ML17354A403
| ML17354A403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17354A401 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-96-13, 50-251-96-13, NUDOCS 9702070425 | |
| Download: ML17354A403 (38) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1996013
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
License Nos.:
DPR-31 and
Report Nos.:
50-250/96-13
and 50-251/96-13
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
Facility:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Location:
P.
U. Box 1448
.Homestead,
FL 33090
.0
Dates:
November
17 through
December
31,
1996
Inspectors:
T.
P. Johnson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
B.
B. Desai,
Resident
Inspector
S.
Q. Ninh,
DRP Project Engineer
W.
H. Hiller, DRS Inspector
Approved by:
C. A. Julian, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects
Branch 3
Division of Reactor
Projects
9702070425
970130
ADOCK 05000250
6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 and 4
Nuclear Regul atory Commission Inspecti on Report 50-250,251/96-13
This integrated
inspection to assure
public health
and safety included aspects
of licensee operations,
maintenance,
engineering,
and plant support.
The
report covers
a six-week period
(November
17 to December
31.
1996) of resident
inspection.
In addition, the report includes
a regional
announced
inspection
of Thermo-lag testing.
~oerations
~
The licensee
has appropriate cold weather preparations
to ensure
the protection of safety-related
equipment (section
01. 1).
~
A weakness
was identified in the licensee's
process for
documenting
and controlling out-of-service technical specification
equipment.
Although the technical specifications
did not
specifically address
the residual
heat
removal alternate
discharge
- lineup, operators
should have documented
an appropriate
action
statement
entry (section 01.2).
~
Operators
reacted appropriately to an inadvertent control
room
ventilation system isolation (section 01.3).
e
The Unit 3 and 4 auxiliary feedwater
and emergency
containment
filter systems
were appropriately aligned (sections
02. 1 and
02.2).
~
The licensee appropriately
responded to Unit 3 control
room switch
out-of-position, including the implementation of a "peer" check
program (section 04.1).
~
Operator staffing plans
appeared to be proactive
and appropriate
to replace
and train operators for observed
and predicted
personnel
losses
(section 06. 1).
~
A non-licensed
operator failed to obtain
an independent
verification of the valve lineup during radwaste monitor tank
recirculation operations.
This was classified
as
a procedure
violation, and
a tank overflow and spill subsequently
occurred
(section R1.3).
Maintenance
~
The licensee's
program to address auxiliary feedwater
piping external
surface corrosion
was
app. opriate (section 02.1).
~
Observed
maintenance
and surveillance testing activities were well
performed (section Ml.1).
A Technical Specification required surveillance test related to
containment
temperature
monitoring was missed
by operations
for
approximately two days.
This was classified
as
a non-cited
violation.
Licensee corrective actions were comprehensive
and
aggressive
(section H1.2).
~
Startup transformer
outages
were well performed;
however,
although
not required,
post maintenance testing did not include breaker
cycling due to risk-related
reasons
(section Hl.3).
~
Containment
tendon surveillance testing
was satisfactorily
performed (section H1.4).
~
Licensee repair
and testing activities associated
with a Unit 4
safeguards
test switch were very good. with strong teamwork noted
(section M1.5).
~
The licensee
plans to address
inspector-noted
buildup of dust
within certain safety-related
cabinets,
including cabinets
containing nuclear
instrumentation
(section
H2. 1).
~
Cooling canal
maintenance
continued to progress
on schedule in
- order to minimize the effects of a grass/algae
intrusion into the
intake structure (section H2.2).
En ineerin
Engineering support efforts to repai r a grounded wire for a
containment air bleed valve were thorough
and assured
nuclear
safety (section El.1).
An Event Response
Team's
review of a
common instrument air failure
was well performed, with excellent teamwork demonstrated
(section
E1.2).
An effective operating experience
feedback
program was noted
as
evidenced
by timely and complete follow-up on
a relay problem
(section E2.1) .
A containment re-analysis
related to an inspector
follow-up item
was closed (section
E8. 1).
