatically at their respective setpoints for the affected unit. See table II.A.2.a for specific valves required.

b. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System RB/DGB Fire One RHR pump and its associated valves must be available at the backup control stations for the fire affected unit. The minimum amount of equipment is justified by ensuring RCS integrity (sections II.A.l.a and II.A.2.a.(1)). The pumps to be used will be pumps 1B and 2D for a unit 1 fire; pumps 1A and 2C for a unit 2 fire; and pump 3C for a unit 3 fire. Table IX.A.2.b.(1) lists the requirements for each unit.

The use of one RHR pump in conjunction with manual actuation of four S/R valves to depressurize the vessel as an inventory makeup method is equivalent of one RHR pump operating with the Automatic Depressurization System.

(2) TB/IPS or BBR Fire Since'CS Integrity will be ensured for fires in these areas (see sections II.A.l.a and II.A.2.a.(1)), manual operation and minimal system requirements are justified. Table II.A.2.b.(2) lists the equipment required and their respective mode of operation with control from the MCR.

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(3) CB Fire The equipment listed in table II.A.2.b.(l) must be operable for a fire in the CB. This will provide a minimum of one RHR system (one pump) per unit to meet RPV inventory requirements.

(4) SBR Fire For all SBRs except Al, Cl, and El, the requirements are identical to those given in section II.A.2.b.(2).

For board rooms Al, Cl, and El, an RHR System (2 pumps) is required to operate automatically in the unit affected by the spurious S/R valve operation.

For those units unaffected by the S/R valves, the requirements are the same as those given in section IX.A.2.b.(2). Refer to table II.A.2.b.(3) for automatic RHR system requirements .

c. Core Spray (CS) System (1) RB/DGB, BBR, TB/IPS or CB Fire There are no requirements for the CS system for a fire in these areas.

(2) SBRs Fire Areas For a fire in board room Al, Cl, or El, one CS system is required to operate automatically as shown in table II.A.2.c.(2) for the unit affected by the spurious S/R valves (i.e., Al-unit 1, Cl-unit 2, El-unit 3) ~ For other SBR fire areas see the requirements for CS system in section II.A.2.c.(1).

d. High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire There are no requirements for the HPCI System for a fire in these areas.

e. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System (1) RB/DGS, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire There are no requirements for the RCIC System for these fire areas.

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f. Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System RB/DGS, TB/IPS, or SBR Fire A minimum of two RHRSW pumps, which service the EECW system in the same header (i.e., north or south) are required to start automatically and no more than one valve to close in the respective header being relied upon. The requirements for the system are listed in table II.A.2.f.

(2) CB Fire A minimum of two pumps and three of its associated valves are required to have back-up control isolation. See table II.A.2 .f for equipment required.

3. Reactivity Control

a. Reactor Protection System (RPS)

RB/DGB or TB/IPS An automatic scram signal is required if one of the following transients occur and off-site power is available: (a) RPV Low Mater Level or, (b) High RPV Pressure. A manual scram signal is also required for the above fire areas. Once a scram signal is generated, the signal must also reach the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRDH) system to ensure a successful sc ram ~

SBR or BBR Fire A fire in any of these areas would not defeat the ability of the RPs to generate a scram signal. A loss of power to the logic would be the only effect a fire would have on the RPs for the areas given, and such a loss would generate a scram signal. Therefore, the RPs meets the criteria for these areas with no further analysis.

(3) CB Fire Area A reactor scram will be obtained by opening the power disconnect to the RPs at the Battery Board. The RPs will generate a scram signal upon loss of power. The RPs Panels are grounded and all connections to power are fused. Therefore, no hot shorts to maintain power are credible and a scram signal can be generated.

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b. Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRDH) System (1) RB/DGB Fire A signal to the CRDH system to scram will be assured's discussed in the RPs description for the same fire area. The CRDH system will lose power which will cause the control rods to insert. This will limit our concern to hot shorts. No power for the control rod drive solenoid valves will be available except for hot shorts from other systems located in the same area.

Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any more than a few will fail to insert due to a fire. These few will then be assured to insert by requiring one set of the back-up scram solenoids to operate, and venting any control air and allowing the remaining rods to insert due to loss of control air. See table II.A.3.b for the CRDH system requirements.

(2) TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire The RPs description (section II.A.3 .a) assures a scram signal will be received at the CRDH system panels.

These panels are located solely in the RB area and will be unaffected by a fire in any of these areas.

4. Process Instrumentation

a. RB/DGB, TB/XPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire The instrumentation required fox all fire areas is (a) RPV Water Level (-155" to +55"), and (b) RPV Pressure (0 to 1500 lb/in g). These variables will provide sufficient information to allow the operator to take all manual actions required. RPV water level and pressure will allow the operator to maintain adequate inventory (see figure I.A). Reactivity contxol and RCS integrity are being assured (sections II.A.l and II.A.3). Therefore, these variables will be adequate to ensure a hot shutdown condition in the first hour of the event.

The minimum instrumentation loops needed to monitor the variables for each fire area are listed in table IX.a.4.

For a CB fire the indicators for these variables are required on the backup control panels. Indicators for a fire in any other area are required in the MCR.

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5. Auxiliary Power

a. RB/DGB Pire Power must be available to the minimum equipment required for a d xvid e d ino, fire in this area.

The power requirements are into three, sections. Sections (1), (2), and ( )

list the minimum distribution boards required for a unit 1 unit 2, and unit 3 fire respectfully.

(1) Unit 1 Fixe The following distribution boards are required to have power available to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:

Unit 1 Untt 2 Unit 3 4-kV Shutdown Bd C 4-kV Shutdown Bd 9 4-kV Shutdown Bd 3EB 480-V Shutdown Bd 1B 480-V Shutdown Bd 2B 480-V Shutdown Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1B 480-V RMOV Bd 2B 480-V RMOV Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1E 480-V RMOV Bd 2E 480-V RMOV Bd 3D The above requirements also hold true for a fare an the units 1 and 2 diesel generator building (DGB).

Other distribution boards must be available for the equipment being relied upon.

(2) Unit 2 Pire Th e fo llowing distribution boards are required to have power avax'1 a bl e to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 4-kV Shutdown Bd A 4-kY Shutdown Bd B 4-kV Shutdown Bd 3EC 480-V Shutdown Bd 1A 480-V Shutdown Bd 2A 480-V Shutdown Bd 3B 480-V RMOV Bd 1A 480-V RMOV Bd 2A 480-V RMOV Bd 3B 480-V RMOV Bd 1D 480-V RMOV Bd 29 480-V RMOV Bd 3E Other distribution boards must be available for the equipment being relied upon.

K (3) Unit 3 Pire The following distribution boards axe required to have power available to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:

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Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 4-kV Shutdown Bd A 4-kV Shutdown Bd D 4 kV Shutdown Bd 3EB 480-V Shutdown Bd lA 480-7 Shutdown Bd 2B 480-V Shutdown Bd 3A 480-V RHOV Bd 1A 480-V RMOV Bd 2B 480-V RMOV Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1D 480-V RMOV Bd 2E 480-V RMOV Bd 3D Other distribution boards must be available for the e uipment being relied upon. In the unit 3 DGB, any combination may be used provided the minimum equipment has the power required.

b. CB, TB/IPS, BBR, or SBR Fire Adequate powex must be available to supply the equipment being relied upon for the above fire areas.

3.2 Time Greater Than One Hour (Figure X.B)

1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Xntegrity,

a. RB/DGB, SBR, BBR, or TB/IPS Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section XI.A.l.a.

b. CB Fire The requirements fox equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.I.a.

2. Reactor Pressuxe Vessel (RPV) Mater Inventory Control

a. RPV Depressurization System The control air for the S/R valves is still required after one hour. The air supply is required to be capable of manual manipulation.

(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section IX .A.2 .a.(I) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable.

(2) CB Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.a.(2) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable.

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(3) SBR Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.a.(3) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable.

b. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System See section II.B.5 for additional RHR requirements.

(1) RB/DGB Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(l) with the exception being that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled. h (2) TB/IPS or BBR Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(2) with the exception that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled.

(3) CB Fire The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(3) with the exception that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled.

(4) SBR Fire The requirements are the same as those listed in section II.B.2.b.(2).

c. Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, BBR, CB, or SBR Fire A minimum of two RHRSW pumps in the same EECW header are required to remain operable and three of its associated valves remain open for all of these areas. See table II.A'.2.f for the equipment required.

d. Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System See section II.B.5.b for RHRSW requirements .

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0

3. Reactivity Control

a. RB/DGB Fire The method for assuring the control rods remain full ful y inserted will be to isolate the contxol air supply to the control rod flow solenoid valves.

b. BBR, CB, TB/XPS or SBR Fire Th fl olenoid valves will remain deenergxzed (safe state) for the above fire areas to preclude wx.thdx w the control rods.

4. Process Instrumentation

a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire The requirements for equz.pment are sti 'll the same as those identified in section II.A.4.a.

5. Decay Heat Removal

a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire One RHR pump and its associated valves axe required to be operable in the torus cooling mode. This pump ma be the same pump being used for RPV Water il Inventory Control. Figure II.B.5.a 1 us t raates e the pool heat-up as a function of time with pool cooling bbegxnnxng a t 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The following considerations have been analyzed to ensure one pump is sufficien ient orus cooling: (a) RHR Net Positive Suction ead ox torus ~

{NPSH), {b) Thermal Stresses on Torus and nd Attach Attached Piping, and (c) Adequate Suppression of Steam. See table II.B.5.a for valve position requirement.

'f

b. RHR Service Mater (RHRSM) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fixe A one RHRSM. pump per corresponding RHR pump must be operable after one hour. The valves associated with the RHRSM pump must be in their required position to accommodate the flow path or the RHRSW system. See table II.B.5.b for system requirements.

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c. Essential Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire See section XI.B.2.c for EECW requirements.

6. Shutdown Contxol Area Environmental Control

a. Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, SBR, or BBR Fire For a fire in these areas the HCR HVAC must be capable of operation via local or remote control after 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The equipment required is listed in table II.B.6.a.(1).

(2) CB Fire The equipment listed in table IX .B.6 .a.(2) is xequired to have adequate isolation from the CB fire area.

7. Auxiliary Power

a. RB Fire The requirements are the same as those specified in section IX.A.5.a for the respective units fire areas with one addition being that either 4-kV Shutdown Board A or C be energized.

b. CB,TB/XPS, SBR, or BBR Fire See section XI .A.5 .b for the requirement in the above fire areas.

c. Time Before Seventy Two Hours (Figure I.c)

1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Integrity

a. RB/DGB, CB, SBR, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire The requirements are the same as those given in section II.A.l.a with exception to the RPV head vent valves and shutdown cooling suction valves. These valves are not required once RPV pressure and RPV temperature are below the setpoints given on figure I.c.

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0

2. Heat Removal and Xnventory Control

a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire Once RPV pressure is below 75 lb/in2g, the RHR system being used can be placed in the shutdown cooling mode of operation. This is done by repositioning of some RHR valves . See table XI .C.2 .a fox the RHR system requirements.

b. RHR Service Rater (RHRSM) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fixe See section II.B.5.b for system requirements for the above fire areas.

c. Essential Equipment Cooling Rater (EEL) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire See section II.B.2.c for EECW requirements.

3. Reactivity Control

a. RB Fire See section II.B.3 .a for reactivity control requirements.

b. BBR, CB, TB/IPS, or SBR Fixe See section IX.B.3 .b for reactivity control requirements.

4. Process Instrumentation

a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, ox BBR Fire See section IX.B.4.a for instrumentation requirements.

. 5. Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control

a. Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System (1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, SBR, ox BBR Fixe See section II.B.6 .a.(l) for system requirements .

(2) CB Fire See section II.B.6.b.(1) for system requirements.

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6. Auxiliary Power

a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire A minimum amount of distribution boards are required to supply power to the necessary equipment.

III. CONCLVSION By ensuring the minimum equipment in section II will be available for the respective fire areas, a stable hot and cold shutdown can be accomplished regardless of a fire in any area of the plant.

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TABLE II.A.I Reactor Coolant System Integrity E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position PCV-69-16 1,2,3 Manual Closed FCV-69-17. Manual Closed Fcv-69-1 Manual Closed PCV-69-2 Manual Closed FCV-74-47 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed PCV-74-48 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed FCV-1-55 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed PCV-1-56 Stay as is Closed FCV-1-14 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-1-15 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-,1-26 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed Fcv-1-27 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed J
Fcv-1-37 152>3 Manual/Automatic Closed PCV-1-38 Manual/Automaticl Closed FCV-1-51 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-1-52 Manual/Automaticl Closed Fcv-3-98 1,2,3 Manual, Closed Pcv-3-99 Manual Closed Pcv-43-13 1,2,3 Manual Closed FCV-43-14 Manual Closed Notes:
1 ~ Valve must close automatically upon RPV low water for the RB and TB fire areas.
2-31 E52165.01
TABLE II.A.2.a Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control S/R Valve Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position PCV-1-4 1,2,3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-18 1,2 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-23 1,2,3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-41 1,2 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-42 1$ 2$ 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-179 Manual Non-ADS Operable
'CV-1-180 Manual Non-ADS Operable
.'.PCV-1-30',' 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-31 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-5 1,2,3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-19 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-22 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-30 1,2 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-31 1,2 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-34 1,2,3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-18 3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-41 3 Manual ADS Operable 2-32 E52165.01
TABLE II.A.2.b.(1)
Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position II RHR Pump A or C 2 j3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or C1 2 j3 Automatic I Running FCV-74-1 or 121 2j3 Manual I Open PCV-74-96 or 971 2 j3 Manual Closed PCV-74-.7 2 j3 Manual I Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 j3 Manual- I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 2 j3 Manual ,I Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 2 j3 Manual I Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2j3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-58 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-52 2 j3 Manual I Open PCV-74-53 2 j3 Manual I Open PCV-68-79 2 j3 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1 Manual II Running RHR Room Cooler B or Dl 1 Automatic II Running FCV-74-24 or 351 1 Manual II Open PCV 74 98 or 991,2 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-30 1 Manual II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-74 or 75 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74"73 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 1 Manual II Open PCV-74-'67 1 Manual II Open FCV"68"3 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-72 1 Manual II Closed Notes:
1. The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'.
Backup control is not required provided unit 2 has backup control for valves 96 and 97.
2-33
TABLE II.A.2.b.(2)
Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1~2s3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Automatic I Running FCV-74-1 or 121 Manual I Open FCV-74-96 or 971 2 $3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-7 1,2,3 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-74-100 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-60 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-77 or 78 2 $3 Manual I Closed I
~
'CV-78-61 or 62 2 $3 Manual Closed FCV-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 Manual I Closed FCV-74-52 Manual I Open FCV-74-53 Manual I Open FCV-68-79 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl Automatic II Running
'CV-74-24,or-351 Manual II Open FCV-74-98 or 991 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-30 1,2,3 Automatic II Open/Close FCV-74-101 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-74 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-74"77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-72 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV<<74-73 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 Manual II Open FCV-74"67 Manual II Open FCV-68"3 Manual II Closed Notes

