ML18025A657

Ses Definitive Report of Significant Deficiency Defect in RPV Unit 2 Bottom Head Side Plate

ML18025A657
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	02/16/1977
From:	Curtis N Pennsylvania Power & Light Co
To:	O'Reilly J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18025A657 (60)

Text

~

Pal O.

F TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA.

18101 PHONE t215) 821-5151 February 16,1977 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Director-Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CcLTTKission 931 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 SU~2Qu~ FEME EUXTRIC STATION (SSES)

DEFINITIVE REPORT OF SIGNWICAhT DEFICIENCY DEFECT IN RPV UNIT 52 BOTXCN HE&33 SIDE PZATE DOCKET NO: 50-388 LICENSE NO: CPPR-102 ER 100508 FILE 840-4 PLA-162

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This letter supplements PLA-142, dated hTovE5nber 5, 1976 and provides a final report of the nature and success of rework performed on the SSES Unit 52, RPV, Bottom Head Side Plate.

The resiark rrLs necessary to correct a deficient~,

reported as a 50.55(e)

"Significant Deficiency", which resulted from an unintentional oxy-acetelyne burn on the surface of the Unit 92 vessel bottom head side plate.

As stated in the referenced letter (PZA-142), a CBI Recast For Acceptance Of Nonconformity As A Deviation, RAD 48, Rev. 0, was issued on 10/10/76 documenting the nonconforTIIiT~ condition.

The process of re~mrk, inspection and acceptance of the nonconforming condition was successfully concluded on January 19, 1977, as evidenced by the clo~~re (G.E.

Q= Representative's signature dated 1/19/77) of CBI RAD NS, Rev.

0.

The locally reduced wall thickness of the vessel and the addi~nal stress concentration resulting from the reTTnval and blending of De burn cavity have been evaluated and the resultant condition is considered adequate as substantiated in the CBI stress evaluation, Engineering Justification For RAD 58, Rev. 0",

which is an attachment to RAD NS, Rev. 0.

~ hying PENNSYLVANIA POWER 8

L IGHT COMPANY

s T

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Mr. J. P. O'Reill

'IA-162 February 16, 1977

~ physical ramark of the vessel as performed by CBI was under the close surveillance of the General Electric Resident Qua1ity Control Representative and was periodically nunitored by Bechtel Qh and PP&L NQK personnel.

The metallurgical concerns were investigated by PP&L's metallurgical consultant.

Also, the final etch ard, inspection to verify complete renoval of all heat affected material ard the liquid penetrant examination for surface indications were witnessed by the metallurgical consultant.

A copy of the consultant's report which concludes "There is no reason to.suspect that any metallurgical damage remains.to interfere with the service performarce of the. pressure. vessel."

is attached.

Kb provide quality assurance

coverage, a mea9~r of the PP&L NQA, site staff was present, on Decetnber 16, 1976 durirg the metallurgical. consultant's exanL'Lnation'of the reworked area of the vessel and during the performance of the anannium persulfate etch test foi the verification of heat affected zone renoval.

Since PP&L has received positive assurance frcm its metallurgical consultant regarding the adequacy of the vessel.remrk arB sir~e.PP&L ~i'as rranitored the activities performed by CBI and General Electric within the prescri3x6.measures'f their respective procedures and quality programs, PP&L is satisfied with the rework and that Nm resultant quality of'he vessel has not been impaired and, therefore, the vessel will perform its intended safety function.

We trust this corresponderce and the attached technical evaluations provide information sufficient for your uses.

Please advise should you require further relevant information.

Very truly yours, Mt'u.W~

N. W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering and Construction Attachments ARS.mcb cc:

Mr. Ernst Volgenau (15)

Mr. G. MDonald, Directo" Director Office of Yanagenent Irdonnation Office of Inspection ard Enforcement ard Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission U. S. NuclearRegulatory Cortmission Washington, D.C.

20555.

Nhshington, D.C.

20555 bcc:

Mr. W. E.

Mr. W. L.

Mr. N. W.

Mr. E. E.

Mr. J.

W.

Mr. E. A.

Mr. H. L.

Mr. J. T.

Mr. M. J.

Mr. H. F.

Barberich N5 Bohner N5 Curtis N4 Felton Bechtel SSES

Geiling, N5 Gustaf son GE SSES Harris SSES Kauffman 8&6 Lidl Bechtel SFHO LillighBechtel SSES Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

., Mr.

Ms.

Mr.

Mr.

Mrs Mr.

Mr.

E. M. Mead N5 J.

W. Millard GE M. R. 51oir Bechtel SFHO E. M. Nagel 'JVQ J. M. Reese N5 A. R. Sabol N4 P. F. Schock 'I%4 R. J. Shovlin N5 M. E. Taylor N5 G. F. Trowbridge - Shaw, Pittman,

Potts,

~r.

@<bridge

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)hei N.ilna REQUES Su"tluc'..

RE CV HD pdIIIN(MbY/wc

.A Of. I'JONCONIFORMITY AS A DEVIATION VESSELS AND PARTS I P.

I RAD =.

3 Rav-,'r Pace Iof~

CBI Contract =

6~~-

"2U nnaibnr.. p.o. =

205H0957r Bov.

12 Prepared By A. L. Dahlber October 10 1976 Date Cooiponao; Lot+om Head 5 S::.i:" rauckle cBI D>Y9. ~

9 Rev.

and 1

Rev.