Plant
Su
ort
Chemistry personnel
were proactive in noting
a slight increase in
the Unit 3 dose equivalent iodine fission product inventory
(section 04.1)
Observed resin transfer
operations
were well planned
and executed.
Some minor procedural
enhancements
were identified (section Rl.l).
A small hydrazine spill was properly handled
by the licensee
(section Rl.2).
Health Physics observation of and response to a radwaste building
spill was timely. thorough,
and demonstrated
positive performance
(section Rl.3).
he licensee
has plans to address
poor material conditions
and
housekeeping
issues that were identified in the primary sample
rooms (section R2.1).
A quarterly emergency
preparedness
drill was well coordinated
and
utilized to familiarize new staff members to their designated
responsibilities
(section
P4. 1).
Site staffing and accountability
was appropriate during holiday
coverage
(section Sl. 1).
Fire endurance testing of the licensee's fire barrier system
designs
was performed using good test procedures
which met the
NRC
criteria.
The testing facility was adequate
and was well staffed
and operated.
However, the barriers tested for one hour fire
endurance
and one of the fire barrier
assemblies
tested for three
hours failed to meet the acceptance
requirements.
These barriers
did not meet the fire barrier requirements
of
" CFR 50 Appendix
R
(section F2.1) .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary of Plant Status.
I.
Operations
II.
Maintenance
III.
Engineering
iV.
Plant Support
14
V.
Management
Meetings
Partial List of Persons
Contacted.
List of Items Opened.
Closed,
and Discussed
List of Inspection
Procedures
Used..
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations..
19
20
21
..21
.22
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 3
At the beginning of this reporting period. Unit 3 was operating at or
near full power and had been
on line since September
27,
1996.
The unit
operated
at full power during the entire period.
Unit 4
At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 4 was operating at or
near full power
and had been
on line since October
24.
1996.
The unit
operated at full power during the entire period.
Common
Hr. Raj Kundalkar was selected
as the
FPL Nuclear Division Vice
President.
Engineering,
on December
16,
1996.
0 er ations
01
01.1
Conduct of Operations
Cold Weather
Pre arations
Ins ection Sco
e
71714
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
program and procedures
which
address
cold weather preparations.
These preparations
were taken to
ensure protection of safety-related
systems,
component
and structures
(SSC) against cold weather
and possible freezing.
Observations
and Findin s
The licensee
implements
an off-normal operating procedure
(ONOP) prior
to forecasted
or actual cold weather.
Procedure
O-ONOP-103.2,
Cold
Weather
Conditions.
Revision 4/25/96,
would be implemented for any one
of the following.three
symptoms:
1)
auxiliary building temperature
<65'F, or
2)
actual outside air temperature
<39'F,
or
3)
outside air temperature
predicted to be <32'F.
The
ONOP provided protection for the outside refueling water storage
tank
(RWST) which has
a minimum temperature limit of 39'F per technical specifications (TS) 3.5.4.
for the boric acid storage tank
(BAST) room
which has
minimum temperature limit of 55'F per TS 4. 1.2.4;
and, for the
protection of other station equipment which could be affected
by
freezing.
Space heaters
were used for BAST room and charging
pump room
heating.
The
ONOP also provided specific actions
and other monitoring
requirements.
2
The inspector
reviewed the
ONOP and the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report
(UFSAR) and discussed
cold weather preparations
with operators
and maintenance
personnel.
Although the licensee
does not perform a
pre-seasonal
checklist,
experience
in South Florida demonstrated
that it
is rare for the Turkey Point site to experience
very cold temperatures
(e.g.,
<32'F).
On rare occasions
when the temperature
has
been <32'F,
the duration has
been very short.
Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the licensee
has appropriate
procedural
controls to address
the protection of safety-related
SSCs against cold
weather
and possible freezing.
Unit 4 Residual
Heat
Removal
Alternate Dischar
e
71707
During the morning control
room tour
on November
26.
1996, the inspector
noted that the Unit 4B RHR alternate
discharge
motor operated
valve
(MOV) 4-863B was out-of-service
(OOS)
on
a planneC
='ea,"ance.