1 ~ The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'-34 E52165.01
TABLE II.A.2.b. (3)
Reactor pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A and C 1,2,3 Automat ic I Running RHR Pump Cooler A and C Automatic I Running PCV-74<<1'nd 12 Stay as is I Open
, PCV-74-96 and 97 2$ 3 Stay as is I Closed
'FCV-74-7 1$ 2$ 3 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-74-100 2 $3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 1,2,3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 2 $3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2 $3 Stay as is I Closed FCV-74-58 1,2,3 Stay is is I Closed FCV-74-59 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-52 Stay as is I Open PCV-74-53 Automatic I Open PCV-68-79 Automatic I Closed RHR Pump B and D 1,2,3 Automatic II Running RHR Pump Cooler B and D Automatic II Running FCV-74-24 and 35 Stay as is II Open PCV-74"98 and 99 1,2 Stay as is II Closed FCV-74-30 1,2,3 Automatic II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1,2 Stay as is II Closed PCV-74-74 or 75 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 1 Stay as is II Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 1 Stay as is II Closed FCV-74"72 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed
.PCV-74-73 Stay as is II Closed
'FCV-74"66 Stay as is II Open PCV-74-67 Automatic II Open PCV"68-3 Automatic II Closed 2-35 E52165.01
TABLE II.A.2.c. (2)
Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control CS Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position CS Pump A and C 152>3 Automatic I Running CS Room Cooler (A 6 C) Automatic I Running FCV-75-2 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-11 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-9 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-75-23 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-25 Automatic I Open FCV-75-22 1,2,3 Stay as is I Closed CS Pump B and D 1,2,3 Automatic II Running CS Room Cooler (B & D) Automatic II Running PCV-75-30 Stay as is II Open FCV-75-39 Stay as is II Open FCV-75-37 Automatic II Open/Close FCV-75-51 1~2,3 Stay as is II Open PCV-75-53 1,2,3 Automatic II Open PCV-75-50 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed .
2-36
TABLE II.A.2.f Reactor Pressure Vessel Mater Inventory Contxol EECW Requirements
'E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 erationl Hdx. Position RHRSW Pump A3 and C3 0 Automatic North Running FCV-67-13 0 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-17 1 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-21 2 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-25 3 Stay as is North Open RHRSM Pump B3 and D3, 0 Automatic South Running FCV-67-14 0 Stay as's South Open FCV-67-18 1 Stay as is South Open FCV-67-22 Stay as is South Open FCV-67-26 3 Stay as is South Open Notes:
I. For a CB fire, the mode of operation is manual for backup control.
2-37 E52165.01
TABLE EZ.A.3.b Reactivity Control CRDH Requirements
,E ui ment. Uni.t Mode of 0 eration Position PSV-85-35A 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-70A 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-35B 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-70B Automatic Energized 2-38 E52165.01
TABLE II.A.4 Vital Instrument Loops 1 ~ General Area Fire Reactor Vessel Level LITS-3-46A and LI-3-46A or LITS-3-46B and LI-3-,46B Reactor Vessel Pressure PT-3-207, PI-3-207, PX-3-207, and LM-3-206 or PT-3-61, PX-3-61, PI-3-61, LM-3-60, and XS-3-53 2~ Control Ba Fire Reactor Vessel Level LITS-3-58B and LI-3-58A Reactor Vessel Pressure PT<<3-79, PX-3-79, and PI<<3-79 2-39 E52165.01
TABLE II.B.5.a Decay Heat Removal'HR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1$ 2$ 3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Manual I Running PCV-74-1 or 121 Manual I Open FCV-74"96 or 971 2 $3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-7 1,2,3 Manual I , Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 $3 Manual I Closed
,', ....Fcv-74-60 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-77 or 78 2 $3 Manual I Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 2 $3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-59 Manual- I Open PCV-74-52 or 53 Manual I Closed Fcv-74-57 Manual I Open RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl Manual II Running
, FCV-74-24 or 351 Manual II 'I Open PCV-74-98 or 991 1$ Manual Closed Pcv-74-30 2',2,3 Manual II Open/Close Fcv-74-101 f 1,2 Manual II Closed Pcv-74-74 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-77 or- 78; 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-73 1,2,3 Manual II Open PCV-74-66 or 67 Manual II Closed Pcv-74-71 Manual II Open Pcv-74-72 Manual II Closed Notes:
1 ~ .The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'-40 E52165.01
1 ~
TABLE II.B.5.b Decay Heat Removal RHRSW Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position RHRSW Pump A2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Al 0 Manual Running FCV-23-34 1,2,3 Manual Open RHRSW.Pump C2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Cl 0 Manual Running FCV-67-49 "0 Manual Closed FCV-23-40 1,2,3 Manual Open RHRSW Pump B2- 0 ~ Manual .Running RHRSW Pump Bl 0 Manual Running FCV-23-46 1,2,3 Manual Open FCV-23-57 2 Manual Closed RHRSW Pump D2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Dl 0 Manual Running FCV-67-48 0 Manual, . Closed FCV-23-52 1,2,3 Manual Open FCV-23-57 1 Manual Closed 2-41 E52165.01
TABLE II.'B 6.a. (1)
~
Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control HVAC Requirements E ui ment Unitl Mode of 0 eration Position MCR AHU A 1,2,3 Manual Running FCO-31-81 1,2 Manual Open PCO-31-104 3 Manual Open Chilled H20 Circ Pump A lr2r3 Manual Running Mater Chiller A Manual Running MCR AHU B 1,2,3 Manual Running FCO-31-82 1,2 Manual Open PC0-31-105 3 Manual Open Chilled H20 Circ Pump B 1,2,3 Manual Running Mater Chiller B Manual Running FCO-31-150B 1,2 Manual Closed PCO-31-150D 3 Manual Closed Emerg. Press. Pan A Manual Running
'oard Room Sply Fan lA Manual Running FCO-31-77B Manual Open PCO-31-151 Manual Open Emerg. Press. Fan B Manual Running Board Room Sply Pan 3A Manual Running PCO-31-77F Manual Open PCO-31-152 Manual Open NOTES
1. Units 1 and 2 have common equipment (i.e. one piece of equipment is sufficient for both units).
2-42 E52165.01
TABLE II.B.6.a.(2)
Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control HVAC Requirements E ui ment Mode of 0 eration eratin Pos.
Shtdn Bd A Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd B Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd C Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd D Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd E Emerg Cooling Unit %manual Running Shtdn Bd P Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running AHU 3A-1 Manual Running AHU 3A-2 Manual Running Chilled Water Circ. Pump 3A-1 Manual Running Chilled-Water Circ. Pump 3A-2 Manual Running.
Bd Rm Water Chiller 3A-1 Manual Running Bd Rm Water Chiller 3A-2 Manual Running FCO-31-110A Automatic Closed FCO-31-110B A Automatic Open PCO-31-110C Automatic Closed FCO-31-112A Automatic Closed PCO-31-112B B Automatic Open PCO-31-112C Automatic Closed FCO-31-116A Automatic Closed PCO-31-116B C Automatic Open PC0-31-116C Automatic Closed PCO-31-118A Automatic Closed PCO-31-118B D Automatic Open PC0-31-118C Automatic Closed PCO-31-121A Automatic Closed FCO-31-121B E Automatic Open FCO-31-121C Automatic Closed PCO-31-123A Automatic Closed PCO-31-123B F Automatic Open PCO-31-123C Automatic Closed NOTE:
1 ~ Dampers operate automatically due to operation of respective cooling unit.
2-43 E5216 5. 01
TABLE II.C.2.a Heat Removal and Inventory Control Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1,2,3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Manual I Running FCV-74-2 or 131 1,2,3 Manual I Open FCV-74-96 or 971 293 Manual I Closed FCV-74-1 1,2,3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-12 Manual I Closed FCV-74-47 1,2,3 Manual I Open PCV-74-48 1,2,3 Manual I Open PCV-74-7 Manual I Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 s3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 1,2,3 Manual I Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2 $3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 Manual I Closed PCV-74-52 Manual I Open FCV-74-53 Manual I Open FCV-68-79 Manual I Closed FCV-74-77 or 78 2 f3 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl 1,2,3 Manual II Running FCV-74-25 or 361 Manual II Open FCV-74-98 or 991 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-24 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-35 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-47 1,2,3 Manual II Open PCV-74-48 Manual II Open FCV-74-30 Manual II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-74 or 75 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74"77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-72 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-74-73 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 Manual II Open PCV-74-67 Manual II Open FCV-68-3 Manual II Closed NOTES:
1. The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed'respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is
'required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'52165.01
ATTACHMENT 3 ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN 3-1 E52165.02
1.0 SCOPE The Attachment 2 functional criteria addresses the minimum system requirements of those functions necessary for achieving and maintaining a shutdown condition in event of a postulated fire. To determine if modifications axe needed to comply with section III.G.2 of Appendix R, a reassessment was made of associated circuits of concern, whose fire-induced failures could affect the capability to shutdown. This reassessment was made to identify cables that are associated because they are not adequately isolated, and:
1. Have a common power source with 'required shutdown equipment, or
2. Could cause spurious operation of required shutdown equipment, or 3 ~ Share a common enclosure with required shutdown cables.
The method used to perform the associated circuit analysis varies from the method=given by NRC in the Generic Letter 81-12 . However, the systematic approach described in this attachment demonstrates that the intent of Generic Letter 81-12 has been met.
2.0 DISCUSSION Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant has five different voltage level groupings of raceway (conduit and cable tray) systems, namely: 4160 V, 480'V, control, medium-level signal, and low-level signal cables. The':".
4160 V, 480 V, and control groupings are divided into divisional and nondivisional raceway systems. The 4160-V raceways contain only'-"
4160-V cables and axe located at the top position of verti'cally "->: "'
stacked trays. The 480-V raceways have 480-V power cables, lightiag .
cabinet feeders, and instrumentation and control power cables carrying,.
30 A or more.
Control level raceways contain alternating current and/or direct-current control cables of 250 V or less that carry less than 30 A and communication cables, such as for telephone circuits.
Medium-level signal and low-level signal trays contain only nondivisional cables and are located at or near the lowest level of stacked trays. Divisional medium-level signal cables are routed in conduit. Medium-level signal trays carry the following type cables:
signal cables of digital input to and outputs from the computer other than thexmocouples; instrument transmitters, recorders, and indicators; eccentricity and rotor detectors; RTD's, tachometers, and shielded annunciator cables used with solid-state equipment. Signal cables for thermocouples, strain gauges, vibration detectors, and thermal converters are nondivisional and are run in low-level signal raceways. These type cables are for very low power circuits- used to convey information. Instrument control loop and related instrument signal cables operate in a range of 10 to 50 mA with power supply voltages up to 85 V dc. The annunciator circuits operate at approximately 1 mA, 140-V dc intermittent duty. The computer cables 3-2 E52165.02 ~
operate at 160 mV into a high impedance. Thermocouples, strain gauges, accelerometers, and resistance-type temperature detectors are low excitation voltage devices; cables from these devices operate at 15 V or less and carry negligible current. Thus, energy produced by electrical faults in the cables routed in medium-level signal and low-level signal trays is considered insignificant and is considered no challenge to shutdown capability.
A non-safety-related cable may be routed in a tray with safety-related cables, but once routed with one division of safety-related cables, it cannot cross over and be mixed with safety-related cables of the redundant division. The non-safety-related cables are the same type and have the same circuit protection,and short circuit rating as the safety-related cables .
With respect to identifying associated circuits of concern, TVA has reviewed protection for power and control cables, and has determined that if a cable fault occurs, existing or proposed overcurrent protective devices will interrupt the fault before cable damage occurs. The fault will be cleared before autoignition temperature of the cable insulation is reached. One case was identified per unit where the load/feeder overcurrent protective devices are not adequately coordinated (see Analysis of Cables That Share a Common Power Source). Several cases were identified where existing cables that can share a common enclosure do not have adequate overcurrent protection; these cables require circuit modifications (see Analysis of Cables That Share a Common Enclosure).
Cables used for 4160-7 circuits are shielded, 5-kV cables. The minimum size cable used for these circuits is 2/0 AWG. The 4160-V circuits are protected by both phase-to-phase overcuirent and ground fault protective devices. The phase-to-phase fault protection is instantaneous (no intentional delay). The ground fault devices are instantaneous in operation and are set,to operate for 'ground fault currents from 5 to 20 A.
The 480-V cables are part of the 480-V ungrounded delta distribution system. Overcurrent protection is provided by molded case circuit breakers with an interrupting time of less than two cycles.and power circuit breakers with interrupting times of less by'ow-voltage than four cycles if equipped with instantaneous trip devices, or up to 35 cycles if equipped with short time delay devices. In all cases, after circuit modifications are made to selected cables that share a common enclosure the protective device will clear a fault before the cable insulation reaches its auto-ignition temperature.
Control level cables are used to provide instrumentat'ion and control power (below 30 A}, to convey information, or to intermittently operate devices controlling power switching or conversion equipment.
The 250-V dc control power circuit was determined to have the highest 3-3 E52165.02
available fault energy. Each polarity of this ungrounded 250-V dc circuit is protected by a fuse or circuit breaker sized to protect the cable fxom damage. Thus, a fault will be cleared by a protective device before the cable insulation's,auto-ignition temperature-is reached.
3.0 ANAYLSIS OF-'CABLES THAT SHARE A COMMON POMER SOURCE Each safety-.related and non-safety-related circuit that shares a common power source with required shutdown equipment was analyzed to ensuxe that the power source is or will 'be adequately protected from electrical faults by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices.
This analysis consisted of a,review of the overcurrent protective devices for the 480-V switchgear which shares a common power source, to verify proper coordination of the load and feeder breakers.
Cooxdination. of protective devices for the 4160-V switchgear had been previously verified by formal xeview of protective relay setting instructions. In all cases, coordination exists between these breakers as designed. Each 4160 V and 480-V s'witchgear ha's' 250-V dc control bus. Since'ontrol level trays occupy a position below the power level trays, a postulated exposure fire could possibly cause a on the control cable for local, control or process interlock. 'ault This fault could trip the control circuit's protective device for a given pump befor'e its power feed cable becomes involved in the fire.
Verification was made that each control circuit as designed was properly fused for this switchgear which shaxes a common power source with shutdown equipment.
The existing des'ign of the 480-V motor control centers that share a common power source with required shutdown equipment, was determined to have proper coordination between the combination motor starter or circuit breaker for each load.and the feeder bxeaker. Also, the control circuit for each load has its own control transformer and is adequately fused as designed.
Each circuit of the instrumentation and contxol power system that shares a common power source with requixed shutdown equipment was analyzed. For this analysis, it was assumed that a fault occurs at the point closest to the distribution panel where nonessential cables could be involved in a postulated fire, without also involving the required cables or the distribution panel itself. Except for one case per unit, the results of the analysis confirmed that the load/feeder overcurrent protective devices are adequately coordinated to ensure that instxument and control power is available to a minimum set of shutdown equipment for any postulated fire. This exception involves a control power load circuit of the unitized 250-V dc RMOV boaxd IA, 2A, and 3A.
3-4 E5216 5.02
4.0 ANALYSIS OF CABLES THAT CAN CAUSE SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT Spurious operation of equipment due to associated circuits will not
'eopardize the shutdown capability because all equipment whose spurious operation could affect safe shutdown are included in the list of required equipment and will be separated or protected in accordance with section IXI.G.2 of Appendix R. Therefore, if a component does operate spuriously, its redundant counterpart is outside the fire's zone of influence and will not be affected.
5.0 ANALYSIS OF CABLES THAT SHARE -.A COMMON =ENCLOSURE At Browns Ferry nonessential cables can share a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, junction) with required shutdown cables. An analysis was made of all switchgear, distribution panels and cabinets that could affect shutdown capability to determine if the load cables are adequately protected from damage by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices'hus, only those cables that are not adequately protected become associated circuits of concern. From the analysis, several cases were identified for each unit where the protective device is inadequate to protect the load cable from possible damage during a faulted condition. Although these cables are not required for shutdown for a postulated fire, they can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability. These cables will be modified to provide adequate cable protection or separation.
In addition, exposed surfaces of cables in horiziontal and vertical cable trays have been coated with fire-retardant Flamemastic 71A or Flamemastic 77 in all areas outside primary containment that contain required safe shutdown circuits. The cable coatings coupled with compliance with section III.G.2 requirements provide adequate assurance that a fire can, be detected and extinguished before it prxopagates pa betweeen redundant circuits over intervening cable trays.
The open cable trays axe the only common enclosures through w ic i could possibly propagate between xedundant shutdown circuits.
6 0 CONCLUSION After the proposed circuit modifications described in Attachment 4 are made, there will be no associated circuits of concern. Thus, the cables necessary for achieving and maintaining shutdown conditions in the event of a postulated fire will comply with section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
3-5 E52165.02
ATTACHMENT 4 ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS AND REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 4-1 E52165.02
1.0 SCOPE The electrical modifications and administrative controls required to bring Browns Ferry into compliance with section III.G.2 are the subject of this attachment.
2.0 SAFE SHUTDOW ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE REACTOR BUILDING/DIESEL GENERATOR AND TURBINE BUILDING/INTAKEPUMPING STATION FIRE AREAS The following section outlines the results of the Reactor Buildings/Diesel Generators and the Turbine Buildings/Intake Pumping Station.
The tables are arranged to indicate all interactions between redundant equipment required for each function defined on the shutdown Logic Diagrams in Attachment 2 (figures I.a, I.b, and I.c). Each table has a sheet 0 which lists interactions between redundant components and a sheet 1 which provides details of each interaction identified on sheet 0 . Sheet 1 also references a corrective action sheet for each identified interaction. Tables are not provided for the RHR, Auxiliary Power, HVAC, and Drywell Control Air Systems due to the complexity or simplicity of the identified interactions. However, corrective action descriptions are provided for all these systems. In addition, diagrams are provided for the Auxiliary Power System illustrating the required power arrangements necessary to meet the functional criteria.
4-2 E52165.02
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t ~ BF 0 - .0- R B - R "C S J 1 0 . 'Co acct thi .:nrci ."..: ritcrin for the RAGtl isolation vnlves, one pnth ~ ~ ~ nut o! three'ust l)u oprrnble. For the inteructions described on sheet ~ l, nt nsi plus c'red;Il I t:hruu pnths come wit.hln 20 feet. Therefore, no modiHcatlon is required. r, F ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE IICT ION B<ctVnED: RLY1 BKDo Ihn-': t:r'< BFN-IT-RB-RCS-l-Jl I The 480V 8C y I>> breaker b h ll kd'bk reactor NOV board canpartment SC breaker will be "racked out" to prevent the I'dhg 4 y ldgggyhdk I I 'll spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation 'kh 8 Ill & ddbybdl dbydhal dd>>' I d kh "racked out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation ofI the through of two power cables, one of which feeds the ~~~ b valve motor, with the subsequent. touching of conductors in the proper phase sequence to open valve ~~~ is too unlikely to occur to be considered. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: REVIem: 062161 Ol 0 FN-IT- R -RCS- I-.MI To meet the requirements of Appendix R, the, cables for FCV~3-98 and 1CV-3-99 will be rerouted iA conduit. All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-15, FCV-1-26, FCV-1-27, FCV-1-37, FCV-1-38 that: are presently-routed on elevation 593 in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit. All cables for valves FCV-1-51, FCV-1-52,-FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, FCV-43-13, and FCV-43-14 which are presently routed in the reactor building will. be rerouted in conduit. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREPPED: Petiem: BFN-IT-RB-RCS-I-M l 0 jI I ~ ~ cX N n~ ) a Ct H EV r) c) VI J h ~) n n n P '7 V V V V V V V V
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F ~ ~ lI: 9 F N .'8 R B - R C S -. 2 -J 1 xiii'o meet tbe success criteria for the RWCU isolation valves, one path nut of. three must be operable. Po'r the interactions described on sheet 1, at no place do <<LL three paths come within 20 feet. 'I'.bcrefnre, nn n~~di f i<<ation is required. ~ ~ 4 ~ I ~ APPENDIX R ConaEcTivE AcTtoN PHLf'ARED' Qi Pl:V IENED: OA1L: BFH-IT-RB-RCS-2-Jl The 480V yl 8C breaker "racked I d b k I'~k2 h reactor NN board canpartment 8C breaker will be "racked out" to prevent the kd 'b I k *'d 'khkh I N bbbbbdy tMhyd ll spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation dkh I out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation kh I I IH of the through of two power cables, one of which feeds the gg~~8 valve motor, with the subsequent touching of conductors in the proper phase sequence to open valve too unlikely to occur to be considered. ~g~ is APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED 'ATE 062161.01 FN-IT-RRCS-2-0 l To meet the requirements of Appendix R, t: he cables for FCV-3-98 and PCV-3-99 wilI be rerouted ih cond'uit. All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-15, PCV-1-26, FCV-.1-27, FCV-1-. 37, FCV-1-38 that are presently routed on elevation 593 in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit.. All cables for valves FCV-1-51, PCV-1-52, FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, PCV-43-13, and FCV-43-14 which are presently routed in the reactor building will be rerouted:in conduit. ,APPENDIX R CORR ECT I VE ACT I,ON PREPARED 'ATE BFN-IT-RB-RCS-2-Ml ~ ~ ~ ~ ~c cII nn cc cv co v) vc J n n :I rl tc n rl '7 ' C~ V Ia IJ, CI ca V cc l4 cc IL V c4 ~4 ca ry, Vr.c) %5. 1 1 r",3 2)3 n vrv.c.s- cc. yw ~ rcv c 0- I') frv rrv. 1-3 rrv- va-c) 1.?c. )1 g..jf i/ I'r 5 r'rr rrv ~ 1 ~ kf l ) rcv 1 ~ 5) IO c rrt. 1-~~ 'reV. CS 11 QY) ll)01 .yc

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5bcot 5 CaMe Troy gamic,~ria ~>C 1 1, Tlat coerectsvc aclaota to Lc 5%eel'1 FCV.69'I St>gp01 GET 1 CSLlc Tea . Itgtt B ar/ills. 1sben for 1Le voter SctsonS ore Iv 4 sf F>4VfillsQ~cl s>T 4>> Qg,cSJI+ pPie>I 5cncralicck an lbc foltoaeitl5 f CY. 44>9 ~ tG l 17 lf3)04>StttltsHCILL li'T Cable Ti ~ I gao 4644~P>$ ~ lao trat en a ea nC r e SPPSSB tt 'i ('.ol,lc T>ss t>a>>5/tYItts FCV-G9-1a, O > IIES FCV GB.It> C ly Sttdl5. ST I, %SF>X O'I>eel I 1 C,blc Tn) Qeveo1OQ 6 A. Itcress>I Learnltch CobtctcI FCY 3-95 ttt" capara'Isan '<<tista SET 2 Cable C~e Paa I Sooa TDP poesy >It pc 8 PreviBC Fere Sorrier for II>aac vol>ca 'aov 1-A f CV .3-99 II~I&5>II>eQu LI~>9 Spats 7-9 Cable T~gs Psaal its isa~~ C. C'ars ~ .1 I<oifafacolaots 'scs svBs st>5csaasc ICV 14 41 4 SET 3 Cable, Tn>5 Pa ~ 8<8 svte>p.ry tie NPSboB:II='ec tss 1 i Jcslss'4 San 41 s 9 12 0 Pro sole P rc OvpprcSBaon FCY-14 46 6666IIJ Cable T of FCY. I- Il A11 cabtes I>r these Cable Teaqs Pov) Ni E. Anoly>IB. FCV- l l5 ssleaa on Ctee 5PS an Ilac I 8 gael 13 ~Clll 1, F I fk Co>reel>vo tet'oooo Can Lc f CV l 26 ~ AII c>LI< Cable Tert ) Peac'l onf of llc eab rc ocl:>>oa er c y valets o>4 stet 5B3 9 1, I',.I 41st I j.t. c bi~I:o tl,er. f. CV I ~ 1 g cIIaeat ~C.II taeaa FCV. l ~ 37 AII cable ~ Ioe ta~ SENT 1 Cable T~IS P>~1 6 sTDP p ssNte R. Tts'6 i~ ~ ecfcrcnev 1o sloe velvet on csee P3 slo'acr>pl>> ol 11ac eevctire i~l a ~ FCV ~ l .38 4 , L et 10 C aOc Tn 1 1 Psael ce ~ lairs. T1 ~ 61 ee'I ea'<<nb 4 r ca'Lls ~ for Ilesc sTr 8 044>> T'DP Wr <<.II Lc pe ~ av).4 L5 FCV- l . 5l JI,II Cal,lc, ) Poocl Pa>eaf valves tn Gee 5JS T~eo A cvrseclirc l thc,oe rCV- l -~Z i>~0[ 9 tae Sbeat II Ch.lc Tera> fb I t1,n Jab-yt 544IML+Sgt>n 4 s>al L5 )" il ~ ai'I>en O aa f asti sa LC Y. l 5> IIII csbt ra1ie ~ 'n ~ e Elec 5>JS 5ET 9 Cable T>45 C.'I'lc T pi p as TDP pe>et/g~ O ss,g:N.p> vscl as:I Lc >613 me c(crc>accl. eIatt1 ev>nbcr I ~. Tt lv FCV ~ 1 ~ 56 II c IIO GL"I 11 s FCY. >f3-13 FCY. 43- l4 hll val>as I>> 1be cables 4r I'Ivor z'ET IIII

~~4 Is ~9 41 C,blc cable T>ay 4~~

'frey,P~) Pace p>oat DP l' p ee>S:ty 1 ~4 4A ~ aal ~ t.al ~ > ~ Jesae:Lrl c ~ oal oo ~ ac oae>Lea sII tteee aloov oalaoaa wll Ilaal decL) L Sl v:it obtbcaotl ae D> III 1'ese, 1ls ~ Irsgn sao'seel I~ >cap I'SI ~ II f>> sbt 1 a 6 gortoI oL sbc ~ oreavQ> ~ ao B ie c>>gaaeos>on f>> tbn 6> etaIivc ~> ~ Valse>a LO reepeoaVLI ~ Oelaa ti4 4 l eoo >capo 6 LIe P>> slc. () 694 $ 61< > aaal;fisol:~ n s,t;f'va):>> I'os ~ 3v tip li~. I 4 n".. passe >See> taeaa )ra ~ Bs>O f'ein Ya Bast ~ APPf.HOIL> R tI>es I M RLACTOR GUtLOIIIG poao 1> ~ Is> teen REACTOR COOLAIIT Lest Or s Baste 3YSTC,H INTEGRITT p>sp' BROblllS FCRRY )/Ut:LCAR PLAIfl p>4465'+'er " If li5 IIC5-3 6 y6 : ~ ot Sttt ~~ 9 ~ . A I I ~ ~ ra Yo meet the:;<<c<<a'..:: <<riterla for the RtlCtt isolation valves, one path nut of three must he operable. For the interactions'escribed on sheet 1, at nn place do all three paths come within 20 mndi.fication is required. feet'herefore, no. ~ ~ nVtEVnIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION PREPARED .'VIE~D: OWE: ~~< ~8'< BFH-IT-RB-RCS-3-Jl BFH-IT"RB"RCS-3~ The 480V 8C ~p t a k& ~ reactor KV board canpartment 8C breaker will be "racked out" to prevent- the k '6'&tyd spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation "t thth4 t&1 t 250V dc breaker which feeds power to open valve ZQL~Z and the insulation burn through of two power cables, one of which feeds the ZG~~ d th g breaker "racked out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation of the valve motor, with the subsequent touching of'onductors in the proper phase'equence to open valve g~~ dH is too unlikely to occur to be considered. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE kCT I ON REPARED: thVIem: DATE l 062161.01 BPH-IT-RB-RCS-3~ -0 FN-IT-ARCS-3-Ml To peet;.the requirements of Appendix R, the cables for FCV-3-98 and FCV-3-99 will be reiouted in conduit; All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-51; FCV-1-26, FCV-.1-27, FCV-1-37, reactor building wil1 be rerouted in conduit. 'll FCV-1-38 that are presently routed on elevation 593 in the cables for valves FCV-1-51, FCV-1-52, FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, FCV-43-13, ~ and FCV-43-14.which are'resently. routed in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit. APPENDIX R ConaEcvrvE Ac+IoN PnEpnnED; L <ee: DQE! dr i7- E~ BF-N-IT-RB-RGS-5-M1 ~r ~~br ~ ag 4 r f rO Vl A rt hl A vr e. 1 ~ ~ 0 n ~, ~r $ n rl 0 rJ V V ~ I ar lL cl IL. 4. ~L Is 4, lL wO ~ ~ ~ ~ NI NI ~ r ~,. 1)r NI . ~ r r ~, h ~ J ~ ~ gg SYHISI 5l Ielrrwl~ Hol Le ~ Rf . He fe lrrsc4n Al'PL NDl X R TURBINE BUILDING RCAC TnR COOL AllT ST51L'l't IN1EGAI I 'f lÃCMH,"l FERRT llUClEAlf Pthllf Csraotv~ CJ rc ~ ~ 0 I ~> tO n A hO tll v> t