Descriritioii of Nonconformity tdcscritie actual and required conditions)

T.e thickness of the bottom.head side lates mas blend round to a 5 7 16" min.'hic1wess as

-a.ia'-'.:z

..=" ~6~6" CL skirt knuckle has been blend Fround to 1 ll 16" minimum thickness as shown on a e 5 and violates the 2" ~+/8u required on dra;Tinr-, 9.

Cause of Nonconformity

".fhen burning, a terra)ora trunion stiffener oer LRP-1 the incorrect torch an~le caused the torch to cut into the bottom head late (see a e 2) and in the skirt knuckle (epee ria e cauein burn cavities.

Re'commcndod Disposition NOTEB IF CONDITIONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLYAOVERSE TO QUALITY STATE ACTION TO OE TAKENTO raRECLVOE REOCCURENCE.

Aeze~w~&m~i sc c

" ea an~ heat effective zone vias assured by an amaoniua persulfate etch per ASfK Code,Section IX, A2"endi:. Ilr oa".apraoh OA 19ir8 Edition addenda i nnro h 1970.

CBI EnnincerinfJ Justification Req'd No LT Yes If Yes X See Attached IfYes p Sec Stress Analysis Locail ft'it!'.t

/ /( /

CBI QrS

(~(r',",/(:

~ '%

r

'( "/r/'(6 osar..

nnn()

CBI Bnry r ~J

+/7 d.

Data a

Cost Rc;>.

Dato.

Custorucl Jua:iiicatior:.'cu::I:Iicnts Custom er Appro Ya I i

Laj~An(rrnC Q niaapprnrrri Name Title Q App. N/comments Date Bfi Snroff;-', ~;,')z...I,gi.rIC Engineer BK Lloyd, 4 '5.r.-.6":, z'.,"~Buyer R I Pen; ose g,!u.ateri al s Engr.

i

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v- (-

('

'4r -7r' JG Erbes

~C~~.~

Responsible Engr.

The loc~".llv reduced t;all thickness and additional stress concentrations are adequate per trle at taci'.ed justi i cation, and excavations have b..erl adequately

<>"I-'R AI-'.";VANcrc.i;.:o Lj

'Ja blended to leave no heat-a: fee(ed zones and yfill not '.mpair in-service"'".".A( 'oYAa osi llr-0 exarr.iri:.tiori of the skirt we1d.

TII~I.e I!ill be no efrect on the safety, utility or operating ciii'cl"1 0 v ririr.;jiui s

i i fe of the vesse i

n

.:r i I'rr

.,'5'

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" % "".~g 1.-'. i+~ Q,. r J~P.

RAD ".

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Rev ~f I~I. EBS I> aa ~aitl llI.V I r P p Sco RI!Ycrsc Sirle For Ilistructions Aw I

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II

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'EQUEST FOR AC~<PTANCE OF NONCONFORMITY AS A DEVIATION r g fPf f

~CLEAR VESSELS AND PARTS RAD Rgv Page2 of~

yesseI game Susquehanna II CBI Contract 4 Customer P.O ¹ 205H0957, &v. 12 prepared B>

A. L. Dahlberf October 10, 1976 Component Bottom Head II Skirt Knuckle CB) 0 9 ¹ 9

~+

3 q&~ (Opal ppPP~X 1+" i~T~rt,q~

2]0 AK Qax. VE.pTH I5y>>>

f Skier VotfcK(f (ft-A)

~puffs 5 CAN.

c~vrflr SR7104{ Lard "Sc=- Rf K

~<S )I (l9.+

~KINET Q or- 'K

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'Vessel Name REQUEST FOR A~PTANCE OF NONCONFORMITY~ A DEVIATION NUCLEAR VESSELS AND PARTS M RAP 0 Rev 4 Page 3 of~

.'CBI Contract 4 Customer P.O. 0 Component Rev 12 ttom Head II Skirt Knuckle P epared By A

L 'ahlbe pate October 10 1 76

.."~9. ~

8 S<teg KNUf g<'-

8 >>

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'EQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE OF NONCONFORMITY AS A DEVIATION RAD" NUCLEAR VESSELS AND PARTS Page4 of

.yes') Name Sus uehanna II CBI Contract ~

Customer P.O. ~

prepared 8>

A. L. Dahlberg Date October 10, 1976 Component ttom Head

& Skirt Knuckle CBI Dwg "

9 Rev.

3

& 13, Rev.

8 OVE,ALA,Y MIN. +AD PE.Q

'DWG. ~9 5 7/16 min. thickness can be assured

'as follows:

From after forming dimensional check

records, the minimum thickness of the perimeter of the plate was 6.76n.

The center of the plate, the thinnest

area, was recorded to be 6.53"..

To be conservative, take 6.53" and subtract the depth of the burn cavity to bright metal, 1.06", to resul~ 'n 5.47n (5 17/32) assuring a

5 7/'5" thickness.

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REQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE 0 NON ONFORMITY AS A DEVIATION NUCLEAR VESSELS AND PARTS anna II prepared B

A. L.

Mberg RAD ~~

Rev 4 Page 5Of~

C<(stoma<

P O ~

205H09575 Rev 12 Date October 10, 1976 Bottom Head

& Skirt Knuckle CBt Dw 9, ~v.

3 and 13, Rev.