The
clearance
had been executed
at 2:43 a.m. for 18C to calibrate the low
pressure
control
(PC) inter lock (PC-600).
Operators
had considered this
valve as risk significant per procedure
O-ADM-210, On-Line
Maintenance/Work Coordination,
and had therefore placed the
OOS valve on
the hot-items-list for the Plan-Of-The-Day
(POD).
Further.
the
appropriate
OOS log entry was
made.
The work was scheduled for the
upcoming day shift (e.g., for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> duration).
The inspector questioned
why the Technical Specification
(TS) Action
Statement
(TSAS) 3.5.2.a
was not entered
(72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />).
TS 3.5.2 required
Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR) and safety injection (HHSI) pumps.
flow
paths for cold leg injection. suction flow path from the refueling water
storage tank
(RWST).
and flowpaths from the containment
sump.
The TS
did not specifically address
the use of the MOV-863 valves which are
needed for cold or hot leg recirculation.
Emergency operating
procedures
(EOPs) directed the,use of these
MOVS to provide
discharge to the HHSI pumps ("piggy-back" mode)
when cold or hot leg
recirculation would be required.
required
MOVs 863 A and
B
to be closed, with power removed.
The clearance in effect basically had
the
same
OOS condition as the normal
TS surveillance
requirement.
In
addition, the inspector
reviewed standard
TSs and noted that they also
.
did not address
these
RHR valves.
The inspectors'uestions
prompted the licensee to re-evaluate this work
and the TSAS requirements.
In addition,
CR No. 96-1488 was initiated.
Based
on the
CR generation
and on this discussion,
the valve
(MOV-4-863B) was returned to its normal condition (e.g.,
clearance
removed,
MOV closed with breaker
open) at ll:15 a.m.
lee MOV-4-863B was
OOS per i:he clearance for about 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Thus,
no TSAS violation
occurred.
The licensee
reviewed their interpretation of the TS, in
light of the importance of these
RHR alternate
discharge
valves.
Corrective actions
as
documented
on the
CR included initiation of a
special
instruction (96-024)
and associated
re-training,
development of
a
TS position statement,
and plans to pursue
a TS change.
01.3
02
02.1
In conclusion.
the inspector considered this to be
a weakness
in the
licensee's
implementation
and control of TS equipment.
Although the
TS
did not specifically address
these
RHR alternate
discharge
valves (other
than
a surveillance requirement),
operators
should have considered
a
TSAS entry.
No violation was identified due to the non-specificity of
the TS,
due to the short time involved (8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).
due to the fact that
the
HOV was tracked
on the
POD hot-item-list and
OOS list, and due to
prompt response
by the licensee,
including corrective actions.
Control
Room Emer enc
Ventilation Actuation
71707
On December
6,
1996, during
a changeout of an indication bulb on the
control
room emergency ventilation system
(CREVS) control module, the
control
room emergency ventilation system actuated.
This inadvertent
actuation
placed the
CREVS in recirculation.
Haintenance
Instrumentation
and Control
(I&C) personnel
performed troubleshooting;
however,
the cause of the actuation could not be determined.
The
module was replaced.
and additional troubleshooting
was performed
on the
module with no success.
The licensee
concluded that the module
replacement
had repaired this spurious
CREVS actuation.
All components
functioned
as required during the inadvertent actuation.
The inspector confirmed that the actuation
was not reportable to the
NRC.
Further, the inspector concluded that operator
response to the
actuation
was appropriate.
Operational
Status of Facilities and Equipment
Auxi 1 iar
S stem
Wa 1kdown
Ins ection Sco
e
71707
The inspectors
per formed
a walkdown to verify the status of the Unit 3
and Unit 4 AFW systems.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
AFW is
a shared
system with three turbine driven
AFW pumps.
Pump A
supplies train
1 on both units,
and
pumps
B and
C supply train 2 on both
units.
The walkdown was accomplished
by performing
a complete
inspection of all accessible
equipment.