~~n n ag~~

~~'h> ~> n ~t ~h Tl t> t> r t> h> t> 'P t> c> c> rD~~

~~4. Ch. cy l<V SS- 1 NI NI 1 ~~~

Vlf gt j ' ref.>/n- rl rff 3 - hhy Wy/g, m ~x (r ref-~e.il V'gh .:Np rev ll ref- f . pc, ftv ~ 1 . J1 >fcv 1 5l I rvv 1-55 Fth.h> hh rg/r.)/v >/ /' c ~ ~ c . c'>'f H]el '.>- . f~>r/vlhen hi~1 Cw JnJ gf gt ftll/tktltttt AftPL WOI X R UllU TURBINE. BUILDING ACACTOR COOLANT SY!llf;8 INTA'RITY BRnnlS IIf'Rf NKEEAH PlAHf 8hc> O(t'1' c' OrN ll 'T8 RCS'l.~O ieij fg 0 c> ~ Vl %I nn vl ~ V J fS, N A vs vs h n r hh ti n aP '7 s' hr V ~a ~ 4 r ~ I aP N. \I lL cr I~ . c i>d F(v 4e-1 tII Nl h rCV l9 ~ Iran rCV-e <<J- ll frv 3. yy. rCV- 14 . f1 rcv I ~ li / X'h. K p I- t4 h I rCV 1 51 NT err 1 5$ x'THIMli \ , ICS'3 H 'sr N. T~lcro:iso Itnl Cr .Jar XI... lie la1ei~ l~e AI'I'I Ndt l Ii IS tIN~ TUIIBlNC, BUILDING S ~ Pj, ',. tti:ACTOlt COOI.AIIT 'T51L'tl ltlltGltlf Y HRCMN5 f[RRT IIVG)AR Plhlif / cg 'c n vl 0 n ct ft vt n ~ t d.l tc T T ct V t ct ~ 4 ct t IL ~ 0 0 11 0 0 ~ 4o 1 1 Par ~ 1 1 1 1 IXV- 1 -Zs 1 1 1 1 Pcv-l, -met 3 1 1 1 1 1 PCv- S- Sl 1 1 1 fcv- S ~ ft 3 3 3 3 J 1 1 Pcr S t19 I'Cv $ ~ IQO 3 3 5 r 4t 0 v c r1 4t n vt 0 4 ~ I ~ I ~1 I g, V ~ t ct L 0 D vt D 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 SVHBOI.~: 2 2 III .. tI~ ?4ICv eel ycvc 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 j 2 2 2 2 2 APPI: NDl X 8 REACTOR BUD.DlNG ~ I RPV '4fhlfR 1NVLIITGAT CAII 5/R VALVE CONROL BSOWIS r ERRT uu'.SCAR A.Au> ftctri>~'cI .tc ii<.~a.< ~v III IT RB mV.O '=clSL . all ChGLE gcspDNsxsct 8 ROUT INg .(PE SEE c.kslg thy lO hll EOVIPFlENT CV SlA Vela>>S All CABLES EYE~ A>>actor >1/ SNEU RUliUCfL ZQQMCLlO g.( 10 PeAci OF MJJQll COHlf CCTIYC S1IB BT, FN R PA 11 B N HlMlQl BDJ) vtM. Ocis TOP,D scesc>>l Cor UNIT 1 QaM\s feeoleens Pe<<l ' flc, 6 Bcaa~ hll BIN Valses Broiler Bld) 5E,T lb <<TPP Deco5.18. NOI 'tSc UHCT goMe ~ t oeolvlo e) ate Paocl 1 A) fl g2 ,gg,n, pig Rassler SW) O'Ceo l0 1 u " I, flse cerracsovC a>>lien I ~ bc AR ~ ere AN 't evelelon) 5QT lb Passel loll~ oa fer >>4 ietef acloeess vc UslIT '3 QeMe c ~ Il .,':Joule"" gaea>>relic>>4 eia 14 folio<<eec) SCo~al os a a osc e' Oooo polis h Ncroul Teevele>>d Csblctsl B eo Dele 8- Prov'sdc F~c Bwricr reise Bise C. Circe'o't Had sf sca'l son Ocos Disso poses 0. Pier:Jc Fir>> Seopprcssiees Bs Oe Jo Aesalysi ~, illsr o 0~ fcc cerrecliva s>>ls ~ ~ >>se 4 aoos Oe ec o 1Lc elov>> scl oa ~ vr eeef flare goosl;~c ae 4eeee( o oo O'sos I'lis i ~ ~ re'leronsv le lloc 1'e< ~o dascrispl'em eaf llsc roieacloce >>cloaca, Tioe 41 cel n velar cas Ov c. ~ roll la ereardJ b) Sl if Aces cvrreclerc hob.c, oe 0 es <<acl s ~ ed ls 5" el ~ clip B oeae Deice ~ os>>d. Oasis ~ esc alseol esvoelacr IVsr o ae ) L>> ra(eros cad. Ci ~ . 0 ale I ~ cv >>slice <<l. ~ <<eo'@co lA, Oees ~ Deere c u sc <<'.B <<g la <<Q re M o ~ 4 s'll cveccl4e ~ a'l.on ~44 B decor:Lcd a 14l decO Coo beers decare pneo Tho 9sogn aoojcol ic over<<clo Rcc fee 4 aeoedoot*lo o( 1l f' t >e>>eo<< Ocoe Ball >>eqsoisac vs cveecb v>>. sveee ecl.a<<. '>>Be roe(~'.llc ~ ala=.is(e rg ~s 4<< >>sf ceo Lie 4r lie Ocv bas ~ i cacL(seel'ev or joel (Nsl ov i'eee >>1ov<< Oo<<o Csosee e U eoo bees pee eo Bc ev basso APPENDII R 11 see R>>elf 0<<o ' s\n Rf.'AC,TOR BUILDING . raise RPV WATER ItfVERTORT CONf Rim Oa e base ~ 5IR VALVE, COHTROL Aors 8ROlfNSfERRT WCLEAR FIAKf beccsrVV V &r.V~~< o BEN llft5 SsRV 0 F)' ~ i << ~ s oal 1 I. ~s ' s o FN-IT- SRV-O-Ml To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all. cables required for'he 'safety/relief valves which are routed in the reactor building will.be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation. .APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT I ON PREWnED: Par>em: DATE 6 -/7- gZ BFN-IT- RB- SRV Ml FN-IT- R -SRV M2 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all cables required for'he"safety/relief valves which are routed in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation.. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION PREV RED RarIE m; ATE: -' "/T-S Z BF N-IT-RB-SRV-0-M2 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all cables required for. the'safety/relief valves which are routed 'in'he reactor building will be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PAEWnED: RV/IE m: DATE: -/7- gZ ' BFN-IT'RB-SRV-,O-M5 .0 c g Tn n <<I 0 iI (0 n H I r( ~) q4 V ~ V I j~ ( ~ ~ I n rl I V Iy 4V V 4 n. do V 0 4V I<< 4o f4l Hr Ht Ar I n HZ t4I Hf Ht I'CV ~ f 4 EI T. pev ~ ~ Pcl 5 Ig Ht ur Hl Ht Hr I'cV- 5 -4.'s'l Nt HZ Pvv f PS El J Hr Ht llr Hr tcv-I .an Ht Elt Hr'4t Ht 'At Pci el HT llt Ht PCi- 5-SL Hr Ht Ht Hg <<Lt PCV- 5 - Ig H[ Hr Hr I'Ci ~ I lt Nt Nt Ht NJ, Pr.V 5 ITS NI Ht fit Hr Pcv- 5- ny fit Ht I4t HZ Nt I4Z Prv -5 ~ lhh lItNL Ht Pci I 4+0 Nt Nt Nt Nr ~ ~ nl 0 f 'c 4 jii H n ~( H ~0 ~ ( V U>ILT 2 nV 4 gl 4V 4 V I'CV f ELt EEL. Elr. ~ It >Lt <<Lt. ELr. Hl E4t 4Yt 5 UOL~( pcv f <1 Ht Ht Ht Ht lll H<< teleia(loon Lxv ~ V 47 HZ 54L At I'Or ~ 5 ~ Elf Ht Ht Xe'v- 4 -Ito Ht Ht HT. APPCNU1X R UB ~ TURBTELE OULLOt)LG RPV WAtLR 1llYERT(QT TXNT 5/R YALYE CON1ROL 8iue45 r ERAT LLLXLt'N f'thill Oai(o ~<'V' r,v(.~IIr'< ~ GTII IT 10 AV 0 ~ ~0. IE rrP( Ema The following modifications are required to ensure the RllR system will Criteria: meet'he Functiona1 I

1. Route all power cables in the Reactor Building (RB) required for the equipment given in table II.A.2.b. (1) in conduit and provide a one hour fire barrier for each conduit.
2. All cables located in the RB. involved in the back-up control circuitry for the above equipment are also required to be routed in conduit and provided with a one hour fire barrier.
~~3. All cables required for the redundant RHR System (System I for unit 1;~~

~ System II for units 2 and 3)'are to be re-routed where they will meet the separation requirements of Appendix R between the cables and the active equipment for the system required in step 1 above (see table below for active equipment).

4. The RllR pump back-up control switch will be revised as shown in the attached drawing to allow bypass of the position switch on the RHR drain valve. See attached schematic for exact change.

By making the above corrective actions, one RflR system will be available for any RB fire. Active ~Rui ment 'Peble Unit l Unit 2 Unit 3 RliR Puicp U RllR Pump C. RHR Pump U I'CV-74-30 PCV-74-7 FCV-74-7 PCV-74-67 I:CV-74-53 FCV-74-53 APPENDIX R RllR Pump Room Cooler B RHR Pump Room Cooler C RHR Pump Room Cooler C CORA ECT I YE ACTION MG Set ll'.N MG Set 2DN eMG Set 3DN 480-V RMOV Bd 480-V RMOV Bd 2D 480-V RMOV Bd 3D xfmr TS1B 1L'-kV/480-V 4-kV/480-V xfmr TS2h 4;kV/480-V xfmr TS3E eEPAREU: C. REYIem: ~/4'FN-IT-RB-RHR-0-Nl ~ ~ N II I I 4 4 A IK II Il P X x IL lL II IL ~ IL Cl IL HZ s)z Hz Nr HZ HZ NE Hz HZ hlI gz Hz Hz 3 Hz I ~ HZ Hz )4z 10 I I ) I lorn QYHt)ALSI g, I)o lealae L, A) ) L))0)X R ~ REACTOR DOZLOING E55EN) IAL EOUIP COO) J)JG ECCW STSTEH naOW5 ireT RXl WR t'INn Iluls < III'~ Patt f Cl 'I erII'1()lb tfc< 0 .Cl 4" 'h'tc ir' CADK I Rtsfp>1$ 78LE t3 IIOVI iNO SKK ~LII af >ala ff EOIIIPHENT CAB!.'ES OIIEF.I Of CORRECTIVE BIIEET fiiiiiil\ if IIIIUIIEfL~IIV~V iXL IIIlllilfll EBhCIIQI HllfSQUl Bf VIr'atf RIIR5>bf Pv p AS O'C51581-I 5KT 12 Cd,4, Tts Ossa IIEQ paa ~ eS'If'5) Hf FCV-P$ 7- 26 RIIRSbf Pp C3 QEK!591 I II$LoofMnttf Sc.et ~ 'stfsls>!S>csisfe ~ f SKT IS C>blc 7 12 Cable 7! feet.oa.(.LJJ@ ~ ~e1~ ta~iltat IIEO ~ gosag.stet> NOTKSI ic ~ ts1$ 1F, scsieMv n sn Qa. GJnOQ.< FCV-67-26 tSt LII~ I 5 ts soiree $ e SI et CS Cable Tn,f Jta I TI>> cstrcclive sclien ti bc 't5'>$ $ ~ 7 5-If' I f'C'V ~ 67 - 13 5ET 12 C>%4 Tw! ~, NC 0 poise lAin for CLe>>lersctlenS stt FCV-6 I- tsstpc -E A,E n.lra Q.ff. EJ fJ4,< eiencrelac el ael Ibg, Me4ire) 14 Shccl 7 Csb'4 Tts Iis>ass~at vnfnc ~ neneatrl FCV. 67 - 13 E$ 755 7 SET 12 Cable T rl Oaai t)EB paaeaf I>5 te FCV. 67. 1 ItSCPIS'te It)as>6 t 'JR>el Cable'.Te fss>.gfs GJnloc II>etrcJ~

~~h. Ifcre>s>I into!ctd Cab)ala) fCV.67 I I I'CV -67 14 ~~~

'fasfe~ lcsslp ~ t ~ ltsf>>6 CSSt5>G It SET Slice I 7 12 Cable Tref Cable Tta )oaa !if8 ....Qa.81 Of4, Ota posaS.lf at I . O. C. Provide Cltcoel Fart Larrftr Hoalif 't.sl epn ICSC15 I Ses a>IO I 5E.T IZ tt f CV -G7- 17 ~ CA'lc Tea! neo> IIEB I<<>> S.lf FCY 6T- 18 ii,, i .. Ielcfg I ES t?1 IL11 7 Ianf Sbael I.B Cab!c Tsrf neet he>> ~ OO. Io! ~a~"'i4~.I +et O. Prat'oo} c Fere aatatao tsnlnts Ic)al>5 I I tcs ~ Is FCV 21 1!)SIL ~t stcscs'ls ts" tn'L .'jET 12 Cable Ttrf Orna lltll Pa>cag.tf heaslypis Qti f>JofJJ fOIRSM Pa>mf> FCY 2I 83 if~a;\ c>IS>e CIS ~ >$ ~ ~ Case Iea t s Sla>CI 15 SE.T 12 C>NG Tfeq Cable 'feel 1~>> rLstet Cl nao> ~ ~s>c Ilt8 0 ataS t If I IIac corrie'lore spline ~ csn bc I: ttbttl:.t >PCPK+43. csc(nt c ts conc s ~ Iss ~ sQQfcJ (U>> t b'~bien If,erenC RllRSbV Pu.np 03 EbtGPS=% ~ BI>eel Ig Cable Test bt>sd I gtsc Is'lalts ll'I>CI>e> GF.T ~ gt8 S~'ll i~ I refcrtntv FCV Zl EC)Ãtf>Ligts Stft.t. 12 Csbfc 7>at nese If>a>f5 TI>.e se Ibac Cist'>ll ~ ~ Sate>l >IC>l>IS i\ II,I) C)MC T.pf I"it 0.0. CLQbt lescs ipI:rn nl liat .em>et!ate ant~~ ~ ~ FCV.61-22 ACS~o Sc!atn. Tl.i eb r! nombcr ICCSCS5P I ~ 5 J I5 a $ IS ~ II '> ~e IIt8 bc paeceda I b5 H if FCV-67-25 It) S ~ IJft.st cnsntc. e 5K,T 12 C>Mc Ttc ncaa pool ~ 5'-If p> ~ >fill 10 .>I>Isis St)r I ~ ><<tat fs,n Og.cJ lbf.. cearrccler c t ~ 8.C et 0 ae aaac) FC Y - fc>7- 26 gt>SSS >IS~~as f.'> >n 5> I If>16 Bctltcdt~lt~ Ossa Os<<> snd bq l at acies>> E ea vtcd. f)ea!S reae sbrcl tsenber I>est o sa II Iee referent".k. (Le. 11'bc i o ~ raealiie oa! on seo!ore belli pena ps ~ te t& t 4 s! <<iI! ~bf be~A ra s t ~ ~ J sll c<<teel:tc ecl..n . II In afava dc>sr:fed oo llasl sbcrQ Ca 8>e<< feet> 71> ~ kcoqn sar>col ie ecetna.sl ~ ka f Ibr soe04 a% A Ibo >>~Q, Soa best 4>ganesa>era F>> Ibnf cer>ocb ice. ~ t ~ ~ aliene 'T4 r ~ efeiL<t olla it>Ci W d en ecgono.ble Cr - Ae. 0 Ca> Qstl> >oaf file! r> 4> jo>l foal I'ete d~eei f li~ i e naa, IS>e ~ tl>SS ~ oa po>ls peen b<<le APPENDIX R Iles> tallJ IICACTOR BUILIIING Oeoi ps>re taste ESSENTIAL EQUIP CCA.IHG tcc> Dace bS>ti hEC'8 SYb'I EN testa BRObJNS f'ERRV NUCLEAR PLAIII Btnl po>sef If <' fks>DIr~te dr. KIII ll K!I KEC>ofo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ +~ ~ I I ~ ~ a ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I g I~ I ll tl II III ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I~I ~ ~ ~ t4 ~ I ~ gl I~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ II ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ tt Ill To meet the success criteria for one EECW System, both pumps on that system must be operable and no more than one valve in the system may be closed. Therefore, the success criteria for both EECW systems would not be met if any one of the following situations occur Failure System I System II One Pump fail One Pump fail

~~2. 2 Valves closed One P)mp fail~~
~~3. One Pump fail 2 Valves closed~~
~~4. 2 Valves'closed 2 Valves closed Situation 1 does not occur as examining sheet 0 shows that there are no interactions between system I pumps (A3,C3) and system II pumps (83,D3).~~

Situations 2 and 3 do not occur as'one system's pumps interact with only one of the other system's valves. Situation 4 dogs occur due to interactions 3-6 all being within the same area. Therefore, cable ES753-I will be relocated to assure the success cr5 teria is met. 'APPENDIX R -.CORRECTIVE ACTION REPARED:- ~IEWm: ~ +'ma: 8 F 5 I T.- 8 8.- F E 6 H.- 0 -H1 (II n Q Id t N N IL I 4 I'I I J nIf P II V

4. L IL L RIIRSV R NX gr biz Rl(AgV (I~~ (ted ttr NZ Ifv C'V If .Nr Nr ICV ~ I 1- I( Ha Hr Fcv- cT tt ur oz rev. cl-as ttr Ar 5YffDOLSI Nt II+ gyltoP tkII A(I(It.t(01 X R TURDTNC BUILDING C55EN1 tht. rnuIP Owl 1Q-.