I

(

<I f

I MlH.X t

3 I u 1 ll/16" min. thickness can be assured as follow:

- <-<ou.'=g,

",."nog-,u TP/~I'M c

< l'3:il SKiRT i< VUC< i E.

From after machining dimensionait che k r cords, the thick.".ess a+ th skir

'r~uckle joint eras measured to be 2 3/32" minimum.

Subtract from this the depth of the burn cavity to bright meta1.p 3/8p and the result is 1 23/32" assuring 1 ll/16 thickness.,

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I CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Location Oax Braot: E:I IBc:f:3 ENGINEERING JUSTIFICATION FOR RAD r'8 REV. 0 SUS UEHANNA II RPV CBI CONTRACT 68-3332 RAD gi8, Rev. 0, covers blend ground areas on the boLtom head and the vessel skirt knuckle to remove burn scars from these locations.

The ground out areas are pictured on pages 4 and 5 of RAD N8, Rev, 0.

The deepest point of the ground 4

out area on the skirt knuckle is about 3/4 inches above the knuckle tangent line.

The deepest point of the ground out area on the bottom head is approximately 11 inches above the weld joining the bottom dollar plate to the bottom head side plates.

Both ground out areas are essentially circular in configuration.

In the following we will investigate the effects of the ground out areas from a fatigue standpoint and also the increases in prima=y stresses that can occur at the affected locations.

GO 151 SUSQUEHA~ttNA II 251" HtlR VESSEL

&ADC BY CMKD BY AEE LJL DATE DATE 10-76 10-76 CHKD DA TC CHARCK HOo S~T I

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'I CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Lag)I(y OAi 0+'C w Vessel Skirt Knuckle Page 5 of RAD

$i'8, Rev. 0, states that the actual measured thickness at the skirt knuckle joint was found to be 2 3/32 inches.

For an extra margin of safety, we will assume in the following calculations that this skirt knuckle thickness is actually. 2 inches.

After subtracting the 3/8 irich depth of the ground out area from the assumed 2 inch thickness of the skirt knuckle, we have left a net thickness of 1 5(8 inches.

instead of the 1 ll/16 inches shown on page5 of RAD >j8.

To perform the fatigue analys~s at the location of the ground out area, we use figures 19 and 35 from "Stress Concentration Design Factors" by R.E. Peterson. Using the above reference..

and pertinent dimensions from page 5 of RAD fr8 iv'e comput'e a stress concentration facto.

as follows:

D=2t =2x2 d=2t

. =2x15/8=31/4" min 3~jll 2

D/d = 4/3. 25

= l.231 r/d

= 3.5/3.25

= 1.077 From Figure 19 for tensile stresses:

K

= 125 From Fig re 35 for bene':-,.g st=esses:

K~ = 1.16 For the sake of conservati"m, we will use a stress concen-tration factor of K = 1.3.

Due to the circular configuration of the ground out area, this stress concentration factor is applied to both longitudinal and circumferential stresses.

GO TET SUSQUEIQ.h'NA XT.

251" F.NR Vt'.SRt'.T-

>JADK nv 1>AT E CHKO OY L3L DATE 10-76 10-76 nv CHKO OA T I'.

CHARGE HO

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HICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY Location Cst l)a~

s.

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Tn the analysis of the vessel skirt in Stress Report Section 2, the closest point to the ground out area where stresses are computed is point 15.

Point 15 is shown on page S2-8 to be at the tangent line of the skirt knuckle which is about 3'/4 inches below the center of thegground out area as was stated above.

To use the stresses at Point 15 for our calculations is quite satisfactory.

From page 35 of Report Section F2, the governing cases /or peak stress intensity range at Point 15 are cases 10 and 13.

Case 10 is refueling with design earthquake at 0

around the circumference.

Case 13 is startup at 267 minutes.

The primary and secondary stresses for case 10 are given on page S2-52 and those for case 13 on page S2-167.

These stresses are based on a 2 inch thickness at point 15.

Actually, the thickness should have been 1.9375 inches after subtracting the corrosion allowance.

To compensate for this error, the stresses from pages S2-52 and S2-167 will be multiplied below by the ratio 2

We can now compute the peak stresses at the ground out area of the skixt knuckle:

Cise 10 47?9 x 1.3 x 1.065o 593 x 1.3 x 1.0656 0

6020 ps',

821 psi SUSQUEHANNA II 251" BWR VESSFL MAORI OY DAfF.

10-76 caKo =nv LJL OAT E 10-76 nv CMKO CHAACC NO SHY 3 OFZZ

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HICAGO BRIDGE 6 IRON COMPANY LocQIIOA Or~ BrouI; I;n~incern:y Case 13

-44530 x 1.3 x 1.0656 24190 x 1.3 x 1.0656 0

-61687 psi 33510 psi The peak stress intensity range for governing Cases 10 and 13 is; S

(peak)

= (-61687 - 33510).- (6620 - 821)

= 100996 psi The peak stress intensity amplitude is one half of the above value.

Before entering the applicable design fatigue curve, the peak stress intensity amplitude has to be multiplied by the ratio of the modulus of elascicity used in the fatigue curve

~

. to the modulus of elasticity of the material under consideration at actual temperature.

Accordingly the peak stress intensity amplitude is:

S

= l; 100996 27.7 x 10 54691 psi c

r,ec>~ ez T7 ARfE Code, to obtain the a '.:able numbe" of cycles:

N = 3500 cycles T¹ actual number of stress cycles affecting the skirt knuckle Accordingly a conservative value for the fatigue usage factor is:

U= -~=.131 wunaa;c r SuSqUEIVV,V,A T.r.