The following criteria were
used,
as appropriate,
during this inspection:
system lineup procedures
matched plant drawings
and as-built
configuration;
appropriate
levels of housekeeping
cleanliness
were being
maintained:
valves in the system were correctly installed
and did not exhibit
signs of gross
packing leakage,
bent stems,
missing handwheels,
or
improper labeling;
hangers
and supports
were made
up properly and aligned correctly;
valves in the flow paths were in correct configuration;
local
and remote portion indication was compared,
and
remote
instrumentation
was functional;
major system
components
were properly labeled;
pneumatic support
systems
(IA and nitrogen) were aligned;
surveillance testing procedures
and activities were appropriate;
and
maintenance activities (past.
current.
and planned)
were
appropriate.
Conclusions
The inspectors
concluded that the Unit 3 and Unit 4 AFW systems
were
appropria:ely aligned for standby operation.
Observed
and reviewed
surveillance tests
were satisfactory.
System engineering
involvement
was very good.
However, the inspector noted
some external
piping
corrosion.
(The
AFW systems
are outside
and subject to a salt-air
environment).
Open plant work orders
(PWOs)
had identified some of the
conditions.
The inspector
discussed this issue with plant and systems
engineering
management.
The inspector
was assured that system
functionality was not affected
based
on
UT measurements.
This was
documented
per condition report 96-1525.
Further,
management
stated
that the external corrosion did not affect all piping,
and that current
program should address
the issue.
Unit 3 and 4 Emer enc
Containment Filter
Walkdowns
71707
The inspector
walked down the accessible
portions of the
ECF systems.
The
ECF systems
provide post-accident
radioactive iodine cleanup to
ensure that
10 CFR 100 dose limits are met.
Three
50K capacity
trains are provided for each unit.
The A and
B units are powered from
the respective vital power supplies,
and the
C units are powered from a
swing vital power supply.
This alignment achieves single failure
criteria.
The
ECFs include
a demister to remove moisture.
charcoal
and
high efficiency particulate filters. and
a spray system to protect the
charcoal
from high temperatures
caused
by iodine decay heat.
The inspector
reviewed drawing 613(4)-H3056,
the operating
and
surveillance test procedures,
UFSAR section 6.3,
TS 3/4.6.3
and bases,
design basis
document
(DBD) 5610-056-DB-002
(Revision 7),
TS position
statement
(TSPS)
No.96-003.
and other
r elated documentation.
During
the walkdown. the inspector
noted that the 4A ECF was under clearance
No. 4-96-10-097A.
This only affected the 4A ECF charcoal
spray solenoid
valve (SV) SV-4-2906.
The redundant
valve (SV-4-2905)
was not affected.
In addition,
CR 96-1102
had addressed
this issue
when SV-4-2906
malfunctioned during testing in September
1996.
The
CR disposition
was
to repair the failed SV-4-2906 flow switch during an outage of
sufficient duration.
Further, the
CR concluded that the 4A ECF remained
based
on availability of the redundant
charcoal
spray
SV.
The
04.1
06
06.1
TS,
and
DBD do not require redundant
SVs to support the
operability.
The inspector concluded that the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ECFs were
appropriately aligned for standby operation.
Operator
Knowledge and Performance
Control
Room Peer
Checks
During the inspection period, operations instituted
a new program
entitled "Control
Room Peer
Check".
This program supplements
the
Stop-Think-Act-Review
(STAR) or self-checking process.
The peer check
is the independent
concurrence that
a control
room operator is taking
appropriate action by another
person of equal or higher qualification.
Prior to control
room switch manipulation,
the
RCO is now required to
have another
RCO or SRO
(NWE. ANPS, or NPS) verify and verbally
acknowledge that the correct switch is being manipulated.
Although this program was being considered
by operations
management
for
early 1997,
an event that occurred during the period December
20-22.
1996 'rompted the peer check to be accelerated.
Chemistry personnel
noted
a slight increase in Unit 3 Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) on
December
22,
1996, during the midshift.
The DEI value went from 2E-3
uCi/ml to 3E-3,
and then to 4E-3.