CCCW GYSTEtd OROVtlS l fRRY Nt<l'jAR PLNIT a III <-<'II ~ a i CABLE, 2 ties PO)tsaSL'I 6 ai ROVIING O'E K ra hat ZhT ISING MLIIPNEHT . CABLES BIIEU CORII ECTIVE 5)I CRT Pit C Ph tt E il Y IYOULM fllfUEIL IUUBBBLR ~V Cart RIIRS'M P )csssso l Jtslsac'c IfSET ~ 12 C>>cd<<al asoT CB .Dasao giga RttttS~ Pr 83 C~SZD S tt ~ ESZS74'B RLol I 6 Cable T<aosf -- ~S~ raL'LC C.oaa aa ass<Lan ' RIIRSQ A p A3 SE.T IP. C. du'l EKS D>>aoi/it HDTNS< l L LCC<ioe l 'IJell CSC COO s CSC CO) roses D RIIR5M P Q3 ~ Ss>>at 1-C C b'Ic Tea I ~ stasaau 1. Tlat ca<rat)it+ ~ clean la bc RIIRSlf Pvoap C3 SET IS Ca duob ma EBS terse </ea la)st<<yar ibe ioateracloeoss ' T~'. Sioaea D,L. LCCSa qencraltccd on lhc I yt~ing RRRBQ Pe>>f 03 5L at o Co eabfe -o'i ~ sosa es oac rs RHRSC3)assssoa tscsssoc\ 5E.T <ftpa '1 l~l 12 Conk poao QES Dsao Sh< ~ I I< ta<O g L. I.CCaasC) h. Rcroul Infalrcd Cable lal Osbfe Tnq g,~~d.. na De< ~ B. Prefidc Fire Barrscr pl ~ Ia Baua C. Cttceal yCadaT eccl son Dist Cs>>eo palea D. Ptoeoofc F tee Bvpprcss'sen la peas Does< E. A nal y sf s, tao<to Et)ass lhc Cattealifc acti<rat care bc Daa tase 1 s Dotal ~ g 41 Iha OL.<c acl:eae er cooobieaa 1 oala thet a 4 To ~ tta Ossa Dares t T)a ~ sa ~ referee<4 1 ~ thc pasta deacfip lien ol lhc coercatift a'ao Sales<a, Tl ~ eh<el nvesbcr Os<so ~.ll ba preeeJJ b) tt iT ~ t)s eos Cat<eels<a Ao S.C, <<D aa Vaaf II>> a<sf ba 3 tC a<lose C oa Des ~ Os< ~s vaal. 0 If oac ah< ~1 n>>e>>fser Is<ate as:N bc rcTcreucek. (i ~ . tt sbe r ea oaalaoe oal,at >>aeohta Oe>>o Des t ~ Agc ~~ .B..L,be ra s e ~ 4<of all <v< ~ <lite aalreia >>it le t)aaa dele<:bed ~ tfef alaceO aa Dost< l <its Ba Tlat deaq>> pa<leal ee <cata>>hl ~ ttaa<a a aoaD~.1 A s n~U, eao Sass. as<pa>>iaaa en I>> ha eeeeaalivt See ~ Tire re eye>>e'bic esfao asle v 4<< <cape a ble tv lle. 0 <La Stets J:I;..I:<< ~;..I:I .It pe<>> 'a d~ <ill:~ Olr,o Dace tr et ~ Its<a< Otal De<at pl< la Ia M ea ~ Dos a ~ APPEHOIY R illn UH B Oooo ~URSINE GOILDX'WG Seta< nl ta ESSENTIAL EQVIF'OQIS O<<o Daslo EECH STSTCTI feats 080M)f5 KRRY IIUCl.EAR 0 Afft e Data< c ~ tl vs a~Vs Sr roo rar BEE rrr0 r C>> 4a 1 BPH-IT-TB-EKN-OHQ. I This modification involves wrapping the division conduits (listed below} containing cables shown on BFH-IT-TB EECN-O, sheet 1, for RHBSiT pumps A3 and C3 with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the intake pumping station, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour II fire-rated barrier does not exist between redundant division cable trays for RHRSÃ pumps B3 and D3. Conduits: 3ES1580-I 3ES1582-I 3ES1590-I 3ES1592-I ES86-I ES82-I ES81-I ES87-I APPENDIX R CORRECT t YE ACT I ON PRWARm: PeviF. m: DAm d /P ez O62166 02 BFH-IT TB-~P ~ Co II ~ ~ ~ s \r / cr LI 'x Cl c <<nI 'c> Z 4 2 g rl (n ll O oo v>>r ~ J rl rr rr rt X Vo V cr ~ or n I ( ]I ~o Jrr ~ rtr ~ << ls ss 5 rl << ~ y sr ll H ~ 'r N oo oo ~ o. rc J ~ oo c~ IC ~ 5 cr Vo o). ~ CL l. 0 55 Co or 15 Cl lo rc~I 55 rl ~ Sl X oJ u sl S'l Cocr)IVII ht C< An I ((('V Irr.( S~ hfrlcr hl 1 j/' 0 ~ I (I.l "~~s 'X F.l'V to l ~ s;I o N)lre Qx ' /,' ~ 2(QQ . i I? I'V llsgls A 'V'/ I I'..c ore hl I (r.z ~~zhb.. I?I'V II~S. o ',g ~ I ~ ". "oo'e ~ ~ A' LI. I V Clc )w C o/ (i ) l Ihi 5 5 s 'o rhino(V Clsso<<e / yp,$ . (r-- 1 ls'l ~ 5 5 5 5 ' rN LLJIV also'wc / Iro- I - zc'S 5 5 oc II ~ ( V CI 5~ e Co fr..-h- t I) 5 5 P / ~ I/o IC (V Clr)<<c lr... 1 ~ <>CI ne( t(IDIX R UUl ~ , REACTOR 8?iTLDIHG RLACTIVITY CO((II(OL RPS ) CAD .".T'IEN 5 <<- Uf(OMNJ ('IPR( sNQ EAI( P(ANT Ihllr+ Wio ~ Cr'C ' ~ ~ I IVK ll I?Il IIC 1 ~ ere 1ulhv~>., I ":I: C I Ie . Bg o 's ~ ' 'or o ~ ~ ' ~ t CABI.E t RTSPD>ISZBtt 6 IIOUI ING ~ r SEE r,> a>l kl TOII If EOVIPMEIIT . CABLE5 BIIE'U OF I CORR'EC'f LYE OIICCT >>RCPARER I ll2LtKFL IIYIKY~I QLVEQ ILUTE BETE ER ELI I-? S - 3 caO) A IRPZO TA ET 13 CL lc'al Oa> ~ ECB Dssa> Plpf i t~() e ~loses > l~p9 ~ I! R>tae'I IO Clnelv.l > r t>e>e e>naa T~ IT>gs+~r Z~iu 'IOTEO> ~~ LIB- 3c20>B IRP281-ZB :>K.T l3 CsnLg ~ . EEB Dc>sffyfs nsess 1 +Pr P g Ts 4L~ ~hIL>JIIP ~ 'stet> IO C~k '.I E Fhc corrcctevc oct>on I~ Lc PIS-3. P-24 LRPZO rA BET 13 C.ehlssl o, <TB poses T>rr r t>hcn Fcr ILr intcroctionp orc ,t >hegX 8 )cncrcleccI Ibc PIS ZZB IRRUPT -1TI GET >II IO Qa '13 lh'I ~ R'" O M~g;. ECB Phee <<r>P no > >inc e' en fcB>o>sng '1 'oal ~ IIB I C.A: I ,B. A IIcro>et Tnvrlrcl Coblctd PT 3 3 e> 2Q IRPNIP c>es ~ 11> h'I I.ill D 'lac> 4>l cheetah sn. Ilsc ET 13 Cacl col >>so IIF>D Dc>ry.>t H. 8. Prov Tel c I ere 8crrior AZ L~> Sml>ets> IISe Clash> ~ >see ~ + O.~Ie ~DS 1$ C> Ic:I II> c Csrcvsl Hc J if ecol eon BL Un:I 5 '>hhe> A>1 c>LI>> Ih >1st SE,T 13 C,.l:.I 0>\s >NEB IP>!esp >IV QO. >3O'I>h 0. Proc>dc Svrprcoj>>e> QZ u:I 8:IA.> RB. .'I>seel ~ 0~).:I Peer> II>~~"~~1 Fore fpv.p). 39 I -go4 >React-DIA IRttoc.zlh GET-let C~li'\ Ovc>ECB Pee> I/>)$ E. A~lyplp. > ~ lc ~ I- W,,r FPV I>f 3$ O> I 1>>D IRPWIP ~ Ulp ~ IIIPICP IIS 3%ech 1,2 ~sntcccf+gM>> Thc ccrrcclivo >cttasc c>n bc 5>t>H csqcel frosts 4>I c>l>>c> sn the 5ET I3 Rc J~ntecal ~a o.r> of Ihc chere cele ~ '>c or \ny 11PD '> ~ CRD RB> ~ rC ln ocm Pb ~py>>eer ~ nf e.onbite}ion thor>of. >e>r Shchl I mk'p. e'eas Da<< ~ 2. lb. ~ i~ ~ rc Toronto Peet ~ dc>el'>PI dn nf Ihc ctlrcctsrc R>>a>>1'ahs pc tees>. Thr cbcc l n n>)c r . Dee> ~ otc ~ rW by tt e'f P>an ccrrcclerc lt D Q\ rr Q ee gac) e! ~ nl y ~ I pal>en f sc pc>> Oee>e v>cl. eely rnc cise ~ I nusssbcr Pre>s hc I bc r<<fcrcn>cl. (Lc. TI ! cvocal'eer>>l:ces 'one>bra be>b Doses, Pe>et h A 'C >n 'ct ~:I chIT bt eccl v'll ba >hots ~ nl >ll cwcelerc > ~ Lie>a Jet>> Leal w Ils>l >bool) >os b>tee I'rere A The )eegA ~ eejcel ec ec>~AI> ~ ae B>a> Tv Ar otq>>ni>c>.~ o, ~ ~~~>I 0>> IL>s A Ac >r tcctivt ~Q, tots ~ > .an. F~.Qa ~ >L~l>Vo Lrn ec>p><c 'Llc Fr >4. Oess 'Pa>e> nkII>rtt~ <<j~l 4ol:~ I'eee' lr.er'e~tl~ Oe<>eee L>a>> roe p>e>e Pe(n Io esse APPEIIDI X TI It>re P>r Ores REAC'TOR BUILVIIIG p>>re reen REACT lY IT Y CONTROL R>r> ) CRLI SYSTEM ': ~ Da e To>te ITP3 h ~ teen BROMHS I'CRRY )OJCLCAR PLAIfl so Ie! Dae>>5 It 1> Ike ~ bAC t ea Ptlt 'll IIB RC B>e>>aC f>ccLI ~ h' I This equipment and .its associated cables are not required by the,final functional <<r1teria. Therefolc', no ful (lu r consideratinn is required. ~ y ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT I Ob BkL:I'hRL.D: BF - T-RB-'RC 1-.J2, In order to sheet 1 of 2 - ~, '... ' '... ~ '..~ show compliahce with the Appendix.R criteria'for required, circuits'whose failure te operate could adversely. affect shutdown capability, justificaBon'is provided below for (A) not requiring separation-of the 0 power supply "cables to Reactor Protection System (RPS)'. logic.an) (B). not.requiring separation qf the cables from the RPS logic panels to the Hydraulic Control Units (HCUS) of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system: I For A and B above, the following design requirements. are=essential to the justification analysiq:

1. All wiring foz'the RPS outside of. the enclosures. in the control zoom is. run in rigid metallic conduits used for no other wiring. (refer to section 7.2;3.10 of the BFNP FSAR).

~~~~The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail'afe (scram is initiated) on loss of power..~~~~

~~~~3. The-CRD 'HCUS require control'ir to pull control. r'ods.~~~~

Since the RPS s'ensozs are routed separately', 'the~gic..will. function for ~ ~ al1 but the. control bay. fires. ~ ~ ~ ~ i for ~ 5 Scram time is less than 3.5 seconds 90 percent insertion'of.control..rods,

~~~~..6. The. power supply cables from;the RPS logic panels to. the. HCUS.are pouted:.in'separate conduit from. the .~~~~

power return..cables. 4 r For A above there are four failure modes for. the logic'power supply cables; they're! ~ Ground short, "- " .. ": '" ot ~ ~ 1

~~~~2. short',.~~~~
~~~~3. Open circuit, ~ ~~~~~

~~~~\~ ~ ~ ~' \~~~~

~~~~4. Line short APPENDIX'~~~~

~ I i ~ ~ ,'. -'-.CORRECT I VE ACT ION ~ ~ I ~ ~ PaEmED: ~ Palms: 4 ~ ~ BFN-IT-RB-RC-l-J2, sheet 1 of 2 BFN- -RB-RC-1-02, sheet 2 of 2 Both the ground short and line short will trfp the cables'ircuit breaker which will initiate a scram on loss

~~~~of power. The open circuit failure mode will also initiate a scram on loss of power. The hot short failure.~~~~

mode can only impose another RPS power supply on the failed power supply cable; therefore, the logic circuit is still protected from damage by qualified trips of the power supply and will function to disconnect power to the CRD HCU's, thus inducing a scram. For B above the cables from the RPS logic panels to the HCUS provide power to the scram valves in the HCUS. This power is removed to cause the HCUS to insert the rods. If these subject cables are involved in a fire, they will degrade while the conduit is still intact. Because of this degradation, they will either open circuit or short to the conduit, either of which will remove power to the HCUS, causing insertion of the affected control rods. Refer to figure 1, attached, for a block diagram level representation of the power supply cable connections to the RPS logic and of the RPS logic cable connections to the HCUS. P APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION fhEFARED: PEVIWm: DATF.: 4 C>l < BFN-IT-RB-RC-1-J2, sheet 2 of 2 0 arm-IT-RB-RC-1-Nl This modification involves wrapping the division I conduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS-3-203B, PIS-3-22A, and PIS-3-22B shown on BFH-IT-RB RC-l, sheet 1, with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 1 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: lRP52-IA 1RP53-IA 1RP54-IA lRP277-XB 1RP278-IB 1RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l ~ cv t'A PATE 6'H 8'z. 062l66.05 This modification involves wrapping either the c'onduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFH-IT-RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 1 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-25C or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . r Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: lRP222-IIIA 1RP437-IIIB-1RP215-IIIA 1RP429-IIIB 1RP207-IIIA lRP419-IIIB 1RP206-IIIA 1RP423-IIIB I APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED 7 D /@rnid fj REVIE ZP: BATE' Z Z 062166.10

~~~~0 0~~~~

. v a J n o a $CI ev en I vl 3 V vl jr. H .0 'n J Ih J 8n CI O 1 0 C 'al 1 TI Vl h H 41 ~ CO v~ ~ ~ C ee 11 e ~ v v v ~ n n h etl n 'n el v Ji CL CC r a ~ ~ & h. Ce X e( n n ls Nle CvMTI,I I(('V 1 v 1(~Ic r lre-.l hl e (I.I-- III'T Le~ u.IC) W 1 ee<<1 . 111 2 A l.leM 2C< CI ~ (V ('.Ic Cevr. .~/7)Y ~ (C.S 1 ~ 14) <I ,p. 5 5 .5 tkry( V CI~ Le<< c (err 1 ~ lS I Cl 5 5 5 / I-15]V Cl.eve 'I IC T 1 ~ 24) kl 5 5 5 ee, 'C P N. I'I ClrC <<C i.~.'A 'h'. ':y. r'y ~ ~ (C.- a ~ O'I) 5 5 g 5 J v CI(( V (z ~ I CleC ~ 14) vt I'II ~ / 'Pl (V rl I" I- '(CS- CS) 1:'I V Tl 1 ~ IC ~ . I ~ 'll ~ ~ RI. I T e', g.. ~, ~ / er r <<r r r l '(c-. - 1 . C~.) II Tnh .7 II( .. I(v 1alarocl eon h('('(WDIX R LJND~ REA('TOR B(jI(.DING I(l:A( TIVI T T COH1 l<nC RP5 $ ('RD 5Y5lCl1 (gnuN> rtRR( 1(U(l th(( PlhNT 2 II~" If.(eJJ CS. 8111 (1 RO.(I(.2 ".I La MO 0 gs ~ ~ c ~ l. CAOK >tcsrottsxsLE .131 ~ ~ '1, 'I t}OUtitt8> ., '.1 e, o It-. ~ ~ ~ SEE.. t r.hatt hT10 L IT ,.'Ch SEES SI)(ET .- DF CO}tt}ECTIVE SllEET IXEPAAER O ~ ~ ge l}UBE QuQUEUX NlUK BllbtfKR gf~ >,o ~ ~i a ~ LIS 3-20 zo- Ih '.Ri SET '(3 Cond>>et Oils ECb Osseegt i ~ I . ML.- LIS. 3. 203C 2RP9.osmh 5 54>>l IS ~ u t .i ~ LIS. 3. 2030 ZRP257'-TO e! SEI }3 c...> 'a '-' l C"~i~<~ ttOTI5> I.IS - 3. 2030 118~ 'N'ct8 54eet 15 c.>.'a ' roses >tc>cs f. Ttae correct'ecc stloon lo Lc PTS. 3. ZZA 2RPPO. IK GET, 13 e..i.;I . tat>en f<< ILe aeter octa>>nb ore r h< PT5 3-22C gRP9ot ~ 5A-r cie general eccl on lire (ottoeee ta) @~set5 Cy<<M'sor>>+PZJ+<<r ffs>>ner> f ~ PI5-3-228 2RP25 /- 18r ~ SU 13 C..l >>1st ~ 'a ~ Qeoe Ezb geee r ra h }ferns>t Ineolvcd Comets) PI S.3. 22 0 ZRl st9-118 5he ~ I >l'5 Qe<<J<<ot L'~S Suetahae All cables in~ lhc. I C.>>le.t 8. Provide Flrc 8srricr 88. ~ Gs.os I e. r., fJ.g. <<P2I} I A2 L;e.e'ht Su'etaLes ~ I~OII 15 Oe<<b<<al ~ Ba>ace ' C. C'rto'at Hodofoceloon gI I; 'I Su:tahe> hll cables I>> tbc SET 13 Ce>>d<<el Oaos IIEZe I'e e t a CK 0. S>ohio C St<> R8. gaua I ~ aatyI}oa Foie Sopprcssaen ~ ~ Qz L' F55I I 8uelches

~~~~85. 55h,b TI zarzg.-zlh,ttyzst g q ~5t 15 MT 'l0 Coo);l ft>no O>ao ~~~~~

~~~~cd.~~ I88 Oaffr r/0/ti D. Proeede~~~~

~~~~8. A~lyblss.~~~~

I 5 FOV.85.558, L 7>>8 ZUNIS.Xle,tRF>ltb UD 54-5 ~ 5 'I Q.J..:t s lhc cetrectelre ecteMs con Lt 5aeohn ' el<<el hll csbtas a tlat SET 13 ftob <<la~os et>> Oee>$58 e stet of lhc sLotc selt<<os or tsps so CIIO R8. sra ~ sea\ lani ~ J2 e y~e~a taML slho I hen there>>(. h r R>>> aoe Oasis Tsa ~ sa e reference to she le ~ e ~ ~ feecrePt en of the correct,re i sate<>at)ed L5 tt I I Iso its h corrcclet t 4, O,C, or D ee sea>>I eh U snl L5 ) el ool;ie 'C es Oea ~ O<<ss vscd Oeh'l) one el eel neo>>her teats u.N Lc re(ere>>col. Ee. ~ . >><<teat;.c -t. <<e.Lea 'Wh OMo re o i ~ bette as:I ~bt Le ud ~ ehd 'ill >>ettcatete ~ ale<<os LSI Le Jesot:4d ~ I41 eloeL) lac Dioie sa I'esto

~~~~~~Tle ~ leoqee oe >eel es toot<<ante~~~~~~

>Iver SL>> eeah5<<eo<eon f>> ice coeeocteet ~ to ~ s1 ~ en +Lc tetze<<e Lle ~ >lao tabs >>> 4 L>>eg~o.Lte Cv ILe. e 0 a os tla>ss to J:f:e ~ ee;..I;(ffsl:~ I'eee deter it<<ra oC tcsic Ooe, ~ '>o>>e tahe ~ ~ Csas too te> ~ Ie roon Es baisi APPEHOIS R Ilare sr> e eo Ooe ~ s>>to REACTOR BUILI}IC re<>>'are REACTIVITY CONTROL Oeas Os>go IIPS f CRD SYSTE,N Casts ROM}}5 FERRY HllCLEAR PEA}fi Osa5 tt.CI fts ~ fehtt.ut 4 ' SfN ff 25 RC<<Z h' ~ t ~ ~ or<<se .e )o" J e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e I o ~ i ~ * ~ e

~~~~~~tl ll~~~~~~~

BFH-IyRB-RC-2-:J 1 This eq<<lpmcnt and its. associated "cables are not required by the Sinai fllnctlonn criteI ln 1 ~ ThereCnrc, no fu~ ther consideration is required. ~ g APPENDIX R ConaEcvtvE Ac T l ON A<ElveED: REvlLwm: PyE: ~~< 8'< BFH- IT-RB-RC Jl BF - -RB-RC-2-J2; sheet 1 of 2. ~ !. ~ 'n order to.show compliance;with the Appendix R 'criteria for req'uired .ctrcuits whose, failure to operate could adversely affect shutdown capability, justificat'ion's.provided. below for (A) not requiring separation. of the " .power supply cables .to Reactor Protection System (RPS).'logic and (B) not requiring'separation of the cables from the RPS logic panels. to the Hydraulic. Control Units .(HCUS).'of the, Control Rod Drive-.(CRD) system. . For A and B above, the following design*requirements are essential to the Justification.analysis:. I. All w'iring for the RPS outside of the enclosures in the control room is run in rigid metallic conduits used for no other wir.ing (refer to section.7..2.3:10. of the BFNP FSAR). .. 2. The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail safe (scram is initiated). on loss'of. power.

~~~~~~3. The CRD HCUS require control.air to pull control rods.~~~~~~

~ ~ ~ . 4.. Since the RPS sensors are routed separately, the logic will:fUnction. for al] but the'control bay fires.. .5. Scram time is less than.3.5 seconds for 90 percent insertion..of. control rods..'.'. ' 6'. ~ The power supp1y cables from the'RPS logic panels to the HCUS are rout'ed in. separate conduit from'the . power return cables, For A above there are four failure modes for. the lo'gic power 'supply cables.;. they.,are:, '. 1.. short; . Ground Hot short, ~ ' 3~ Open circuit, 4.'ine short. APPCNDrX S ~ I' t -.CORRECTIVE ACTION r "' ~ ,. fhapma>: ~, "/' ( ' Rerrem: D~:1 Yra Y~~ BFN-IT-RB-RC-2-JZ, sheet 1 of 2 ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ' ~ BFx-. IT-RB-RC-2-J2, sheet 2 .of ..Both the ground shortand line. short will 2. 'O. ': trip.the cab'les'ircuit ~ breaker which wi11 ~ ~ initiate ~ a.scram on loss of power. ~

The open circuit failure mode will also initiate a scram on loss of power. The.hot short'failure mode 'can only impose another RPS power-.supply on the: failed power supply. cable; therefore, the logic circuit is still protected from damage by qualified trips of the power. supply and will function to disconnect power to the CRD HCU's, thus. inducing a scram'.

~ 'his For B above the cables .from .the RPS logic panels to the HCUS proyide.power. to the scram valves in the HCUS. power is removed to cause the HCUS ta.insert the rods. If these subject cables are involved in a fire, '-.they will degrade while the conduit is still.intacf. Because'of this degradation, they.'will either open circuit or short to the conduit, either of which will remove. power to the HCUS; causing insertion of the affected control rods. Refer to figpre. I,: attached, for a block diagram leve1 representation of the. power supply cable connections to. the RPS logic and of. the. RPS lhgic cable connec'tions to 'the HCUS. ~ ~ s ~ ~ Y ~ ~ ~ ~ J' 'L ' r "~ 4, ~ ~0 fl ~ L ~ ~ I ~ Y ~ ~ j \ ~ r APPENDIX R ~ ~ Y ~ ~ '. ':.CORRECT I VE ACTION REWRED ~ r PerIem: ~ ~ "Y E~ BFN-IT-RB-RC-2-J2, sheet 2 of 2 This modification involves wrapping the division I conduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS-3-203B, PIS-3-22A, and PIS-3-22B shown on BFN-IT-RB-RC-2, sheet lf with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 2 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: 2RP52-IA 2RP53-IA 2RP54-IA 2RP277-IB 2RP278-IB 2RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION REl ARED. 7~ n ~ Wi" R&'IENEDl DATE: 062166.04 -BFH-IT-RB"RC-2-Ml BFH-IT-RB-RC-2-M2 This modification involves wrapping either the conduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFN-IT-RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 2 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-25C or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FPT-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: 2RP206-IIIA 2RP419-IIIB 2RP222-IIIA 2RP437-IIIB 2RP215-IIIA 2RP429-IIIB 2RP207-IIIA 2RP423-IIIB APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREWnED: -7 rent REVIem: DATE: ~ r8'~ 062166.11 BFH-IT-RB-RC-2-N2 4 ~ I V .C 'to >>I 'X V o ~ na fr rn J ot tD 0 ~1 n do V S~ V o'ot tt tt tt >>1 >>t tr g oot o N l )t ~ 'r \ o. ~ v 'Ir o v 4 ~o V , f A v to H H ~ tt rt' tt M E~ rt II eo oe J tf. v ~ ~ CC ~ 0 X ot ~ I ~ KPrr Cothttotlt . h dg ad Ao t<t'V I.t Irit>>r Irrel u- ..ua) 1 ' s v sP y,ry l. VI<< ' I ~ o>>1 III J.lmaO ll III'lsgl // ~ I'>>C>>o ~ o (I'L C ht 'g(r o = 3.1Z7%.. P.IV tlqlo I 't e>o.oor C 11 r / >. V ~ o r ~ MvtV Clttov>> r g (r- 1 ~ IA th.olV I:los~>> Crr. d tA ~ 5 5 Ll3JV CI r>> o r I ZS) X'i r i'r i . l> ~ ta ~ ~ ~ 5 5 ~ = o I(,IV ~ (r rv I trr) I I ooor I 6I ICI ~ I Cot ~ t ~ Cy., I Pt I I I l.l. 'I f C'I,>>...r Itr... 1 ~ 1h) 1 Ir.V f 5.Svh ' i7 I ~ ÃHUOL5t r:V IIS dnh III ... It [~I>>r e>>lm o tlt'I'lttttlX tt oo o Uttl REACTOR BUtLOlttG ttCACtlVt tY COtt(HI'L cps f canto s>51N *,~'> r NouNS rlRRS WOLhR PthN o o ~ g dgdt toity, jIG.>>o lit tt tt'Rl'IIC 3 ~ry Lh r r ~ ta.iLQ ~ t el as Ia) li I'. h ~ es 'i I Chebf, ROV'I IRG SEE t Rtsrollstol.t gr,Lul hT IOII 8 \ r If 'WVIPNENT CABINS . OIICEI CORRICf IYE. BIIEfT, I'RfPhII A f UVI5UKB ~maLYJP M)@YE.Q W VillKH..333IKRhCIlQH IIlhUKQ Kfuuull L[5- 3 203A 3RP2D. IA ~ SET 13 C l<<:I ~a~ c,fb 0 a~ ogl 1 203C 3RP94 KA "."+ZAN;-i '.I5 ~ 5 oi l2 l.l5 - 3. 2O3 B 3nP 25'- IB f IIOT 5 I LT5- 3.2o3D 3RP319- KB'l shoal C..l;,I I. ytw cetrcelovc aelooea I ~ bc

5. 3 - 22.A 3RP2o- lA 5Kf 13 c 1-s <<a I f+.b ry"*.v3gtrtrde Sos( ~ Iailcsa fer il ~ ullcr ~ eleonS atc 3 I ~ cpncroliced in ibc feIIoulohI 3f<P94-KA '

n an PJS -3 r 22C Sicea IP enaencre PIS.3- 228 3RP25T-LB SET 13 C.hl ;i Pl 5 3- 2Z.D 3RI'3I9- ILB rl 12 CW:I A. Rcraui I~aired Ccbiela) sa Al L:I S~iaba) Nl eeMe an ~ Iloa rIET 13 Ko B. Provadc Fire Barrier sj12 I.: 'a Suai.boe Ras. !>a,e ~ 789 I~ Il Co.l:I ,E rests(loran suaM- C. Coreesi 'Hade'f sisal oaaea Ul L~>>'I Su.iotas All eebi Xn ibc SET 13 Co l;i Daao II(b aaeao F tI'ca L'I Ra. Sl css rates b.o.aohopfrh P. Precede Fire SsorprCSSahn 02 Ssa'oaobaa T ~89 11 ~ C l.:l bee~of'a rfs> oirr fST B5 SSha ( TOh 3IITZOS IfhablitgA'll Mr 14 C. d;.I Ocao ffII rtteaorfe)/)a E. Analysis later rt, lSrig o SIIyaa'J'%6oSRyhtS III glassie g Co.li:I s~ Fsy B5 550rl 1OB e'he~~. eerrceIIvc selt ~ s csn bc $ attoa seahai rra>> hll cables an S e SPT 13 Rclhhsa~s ote reit Eg B r.sr ~ el af Ibc abate sel'a er Is<to~~ f al sao go aay IlrS a ~ tRD ~ h oaohC conb.~i.on ILcteef. sa Sateen I Cnluoi s'\a bassa Z. Tlo:a ia a rcfcrentv I~ abc rear< cacr>Piton al lite eostccl.ve o ~ eeloaea Tba abaci nooelbea t'ats Qatao 11 b dgbs Iatan eirrcclorc hob.C, er D ss eccl Ssrsa ~ nd bl ) of cali ~ ts C os Ona o Oaree used ~ Otsls rnc alstv I nvrabcr Pere ee Ii bc referenced. (a.c. TI a4 fat cvecal'ooc asl en shtobca br'b Othe ee eC t l ehl e ~ ah>>li eblbe ned re at ~ ~ t3 all a<<tealuc ~ alorsa oOI ba Sacs Jc ate:feed ee llosl abaci ) aao Bells