~A>nK 4V CVIKD OY LJL CHARCL NO CO 281 251" B'.ll< VESSEL oArc 10-76 0 ATf.

10-76 CHKO ORETC

>>v +

oiZ~>

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CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY O>I: Brooi: Eopincrric ~

Location This is less than the code allowable value of 1.0.

The stresses at Point 15 due to various primary 1oadings are given in Report Section S2.

These stresses are again based on a skirt knuckle thickness of 2 inches.

Accordingly we have to adjust these stresses for the reduction in thickness resulting from the depth of the ground out area of"3/8 inches and the total corrosion allowance of 1/16 inches.

The new net thickness at the point under consideration is therefore:

k

= 2 - 3/8 - 1/16

=. 1 9/16" N

To compute the adjusted

stresses, we multiply the stresses from Section S2 by the ratio 2.0/1.5625

= 1.28 to obtain membrane stresses and by the ratio 2.0 /1.5625 to obtain bending stresses.

The adjusted stresses are used t'o=compute net stress intensities.

Proceeding in the above manner in'ffect assumes that the'ground out area extends all around the circumference o

the skirt.

This is a conservative assumption.

In the following calculat'ons we first list the section S2

~c a.> f.,

c i ',w r,

~

-p eiq~ yvipp~

r i oaga qo coen j 'j one:

~

Membrane and bending stresses are listed separately.

B nding stresses ar obtained by subtracting membrane

stresses, as given in Section S2, from the total stresses given in the same

.section.

From the listed stresses, the worst loading cases for the design, emergency and fault conditions are selected.

he stresses for these wo"s= loading cases are multip:

d oy thr. appropriate thickness r tios to obtain adjusted stresses from which new primary membrane stress intensities and primary membrane

.+

primary bending stress intensities are computed.

GO 751 S USQ UEHA TNA II 251" BUR X'KSSL'L t>>OF. llY 0Ar F.

10-76 CHKO OY 10-7(

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CHICAGO BRIOGE 5 IRON COI'APANY pgY' i

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Location DESIGN CONDITION DESIGN MECHANICAL LOAD - Membrane Stresses At 0

(p. S2-34)

At 90 (p.

S2 40)

At 180'p.

S2-46) 2697

-3120

-8936 5155 5272 5389 0

0 0

1506 0

DESIGN MECHANICAL LOAD - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2-34)

At 90'p.

S2-40)

At 180'p.

S2-46)

Og) 842

- 5962

-11084

- 238

-1789

-3340 0

0 0.

Iq O.

0 1262 0

REFUELING WITH DESIGN E.Q. - Membrane Stresses At 0

(p. S2-52)

At 90'p.

S2-58)

At 180 (p. S2-62) 0 ())

2508

-3307

-9122 Oc.

104 48 198 0

0

~

0..

I ge 0

1512 0

REFUEL'ING WITH DES)TGN E.Q. - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2-52)

At 90'p.

S2-58)

At l.80'p.

S2-62) 2271

-2699 7068 697 810

-2316 Or 0

0 0

Qe 0

1260 0

SUSQUEHANNA II AEE LJT MADE. I ~ Y CHKD E) Y CHARCC HO, oo 787 251."

BMR VESSEL 10-76 15"-'7'6 OAYC 5HT Q Ol'l 3,

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I CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COIVIPANY LOCgjoq ORL IIfOOa

',U 'iqcqgj~i By inspection design mechanical load at 180 is most critica

~

for both the primary membrane stress intensity (P

or P ) and the primary membrane

+

primary bending stress intensity (p

+ PB) categories.

Primary Membrane Stress Intensity (PM or PL):

Og

= 1.28 x (-8936)

= -11438 psi Oe

= 1.28 x (5389)

=,

6898 psi P

or PL = 11438 + 6898

= 18336 psi <

S

= 26700 psi M

L m

P Primary Membrane

+

Primary Bending Stress Intensity (P

+ P )

= 1.28

(-8936) + 1.638

(-11084)

= -29594 psi Ge

= 1.28

( 5389)

+ 1.638 {- 3340) -

1427 psi'

+ P

= 29594 + 1427

= 31021 psi (

1.5 S

= 40050 psi CO TS)

SVVJCC I SUS~UEHANKK 1'I 251" R41R VF.SSET,

>>AOC OV CHKO OV AEE LJT.

OAT 4 QATC 1.0-6 10-76 ov CHKO OATC CHA AC K HO, SHT 7 OCQQ

CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Lppggjpp Ol~ lirolk L:ip~'~~TIER I

Emer enc Condition MAXIMUMEARTHQUAKE - Membrane Stresses At 0'p.

S2-79)

At 90 (p.

S2 85)

At 180'p.

S2-91)

OQ'321

- 3309

<<14940 Oe 4099 4385 4671 Or 0

0 0

lye 0

3014 0

>QXIMUial EARTHQUAKE - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2-79)

At 90 (p. S2-85)

At: 180'p.