Operations
was alerted to this
increase
in DEI, and the Unit 3
RCO found the
VCT divert valve
(TCV-3-143) in the divert position in lieu of the demineralizer position
at about 4:30 a.m on December
22,
1996.
The valve had apparently
been
repositioned during the peakshift
on December
20.
1996,
as required by
an
OP which temporarily aligned
a primary demineralizer
.
The valve was
not repositioned at that time, resulting in letdown flow being diverted
around the demineralizers.
Thus for four shifts, the Unit 3 letdown
flow was not being purified, causing
an increase
in DEI.
The licensee
instituted
CR 96-1616.
Corrective actions
included this above mentioned
peer check,
independent verification procedure
change,
discipline,
and
enhanced training for periodic
RCO control board walkdowns.
The inspector
reviewed the specific event,
the peer check program,
and
discussed
them with operations
management.
The inspector
noted that
four operating shifts had
an opportunity to note that the .TCV was
ositioned in VCT divert.
(No alarm was associated
with the position).
he inspector
concluded that chemistry was proactive in noting
a small
DEI increase.
However, operations
related weaknesses
relative to
procedure
implementation
and control
room panel
walkdowns were noted.
Operations Organization
and Administration
0 erations Staffin
71707
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
staffing plan for the Turkey Point
operations
department.
Planned
inter-company transfers to St. Lucie and
announced
resignations will result in a loss of five operators
including
four
RCOs
and one non-licensed
operator
(NLO).
This should occur in
early 1997.
The licensee
had the following operations staffing (less
the forecasted
losses)
as of the close of the inspection period:
Position
Number allowed
Number staffed
ANPS
NWE
RCO
6
12
6
18
30
6
12
6
17
38
In addition,
an
ANPS was assigned to the work control center,
4 NPS/ANPS
personnel
were assigned to training, five operators
(four licensed)
were
assigned
as outage coordinators,
five operators
(two licensed)
were
assigned
to operations
support, six RCOs were in license
upgrade
training,
24 NLOs were in training programs,
and two NLOs were assigned
to safety
and radwaste.
Plans
were to start
a licensed operator
(RCO)
class for 12
NLO individuals early in 1997.
The inspector
reviewed historical attrition in the operations
department,
and current plans to address
predicted
and known losses.
Based
on this review, the inspector
concluded that the licensee
had
adequate staffing for the present.
and had plans to address
operator
replacement
and pipeline requirements.
Further, the inspector concluded
that licensee
management
appeared
proactive in their staffing plans.
II. Maintenance
Hl
Conduct of Maintenance
H1.1
General
Comments
Ins ection Sco
e
61726
62707
Maintenance
and surveillance test activities were witnessed
or reviewed.
The inspector witnessed
or reviewed portions of the following
maintenance activities in progress:
Cooling Canal
Maintenance
(section M2.2).
CV-4-2826 wire repairs (section E1.1).
C bus cable tray repairs.
Unit 4B safeguards
test switch repair (section Hl.5).
The inspectors
witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test
activities:
AFW periodic testing (section 02. 1).
Nuclear Instrumentation Testing (section
H2. 1).
3-OSP-201. 1
RCO Daily Logs (section H1.2).
OP-4004.2,
Safeguard
Relay Rack Periodic Test (section
H1.5).
Containment
Tendon Surveillance
(section M1.4).
4-0SP-052.2,
RHR pump testing.
Observations
and Findin s
For those maintenance
and surveillance activities observed
or reviewed.
the inspectors
determined that the activities were conducted in a
satisfactory
manner
and that the work was properly performed in
accordance
with approved
maintenance
work orders.
The inspectors
also determined that the above testing activities were
erformed in a satisfactory
manner
and met the requirements of the
echnical Specifications.
Conclusions
Observed
maintenance
and surveillance activities
wer
. 'ell performed.
Hissed Technical
S ecification Surveillance for Unit 3
Ins ection Sco
e
61726
90712
92700
On December
5,
1996, the Unit 3 Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor
(ANPS) discovered
problem on Unit 3.
Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.5 required
a 24-hour surveillance to
periodically check primary containment
average air temperature.
TS 3.6. 1.5 required that the primary containment
average air temperature
not exceed
125 F.
Procedure
3-OSP-201. 1,
RCO Daily Logs,
documented
this required surveillance
every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Further, the
OSP required
that the primary containment air temperature
at the 58 foot elevation at
0', 120',
and 240'zimuth locations
be arithmetically averaged.
Observation
and Findin s
The requirements for this
TS surveillance
were usually met through the
Emergency
Response
Data Acquisition and Display System
(ERDADS)
receiving input from three temperature
elements
(TEs).
TE-6700,
6701,
and 6702 were located at the appropriate
azimuths in the containment.
The
ERDADS calculated the average
temperature of the three
TE inputs.
This average
temperature
was monitored and recorded
by the control
room
operator
(RCO) during performance of operation surveillance
procedure
3-OSP-201. 1 and
RCO Daily Logs.
However
. in June
1996,
one of the three
TE inputs to the
ERDADS became inoperable.
Consequently,
redundant
(1497,
1498.
and 1499) were utilized in lieu of ERDADS.
TEs 1497,
1498,
and 1499, were located in close proximately (similar azimuth) to the
ERDADs TEs,
and provided input to a chart recorder
(R-1413) in the
control
room.
Further, the containment
temperature
monitoring portion
of ERDADS was declared
OOS,
and was appropriately tracked in the TS
equipment
OOS log book.
On December
3,
1996, chart recorder
R-1413 failed,
and
TE 1497,
1498.
and
1499 were declared
OOS.
The Unit 3 ANPS at this time directed the
RCO to use the
ERDADS TEs to meet the requirements
of TS 4.6.1.5.
However, the
ANPS did not recognize that the
ERDADS containment
remperature
average
was no longer valid as it only received input from
two of the three required TEs.
The
RCO utilized the invalid ERDADS
average
through
December
5,
1995.
On December
5,
1996, another
ANPS
questioned
the validity of the
RCO using the
ERDADS containment
temperature
monitoring capability.
Condition report 96-1536 was
initiated.
and the
OOS chart recorder
was repaired
on an urgent basis.
Future
TS 4.6. 1.5 surveillances
were then performed using the chart
recorder three
TE inputs.
As corrective actions the licensee
completed
an independent
review of
the circumstances
surrounding this missed surveillance.
Further, the
licensee
ensured that other similar TS surveillances
using
ERDADs inputs
were being performed.
During the follow-up of the event, the licensee
noted that the chart recorder
was not logged in the TS equipment
book.
Further, the chart recorder
was not in a routine calibration
program.
The licensee
discussed
these
issues
in Licensee
Event Report
(LER) 96-12.
Co'- -1 us i on
Based
on licensee identification of this issue,
and on thorough
and
prompt corrective actions, this missed
TS 4.6. 1.5 surveillance
was
classified
as
a non-cited violation (NCV).
This is consistent with
section VII.B.1 of the
NCV 50-250,251/96-13-01,
Missed Surveillance for Containment
Temperature Monitoring. and
LER
96-12 were closed.
Startu
Transformer
Outa
es
61726
62707
During the period of November
29-30.
1996, the licensee
removed
each
unit's startup transformer
(one at
a time) to clean accumulated salt
spray from a previous high wind storm.
TSs 3.8. 1. l.a and 4.8.1.1.1.a
were appropriately
adhered to and the
OOS time was minimized.
No other
risk significant safety equipment were 00S concurrently.
The inspector verified and reviewed licensee actions,
TS compliance,
and
risk related decisions.
The inspector
questioned
the post maintenance
testing
(PHT).
The
PMT verified that the breakers
associated
with the
vital buses
were racked-in
and available.
and that the startup
transformers
were appropriately aligned in the switchyard.
However, the
PHT did not test the breakers'losure
capability.
The licensee stated
that it was their
normal practice not to test the closure function of
the startup transformer
breakers
at full power as this would be
risk-related.