~~~~~~y lee ltoqh er ',eol s ~ ocoron.sir Rsr'a f>> abe aeape~h A abe n~e~~~~~~

~ at beta ~ etqassag es oon f>> Ibc aee ael v ee o atro eel.~. Tl>> r<<er~.'Ll ~ eel~lao ra@ay 4n ~ ore ~ blc I>> Oi. Oau beers ea J:I ital >> a jebel;I+a1.$ + reer dvtat or \ 'eseal Oet, sWot) eton o Dont "lettre k lt no r ~ basso APPEAOly A s iles( r ~ K Ml REACTOR BIIXLD1RG ~ I* Oioo Qe(n r e roon REACTIVITY COHTROl ftrs Oa s fatso RP5 $ CRO STSTE'H re<> ~ ccs ORO'4HS f CHAT HUClt:AR PLAN1 friy T'r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~,' -'..1 o ~ ' ~ ~ Ij '0Il'll () B F jl-,RH- RE J 1 This equlpmcnt nnd its associated cables nre not required by the final functional <<riti via. Thercfovo, no fuvthnr consideration is required; I ~ l APPENDIX R COAREC'T l'YE ACT10H BiLi'NEED: I:.VtENL-O: ) V gATE: 4/Zlg BFH-IT-RB-RC Jl BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 1 of 2 In order to.'how compliance'-with the Appendix 'R criteria for required.'circuits whose failure to operate'ould adversely affect shutdown capability, justification is:provided.below for (A) not requiring separation of the power supply cables to Reactor Protection-System (RPS) logic.and (B) not requiring separation of the cables from the RPS logic panels to the Hydraulic. Control Units (HCUS) of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. For A and B above, the following design requirements are essential.to.the justification analysis: 1; All wiring for the RPS outside of the enclosures.ih the control room is run in rigid metallic conduits used for no "other wir'ing (refer to section 7.2.3.10 of the BFNP FSAR). I 2; The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail safe (scral is initiated) on loss'f power. 3.. The CRD HCUS require control air 'to pull control rods.

~~~~~~4. Since the RPS sensors are routed separately, the logic will function for all.but the control bay fires.~~~~~~

~~~~~~.'. Scram time is less than 3.5 seconds for 90 .percent. insertion of control r'ods..'- -.~~~~~~

6. The power- supply cables from the RPS logic..panels.to the HCUS are routed in separate conduit from the power retorn cables. .~

~~~~~~~ For. A above thete're four failure modes for the logic power su'pply cables;. they".are:~~~~~~

1. Ground short,

2. Hot short,

3. Open circuit, .

4.. Line, short. APPENDIX R '.CORRECTIVE ACTION ~ I': . ..- REPARED: ./" PerIem: r ~ I~ ~ ~ ~ BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 1 of 2 4 ~ ' B T-RB-'RC-.3-.J2, sheet 2 of 2 ": ~ L ~ ~ t Both the ground.shortand line. short'will .tr)p.the cables'.circu$ breaker which:will initiate a, scram on loss of power. The open circuit'ailure mode will also initiat'e a scram.on'loss of power. The.ttot shor't failure mode'can only impose another RPS.power. supply on the. failed power supply cable;.therefore..the logic circuit is still protected from:damage by qualified trips:of t3e power supply and will function to disconnect power to . the CRD HCU's, thus inducing" a scram.'or 8 above the cables from.the'RPS logic panels to the HCUS provide.power. to the scram valves, in. the HCUS. This power is removed to cause the-HCUS to insert the rods..If these subject. cables are involved in a fire they will degrade'while the conduit is st'ill intact. Because of this degradation they. will either open .. '. circuit or short to the conduit, either of which wi.ll remove power to the HCUS; causing insertion of the affected control rods. ~ ~ Refer to figure 1, attached, for a block diagram level representation of the power supply cable connections to the RPS'ogic and of. the RPS logic. cable connections to-the,HCUS. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'LL'~ ~ ~ r ~ L ~ L ' r n. ' oi. r ~ I ~ *~ I L ~ APPENDIX=- R ~ ~ :.CORREcTIVE At:T)ON ! L , PREi ARED: ~ ~ '. RVIem: DA~: dZrs g~ r BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 2 of 2 ~ ~ asm-IT-RB-RC-3-ml This modification involves wrapping the division I'onduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS 3 203Bg PIS 3 22'nd PIS 3 22B shown on BFH-IT-RB-RC-3, sheet l, with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 3 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: 3RP52-IA 3RP53-IA 3RP54-IA 3RP277-IB 3RP278-IB 3RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION .PREWaED: REV Iem: IlATE: lE 8'z 062166.03 BFH-IT-RB-RC-3~ BFB-IT-RB-RC-3-lQ This modification involves wrapping either the conduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFN-IT-.RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 3 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-2SC or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined. by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: 3RP206-IIIA 3RP419-IIIB 3RP222-IIIA 3RP437-IIIB 3RP215-IIIA 3RP429-IIIB 3RP207-IIIA 3RP423-IIIB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: 7 E REVIEWED: ICE: 4 r'H dPz. 062166 12 BFN-IT-RB-RC-3~ Failure Modes Analysis for the RPS System fg ~g ~sons rf c~tr lay $888 S<'re ~S RPS Ps're use~ Pe~~fs 8 Bc ct(uP R B~k~p 5g ytcg~ Vss!VCj sc.~ vd& (sr si'c &ouhg ~pt~ R5'- 25 g,y-swot 8 v~(uo$ ) >~6~tu~) 8) F>(jt~ x5',',<z D ~ ~ ls ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ (es)'a~Sf'if fcoCtssr tfCl4$ PRST~fessc4oe H<QS Cn nero a's ~ t ~ Tu>L>ne Gui>cking ~sr'rea Fcv- 3b~l Figure 1 RPS Block Di agram Scram = (IA + IIA) (IB + IIB) 'a ~ I et .C <<r r Le vZ ~ ~ C ce ~~v gr ale i gn jn et ee t <<n ~ t>> ee n Jn ve ve O )$ . . v . V ~ ep at ve ~ ~ ~ e ve ? J<< f ~ 7 ~ tt ct Ct V ~ ~\ a 'p ~ aa ~ ~ v v+ te0 g 'fl 4n Vh n ~~ et h 4< n 7 n ~ ~ a. c ~ Jc ee J~ ~ e/ ee ec Je T ar 15 n la eie'rr CVMtatfI ~ OC ~ ea. Itl ea Ao. III'V ) ~ )t,)cr Yig F aa I 1 t e' (au~ ttf'V le a Jll vtelce ear I eer1 !SI Hj Jam.Zn I] . ttl'V t)ella I'a ~ .,aae C, ;ihip'~. ier 4'I - 0 fc.h]. Ie)'V II <<tl a . aae .ea. g