S2-91) 0$

4709

- 5485

-15680 Oe 1443

-1646

-4735 0

0 0

tg:e 0

2518 0

REACTOR OVERPRESSURE - Membrane Stres'ses (p. S2-97)

- 2767 5966 0

0 0 ip (p. S2-97)

- 6015 Oe

-1804 0

Wg) g 0

inspection maximum ear";.q"ake at 80's most critica1 fo'oth PM or PL and PL

".- PB categox "es.

GO 137 S'V to J CC T SUSQUEHAbRLM. II

'251" B':lR VESSF'.L

>AADc g)Y AEE DATE

]0- 6 CHKD OY LJL DATt 10-76 DY CHKD OA1 C CHAffCL '40

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CHICAGO BRIOGE c?c! RON COMPANY

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Qt(Wa LllglRCCCIUg Location P~ 'r PL Gg

= 1.28 x (-14940)

= -19123 psi Oe

= 1. 28, x (,

4671)

=

5979 psi P

or P

= 19123 + 5979

= 25102 psi <

Sy = 42600 psi M

L PL + PB

= 1.28

(-14940)

+ 1.638

(-15680)

= -44807 psi gc

= 1.28

(

4671)

+ 1.638 (- 4735)

= - 1777 psi P

+ P

= 44807 + 0 = 44807 psi (

1. 5 Sy = 63900 psi L

B co var SUSQkJEklANtA T.I 25 1 gg~

VP.SSLQ LoAOc.

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CHRIS QV LJL PATE DATE 1.0-76 10- 76 llY CHKO OA TE CHARGC HO SHT Q OPZ

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CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COiVlPANY Location L'O inCerin Fault Condition FAULT CONDITION WITH 60 psi PRESSURE - 11embrane Stresses At 0

(p. S2-110)

At 90'p

~ S2>>116)

At 180'p.

S2-122) 10265

- 3309

-16879

-260 82

'23 0

0 0.

T@g 0

3552 o.

FAULT COÃ3ITIONS MXTH 60 psi PRESSURE. - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2>>110)

At 90'p.

S2-116)

At 180'p

~ S2-122)

GQ 9035

- 2784

>>14601 ag 2746

- 836

-4417

~r

. 0' 0

~4e 0'974 0

FAULT CON)ITION WITH 1025 psi PRESSURE - Membrane Stresses At 0'p.

S2-128) o

(~

g'7 1 tb'i At 180'p.

S2-140) 10267

~ D)A>i

-16885 CTe 4048

<385 4721 lfe 0

3518.

0 FAULT CONDITION WITH 1025 psi PRESSURE - Bending Stresses 0

( p. S2-128) 90'p.

S2-134)

A" 180 (p.

S2-140) 0 (f) 5423 5485

-17395 1962

-1646

-5253 0

0 0

'Tf8 0

2907 0

SUSQUEHANNA XI

'251" PAR V.':SHEL

~ i*DC OY CRKD OY LJL AEE 0ATE 10-76 10-76 OY CRKD DATC CHARCC t4De s~< lO o+ZZ

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CHICAGO BRIDGE Bc IRON COEYIPANY ppgljpp Oal: litmus En8inaering By inspection fault condition with 1025 psi pressure at 180's most critical for both P> or PL and P< + PB categories P~ '" PL 0$ = 1.28 x (-16885)

=

-21613 psi ge

= 1 28 x (

4721)

=

6043 psi P

or P

= 21613 + 6043

= 27656 psi < Sy = 42600 psi H

I.

PL+ PB Gcf>

= 1.28

(-16885)

+ 1.638

(-17395)

=

-50106 psi

,C7e

= 1.28

(

4721) + 1.638 (- 5253)

=

- 2561 psi PL + PB = 50106 + 0 = 50106 psi < 1.5 Sy = 63900.psi

'rom the above calculations we conclude that a11 requirements for prima y stress intensit'es are satisfied at the ground out a'.ea on tne vessels

-'Iixrc t'nuc;k~e.

GO 737 SUSQUEHANNA. IT.

2 51" BVR Vj..SSI."I, MACLE tl Y OATE; 10-76 C ~ EKO OY LJL OATE 10-76 CHKO DAE Q CHAACK NO 5HT f f OiEp AE

0 I

l r=

pl e

f

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4

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CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COiVIPANY O';. '!.'ii c:r att Location VESSEL BOTTPil HEAD i

Page 4 of RAD N8 states that the actual measured minimum thickness of the bottom head side plates was found to be 6.53 inches.

For an extra margin of safety we will use in the following calculations the minimum thickness of 6 3/16 inches as specified on the CBT. contract drawings.

After subtracting the 1 1/16 inch depth of the ground out area from the assumed 6 3/16 inch thickness of the bottom head plates we have left a net thickness of 5 1/8 inches instead of the 5 7/16 inches shown on Page 4 of RAD Pi8.

To perform the fatigue analysis at the location of the ground out area we use again Figures 19 and 35 from "Stress Concentration Design Factors" by R.E. Peterson.

Using the above'eference arid pertinent dimensions from page 4 of RAD 5'8 we compute a

stress concentration factor as follows:

D d

2i = 2 x 6 3/16

= 12 3/8" 2t

~

= 2 x 5 1/8 = 10 1'4" 8lt D/D = 12.375/10.25

= l.zU,"

r/d = 8/10.25

=.78 From Figure 19 for tensile stresses:

Frt.t. Figure 35 for bending stresses:

KB = 1.21

~

SUSQUEHANNA T.T.

MAO" iiV AER C ~1+D QV LJL CHARCC ND, 251" Pq'R VESSEL OATC DATl 10-76 10-7 CHKD DA. F.