Normally, these breakers
are closed (tested)
during the
unit shutdown.
Further,
procedure
0-ADM-737. Post Maintenance Testing,
only required breaker testing (including closure) if actual
breaker
maintenance
had been performed.
No breaker
maintenance
was performed
during these startup transformer
outages.
Containment
Tendon Testin
61726
During the period, the licensee satisfactorily performed containment
tendon surveillance testing
and maintenance
required
by TSs 3.6.1.6.
4.6.1.6.1,
and 4.6.1.6.2.
The surveillance
was performed
on both units,
and was the 25th year test from the date of the structural integrity
tests
(SIT>.
The Unit 3 and Unit 4 SITs were performed in July 1971
and
February
1972, respectively.
The inspector
reviewed the following documents:
TS 3/4.6.1.6,
UFSAR Sections
5. 1.7.4 and 5. 1.2.
Safety Evaluation
(FPL) JPN-PTN-SECP-95-046
(Rev. 0), Unit 3
and Unit 4 25th'ear
Containment
Tendon Surveillance,
Procedure
O-SMM-051.2, Containment
Tendon Inspection,
Rev.
10/24/96,
FPL Specification
(SPEC)
C-033, Technical
Requirements
For
the 25th Year Containment
Tendon Surveillance
(Revision 2),
VSL (the contractor) Corporation procedures
and drawings,
ASME Section
XI (IWL),
Previous
NRC Inspection Reports.
and
LER 50-251/92-009.
The inspector witnessed portions of the testing
and maintenance
activities;
reviewed completed surveillance
results;
independently
verified that acceptance criteria were met;
and.
discussed
these
activities with maintenance,
engineering
and vendor
(VSL) personnel.
The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately conducted
containment
tendon surveillance testing.
M1.5
Unit Safe uards
Racks Testin
and
Re airs
On December
24,
1996, operators
tested Unit 4
B train. of safeguards
logic per
TS Table 4.3-2.
Pressurizer
pressure
interlock test switch
PC-455B failed.
and operators
implemented action required by TS Table
3.3-2 item Sa. action 19.
This TSAS only required
a verification that
the low pressurizer
pressure
safety injection (SI) block was not
energized.
No TSASs related to unit shutdown were required.
The TS
surveillance for SI logic testing
was within the required surveillance
testing interval.
Subsequently,
on December
27,
1996, the licensee initiated
a plan to
repair the test switch.
The licensee
reviewed all applicable
TSASs.
Action 22 of TS Table 3.3-2 was the most limiting and required the unit
to be in hot standby in six hours.
The 4B train of SI logic was
de-energized
and repairs
commenced.
The licensee
considered this
activity to be risk-significant and load-threatening.
The red sheet
process
and procedure
O-ADM-217, Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests
10
or Evolutions. were used to ensure appropriate
management
oversight
and
controls.
Further operations,
engineering,
1&C,
QC,
and plant
management
coverage
were included during the repairs.
Repairs
and post maintenance
testing were completed within three hours.
The 4B SI logic train was successfully
returned to service,
and all
TSASs were exited.
The licensee
concluded that switch failure was due
to aging and possible misoperation.
The switch has both
a collar which
turns.
and
a button which depresses.
The inspector observed testing
and maintenance activities at the SI
logic panel,
and control
room testing
and oversight.
The inspector
independently verified proper
TS surveillance
and action statement
compliance.
In addition, the SI logic prints and electrical
schematic
drawings were reviewed.
The inspector
attended
several
pre-job meetings
and the procedure
0-ADM-217 briefing.
Other
documents
(PWO, etc.) were
also reviewed.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee
performance in
this area
was very good. noting strong teamwork.
Maintenance
and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
Nuclear Instrumentation
Cabinets
62707
During a routine observation of a surveillance associated
with Nuclear
Instrumentation
(NI), the inspector observed
buildup of dust
and lint
within the NI drawers located in the control
room.
The inspector
discussed
the issue with the
18C supervisor
who stated that the NI
cabinets
were vacuumed every outage.