~~~~~~,qy "... Pxx~,~~~~~~

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O ."Vs>Cf< NOuII5 ffrlIY sllIQ(hR Plgif 54cIS t+vf IS v &Ca.l '.I ~e +lull II.III AC-2 ~ / IfcfI<f4/ e/ '~ I Ie:~I~Q. 0 ~ ~ ~ f s ~s r v 'Z v as s /j<< 0 'va ~tn .C >>rl =O r ! a ~ >v. r ~ gar r vs $ 4l vs ar sn ar ~ aI,ar 1 al J sr Ir~ 'X s h va 1 )s sj r > aI ao iv ~ ~ + ~ s s 4 4r ~ j ~ n ss a ~ 'n aa ~ h n rs aa ~a n n ~ n aa ra P rI Jw asc J ~ ~ 4 sj sJ > jJ g >I N'.. rrhs<<SI I gn ttt'T L~ @sacr /Y .b rP! hg ~t2a 4t. . 4t 1+rgt hl r n). ReT ts<<uiaa;s I ~ sr\ IR Ll'i. 'b=20nvtt... R'I'T I\abls Iss ~ C sss g hl ssa V (I'.IG. 3M2h), IIIV alvlas ). l so j ssrr Rl . 'P,<g,,/'j.,) If1 0 =2245 s- ~rI / sa: I v Cls as4c (r rs I ~ Ht at ttr Ibtv Clsa.ve ~" 1 ~ a $3 ~ NKHI s ~ I 8 IT Ql ~ ssc :, ~ .. gx-.',: 4 Ra) al Hl Al ~ /v II-ss CI / sjg / r,'/ p I ..a-q'a$ hl lit N tlat tlat ttL ttt, 1'I 'I V CI ~ str ~ I ar) I NL ttL a'a ) ~ ISN'T IIt .1411 a ss I ttl ttl ttt ttl II!. IT a'I.s>>s. yX ~ 1 aA sll AL tlat, tt I l4t IrT.VJ 55h Elt SY ttBOLSa 5 .. Iaarrrrt'vrs ttrl t/ns*rnt III .. .. It>> fnlsrnatnvs ht'PLtlD[tt 81~ R tttl(IMPAR TURBltK BIILLDItlG ftCACIIVllf CQtt I t
>>> m IIC.> s ws ss gsj ir. ~ ~ I, I I ~" I ~ lC..I .. ~ ~ A ' \ ~ Cl Cl ~ I *. It . 0 '0 I ~ ~ It tL3 Ol I I 1 a 0 I ~ n ~ n In f0 I Yl JF I4 I H - n l4I 0 O. I- I-LTTS 44A HI N! ~ ~ a-3-4eh Nl 1 PX ~ 3 2o7 tl! tt? PT 3 201 H! NZ PT. 3 20'7 H! NL Ng LH 3-ZOCI tt! H! I ~ Ta-c 4-ssg Nl H1 ttI ~ ~ 114 64 555 N! tt! ttI WL TL ~ c4- SSA tt! HI xs-c 4-ssb HI W! Ã5 Cr4 ~ 35C N1. tlat HZ N!', SYNBDLSC C lntcrv.ten flItCenIl HI NO [nls n.liras I ~ ~ ~ R 'cttDIX ~ KAC'!OR BttIt.OItt(' ROCt:S5 VARTASLE, ~ ~ g lttSTttut4C tnA11OH \ 0 DROWNS FCRRT hXKLEAR PL%C I S. tt tg,+,a.'c ~ .. -.'rCLO w gn ZT m.tITg l ' I' ~ I f I ~ ~ e jIj lI CAGK 'T'I, RcsfoRsIOLT, 6 ROUT IRS S'EK r L<tfg LX IOQ . EflVIPNEHT CA TIL'ES 3REU OF S'l Pit t:rhRf.tl ZT FIUtfULH. Ilk%i tEP 1.T - 3 ~ <1 6 h ~)~LQf~ lR10TO, lRiOT I. RU80CH. LHIQIICXIQ9 5ET 15 C <~I. T CORRECTIVE CRT LUIKR <c<<<<<<< ct<TDP 0 <oot.tt p l I 5 > ceorccleve hei<on lo Lc TC- 6'1 . 55E All Babies in<ed< ST;T 15 CcMc T~ro Cc<>el~st< i<ben fer ll,~ enlcracl'sons e<t t~" TE- 64-55F lbc RB. 51 l,l.0 Csblc T<g <C nd n <<IQfts pote ~IJ Oct 0 ce B. Prerodt fire Sorrier I ~ ~ te lb<st Co Circe<1 Hedsf ec.olio<<< 0< ~ I Oeeto n oe< D. Pro<:Jt f'rc Seetoprrssoo<1 lice< Ooe<<s 0<oct E,. An lysis. l>cro fke Cerreelirt CC t:>>e Cen 1st Oe<<< De<to ~ <of of lhc chert scl>>ec or eay tlctc Oosobenol \eo lhcreof I I<< 0\so Ou co 'L Tlo:c is ~ refcrrnev lo I'<<to dc<<sr'of<flee>teel;rc I Oclec<o. Tl ~ cl ccl n<gbcr Co I 0<I1I e:Ih '4e ore<cd.d L) cc" cf g F1<an cerrccls<t hob,C< ~ 0 I ~ oesck ~ nd Oecs 0<ceo O Feet< SO I be ref tron<.t\, fl~ . Xf <le I cr<ccl'eec oe'1 rn <<<et<>>< lr ~ et< f 1 ic ec<<t<<'.l4 f>> 14 etc'gsrr<<% g At ~ cs 0<st. crqc~cec.<< f>> cbo ~eccl:vt ~< ~ ~ <<V. ~ Ioe Tfoe <otto<<<<.Llt otic<<:1<iv k>>n <<eye ~ blc t 4. c<I:fe< ~ 'l.<<e f<<el sr re<<'eces Ocoe ~ freer og 11~ o< c<<<1 0 to.. 0<he Csee>n ROCK SS VARIABLE, Re<st 0<<o 0<st< ll5TRUME,STAT IOtl tccn f BROlfT)S ERR'C NUCLEAR PlANT 0 t<S-ty-tc B,,f1~.c.uy etR ff RS.Ptl. I c cLJ I I ~ RB-PVI-1:- Jl ~ SF'- I This equipment nnd i.ts associated cables nre not required by the fina1 functional criteria. Therefore, no further consideration is required. ~ ~ APPENDIX R (,ORRECT I VE ACTION Ftirw<En: .Q PFV I LHED I IhTE; <i~isr To meet the separations requirements of Appendix 'R for unit lq 'cables 1R1070, 1R1071, and 1R933:will be rerouted in conduit. ~ APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT I ON PREpnnED; PerIWCO: DATE: BFN-IT-RB-PVI- I-M l l ~ .> ~ ~ ,~ f 0 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ ~ I I In 4 0 In In )3 0 0 I (3 Itt In I tl I n I n H I I I IO I V "I )r )~ l 3o UT5-Z- 14A ~ ' V ~" ~ ' ~ ~ f.z-s- Cc A PX- S. Zo't , the clI Pl 5- CCIW I Ht H1 VV ~ V ~ ~ I PZ 3 801 HI Ht At NI 1 ~ I ' I LQ S-204 ~ Nt TIT. I ,I TE c4.55E HZ AI.. Hl AI, ) - ~ ~~ TH 555 Ht p TI 44 55A ~ NI, H1 ~ ~ XS-t W-558 HT Ht Nt ~ ~ YNBOLSf ffs Ce4 ~ 55C O Inleioclen IIol Con J HI C4o Inleraslton APPDlplÃ R REACTOR I3UIl.Dltl(j PROCKS5 VARIABLES INSTRufeCflTATION BROwll5f[RRT bKLfAR PLAIIT fNtitgnt II P ~ AA) t 'lft' sf% Il.lt5 Pfl 2 I~ d) x' 1 ~ ~ ~ << 1! a I~ (r ~ 'I "i-j ~ ~ 'f CABLE tiESPotloT8lf 9 ROUTING co t N LT 10 EQUIPMENT CASUS GREET CORRECT IV'E Stlf fT PttCPARf R QElV V N CIST 'IE2hCXIQN NIIMKR ~Vf.W PT ~ 3- 2C17 2R933 SET 15 CILlc ~ s> T+P, O.se>ScPta Prg, r.'4~ PT-3-1" I . RRD37 . Pl cl lg CsMc Tray TE - 6>l -55E All col>le a in a'>le ET 15 Cs'go T~c )oo, llt8 tt ~ ss g 11 1 2 TE- ()>1 55F 1.1)c '118. Les'te 8 Col 4 Tee. ra,t, I)>O,tpSJ4H E rt>> carrcctsvc oct>m to Lc Os>le tat>a/I 1st lfo salcrsctsotsc otc rser ~ qcncralscc4 in 14, folio>>snT ataasc sts ~ esne e' Oooo t)t> ~ I Psa h A. ttcrovt Irrolrcd Coblctol Oo1 ~ B. Provide 1'lrc Barrier >I> ~ te Sana C. Ci 11 '8 deaf ~ .ol on Oass t)ass P>ers 0. Prov:Jc Fire S<<pprccoion h>aa Or<is. s, Pe ~ l ~ TLc cartes'1>vc act>a<<a can LC Otal Oe>c ~ ~ >st of lLc cL>rc oclieoo or wof ra>ra coo>bit>>1 ots tlsaeaofo Eav sas Oer le Tts.s ia s rc Tcrcnev 1~ 14 P>eet doscriopl >co ~ ol tlsc co trccloec I I Cclosn. Tt c al ecl no.nLcr ~ aI Os>it ~ v>ll Lc orrerd oI Ly tt if P>ets corrcclsec A,b.c.ar D sa <<scI 444 Q S ~ 1 oslo ~ es 8 Oea I 0>la ~ acl. Ol) e,c sls 1 Peer> >> 11 Lc ref cree cch. (I.a. Tt sic I rtc<liov iat>l ra L )L Oass '>rre ~ Ard C>>'st sst:o >>tt alVLc>>g l'I s e I ~ III 1B et>ecol>to ~ alt ~ Ia 11 dc>sr'>Lcd ao 141 slsccL) CSI Dna> reste Tls ~ Ie>q>s pteacel s ~ scar>>.)olr (<<)L ~ eagayt>1 A aLc ea> Oe>h otqs ssal en f tL>> aveacl'vc. ~ t ~ ~ al's<<T4 reap><<>.L4 ~ ay '1>l>> @co tv)pro ~ .Llc Fer alc. 0ai ~ para> J:I: <<:>> o,,r0>>sl rear t Oea O>>)t ls ~~~ be ~ I ~ t)eels re> n 'it I n O>ao ro>n'eca ao~ 'ba> ~ o>sle I APPENDIX R . KACTOR Bit ILOING PROCESS VARIABLE Oaas ',Oa) t> NBTRUPTENTATIOH t>an '. BROGANS I'EttHY HUCLCAR PIN>t Oaaa>$ 't are Ot> ~ fttt II4tt PVI 2 ~ I r t r ~ t)Lt ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ R B, lf L"." 8 F H - I "i R B - P Y I - 2:- J 1 This cquiiww nt:uul its ns: ucintc'd cnbles nre not required hy the final func t ion:i r r it c r in. 1 Therefore, no fuvt.lu r consideration is required. APPENDIX R CORRECT I'E ACT ION Pni.WnLD: PJ'.V I LNED: BFH- I T- RB-PY I Jl BFN - IT= -PVI M I To meet the separations requirements of Appendix R for uni.t 2; "cable-2R937 will be rerouted in conduit. ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREWnED: Pe IESm: DATE: - xr- Ez-BFN-IT-RB-PYI-2-Ml 0 i )li ~ ~ I N(
- r
< ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I~ CI 'll. \'I ~ ~ ' 4 Cl ~ ~ . Vi 'i rI 4 O It} ltl 'Ifl 'I ~ \ I ~ ~ PI I I I I I + + n n fl 4 I w ~ I I n I I I Vl II n III II }- I t.tt5-Z- 4c A t.r-a- 44 A ~ r PX ~ 5 ZOl HI NI Pl. HI ~ ~ PT. 5- Coo PZ- S. Z01 }.M- 3-Zotr HI HI H! HI t}I tl! 'tI HI HI Ha )l! HI t}! BI C4 55E K t}4-S4-SSS TT.- c4 55A tl? HI XS kt4 558 HL HL 5'f N BO}.SI X5 04 554 HE HZ HI ln}crcc};~ }try ~) HI Hc It }erne}IIIII !P}'Et(Dr}t R I REACTOR 8UIl.DI}ts \I PROCESS Vht}TAB}.C ~ ~ INST}tVHD}TAT!OH I BROW}lS FERRT }%K}EAR PLART it ~ I ~ c ~ Qgtc I 5'71'I PIIrtlbit.~}I s ~ ZTIl.gt.tm.P~g S ~ ~e ~ ~ I rf ~ Ie ~ I ~' ~ CAGK 7 Rt>I<OIIbtBCC 8 ROV) ltIG 4~au ZAt IO)I IT EOVEPNENT CABLES GREET CORRECTT<IE SNCtt WEc'ARBCl .htmIIEE. ~IL"9~>C T< O'I 55< A'A csbl(5' t'e. SE.T IS Cable T<5 0<<>> IIEb Diss>>$ .)I. DOMRAe~ TK- res>>) -55F RB.. ~ ~ )g>>I ~ I4 Cable ir 51 bar>> l>>~ bass )IOT Ebs ~ roots II(<< t. y corrcclive ac)i>>4 la Lc lolls le)Ion T<< Che enlcrcclianb are generollcel I-in oa ~ roar>> Ihc Tello>>,nf at<area nle>>lt>>ca' Qas>> Dnt>> nets A. Rcrass) Lava'Itch Ccblelcl 8 oae B. Praviba flic B<<rler roe>> it <a C. Circa'I) )454>>f >>eel oaf< n,.e . p>>see na ~~~ 0. Prov: Jc Fire 5>>>>csprccbieot) \I Os>> o>> pea ce Aslaly>lb. IT>>tta rE(pc lhe correclava ocl>>ens cess Lt C>>o>>C ~ ~ nl of IL( 4'L vc ccl oc ar aoy CI<r l C.<<'L:~)ia Il,ct of. It<< <o ~ ~ p<>>ae Th ~ s~ ~ rclcrentv )o IL>>e I'I~ t ~ ala'scr>>ys it ~ ell Iloc c etc(lace ac):<<s. Tl.~ (heel non<L(r pea>> pe>>at ~ v>>II bc rt ~ <VL) L) r) i t han (oretc)i ~ t A,S C ~ oe O e>>o<cl 0>>l ~ ~ nh L4 ~ <'lean t >>5 Ore>> Ol I I t vccl. 0.,th enc (heel ew~bcr Icosa ~ s It Ioc rtftrente'l. Ii,~ TI Iic >> ~ >>ecol:>>c aa'I.oe ~ea).re neo>> Oorra AW e ~ 51 <<R ooLIL(~d raat ~ ~ eJ all co>>real'>>ie ~ <'l>>o>>l ~II Lc ha Jc a<r'iL<4 ao )hei el eel l (ae Ool ~ e I'sais Tla ~ 1raqn r>><<>>i ~< ecocr<AI ~ Calcic fee I cee)o~e) 4 ILc a~eoolb ee>> best. cstqooiaol sn 'Cl tr I4 <Voto(liat c>>i ~ ~,I.en. r ~,)~.LI~ atlatl),1 M al.e>>a +g~o.L)e Isi ilc O<ar 'bal ~ s se 0:I:< ~ I <<a<<; I:fvel:~ rata ~ Jveotigli~ Oe>>>> Da>><e 5 pea>> Ds>>C ~ ret n bello LPPE)IDIÃ R Cia n o>>o CACTOR GUILOIHG peo>> Deere assn 'ROCKS VAR lABLK, Ra '4< I)<r>>LIC.Iab <<OCR llRO.Pyl scurdd~ SbccLi ML I~ ' I >> ~ 1I BF tl- I l.,: +8- P Y I -3: J 1 4: This e<lnlpuN..nt nnd its associated cables ave not required by the final Functional cvLl<<vin. Therefnrv., no fnvtlu r cnns5deration is required. I ~ ~ ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT1'VE IICT?ON B(El%l(LD: Rt:.viLe;n: ~1.'v. DwE: to~4 O'8 ~o BFN-IT-RB-PVI-3-Jl FN-IT-8 -HVAG-0-MI To meet the requirements of Appendix R, cables .ES3912-II, HS3795, ES3?96- ES3913, ES3914, ES1400-I,. ES1293>> ES1401, ES1294, and ES1402 will be rerouted in conduit as necessary to provide the required separation between the control bay and cabling to water chillers A and B. Cables E81240-1 and. ES3740-II will be rerouted in conduit as necessary to provide the required separation between the control bay and cabling to water chillers 3A and 38.'PPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON .PREPARED: PeriEWCO: BATE: BFN-IT-RB- HVAC-0-Ml ~ ~ <+ iw ~ Ir o.$ '}'>><cq <Tl' < Qq'c l )] ]) l f4~ '1 ~ <~ ~ ~ ~ ~ <}t < l l, ~ l<' ' . ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ V. ~ f tl )3 O s) <<l <<I 4 <<< pl .r <p J O l d 0 n n d n VI ~ l H n bl n c ~ ~ ~ H <<
0. CL l- <C H~
LrTs-~- ca,a NT. Nl O 4c A PX 3- 2oq Nr N$ N1 Nr ~ ~ ~ Pr- a- cc<s hll < NT HI % ~ C PI- NL Nr NI 5-2'.M. ~ I< g ~~ 5 20c< Nr )t I NT }'lI Tt-44.55K t}I tlr TH-6<-~~a }t I l}I rl. c.l-55A HI }lr N$ . ~ ~ ~ ~ xa -Q4-55c< HI NI l<$ C>>4 55C N. t'lr NI SYMBOLS< I~}r.eel<~ llcl Gs<,)<.el Pf He Inta cJ'n~ ~ ~ APPE}}01X 8 TVRGI}}C, ger t.gr }tr,. ~ ~ PROCESS yhl}TABLE, IHSTRUp}ENTAT rp}t pLAHr p',>> t}ROM}tS rfRRY ht<OEA}t OC<C<f'< ' li<rohl<t C 4fle< Pl <<.ZT ~ (}<<.PyZ.Z ~ I r. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~, ~+ ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ l~ ~ h ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~,lr' gV A lL 0 4 Vl In Vl Vl VI N )3 A ,'s 4 IL3 ~ ~ ~r r n n r n H t r0 I n rJ d V X' I )r ,~ re
0. O. I- x 30 ~ ~
I LfT5-a- 1c i LZ-S- CC A ~ ~ ~ PX- S- Row )J I t) I t)T hl Z ~ PT ~ S- Cow YZ- S- gog HI ttf t)E t)I L)1- S-Zoo llI t)I 'lI t) I tti TE- C 4-SSK 'T H 6( SSB ~ Tl C 4~ 5SA t)E XS tel -SSB XS Ci i 55C 5YNBOLS) Ie)er~tw Rrl C~4 .i$ t)l t)e I )cree)lee ~ ~ APPC)IDIX 8 fURDIt)L BUS LOIN(i PROM'nR TAO).E JIISTRU)1C)IIAIIO)I 9ROQ)IS I'[RRI KKIfAR PLARI ~ ~ 4 ~ e Oasg r S'ST IlaroOr) ~ <~ ~ r gt'W !T TS PTT a. S'vr ra I, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r II. co 0 h ct lO )3 c c Ipt I 4 8.3 c c n I 4 cc n .n 4 I I c Ic I H cd T
0. C. I I- )C 3o t.f $ 5-S- <c h 1 c
LI.5 <rrh PX ~ 5- 201 tlt tl! Ht pgf Pt 5-2O1 III HE H! Hf ~ r PZ 5 201 I !If Itf ~ ~ c r 5-2OI<< HZ It! H! Nt . ~ ".p t 7'E C 4 55K Ht It f ttf At ~ ~ lH 64-55B H! Itt Itf n- C e-55A gj nlI Hf H! ~ ~ ~ r5 ~ e a -55a V ui XS G i 55C ntf ntt kYH80LSc tnlcrscl4~ Hot t:a~QeL Ht It<< tpptcrncl ppprc hPrCHOtf n IIttRSIHE Otjift. In@ PROC'S VhRlbSLt: 1HSlRUHf It thtlOH ~ cc c ~ GROWTHS FCART htKWAR PLNT >>I ~ ~ bkeg ~ s I ~ c'a,rpQ It ~ @ cc 11.th. Fv! .'
v. pr I c'r r.
~0 r p ~ n p r <<'<<<<p<< I 0' I( '"l'IPTE5<< I I -"Qc I I I I. C rl-il~ 43~ u.la Circ E I I t I<<streets o<<r Il 4 veetotlira 0 I ooiieets reyoeol I~ rot<<et <<I t 1 II I (I 41414 ~ l 4 Zaeee it aes;Iolelc c Rc c 44 etc tete 1 44c rrlclte I I <<I 3-:II.4I . I 4 I I. .l I I I er 7I seersl 43 4LA<<<<44 I-r- 14IAc T ~ ~c cs S....I. R I (I ee 0 14 Iotas's 4<<st<<os) ssl e<<s is I- I I I L 't 8 I ) I . "r-ccc te rcgoierh lo s)cga C<<41441<<e<<S (ee Ala 13<<is 4SSaegh Qlyo<<<<color I II 1-( I <<0 n 0%<<olhoccscs f00te I cc cp I <<0 I oe PI I-I I I I a e 0 O cc eec4 .I I DPI I cele S Oil l 1 '. e 'Cl, ~ 1 <<) rsel c ~c ~e I I II pe I I SY!1IIOESI I I I T S I I ( I C&atl r:Ile I'ro IIrear I I il / LI c I I Jr'll I I I I I"" rs l J I a e.( I I I e 3 ( I eEI I e'e I I ( -I I I I I I tl0 I ) )I I I I L-e-- -I I- HII- -'I Lrs J ~ I I ( ~ ~ I t N.f' Ec ee es a r I I <<X' rI I t e 43 r. I I II. - II-' Il g oa r3 1 c J ~c vd 0 va 0 ~ ~l ~s JIJ I l l as 0 I 9 ~ 4&0 '1IIsr sD -I II- ~ II- .c lcol I~r41 4ILV 51~II~ 8J u ~ l 5CA E Ss.5 R.IV 54I JPJ0 IIJ SEC r\ ~ t I L EI Q Sic<<l J<<eco BI ~I N j I Wll-N Vetoer I IV ~ er'l.el<<I<<acc Bl 3E0 ec Soc nolcr R ~c hcI'PCIIOIX 8 1 0 4 Z tr Z or lll.ACTOR BulLOIHG AVX1L'IARY POWCR n0 ~ r 5YSTCM I I nE t 1 2 Ueerr 3 IIROMHS fERILY HUCL EAR PLAN ~ L petr<< I'est. OQ IJ bIII TT RB sr' I t ~ ~ r.v. See cc BFH-IT-RB-APS-1-Ml Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolically on BFH-IT-RB-APS-1 and listed below to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 1 reactor building to ensure adequate power is available to supply electrical boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 1 reactor building fire. Conduits: 1ES3930-II. lES3 925-II PP629-II lPL451-II '*lB92-IB PP465-IB PP466-IB "This conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting from cable tray system. AP P END I K R CORRECT! YE ACTION REPARED; fhVIem: DATE: 062165. 04 N r,: Il ~ c j tta dhrr >t t(OTfea I l l. Ca<<lv.la a4>>a>>rl'rarr(afa ara ELIa var ~ rem I I. orlrons rrguorad I ~ cna<<re I sdaIL<<aE4 paarer Ia arallaMa .I Iar ~ fiora in r ail Eaao I 5 4 .I 4 reaalor 'building. I r I / s K K
f. Tf nae>>al all<<lJo aa palla I is I sl, >>an<<sl acV.an is 4
4 "r S II rq,,rcd t al 5n tlla ( cannaaloan (K )ha aaa~cl J I A'I (5. R sh<<ldaJn taA. r Q Jab~ Zl ~ la ( 4 S. C>>joIL aaala la lla sara(fad l c a 4 f <<nial to 4all Satal ~ EL%% (.>> alE ..aEa. w((l):a car Z ~a I I II I aria'<rra l, I as lr %c c,zcx5 j I 1H I I I I Ir 4 0 t I 1 (A<<:)>>'.LlrK4 e<<rw 4 I I I I &I Cskin I a) I I I I 1 .. al ~r r ~ I ~ a I ra e I I I I f K c p4 I I I ~a 4 ( I I g I ~a I T I I I P>>ayr'YH6ocSL a>> ra I Lg "l p5 ~I N I ~A L g)f- I~' -%It a a 1.F I 0 EL SOS 0' 5 ra s.o D cc Nas.ta A ~ 4do khr (30 I I '1 Z 3s. .e I J 'r l~ I 4 gV 55 4nt ID5 \ I(.rn 8( 3ffi daatfi ~a Q >f C O J ~ ~ Y I ~a aa ~ 5 I /J 4 LV'Spalla<<a Ll 3fd C>>l rrL SLO ta 5 WaLL5( aK Slat(o<<n lt 3CO dec n.lc a fl. <<S.5 'an naEe tr APPEN>LX LL ra 4 c 5: <E(ACTOR BU?LOIHG n Dr 4 /UXILIARY PO'hIER SYSTEM I(rrsr Lirlar 3 Daltr ~ P PaL,Q(l. rlr ~ GROWN5 FERRY tIUO.E(LR PI.AMI bfll LY-lt(L-A'PS E BFH-IT"BB-APS-2-Ml Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolically on BFN-IT-RB-APS-2 and listed below.to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 2 reactor building to ensuie adequate power is available to supply electrical boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 2 reactor building fire. Conduits: PP465-IB PP466-IB PP459-IA PP460-IA **38180-IE 2ES3l0-I *PP633-I 2ES320-I 2PL450-I *Ttus conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting fran cable tray system. ~*This conduit only has to be wrapped until it attains a 20-foot separation distance fran the alternate control power feeder to 4-kV shutdown board 3EA. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED;~< L . ~n Bl Vr. REYIEWED: 062l65.05 BFH-IT-RB"APS-2-Ml es 0 ai ~ si ~ 'C* its tAil sC stat t:Ss C a t: t.'Ae ~ SS ahra ~" 4 l ~ eisa I e V. sea sic i<<is<i:eo ~e ~4 ei I I . 5ia ~
4) eo i
j lo resect 4 sa)oslc t se asia B .,o s~s)s'Lta s tac I 4 n seaB '&etc eras)sr Lre)$ ~ n I v II I cls L It aoeeas) tl lt eaa 'J t le \ t elleao) Slboee 't I it(eeeitl te ata)SS t)eet teeerote<< 4 I ee t>> b.e. ~ ssasrjl oL45w ts)h. ei I ~e oi ~e I e L ~ ee v ~e 0 ~e << r 4I ~ 1 ~ I r T r dl fstc I es ~e Lsnel Lts, I oe SYl1BoLSs f T ef I I I .'I l I stI CsaL.t <<etio FVC ))>>tm I I I I I i$ os I ol I I)j I esMc ~s I r I g t I e te 544 ae)4 2 ti I l I ) sv I ~ i I I I I I I l I J I l I I t- t- ~ i O is I l I I s C 4 e 4i I I l 0~ s I 1 its ass.es I c 5 as ts' l CL st5s.o ts t t< 5tlta bt slA V N f1 5 S5 'P I t'sV 5LI 4 Bl Wa ~ f' I tt ~ S et c' I t LV 5V) blitt lait tt 5c 5.S ss t sv stot btgtts t t5.S sl APPC))D1X R ti 4\ fIF.ACTOR OU1I.DING re e AUXILIARY POWER $ SYSYFM Uott V UssLV 8 0 sstV lsROWIIS FERRY HUCI.CAR P).Lt) Dst Ce Fata, .C Btl lt ))B.MSQ I ~ te 9 2- 'V. tv~ ~ ~ I ~ s BFN-IT-RB"APS-3-1'il Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolxcaLly on BFB-IT-RB-APS-3 and listed below to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 3 reactor building to ensure adequate power is available to supply electricaL boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 3 reactor building fire. Conduits: *3B88-IE 3ES310-I 3ES320-I 3PL450-I PP465-IB PP466-IB PP643-IE PP644-IE 3PP733-I *Sos conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting fran cable tray system. APPENDIX R CoaaccTive AcTroN flaws: utee>: IhTF: 4 l8 8z 062165.06 BFH-IT-RB-APS-3-Ml C t n 2 g 2 IC rr.' rv.' p2 9 Ill AT At Ilf III Al HT IIT IIT AT AT Ag ~ T. 11t 11t 11 I gl tl f II! 1 rrc gT AK alt Hr II! IIl 8 'foal II! Irf IIT ll! 5 6Y NViALS1 @.... ~ esolm III.I C~. @eh OI 7IIlirsrlioII Appr.lrolx R UBLL'3 ILL'hCI{)A BUILDI NG Dt:CAY IIEA I Rf:HOVAL I<llR.")W 5Y5l I; H OROMIIS I'fRRY N1K1,CtN Pl@I oars ~ S P'0" 4IIe .II)I u arrl 'lr'11$ 'fIIIIR 11r-f l u AA. ~ I '.11II CABLE, t, ~ I >'esto(IOT81.'C ? 15 ROIII ING s, SEE r,ha( kT 18 1T EQU? PHENT CABLES SIIED CORRECT1'VE SI I K ET tgapAIICII ~ aWBf.K Esses-C 'LYQ1XL IILIIfQQi. JllKEXXIQH 8~~ ~ RIIRsW Cbrit hl Esy5-I, SET Iy C.bi. T" Oaa>(ICS 0.> ~ >coca . '(If3.a.ddlL RHIIsrI I' Aa ESBB-I Essa-T goals 1,B Cble T ~ nc(bc~>1)a~~ RIIROW P~A1 K515 I 5E f I'I >IICC 044> a a 1( NOTES( .O.a~aO4~ .:- RRIIsw Is.~ Ci Esiao I ~ ESIct I :~,( 1,8 Coblc fiat," E. ra na(c~~~(> I Th coereclave act>on Io 'bc II~>4 4 i. I l 'ES'IS-I S< ll C,Ll~f ~>(ats Irl(. C mIIIL>> 9cce 1 ~ ben for (Lo shieracrona a<e RIIRSW Pr C2 Esli'3-ILE5111-T sa .(s 1 B Cable Tres ' .:A,E, ~enL) a gencroiicca in Ibc foII414 n$ g na(a ss naonnc s' RRRsri P A2 Kss8-I SET I I C,u, T, Qs> $ )ee per> ( '7 !1 P pash Q ll.(WOW A. Rcroa(I l.nvoived Cable fr) RIIRs~ P P Cl Esioo-T, Esaoc-r sai>4 )>8 CaQC T<>> 8o I Rllllsai P<<w A2 ES88-I SET I c 4 'I~s ~a sate po(>C r la B. Provide Flic Barrier s~',8 r.. @,g.M11.>> ESIIS-Is ESI(1-I CLQc Tro 8 ((acr C. C>rcv'at Hrdsf >col aon RIIRSal Po~C1 Es lop I, E510t-I 5'ET 11 Csbir fca. Oeseeaea Q.O.L~ pee>C 'S + IVIQ SW Pvost C2 ES ll)-I, EsII1-I 5(J>sa l>8 C,bl f A,E 0 a<. O. Pro a>le Fire Svpprcssion HHRsvf Po~E 01 s< RIIRssl I.> Ol 3Es aaa~ to@0-lf sac sL<e'I n I'dvlat C>4 Iv>1 Hi'><<o 8(nac~e pro> ((CO IS><(> I~((s(v~4'J<iaa Q,fi Q>0?wc C.9') I Analysis. p '<<n ~ floe co<re'alav ~ aclsoes can Lc RRRSW R>osf 02 nssss-a c.u, s,. ((44( S(M n- g.a.c&.N Oa>< ~ C'P+( ~ nI of Ibc aL><e asl:eec or ooy bi~).o iht<oo C.'~ RIIRSW Pa>esp D2 ESa<413 - K 51>>a ? Cebl ~ T< ~ ee((~v~frv 0\Le Oases a. T'h ~ ~ ~ ~ rclorcncv ao liat laa ~ ~ ~ al ~ Lce'spl on>a nl Ibc ercrecl'ave ac.l,eis, fhe ~ I cc1 nronbcr 044 ~ Pa>al v>'ll be ores W LS (I" If Ia> an corrcclarc h,b.c. ~ 0 ao <<a<<$ san( ~ <ad bt S 11 ac'loan L ia pie ~ 0>sas vacua. o>>IS one 41>441 nonuser tv> r e os:Ii bc reference]. (a ~ . TI >14 carr tsl'are raison 44>>Les ba(L Oeaa, Os<( ~ h 44 c va ae w'll 4 Li Lt >eel raa>r ~ 4 all coi<caliie ocl ~ sa <<11 bs lose<:bcd ~ 11>al Lbccl.) a4> Psaia 'lbe Lsqn r>o',cal is ocs( al ~ f (Lr ~<<1 A abt qq~(>b c: Oe ~ > OLSS ~ ops 'sao(1~ ~> 8 f'W ~<~tive <aa< ~ ~ 4'I:an. Thc r ~ sf~4.Lle o(las.((Vo ILer>>tate L.LIe fV (Le. Ocas IS>sss ~ <<al:II>41 ~ or ~ io>l'fico'/i~ I'4 << da>is<ap1 ((c nn, Peas rs<<> 4 4 p<<(s Pl(<a c OI>(I APPENDIX R fI eis h 041 ~ as>(I REAC:fOR BUILDING re>ia DCCAY ll'EA'T llCl.lOVP l Rcs( oaa> Bas( ~ RllRbW SYSTEM,l l ~ ~ 14<n ~ DAO'WS 1 CRRY $ 1VQ.t:AR PLAlil g, ((cc IS><,QA ~ ~ ~ Qfg Ii.hTI C((CQ I e' S(CLl-~l ~ (((s(4' ~ ~ ~
i
'>>i i'~i: Section II.13.5.b. (1). of the Functional Criteria requires that one RllRSW pump bt opurnb1e Cor each RflR pomp.: In the RB, three separate R1fR pumps are bel>>g relied upon {i.e. 18, 2D,:3C for u>>Lt 1 fi,re; 1A, 2C, 38 for unit 2 fire; and 1A, 2D, 3C for unit 3 fire). ~ Sheet 0 indicates this criteria could only be defeated where h and C RHRSW pumps have interactions. Therefore, by rerouting cables for the RHRSW Pump C2 (ES113-I and ES117-I) to meet Appendix R separation requirements in the RB fire area, the cri-teria will be met. APPEND I X R CORRECT I'E ACT I OH REpmED: G. lhvtE m:~4' DATE; Nil"/$ ~8 BF H- I T- RB- RMRSM-0-Ml ~4 ~V ol P IV m Rc cs ~o c c Q E c 4. 3 3cl 7 Pc 2 1 OC OC flC g ~$ 2 OlksvF Pa <<F A'I I 1 I 1 RllBsrf 9, g AB 1 RQRsd P~ P Ct RNesd I4.F Cx j 1 Illgsvt l4>>p Bl 1 1 IFNPsrF I4 F IFE IIINI.Pf P~>>F 51 1 1 1 PARsvl 14soF bs GYH8OL5c @. lal<<ccl.sa cLI Cee.'4<<L ill fl I'+1<cpcl:as UI~ all'PCIIDIX 8 <<]uIIiIII Oul<OI~I, DT.CAY IKAT Rf HOVAL RHRSW SY5TE.M BROWNS fCRIIY NUCKAR PLLIIl Q Let c 4'r'fc P~c ~ 0. Stm 11.as cwcA C ir Ea. &mLQ cc9 CABK rLRSPOLLsIGLC Cp LEOLET IELG I ~ ~ ~ ~ SKK r. Lssr A'1 I OLE IT LEtEIE EQLE? PPLENT ~QQLK REIRSM P <<gELl 'CABEK5 EXQ E515-I SLEEK'f EEEELIEEE 5Er L7 l OF CORRECT SLLCLT'PLLLLLikI 'Hi. PILL PAIL C R Oaa V ~ KKB .O so>C.O.ra e ' 5Errr + C.4;E Q . tot> tfgi/gol~~ gfc~ow p, >I EBS Q- T. ELLLRSH PvscPCL ES LOO- T. SET 17 KE 5 Dose c.%ra ELOTKSI "B ~ R~>R>w p 2 Es>>I saeE + C.nh.'Il','alle 21u ~~+M~~+~ E. TL>o eorrcclive seL'eon lo Lsc ELLLEl5H Punp BE 3KD4080-E SEI 17 r ~'kon I r LL~ Lcr sel >ons otc Trs) generoLLCC4 in Lhc TPLL>4>any RELRbvC PuM 62 ES Z5SS- TL ~ blusl + I ~ nsnncrt 1(LLLi.'SH Puo>E Dl DES +OBO. EI 5ET 17 pea> Egg rs se Cs le Trsg Pasta eI/ A. Rerou'1 Involved Cablclsl BELLES'un> DZ. E52t L3 - TI DLroE el >J Ooai 5. Provide f'rre Boirier r> ~ Ia LL>aac C. C:rco:1 Hodifico'I son Osis r>n ~ I Paste , . ~ D, Prov>dc F;rc Sa>ppressl>on htaa Ol>os Os> u C. Analysis. rs sr ~ Kr roc>r EL>e eorreclsv ~ scL>ons can lsc Dao I rlw>a> ~ nL ot Llac \La>ac cela>ea ~ os'lif rsct i csoalsino1 an LlicrooC> a I Oooo Oae ~ s 2, TL>i~ aa ~ relerencv 1~ t Post ~ dose repl eon n'I Ilia eatrcclsvc e aclaovi. Trio olios 1 nvsnbcs Pa> ~ Oaes> so>El bc prost&. Iy sc if cos reel re A Q Cs or 0 ' IL>an Os>a Oas ~s ~ nl Lal wael. ~ Oe>L> 3:Ivnc ~ eel>en C shool asacl as ns>en\acr P>ats is.i 'be rsTcrenccl. (i.~ . Tl >'4 Rata ~ <<ec>LL c aalson anv>1 ts Loch oi> Deere A ail R as> M o> LL aoL>L bc ae>$ r>ae ~ a J sll 4> tc>L'ete ~ sla>aa ~LL L s s Jose>:L>c) os 11>al ILICCL,) cu D>st> I ~ Itt * 'll> ~ le4$ A plass>E e>> ec I 'nL ~ s ( abt ~ >spica\ oI cE>e scar'esnLE> I~ I Pat I. wga~csr'.~ t: i& ~scc1ivc. as>I ~ 4 LC>> scars ~ )Lc F>> al~ Ocai PIS ~ I J:I; ~ 'L. o;.,r.( l: Ptas de>>4t >p 1 san. I 4 ra>ns Dans ctaste l<<w t> I peer> P>> ti oaa bail ~ APPENDIX R riots Rassler TUf<ISINf. NEILDEHG Q44 ~ b>tsc I'sen OECIE'f IlEAT REMOVAL. Rcu OIas pair a BURSA ~~SVEll . Ptan Lrrr I MONNS fERRY NUCLEAR PLAN S'p'C Lirw.ll 15 RRRI>r II 'c.eo'us~P' Dora> Ebsr >Acres SErcLl ~ ~ B F N "~>-"T. - R B D C A 0 - 0 j. I 'l'he Drywell Control Air System wi11 be modified to provide a means of a longterm air supply to the S/R valves. This modification is in the design study stage due to previous safety concerns. APPENDIX R CORRECTIYE 'ACTlON PcvtEwco: ~ Dave; ~i~"C 8 ~ BF.H-IT-RB-DCA-O-M1 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS RESULTS'FOR THE SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM, BATTERY BOARD ROOM, AND CONTROL BUILDING FIRE AREAS Each Shutdown Board Room (SBR), Battery Board Room (BBR), and the Control Building are considered as separate fire areas in the Functional Criteria (FC). Each of the areas has been analyzed to ensure a minimum amount of equipment will remain available for the fire areas defined in the FC. The results axe indicated in the attached tables with corrective actions identified where deficiencies were found. The following criteria was used in the analysis for the respective areas. 3.1 SBRs and BBRs Each piece of equipment was reviewed to determine the affects a fixe would have on the function of the equipment for that specific fire area. The following abbreviations were used to. indicate the effects on the equipment: EFD Equipment Function Defeated The required function of the equipment for that specific fire area cannot be accomplished. NPS Normal Power Supply Lost One of the normal power supplies (e.g. logic power, control power, equipment power) required for the equipment to perform its function for that specific fire area is affected. However, a manual transfer to an alternate power supply is available. Once all effects were identified, each piece of equipment was then reviewed to see if the FC was met with the following additional considerations for the RHR system: The RHR system requirements are satisfied. provided the flow path integrity for each RHR system in use (see table) is assured. SBRs RHR Pump Operation SBR Unit I Unit Unit 3 Al B>D C B,D A2 B,D C B,D B A B B,D C1 D A,C A>C C2 A,C D A,C D B A C,B>D El A,C B,D E2 A,C B,D B,D F A>C C A 3EA A>C B,D C>B>D 3EB A>C B,D 3EC A,C B,D 3ED A>C B,D 4-3 E52165.02 3.2 CB If adequate back-up control isolation (BCI) from the CB fire area is provided for the equipment required, the FC is met. 3.3 The type of corrective actions required to provide BCI or meet the functional criteria are coded as follows:
a. Reroute involved cable(s).