S~V f Z, OF 2.Z

~

4

~

0 CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY LOCGIIOA Oat DrcoL: B"oiRv PIcg For the sake of conservatism we will use a sLress concentration factor of K = 1.35.

Due to the circular configuration of the ground out area, this stress concentration factor is applied to both longitudinal and circumferential stresses.

As was previously stated, the deepest point of the ground out area on the bottom head is approximately 11 inches above the weld joining the bottom dollar plate to the bottom head sid3 plates.

No stresses are given at this point in Report Section S2, however, they can be found in the computer outputs in Appendix A to Section S2.

The closest point to the ground out area, for which stresses are listed in Report Section S2, is Point 38 at the transition between the bottom dollar plate and the vessel side plates.

Point 38 is shown on page S2-9 of the Stress Report.

A comparison of the stresses at point 38 to those given in Appendix A for the ground out area location "shows the point 38 stresses to be slightly larger.

Therefore, for the sake of conservatism and for ease of reference, we will use point 38 stresses at the location of th= ground out area in the following calculations.

From Page 36 of Report Section F2, tne governing cases for peak stress intensity rang at Point 38 are cases 1 and 13.

Case 1 is the zero stress case.

Case 13 is startup at 267 minutes.

GO 187 SJSJCCT SUS UEHANciL4 T.I 251" BUR VESSEL AEE 10-76 LSL MAOISM QY CHKO OY CHKO A*YC CHARCC 40, SHY f~ OY

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CHICAGO BRIOGE & IRON CO"APANY Osh Hro~ngineeria8 location The primary secondary stresses for case

13. are given on page S2-168.

These stresses are based on a 6 3/16 inch thickness at Point 38.

Actually the thickness should have been 6 5/32 inches after subtracting the corrosion allowance.

To compensate for this error the stresses from page S2-168 will be mutliplied below by the ratio 6 ~ 1875 1 P1 2

6.1562 Ne can now compute the peak stresses at the ground out area of the bottom head:

Case 1

Op=0 Oe =0 0'I-0 Case 13 Og

= 23280 x 1.35 x 1.01

= 31742 psi I ~

Tn addition to the above peak stresses, we also have to consider thermal skin stresses.

The maximum range of thermal skin stresses on the outs'de surFace of t¹ bottom head-is given on va -e 72-39 as 12931 psi Accordingly the total peak s"ress intensity range at the ground out area in the bottom head for governing cases 1 and 13 is S

(peak)

= (31742 - 0) + 12931

=

44673 psi GO 767 lv3JC:CT SUSOVE<~A.>ma II 251" Bh'R V:"SSEL

>AAOf'Y CHKO OY 0 ATE, OATS 10-76 10-76 CwKO CHANOK HO SHY 14, O<z?

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CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY Location Oa~ Broa~ E:]'jgywgj-The peak stress intensity amplitude is one half of the above value.

Before entering the applicable design fatigue curve the peak stress intensity amplitude has to be multiplied by the ratio of the modulus of elasticity used in the fatigue curve to the modulus of elasticity of the material under consideration at actual temperature.

Accordingly the peak stress intensity amplitude is:

3

= ",

44673 30 x 10 27.7 x 10 24191 psi

<faith this value we enter rigure N-415(A) of Section III, ASME Code, to obtain the allowable number of cycles:

N = 14000 cycles The actual number of stress cycles aff cting the bottom head is given on Page 1'2-41 as n = 458.

3 Accordingly a conservative value for the fatigue usage factor is.

U = ~7-

= 0.0g~)

This is less than the code allowable value of 1.0.

oO 187 7

SUSQP.'.HANNA II 251" Bt:>R VESSFL 6446340& llY AEE OATE

< 0-76 C;ll34',P I) Y LJL 0 A T t.

10-76 C ~ IKQ C3AZC CHANCE HO i~a )5 oFZ

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CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY Location Olla BC<>A L'dlilllCC(I:lit The stresses at Point 38 due to various primary loadings are given in Report Section S2.

These stresses are again based on a bottom head thickness of 6 3/16 inches.

Accordingly we have to adjust these stresses for the reduction in thickness resulting from the depth of the ground out area of 1 1/16 inches and-the total corrosion allowance of 1/32 inches..

The new net thickness at the point under consideration is therefore:

= 6 3/16 -

1 1/16 - 1/32 = 5 3/32" To compute the adjusted

stresses, we mutliply the stresses from Section S2 by the ratio 6.1875/5.0937

= 1.215 to obtain membrane stresses and by the ratio 6.1875

/5..0937

= 1.476 to obtain bending stresses.

The adjusted stresses are used to compute new stress intensities.

Proceeding in the above manner in effect assumes that the ground out area extends all around the circumference of the bottom head.

This is a conservative assumption.

In the following calculations, we first list the Section S2 stresses for all the different primary loading conditicns.

0~I,'lJ c nV c iu Cl0 nc,'.,

i~i 0lC ',.ibiii".0 ci l

~ 'Ce<<0 Sc O<<J <t OY AEE CH00i'0 OY LJL CHAACC NO, co )a) 25l" RWR VFSSEL OATt:

10-76 10-76 C%0 K0 OATC gHT I 6 Oi Zg

4>

t1 4 y+

h 4

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I CHICAGO 8RIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Location Oa< BaxA Lupine.ring DESIGN CONDITION DESXGN MECHANICAL LOAD >> Membrane Stresses At 0

(p. S2-35)

At 90 (p.

