ML18025B535

Forwards Response to NRC 810331 Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-259/81-06,50-260/81-06 & 50-296/81-06. Corrective Actions:Door 232 Was Immediately Locked & Design Change Request Was Revised to Include Interlocking Doors

ML18025B535
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/20/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18025B534	List: ML18025B535
References
NUDOCS 8106120222
Download: ML18025B535 (6)

Text

TENNESSEE VALLEY AVTHORITY. ~ -,

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 20, 1981 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This is in response to R. C. Lewis'arch 31, 1981, letter to H. G. Parris, Report Nos. 50-259/81-06, -260/81-06, and -296/81-06, concerning activities at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant which appeared to violate NRC requirements. Enclosed is our response to Appendix A Notice of Violation. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

To the best of my knowledge, I.,declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

. M. M/1 s, anager Nuclear Regulation I and Safety Enclosure An Eaual Opportunity Employer

ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO R. C. LEWIS'ARCH 31, 1981 LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS INSPECTION REPORT NOS.

50-259/81-06, -260/81-06, -296/81-06 Violation Technical Specification 3.7.C.l requires that secondary containment integrity shall be maintained in the reactor zone at all times.

Contrary to the above, secondary containment was not maintained in that between 7:40 a.m. and 8:40 a.m. on February 25, l981, the secondary containment boundary door No. 228 was propped open for painting, concurrent with equipment air lock door No. 229 being open for the receipt of new fuel.

In addition, personnel access door No. 232 was verified to have been utilized for personnel passage a minimum of three times during the period that doors 228 and 229 wer e open. l Unit was operating at power and units 2 and 3 were in a hot'hutdown condition; This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1.D.3). A similar item was.

brought to your attention in Inspection Report 50-259, 260, 296/81-03 which was forwarded to you subsequent to this occurrence.

Admission or Denial of the Alle ed Violation TVA admits to the alleged violation.

Reasons for the Violation if Admitted The design of the power plant allowed for doors 228 and 229 both being 'open with no interlock functions or alarm functions., Further; these two doors are separated by another door, door 232, which prevents personnel opening door 228 from observing the status of door 229 and vice versa. Thus, the painters at door 228 and the personnel at door 229 could not observe the status of the other door.

Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved A. Door 232, located between doors 228 and 229, was evaluated by the Division of Engineering Design and it was determined that, when closed, this door also provides a secondary containment boundar y.

B. Door 232 was immediately locked and placed under administrative control with door 229, such that both cannot be open at the same time. This should prevent possible further violations of secondary containment integrity by the simultaneous opening of doors 228 and 229.

V C. On February 27, 1981, installation of warning signs on secondary con-tainment pressure barriers and reactor/refueling floor pressure identified in MMI-116, was begun. Sign installation was complete, on March 31, 1981.

D. On March 2, 1981, the Assistant Power Plant Superintendent (Maintenance) met with plant carpenters and painters and discussed with them this occurrence and emphasized to them the importance of not blocking pressure boundary doors open and being aware of secondary containment integrity status.

E. An existing design change request was promptly revised to include interlocking doors such that secondary containment integrity would not be violated by doors 228 and 229 being simultaneously opened. Subsequently, engineering change notice P0419 was issued to install appropriate interlocks.

Corrective Ste s Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations Zt is planned to complete the work on ECN P0419 during the unit 1 outage which began April 10,,1981.,

Date When Full Com liance Will be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on February 25, 1981, when the door locks and administrative control were put into effect.

0

\