b. Provide fire barrier.
c~ Circuit modification. d~ Provide fire suppression.
e. Analyze.
The corrective actions sheets correspond to identified inter-actions from the tables. 4-4 E52165.02 J j II ~ . 58R>, BBR~, anA,t 8 Analljs!~.....,..l... ~EHDBR=BBR<B~ Reac Coo)an I)sh e.(n .I.nhejrll g,. I*<<<<<<II<< O)g. <<III ply <<7, p'Bz al'or IJ C 7W <<<< ~ ~ ~ .d,'<<II<L>z 2 4 S 'tI 'L. G 1 'LV'.c II,Cot .'k; ~ir ~ 2 ~ 3 :Cm. ~C<< l '(r:. 'k . FCV 2 ..'!e . (Ie1 .'Cc,s. Yc'(CS lt(w fFQ .'ls~ FCO i'- t.tt(1 .'.b.x 5 1.!V.>>. !>tA, 3 ~ l I!/(l Vc>
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f 4 APR '0 R-BBR-CB-0-Jl In Shutdown Boa rd Room F, the possibi Ii ty exists t ha t va ives FCV-7~>- 1 00 , I'CV-7~~ - 0 1 1 , a nd va lve 1:CV-23-57 a ll cou ld t he flow path 8 >> t e ty for system spuriously open . This wnuld II {8 & D pumps) of RllR ~ n defeat gri Unit 2 and the fiow path ineprity for system I {A' C pumps) of 101R in Unit 3. P The corrective actions are to rack out the breaker. for. valve I'CV-23-57 and to require that the RllR system II of Unit 2 remafn in standby con-dition to provide adequate flow path integrity for. Unit 3 RIIR system I. h schem;itic of the valve's power and control circuit is atLached. APPENDIX R CoaoEcv~vE AcTioH PhEtenEO: PEVI BIED.'~E:

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AP R-'~ R-88 R- CB J2 For n fire in Sliutdown Hoard Room Cl area, the D RIIR pump is required to operate in Unit l. The normal power supply to the RIIR pumll D cooler is 480-V Reactor MOV board lH which is.normally powered from 4-kV Shut-dnwn board C. Tliis pnwer may not be available due to the fire, there-

-fore a manual transfer may be required to provide alternate power to 480-V Reactor HOV board 13.

APPEPOIX R CORRECTIYE ACT)Op

@EWnED:

PevicstED: +("J. 4vA 0m E: &'~igz. APR-SBR-BBR-CB J2
0 A P R-"-88 R CB-:0 J3 ~ I For a fire ln Shutdovn Board Room h, 8 and 3L'A and all Battery Board Rooms, the possibility exists that all required I 6 C pover may be lost. Therefore, a aianual transfer may be required at panel 9-9 cabinet 2 to provide adequate I & C purer. APPEtIDrX < CORRECTIYE ACTION REPARED,'erlem:

~l W.

IIIPR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-J5
1 APE-,;-BHR-CB'-:0- J9

'l'lils cq~iilnlN.nt. and it" associated cables are not required by the, final l'>>nctional cri(erin. 'fhercl'orc, no l'urtln r co>>sideration is required ~

AI'PFNDIX R CORRECT I'E AcT I OH A~l'l nnED. RVlLM-:0: Obli:: ~l'~ AP R-SBR-BBR-CB J0

-SBR-BBR-CB-0-Ml En order to meet the Appendix.R criteria for required circuits whose spurious operation. could adversely affect shutdown capability, and also to ensure the operability of the reactor pressure vessel isolation system, an additional backup control panel, located in a fire area separate from backup control panel 25-32 and from the control building fire area is required.

In addition to the new panel above,.new manual controls, as marked on attached General Electric drawing 73QF929, sheets ], 3, 4, and 5 are required to ensure that the manual safety relief valves do not operate spuriously. These controls will be located on the new panel. ~ The Automatic Depressurization System (AOS) safety relief valves already have adequate control isolation. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l QtuoJ d PZVlem: DATE: > i 8'~ APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-H1
0 APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M2 In order to meet the Appendix R cr'iteria for requiyed circuits whose failure to operate could. adversely affect shutdown capability, backup control with isolation from the Control Building Fire Area shall be provided..for the following valves.: FCV 74-7 Units 2 and 3 FCV 74-58 Units 2 and .3 FCV 74-30 Unit 1 FCV 74-72 Unit 1 FCV 68-3 . Unit 1 FCV 68-79 Units 2 and 3 FCV 78-61 Unit 1. FCV 78-62 Units 2 and 3 t ~ The location for these control and -isolation devices. is at each valve's motor control center at the 480-volt MOV boards. The control circuit changes described above are as marked on attached d~awings 45N779-6, 9, 11, and 21; 730E920-1, 5, 8.. APPENDIX R PREPARED: RerIwm: HATE.'~

~

CORRECTIVE ACTION t~ ~~ APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M2

- ~

APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-N3 In order to meet the Appendix R criteria for reguii'ed circuits whose fhilure to operate could adversely affect shutdown capability, the changes described below are required for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system injection valves to ensure that either valve can be opened manually even in case of a single fire affecting the train of logic contro-lling it:

1. They shall be enabled by a low pressure permissive signal from either train of .RHR logic.

2. That portion of logic. in each train of logic that develops the low pressure permissive signal shall be isolated by fuse from the remainder of the circuit.

3. The routing of the cables for the redundant power supplies to the above logic trains shall be in accordance with Appendix R separations criter ia.

4

4. The sensor which provides the low pressure permissive signals to each train of logic and their connections

. to this logic shall be separated in accordance with Appendix .R criteria.

The changes and -11.. described above are marked on attached drawings 45N779-22; 730E930-2, -3, -4; 730E920-6, -9 : .-

~~

APPENDIX R ParIem: DA~:

~

COaRECT-IVE ACTION PREPARED;

&/a Sz-APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-H3

APR-SBf3BR-CB-0-M4 -0 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, cables 1H13, 2/3, 2M7, )M3, 3M7, and 1M12 will be rerouted .in. conduit such that they will not pass through the control building fire area., APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PnE WEED: fhVIE m:

&TE 'P R-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M4

4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The associated circuit analysis discussed in Attachment 3 concluded that certain modifications"were required to ensure safe shutdown capabilities in the event of a postulated fire. The following section contains corrective actions sheets that identify the required modifications. Schematic drawings are also included when applicable. E52165.02
BFN-IT-BBR-AC-1-N2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit and its protective device will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Existing Replacement Cable Huahex, Cable

~xe ~m Cable Bkr/Fuse Unius Bkr/Fuse Aux'eference Power 1RM700 414, ANG 012,AWG 40A, Breaker .20A, Breaker 120V ac Unit 1 45H777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr.

No. 1107 APPENDIX R CORREC-TIVE ACTION PaFvuam REV Iem: DATE: 062170.04
BFN-IT-BBR-AC-2-N2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device,.a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Raker. Cable Maze ~is~ Cable Power

~~c Reference Khmetia 2RN700 014, AWG 012 AWG 120V ac Unit 2 458777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr.

Ho. 1178 APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION Paevam: REVIE m: DATE 4 - i'P'- 6'~ 062170.05 BFB"IT-BBR"AC-2-M2
BFH-IT-BBR-AC-3-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown'capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacenent Cable Cable Cable Power Reference Humhm Bmzm ~h~yjttg 3RN700 014i ANG 012 ANG 120V ac Unit 3 458777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr. No. 1108 APPENDIX R CORRECT t VE ACT ION FRe~~a>: > - J-l PZVtE m: DATE: 062170.06 BFH-IT-BBR-AC-3-M2
BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Ml Some power circuit cables have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables from motor control centers in the control building that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC. Control Ba Vent Board A Control Ba Vent Board 8 Cab e ID Compt ab e ID ~Com t Cab e ID ~Com t Cab e ID ~Com t MS1 181 ES1310-I 5F PL1106 2D ES3810-II 6A PL1125 1C ES1288-I 6A ES3700-II 2E MS2 68 ES1300-I 2E ES1225-I 6D PL1183 3A ES3825-II 6C ES1350-I 2F ES1325-I 6F PL1196 38 PL1163 6E PL1100 3E PL1189. 781 ES3850 3C ES3725-I'I R2D PL1175 58 ES1316-I 7C PL 1138 3E PL1115 5C PL1150 7E ES3788-II 5D ES1200-I R1C Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with 'clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See the attached sketch. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREPARED: REVIEWED: DATE; C 2. I 8~ 062170.18 BFH-IT-CB-AC-O.-M1
BFN- IT-CB-A'C-0-Ml-1 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Hl-1
BFN- IT-CB-AC-0-Ml-2 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Hl-2
0 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will, be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse . Power Reference Humbez. Uhhiua ~@tlag &earn Babas~ FE700 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45W643-382 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 2, Bkr 231 ES563-I 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N779-18R7 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 2, Bkr 218 20 A. 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N771&R5 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 318 PL916 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N769-3R7 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 510 IV2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 lPC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 1PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 458777-21R4 1PC562-II 1PC479-II 1PC477-II APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED

'EVIEWED; Q c~~ ~c M~

DATE: 062170.11

'lhe cables listed below are not adecpately protected by the existing overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fire-induced fault on any of- these cables has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, additional protective devices will be added as indicated be1ow and as marked on the referenced drawings.

Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Humbler, Matiug ~hUaa Baud Bahm~ 1A1185r lA1240 20 A 10 A 48V DC on Panel 9-9 45N620-12R9 lA1233 Breaker Fuse Breaker 131 1Vl705, lV1554 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-2R10 1Vl581i 1V1700 Breaker Fuse Bus A, Bkr 219 1V1708 1V1706 i 1Vl707 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-3R11 1V1608i 1V1709 Breaker Fuse Bus B, Bkr 319 lV1634 1LT140 g 1LT143 20 A 15 A Panel 9-9 Cab 5 55N2701-1R9 1LT141, 1LT40 Breaker Fuse 120/240V AC 55N2701-2RS 1LT10 g 1LT20 Nonpreferred bus lLT274i 1LT297 APPENDIX R 1LTSg 1LT70 1LT18i LT75 CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED.'EViENED: 062170.14 BFH-I~AC-1-M2 Sheet 1 of 2
Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Em~ R~t' ~pic'gg ~u~rc gche~ti c R223 20 A 15 A 120V AC Z&C Bus B 45N614-7R6 R224 Breaker Fuse PNL 9-9, Bkr 305 R149 20 A 15 A 120V AC DC Bus A 45N614-7R6 3A2 913 Breaker Fuse PNL 9-9, Bkr 205 APPENDIX ACTION R'ORRECTIVE 062l70.14 BFN-I~AC-1-M2 Sheet 2 of 2
BFN-I~AC-2-Ml Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate-this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference pe@~ ~@~a &urm Sahmatia 2PC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 2PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 458777-21R4 2PC562-II 2PC479-II 2PC477-II 2V2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT ION REYIWm: DATE: 0 - ~9- 8'z. 062170.12 BFN-IT-CB-AC-2-Ml
BFN-IT-CB-AC-2-N2 The cables listed below are not adequately protected by the existing overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fire-induced fault on any. of these cables has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, additional protective devices will be added as indicated below and as marked on the referenced drawings. Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference = Healer. URtiaa ~3atiaa Buuzm Bah@~ 2V1705i 2V1554 20 A 15 A. 120V AC I&C 45N614-2R10 2V1581 i .2V1700 Breaker Fuse Bus A, Bkr 219 2V1708 2V1706i 2V1707 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-3R11 2V1608i 2V1709 Breaker Fuse Bus B, Bkr 319 2V1634 2LT140 g 2LT40 20 A 15 A Panel 9-9 Cab 5 55N2701-1R9 2LT20g 2LT10 Breaker Fuse 120/240V AC 55N2701-2R8 2LT14li 2LT274 Nonpreferred bus 2LT297, 2LT8 2LT70g 2LT18 2LT134 APPENDIX R CORRECT1VE ACTI ON PREPPED: REV IENED,'8 DATE: 4 /8-062170.15 BFN"IT-CB-AC-2-M2
BFN-~-AC-3-Ml Due to inadequately sized cable protective device< a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Huaca ~hhioa $QR~c Bshe@~ 3PC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 3PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 4SN777-21R4 3PC562-II 3PC479-II 3PC477-II 3V2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED '~ ~

, ~

REVIE m: DATE: - <~- tZ 062170.13 BFN-I~AC-3-Ml
BFN-I~AC-3> i 8' 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 1 of 3
Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 480V Diesel Auxiliar Board B Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t ES3130- I I 3A PL2500 7C PL2375 3B PL2390 70 PL2350 3C FE699 7F1 ES3244-II 30 ES3110-II 8A ES3147-II 3E ES3222-II 8B PL2777 3F PL2727 8F PL2407 2A ES3100-II 9A PL 2314 2B ES3211-II 9B PL2307 2C PL 2712 9F PL2357 20 ES2809-II 10A ES3120-II 4A ES2850-II 10Fl PL2371 4B ES2863-II 10F2 PL2340 4C ES2750-II 11A ES3233- II 4D PL2425 12A ES3140-II 4E PL2694 12B PL2752 4F PL2576 5A PL2625 5C PL2675 5E APPENDIX R CORRECT.I VE ACT ION PREPARED REVIem: DATE: . gz 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 2 of 3
Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 240Y. L i ht in Board 1A 240 Li htin Board 2A 240Y Li htin Board 3A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 2D3 LD-4 P283 2D3 P291 3D3 3D2 P275 P288 2D4 P292 304 304 P276 P294 203 204 P278 P295 204 3D3 P280 AP P END I X R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED'. en~: DATE: 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 3 of 3
BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2-1 f~CC Bus Load 8 FN- I T- RB-AC-0-"l2-1
. 8 FN- IT-RB-AC-0-t12-2 HCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-O-HP-,2
BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Nl Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have'enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-Ml. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION BFN.l . BFN- IT-RB-AC-I-Nl
Tab FN-IT-RB-AC-)-M) 480V Reactor HOV Bd 1C 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd )B 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd )A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t .1PL2060 1C 1PL912 1D2 1PL1383 )A) ES) 52-I 3A 1PL900 2A 1PL)010 4B 1V2110 3B 1PL5175 2B 1PL1017 8B 1V2100 3C 1PL875 2C 1PL1375 BE 1V2122 3E 1PL935 2D2 1PL1390 1)A) 1PL585 4A 1PL5140 3A PLR2000 4B PLR1975 6A 1V2130 4E 1PL5118 6B

)V2460 5B )PL5110 6C )V2308 5C 1PL1190 9A )PL2215 5E 1PL906 )OA 1V2465 6B 1PL5180 10B 1V2317 6C 1PL5200 10C )V2558, 6E 1PL953 10D2'1C PLR2012 7A 1PL5135 1Y2300 7B 1PL972 11D2 1V2160 7E PL)326 12A )V)950 8B PL1327 12A lV2150 8E 1V2500 9B 1V2516 9E )PL2225 11C 1ES300-I R6B 1ES462-I R6E 1ES2962-II RBA 1ES2925-II RBE APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION REPARED:

fhVIE m: DATE: 4-~~- ~ BFN.2 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-)-N)
BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Ml-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Hl-1
BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-tel-2 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-t<l-2
BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that. are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-M2. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R HATERS CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIem; 4 BFN.3 BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml
Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-Nl 480V Reactor NOV Bd 2C 480V Reactor Bl d Vent Bd 2B 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd 2A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 2PL2060 1C 2PL900 1A 2PL1383 1Al 2V2100 3C 2PL5175 1B 2PL1375 SE 2V2122 3E 2PL875 1C 2PL1390 llA1 2PL585 4A 2PL5140 2A PLR2025 4B PLR1981 5A 2V2130 4E 2PL5118 5B 2V2460 5B 2PL5110 5C 2V2308 5C 2PL906 9A 2PL2215 5E 2PL5180 9B 2Y2465 6B 2PL5135 9C 2V2317 6C PL482 10A1 2V2508 6E 2PL1118 10C2 PLR2037 7A 2PL1115 100 2V2300 7B 2PL1110 10E 2V2160 7E PL495 10F 2V1950 SB 2V2150 SE 2V2500 9B 2V2516 9E 2V2110 11C 2ES300-I R6A 2ES462-I R6E 2ES2962-II R8B 2ES2925-II RSE 2PL2225 R'1A APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED! r7: /g/ DATE: 6 BFN.4 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-Ml
BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB- AC-2-Ml-1
BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-f'11-2 HCC Bus Load BFN IT RB AC 2 t]l 2
BFN- IT-RB-AC-3-Ml Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-M1. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: paten: M DATE: BFN.5 BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Ml
Table FN- IT-RB-AC-3-Ml 480V Reactor NOV Bd 3C 480V Diesel Aux'iliar Bd 3EA 480V Diesel Auxi liar Bd 3EB Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 3PL2060 1C 3PL1840 2A 3PL1850 ZA 3V2100 3C 3ES2200-I 281 3ES4700-II 28 3V2122 3E 3PL1975 282 3PL1976 2C1 3PL585 '4A'8 3ES2328- I 2C1 3PL1886 2E1 PLR2050 3PL1880 2E1 3PL1882 2E2 3V2130 4E 3PL1884 2EZ 3PL1810 3A 3V2460 58 3PL1800 3A 3PL1863 38 3V2308 5C 3PL861 38 3PL1862 3C 3PL2215 5E 3PL1860 3C 3PL1989 481 3V2465 68 ,3PL1970 4A 3PL19S6 482 3V2317 GC 3PL1980 481 3PL1977 4C1 3V2508 6E 3PL1983 482 3ES4705-II 581 PLR2062 7A 3ES2336-I 4C1 3ES2516-II 5C 3V2300 7.8 3PL1820 5A 3ES4650-II 5E 3V2160 7E 3ES2205-I 581 3ES4640-II 6A 3V1950 88 3ES2140- I 5E 3ES4670-II 6C 3V2150 SE 3ES2150-I 6A 3ES4660-II 6E 3V2500 98 3ES2160- I 6C 3ES4730-II 7A 3V2516 9E. 3ES2170- I 6E 3ES4740-II 78 3ES425-I R6A 3ES2220-I 7A 3ES4750-II'ES4720-II 7C 3ES462-I R6E 3ES2230- I 78 7D 3ES2962-II RBB 3ES2240-I 7C 3ES2925-II R8E 3ES2250-I 7D 3PL2225 R11A 3PL1888 7E1 3PL3780-IE R118 3PL1892 7E2 APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l REVIem: DATE: C- Z.I'--'-~ BFN.6 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Nl
BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Hl-1 HCC Bus Load BFN- IT- RB-AC-3-Nl -1
BFN- IT-RB-AC-3-Hl-2 t1CC Bus Load B FN- IT- RB-AC-3-!<1-2
BPH-IT-SBR-AC-1-Nl

'lhe fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables lES2819-II and lES2813-II on 250V dc reactor N3V board 1A, canpartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FCV-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and feeder breakers:

Corrective Action: The magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device coordination. (Refer to the attached marked copy of GK time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.) APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION PREPARED: REViem: DATE: 062169.01 BFN-IT"SBR-AC-1-Ml
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference

/gal~ URtias QkiKcc lES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd lAg 4M763-8R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr lBl lES1960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 1B, 458763-7R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr 8Bl lES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 1Cg 45M714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D lES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RKV Bd 1Cg 45H714&RG Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B APPENDIX R CORR'ECT t VE ACT I ON PREPARED '.