S2 41)

At 180'p.

S2-47) 12669 12696 12723 11220 11375 11540

-625

-625

-625 l qe 53 DESIGN MECHANICAL LOAD - Bending Stresses At: 0'p.

S2-35)

At 90'p.

S2-41)

At 180 (p. S2-47)

Op 2761 3534 4307 780 1035 1290 0

0 0

Wg8 0

35 0

REFUELING WITH DESIGN E.Q. - Membrane Stresses At 0'p.

S2-53)

At 90'p.

S2-59)

~ ~

1 cIpcr

(~

qQ 596 319 487

-30 O.

59

'EFUELING NXTH DESIGN E.Q. - Bending Stress s

At 0'p.

S2-53)

At 90'p.

$2-59)

Ac 180'p.

S2-65)

CTcJ>

- 38 1508 Oe 6

2+7 501 OI-Tj)g 0

0

'36 0

0 GO 181 SUSQUEHANNA II

'251" HHR VESST:.L LJL AEE OI TK DATE 10-76 10-76 Mknl. OY CHKO OV CHKO OATE CH* 4CE NO s~r I7 oc>g

C, 1

1 II t

4

CHICAGO BRIDGE 6 IRON COMPANY

'aGG~A', LBgN~ITSGg Location O~'y inspection design mechanical 1oad at 180's most critical for both the primary membrane stress intensity (P

or PL) and the primary membrane

+ primary bending stress intensity (PL + PB) categories.

Primary Membrane Stress Intensity (P< or P )

= 1.215 (12723)

= 15458 psi

<8

~ 1.215 (11540)

= 14021 psi 0 I-

= -625 psi P

or P

= 15458 + 625

= 16038 psi <

S

= 26700 psi L

m Primary Hembrane

+ Primary Bending Stress Intensity (PL '+ PB)

OP

= 1.215 (12723)

+ 1.476 (4307)

= 21816 psi Ge

= 1.215 (11540)

+ 1.476 (1290)

~ 15925 psi Gi-

.= 0 P

+ P

= 21816 psi < 1.5 S

= 40050 psi

'SVBJEC T SUS UEHANNA EX 251" BUR VESSEL M*OC BY AF.E 10-76 C>N 1 BY LJL 10-76 BY CBRIT GATE CHARGE HO

• -. IS o.zz

CHICAGO BRIDGE 6 IRON COMPANY LOCGIIOfl

'1r EMERGENCY CONDITION HAXRIUi~l EARTHQUAKE - Hembrane Stresses At 0'p.

S2-80)

At 90'p.

S2-86)

At 180 (p. S2-92) 10359 10413 10472 8990 9318 9647

-512

<<5 12

-512 Vgg 0

118 0

HAXIHUi~f EARTHQUAKE - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2>>80)

At 90'p.

S2-86)

At 180'p.

S2-92)

Gp 1461 3017 4578 CTe 379 892 1403 GI-0 0

0 tqg 0

72 0

REACTOR OVERPRESSU1<E Hembrane Stresses (p.

S2-98)

Gcp 13965 12515

-688

~l,,

t tl l

{p. S2-98)

Gg 3765 Og 1095 Gr G

~d> 8 0

i/spec-i on reactor o;7ergrF ss/re P,

"l" P, and PL + PB categories.

~

~

r.s vc.osc crt 1.ca1 Jor botl1 SUSQLV.I&NYA II 2 >1"

%1R VT"-lSf'.T.

~rs,Al: llY C<<KO llY AEE OATG OA'TC 1.0- 76 10-76 C ~ IKO CHAACC HO gwT J g OFZg

N ~

~

~

)

~

~

~ CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Location PM '" PL Gg

= 1.215 (13965)

= 16967 psi Og

~ 1.215 (12515)

= 15206 psi gi-

= -688 P

or P

= 16967 + 688

= 17655 psi <

Sy = 42600 psi M

L PL + PB OP

=- 1.215 (13965)

+ 1.476 (3765)-

=

22525 psi ge

= 1.215 (12515)

+ 1.476 (1095)

=

16822 psi 0;=0 P

+ P

=

22525 psi ( 1. 5 Sy

=

63900 psi "L

B SU~Si UEHAN!tA rt 251II Ptqg g., c Q,.f MAt>l'lY AF.E, oarn ZO-76 CHKO llY QArt'0-76 OY CHKO OATC CHAAGt-'O, r+OOcZZ

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CHICAGO BRIDGE 5 IRON COMPANY Location QaL Brio>> Eu;ii>>:erictt FAULT CONDITION FAULT CONDITION MITH 60 psi PRESSURE - Membrane Stresses At 0'p.

S2-111)

At 90'p.

S2-117)

At 180'p.

S2-123)

Oq 560 625 689 125 507 1144

-30

-30

-30 7+8 0

390 0

FAULT CONDITION WITH 60 psi PRESSURE - Bending Stresses At 0'p.

S2-111)

At 90'p.

S2-117)

At 180'p.

S2-123) g cI)

-1088 719 252o Ge.

- 354 240 578 GI-

'0 0

0 T@g 0

84 0

FAULT CONDITION MITH 1025 psi PRESSURE - Membrane 'Stresses.

At 0'p.

S2-129)

At 90'p.

S2-135) hg 1:?h J

/'~

> Q I/.1'>

Og 10349 11289 Gg 9285 9425

-512

-512

-5 2

~(p 0

137 FAULT CONDITION 4'ITH 1025 psi PRESSURE - Bending Stresses At 0'r Qg~

A" 180'p.

S2-129)

{p.52-135)

(p. S2-141) 1201 2141 4793 Og

- 56 785 1489

~pe 0

0 0.

8/.

0 By inspection fault conc ition t)ith 1025 psi pressure is, most critical at 90'or the PM or PL category and at 180'or the PL + PB category.

$VOJKCT SUS UEHANiN TI 251" BWR W:SHEL MADI'>4 AEE

=

1()-"7'6 C ~>Kr& i>Y j.I)-'t6 DY C ~>>>0

~0*'ic CHARGC

>>O s r <)orZ~~

II

~

~

P

~

g 4Q

'0

~ s j

CHICAGO SRIDGE 5 IRON COMI'AN'ocation PM or PL Og

=

1.215 (11289)

=

13603 psi 08

=

1.215

( 9425)

=

15451 psi Oi- =

- 512 p

oz p

=

13603 + 512

=

14115 psi(

Sy

=

4260$ psi M

L 4

PL+ P~

Qq

=

1.215 (10437)

+ 1.476 (4793)

=

19755 psi gg

=

1.215 '( 9701)

+ 1.476 (1489)

=

13984 p'si Gi-

= "0 P

+ P

=

19755 psi( 1.5 Sy

=

63900 psi From the above calculations, tre conclude that all requirements i:or primary stress intensities are satisfied at the ground out area on the vessel bottc:- head.

GO 787 sv(IJcc r SUS UEHANNA XT.

251" 8':jR VESSEY M>OI

!) Y 1.0)76 CHKO !iY LJL OArs ln-i6 CHKO OATC CHARCC KO.

s~r Pros

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7

<0 STP; W. E.

D. S.

R. A.

W. L.

E. J.

C.

C.

S. L.

R.

W.

J.

W.

Barber ich Bast Beckley Bohner Brignole Cole Denson Dunn Geiling N5 N2 Susq.

SES N5 Susq.

SES N5 Susq.

SES Al-2 N5 J.

D. Green H. L. Harris E. M. Mead J.

M. Reese W. J.

Rhoades A. R, Sabol G. E.

Shamis R. J. Shovlin W. R. White Susq.

SES Susq.

SES N5 N5 N5-v4~

N2 N5 TW7 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT //2, REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV)

ER 100450 FILE 899 PLI; lfA3 Attached is a copy of Dr. R. D. Stout's metallurgical report cn his examination of the RPV oxyacetylene torch burn repairs.

Dr. Stout found that both the procedures used and physical repairs were acceptable.

Should you have any questions or comments, please contact me.

M. E. Taylor Supervising Engineer-Technical JAZ BSW 613016 P E t4 N 5 Y L VA8 I A P O'W 6 R 8

G H T C Q,v, P A iV Y

gO y P'

e

~tyi Q o~gi lpp. ~ ~

Ct

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LEHIGH UNMRSIYY Bcthlehe>n, Pennsylvania 28015 TtlE GRADUATE SCHOOL Robert D. Stout, Dean Telephone:

215.691-7000 Ext. 427 f~'t

~ $ ttt P':.',:.'D QEC2u 1976 f'iVP l'LT..=NC.

December 17, 1976 Mr. J.

W. Geiling Manager-Power Plant Engineering Pennsylvania Power and Light Two North Ninth Street Allentown, Pa.

18101

Dear Mr. G'eiling:

On December 16 a visit was made to the Susquenhanna Station at Berwick in,the companv of ~lr.

Walter Rhoades.

Tne purpose of the visit was to determine wnether the proceaures used to repair the region of the Unit 2 reactor vessel burned by an oxy-acetylene torch were successful'from a metallurgical viewpoint.

All personnel were extremely cooperative during the examination.

Those who were present or participated in the work were Mr. LeVasseur of G.E.,

Messrs Holfast, Dahlbe g, Howerton, and Cristoferi of CBI, Mr. Morgan of'Hartford Al, and Mr. Beckley of PP&L.

As a first step the written procedures for the grinding, etching, and aye penetrant inspection were reviewed.

When tnese appeared to be in orae

, tne party went to the location of the repairea burn area.

The contoured area was smooth and regular to the eye and to the toucn.

The area was then etcned with an aqueous ammonium persulfate solution by rubbina it with a saturated cotton swab for two minutes.

After a spray rinse of distillea water, the area was cried. and carefully examined.

No trace could be aetected of any darkened portions which would have indicated residual heat-affected

'ones proaucea bv tne ovyacetvlene burn.

Next the dye penetrant was applied, the excess was removed, and the white developer was sprayed on the'rea.

After 7 minutes the surface was closely scanned to searcn out possible indications.

None were discovered.

These steps completed the examination.

caus k

Mx'. J. N. Geiling December 17, 1976 It is my con'elusion from the results of the inspection procedures that the burn area has been satisfactorily repaired with regard to the presence of metallurgical anomalies.

There is no reason to suspect that any metallurgical damage remains to interfere with the service performance of the pressure vessel.

information.

Let me know if you need further Very truly yours,

'obert D. Stout

p-w~%. ')