REViem DAve: (e-/0- g 2 062170.08 BFN-IT-SBR"AC-1-M2
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor MOV Board lA Reactor MOV Board 18 Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1210 1A 1RP1365A 13A 1PL2350 1A ES3333-II 15E 1PL 2014 1D 1PC700-I 13C PLR2018 18 ES3900-II . 17A 1PL2052 28 1PL 2051 168 ES3325-II 3F 8518 178-1 1PL2275 5A 8510 16Cl IV2475 5A 1PC504-II 17E 1V2235 6E 1ES1428-I 17E 1V 2450 6A 1PL2300 18A 1ES1125-I 7E 1PL2425 R9A 1PL2040 6C-1 PLR2006 188 1PL2325 SB 1PL2450 R98 1PL2250 7A 1PL2210 18D 1PL442 981 1PL2430 R90-1 1ES4450-II SA 1PL2025 5 6 18E-2 1V 2781- IE 982 1ES1450-I R90-2 1ES3680-II SC 1PL2460 R98 1V 2788- IE 90 1V2831-IE 98 1V2800-IE 9E 1V 2838-IE 90 1PL2200 llA lv2850-IE 9E ES825-I llc 1P C710-I I 11A ES833-I 11D 1V2244 12E 1ES2900-II 13A 1ES3700-II 13E 1RP1390-8 14C-1 Corrective action is to install fuses in the power ci'rcuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: REVIEWED: DATE: 052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-1 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-1
Bl-N-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-2 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-l13-2
BFH-IT"SBR-AC-2-Ml The fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables 2ES2819-II and 2ES2813-II on 250V dc reactor bGV board 2A, ccepartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FCV-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and.feeder breakers: Corrective Action: The magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device coordination. (Reference attached marked copy of GE time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.) APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PaEenED: PZYrem: DATE: 062169.02 BFH-IT-SBR-AC-2-Nl
BFH-IT-SBR-AC-2-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in'he following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacenent Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Humbug 2a&og &uzi Babism 2ES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RKV Bd 2A, 45H763-10R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr 1Bl 2ES1 960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC M3V Bd 2Bg 45H763-9R2 Breaker Breaker Bkr SBl 2ES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RNCV Bd 2Cg 45N714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D 2ES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 2Cg 45N714&R6 Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B 2ES1371-I 30 A 20 A 250V DC RN3V Bd 2Cg 45N714"5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 4B APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED m: 'RIE DATE: 062170. 09 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M2
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a colmon enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor MOV Board 2A Reactor MOV Board 2B Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1225 2PL2014,5,86 '01A 2ES428-I 2ES1450- I 17E 19A 2PL 2350 PLR2043 1A l,B 2PL 2210 2PL 2250 11B 110 2PL2275 4E ES829-I . R9A 2ES2900-II 1C 2ES3700-II 12A B514 5A ES837-I R9B B522 4C 2ES4365-II 13A 2PL2325 5E 2PL2430 R9C1 2V2475 5A 2RP 1390-B 14C-1 2V2235 6E 2PL2425 R9C2 2V2450 6A ES3887-II 17A 2PC700-I 7B 2PL2450 R9E 2PL2040 6C-1 2P C504-I I 17B 2E S1125- I 7E 2PC1001-I R10F 2V2244 7A 2PL2300 18A 2PL 442 9B1 2ES3680-II 8C PLR2031 18B 2V 2781-IE 982 2V2831-IE 9B2 2ES4450-II 18D 2V2788- IE 9D 2V2838- IE 9D 2PL2025 5 6 18E 2 V 2800- IE 9E 2V 2850-IE 9E 2PL2435 R9A 2PL 2200 - llA ES3329-II 10C 2PL 2460 R98 ES3337-II 10D 2P C1003-I I R10F 2PC710-II 11A Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED REVI ENED

'ATE:

052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3
BFN- IT-SBR-AC-2-N3-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-SBR-AC-2-t13-1
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-H3-2 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3-2
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-Ml

'The fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables 3ES2819-II and 3ES2813-II on 250V dc reactor KV board 3A, canpartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FQT-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and feeder breakers:

Corrective Action:

'Ihe magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device cooidination. (Refer to the attached marked copy of GE time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.)

APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: DATE: 062169. 03
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing 'Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Hunker URiiaa Ruxm Saba~ 3ES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RKV Bd 3A, 45H763-12R2 Breaker Breaker Bkr 181 3ES1960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 3B, 458763-llR2 Breaker Breaker Bkr 881 3ES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 3Cg 458714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D 3ES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RKV Bd 3Cg 45N714&RG Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B 3ES1371-I 30 A 20 A 250V DC RMOV M 3Cg 45N714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 4B APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT I ON PREPARED

'EVIem:

DATE 062170.10 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M2
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temoerature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor NOV Board 3A Reactor MOV Board 38 Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1237 1A 3ES2291-I R981 3PL2350 1A 3ES4782-II R90 3PL2014,15,16 10 3ES2292-I R982 PLR2068 18 3ES4786-II R9F 3PL2275 4E . 3ES2286-I R9F 3ES2900-II 1C 3PC1003-I I R10F 3V 2800- IE 58 3P C1001-I R10F ES2652-II 4C 3PL 2210 118 3PL2325 5E 3V2475 5A 3PL2250 110 3V2235 6E 3V2450 6A 3ES3700-II 12A 3PL2052 7A 3PL2040 6C-1 3ES4365-II 13A 3PC700-I 78 3V2244 7A ES1387- I 17A 3ES1125-I 7E 3ES3680-II 8C 3PC504-II 178 3V2788- IE 98 3V2831-IE 98-2 3PL2300 18A 3V 2781- IE 9C 3V2838- IE 90 PLR2056 188 3PL442 9E-1 3V2850-IE 9E 3PL2025 Iml 6 18E 3PL2200 11A 3ES4450-II 10A 3PC710-II llA 3ES1428-I 17E 3ES4791-II R98-1 3ES1450-I 19A 3ES4792-II R98-2 Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. AP P Eilo I X R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARE: REVI Eh 63: DATE '. 052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-N3
BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-H3-1 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M3-1
BFN- I T-SBR-AC-3-M3-2 ttCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-H3-2
Cable 1PL881 fran 480-volt auxiliary boiler board (NCC) and cable 3PL4871 fran 480-volt condensate demineralizer board 3 (NCC) can share a ccmmon enclosure with cables that are recpired for shutdown capability and have available fault current high enough to raise conductor temperature to the auto-ignition level before a fault could be cleared. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuit with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See the attached sketch. Cable PL232 fran 480-volt comnen board 3 (swgr) can share a cammon enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability and has available fault current high enough to raise conductor ~rature to its auto-ignition level before a fault would be cleared by its non-instantaneous circuit breaker. Corrective action is to move the cable to a circuit breaker with an instantaneous trip element installed in an adjacent canpartment. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: rl 4 /'ATE. I /8 062170.01 BFH-IT-TB-AC-0-Ml
BFN-IT-TB-AC-0-f11 51CC Bus Load BFN- IT-TB-AC-0-P1
A postulated fire could involve. both the 4160-volt cables (1PP400, 1PP401, and 1PP402) supplying power to reactor recirculation pump 3A motor-generator set and protective relaying control cables (1PP431 and 1PP450i for the power circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first; causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared.

'this possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump lB motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 1PP525, 1PP526, and 1PP527, and control circuit cables lPP432 and 1PP575) .

The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763-6 with changes circled) . APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION fhviem: DATE: 4 lb'Z 062166. 07 BFN-IT-TB-AC-1-N1
BFN-IT-TB-AC-2-Nl A postulated fire could involve both the 4160-volt cables (2PP400, 2PP401, and 2PP402) supplying gower to reactor recirculation.gump 2A motor-generator set and protective relaying control. cables (2PP430 and 2PP450) for the gower circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first, causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared. This possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump 2B motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 2PP525, 2PP526, and 2PP527, and control circuit cables 2PP431 and 2PP575) . The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763& with changes circled) . APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED

'EVIEWED:

HATE: 062166. 08 BFN-IT-TB-AC-2-Ml
BFH-IT TB-AC-3-Ml A postulated fire could involve both the 4160-volt cables (3PP400, 3PP401, and 3PP402) supplying power to reactor recirculation pump 3A motor-generator set and protective relaying control cables (3PP569 and 3PP450) for the power circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first, causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared. This possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump 3B motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 3PP525, 3PP526, and 3PP527, and control circuit cables 3PP568 and 3PP575) . The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763% with changes circleS . APPENDIX R CORRECT?VE ACTlON DATE: ldP 8Z 062166 09 BFN-IT-TB-AC-3-N1
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J ~ esr ~:Cr ss Sv 4 (5 i. h Alai sea v claus Vrs $ p 4 ~kj ~ 4 y Qlrsla N) T5r ~ T kI 5 f 6 1+sell 'K IL ONvel sseo rasa salsa Ns ~ vast seat Claus (slarraas) ic 5 V ara wst Nn Ssst( Nssascf SSAIMI COS(AC'(5 c I I 4 ~ ~ oosaadvr 2 6 t COssat I ~ ~ lsvosa ILK'e rlr'l'l Vau ro ~ I C rlvres cr ra aolt OC'I asN ~ orav C I ssr ao ~ sllT vav(, eaason I vo OCAT oeNII ra eer vase Ie vel vsse, ~ ~ Karsvaea Iao Vase sever \vaav IKaroasrea adeoew Salva aaa ~ s~als 'I lair , ~ l(S(l I( 5an"4( uu ~ ~ 'sr ~ ~ I orNas aso SINN s(oasoa Ssa(N rrl aa\ (Isis fl~ soaa vwa osv AsoososK costscn 0Ã rcvaro 55 ,Ssa(N 0\II Vase Ssu tllsa( 5(scd Kn (slu (sa I~ ~ l alar( ~ srIN4>> sONAra ssl aa as 5 aaN ~ 4 aatsvaaodr I ao(r Paar+ ~ Kaawa at Oost os Ive tsls) OSN aavvea AL COrrussa(f 5la(aa Overs osac I 0 osav ra ac $ al L(K sv ssso Wsw tcv.a( t) rs-W-)5 NNa)4 TsSNat I sasrvssl covacss Cvrua ~ 0 rsaa )OS(tveaa 40 k 1 I otto tt ~ ~ I')5 tcsf ~ SN4 )4(ls (OAS ~s Ness CL(SC C CONTACT DIAGRAMS I ( sacr Tsscsll Ale(allot leorCOATIVC CLO((i~case)ra 'Q VTON Sal cLCWO os lorw sssc I als C OC)0 crr Nal Oct I area foe'rt cA5 ossf NSC 4 ~ ACIS Ls rrre Dais k ====.,'I( TtclTNCLT OACslT(oh 4 4 lls )0 I( (COWS C IALLANVA(ca I KILI15 14 rlulall ~ .C. Oa arras( ~ vsse na olwsc( laoadasla I scare)(JL( IOIN Iee a(ac L ) II.=.-I 40 ~ I)OOSII(ls Oala t ~ Kw toa otf cls Tat a fNC4T elr ra)r e,'5 ~II elollTIOIL fl)f ~ ~ I O(t) s 4 t(utsa(L(e au, 1IIC(D Iat so<<ulna Is(soa(tw(.La-50 4 Isnssscl(d(oh lsu ssl au ~ ~ 4 (rl(o(l VN.LvLI) r stl su(esurf nv(t eo() ll I~ ~ wSO )C)(sra IS) 0 ~ Wall(lsl lass(Of (I fll Iu(tacit ~ sl aads( (s so) Ceofc t) () s. wruL 0 C ~ Ol ll'41 Ca(SO($ ll 'IVII )a ~ ((sas OeC) ~CC to 4 0 ~ slot(so ~ le> T 4 6 CCCATIOI ~ <<g>> (wc(I 0 Pg o ))X a sa 0 7 l CI t sWea fs i 6 STA(SOLS 5 ~es CO(T OD IW AICR CLOVE MIICI Is(STC crs Tasse( 4 ( Ousa LOC~ 0 (I 4 g~ 444 5 aZ,j CC ll iC )I llll as C I I~ lrrri0 Tla olwv To or ~ Cae ISTNavs lsa VKTI Ioa OIKAS rsvNa-t)CT) tc.lr)51 SOL rKTI Ioa ssasava vowl 'ftI os Os(S AT clv'lvstsrsca'rssss iasl caAsss osvrsolcasov coa Sears vasav 0 14L %sf sfs aa 'cc sa (Isa a(Ill lcl oaa ~ valve alia(ca( oua TKvQ Wsaraan 10 OKA VKVO 0 vcralrso cfsravrhv~ asv I 5) 10 5 I s t II Olar Ovles( 1ICc Ires(ATION coasoe evc tears(lce )v'rcsltcl Lisle oao-saovfaKNS $ 15'tell al'TCAS )a(5(LOC 5(0544$ l(VIL Crala)L 10 olla(la (LSer Llv(L AO)VC orNAI coaarcvcass(w Ort Lls L(rhaSCOSCAII)V (saASW )LSSL(l COL (VAO VKVC Occ f(T'4 ta fcv CC ts fcv a( tc t(>SC tr SJAE A AND GFF GAS cuwc C)(st aol( 1 I'Sa a) ) 4 ((t ssal tt ssastto YSTEM CHANNEL A 4CC)IIIL"I Vs)lVCS ~ o)a OC) C OCS l C >>0>>a <slav I s~ ~ f ) an a g ~ 'J~ )44 )h ) 55 a~ (a(sv slstvsccaaP(1.N a ' r I 0 rrr tr, ~ -H 4I'$4 4 ~ sa ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~a v (calrssvh Ataaro+Io 0 TAO(CLAT aaavs v 0'NL C(a Lshr(8ÃS 10 Octa scraccf caasrÃ$ Ka al coot Kvs(sswd tl ~ raoc oocveca(at(co eo rswss(AL eow ovavca caw'sst, I L 1 II4 I. Iua ae I 1 ~ are rv I Tvaa la 5 C 1 0 4 ) ~I ~ rv 'v~'r% ~ vssssas h( 4 Ssrsa Orle t vs aa'l1 Orle a(WIS 1 0 V AA)) Iul 1 0 il 0 s h~ ) 0 rKN (r 1 ~ ll I'starl)4 4 sll ea')to s ~ sn( 4 ~ 4 L~hs ~S ~ sll C I <<I ra <<TL ~ Wasaa at La ar ~ aa TN ) a(l ~ CV VCV Srr I I ~ SS 4 ss) ,Lr CLOS(5 CO IKTS ace(5 Ceanan ~ LS vrvAohctvcr <<~(arse 1st Wive Or'Sas nsK (ta)l( ~ 0 ~ Oer 4 roa weel ov-aas Ttur(ll SI( fo g ~ ~ seaa 5 I I Nasal aaasa aaa'A cess'5 V ~ 5 4 ao ~ 4 <)f t~ ~ ~ I,saa ~ Ssa TKVI IOA olNaa rawa 4 lsa vuvl roa ONNAS ~ altO 4 Tslvl Iasla ~ 'stss(L caAO ~ sv $ sa valvl KW OINAS aa SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SH.2 t I sl v ah I ~ ~ wave oaaal Nsv( Wllacan lo TKTI Wstacaa lo o(a rls(A ~ aw Js(5 SAII la a Wvaaa(L 10 ole Ossa VKTO VKVO valse Wseacsa )0 ~~ ~I Vl 'VKVO OIO VKVO ~I 8ROWNS FERRY NLICLEAR PLANT f ~I ~ r .CS TENNESSEE VALLEY AUT)CO)CITY I~ ra s aassow or c'ssalca'vs4 ocsne <<>> Ot. OOT SLOW(((CO ~ (I vvah(LO ~ rrhh C 0 s~ CVNAS raua 4 orNAS Iasla 4 ONNAS tana 040 fllltlaATVAC Osrssoet IIC, Zu ')NKTK ~ aslaasss Oaase VKV( Tll(W 044% VKIC CSLCL OAAO TKVC ccssaasoow Dlo esaa>>5 ((t(os'(u.c "'DI4 2 ev ON-N Or I 4 )(((5 C)CATT(.( N'a t )5 I(f(0( S(sa(CI(t)S(AL sc+/ Crab ll tl 1) ~ ~ as 5 0 se 0 ~ I O(af(0rlstA(IO(C Ct)s(f ~ () a ~ 0 4 T) tr(C E E'-Ir)9NSt 0 49 f(Y.(lri~ 7 1 5 Vv'sf ir(OCDIS (J(e v(r c c c freaai C c ~1 ~ ilf IDs) TC rra ~ rial ai shalo Ciau Oz(a ssf 4 CLSIC ccrsact 4 4 1 (rq VALVIu 11\iv ~ Taarsl )ne ~ r ~5 ~4 01(s. poser s tres Isa<< D'1(DI) avso CL 11 O!J OCO)OA 040$ ir CEO I: n aor<< <<>>4 C rata u Jn caoa 4 al 4 I APPENDtv R j 7 a)' I0 Clef Safe<< 4rl. ort 0 S SAC Ssec I lt(a( W arDIfra 51 Q~ ss DISsor 5'I Co ) ~ ~ rre asra ~ ar sra <RATIO ~ ~ ~ 0 (rtraasru) 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ <<$ .0 astor I) r Sf ~ Sl 4 n C ~ ou Sserrl!I >>DezDkf 0 (DD 0 le<<oar 4 (IXI I sac at N aaaÃaaaa g>>g iiN+ ~ aaszD<<aur ~ 0 Ii ac CAI sue(4 OOS IOO SLSaar() I ~ era 1 Iamava I < aa rrrl 5<<> ~ v sv u see rasa av rasa<<<<au QS>> or>>o>> AA ~ av Wa a Io<<4 CCa)l jra 4 00 Sa1SOTS(D. (- 55)> 1004 45 I <<Du ~ ~ aaesN csfacre s(5 r !C<<<<SO CS)ue <<55 Srua aseaaiazu esne s$ ~ t l (De(acts II Off rile cuapourie4 ~ ~ ~7 rosa ~ Cvtzst ~ ICai-er Af IC+r ns Ila ~ Sst Nasa oa Ea 4 "='- H Iuasa seas SA<<a I <<T osaa>slee>>as ae raus >> 'C I f sv ~ ra~ 4 gr 0 r NB ~1 4 I DIP " ~ aoss 0 aisoas Isla a>s 4 Ila sua Zzaasa (CD ua} Cg << 4 ~1 0 'ae ~ oa<<eo 7 o<<e ~ ~ >>7 IL yg-'-' ~ C fiD'I SLaria <<ka 4 ac ~ ooaa ao 0 4 ~r c c' v I VK.~ Iba a<<aSA ONE ra\ rsu so>>a <<>>rsra I 7 V (( ~ '>> If ~ ore ~ a Ni-l 4 o sa I se>> I ~ a<a Oeoeaa Ve vzaaa teresa ee eras casse ~ soaa Icia 4 u ra area aura $7$Savzaac C ~I De earl<<<< ) tI -.0::M::t I sana) ~V 'Y<<av ~ &% ~ v V 0 CONTACT DIAGRAMS srasssael (Sera 54 e} usa ar JJS tulvs ssu< ofscsis cssrccf a OLUU vscocs ssua ran vltvl Situ tl SSna Slit IIILIIC 'Lint SnS 5JAE B AND OI F.GAS 4 sns lain ~ aa rsoasraa Valet 1Ce.DISS 4 aCr 5su 0 IEIO cosa el hL CD(!I a<<frl Vuef IS fISLLT Drsis (II~ ) SYSTEM CHANNEL B c urt cfcsuvar nest roost Stra one e>>tevuvc isrsacr ccoicoprtD / ufo oe ssof so auls ~t Ioassu (fs )0) 0 <<Derko ~ I srs 0 <<DOI ia Nes cus f(var so Lsa c Jest ~ 0 0 sll I-D sla c on a ~lceasr Ss c <<0}t ' B Cris ",I+ St <<~ral Jih I o 0 <<sails (5(>> f0 acWII} .1$ I( L>>T I) f <<s ~ I Ae(O ls'llJoet I) A~ sl I <> ~0 I VALVES K(s. 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ML18025B817

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