The inspector questioned
the
effectiveness
of the vacuuming,
and discussed
the issue with the plant
manager.
The plant manager
agreed to look into enhancing the vacuuming
process to ensure its effectiveness.
Dust and lint buildup in cabinets
pose potential fire hazards
and could affect the electrical
hardware
within the cabinets.
The inspector concluded that poor housekeeping
in the NI cabinets
was
a
negative observation.
The inspector
plans to monitor this issue during
future inspections.
Coolin
Canal
Maintenance
62707
Based
on corrective actions
from three previous
(one in 1995 and two in
1996) cooling canal
grass intrusion events
(reference
NRC Inspection
Reports 50-250,251/95-06.
95-09.
96-01,
and 96-02), the licensee
continued with canal
maintenance.
This included canal
berm trimming and
vegetation
removal.
sea
grass
and algae bottom removal,
and
boom and
pumping systems
usage.
The inspector toured the canals
on December
11,
1996,
and verified that
these corrective actions
were continuing.
Additional corrective actions
included directing the screen
wash discharge to the canal
discharge
and
not to a weir pit located within the intake structure.
Further,
enhanced
preventive maintenance activities for the screen
and the screen
wash nozzles
were ongoing.
ONOP enhancements
were also initiated.
11
Based
on the above activities. the licensee believes that the severity
of grass intrusion events of the past two years
should be eased.
The
inspector intends to continue to monitor these activities. including
cooling canal/screen
wash performance.
The inspector concluded that the
licensee
was appropriately addressing
these
issues.
En ineerin
Conduct of En ineerin
Unit 4 Containment Isolation Valves
37551
and 40500
During the period, Unit 4 containment
instrument air (IA) bleed valve
CV-4-2826 was identified as inoperable
due to a
DC ground.
Operations
appropriately
implemented
TSAS 3.6.4 and 3.6.1. 1 which required the
redundant
valve (CV-4-2819) to be isolated
and deactivated.
Maintenance
and engineering troubleshooting activities identified a grounded wire
running from the auxiliary building to a terminal
box (TB) on the roof.
Maintenance
was unable to pull
a new cable. therefore engineering
evaluated
other options for repair.
The licensee
concluded that the appropriate repair was to splice the
cable with a ray-chem splice kit, and to remove the cable run to the TB.
Prior to initiating repairs,
engineering
performed
a detailed safety
evaluation
(PTN-ENG-SEES-96-081)
per
10 CFR 50.59 requirements.
Further,
the licensee
implemented
a temporary system alteration
(TSA) to
document
and control the wiring modifications.
TSA 4-96-003-16
was
implemented
on December
13,
1996.
The inspector
reviewed the above referenced
documents,
the TS and
requirements.
The repair activities were discussed
with operations,
maintenance.
and engineenng
personnel.
The inspector
also witnessed
portions of the field activities.
The inspector
monitored Unit 4
containment
pressure.
and the associated
buildup with the IA bleeds
unavailable.
TS 3.6. 1.4 limits containment
pressure to <3.0 psig.
The
inspector
independently verified that pressure
did not exceed
2.0 psig.
Once the TSA was implemented
and the valves were retested.
containment
pressure
began
a slow decrease
towards its normal valve of slightly
positive (e.g.,
about 0.1 to 0.4 psig).
The inspector
concluded that
engineering
support for this grounded wire and associated
repairs were
thorough.
and assured
nuclear safety.
Instrument Air S stem Failures
37551
40500
On December
17.
1996, at about 3:45 p.m.,
both units experienced
an IA
low pressure
alarm.
(The IA system
was upgraded in 1995 and operates
crosstied at Turkey Point, with four compressors
shared).
The control
room implemented their
ONOP and alarm response
procedures.
Control
room
indications for IA pressure
decreased
to 90 psig.
(Normal pressure
is
about
105 psig and the low pressure
alarm is at 90 psig).
The normal
lineup is for one compressor
in lead (running),
one compressor
in lag
(backup),
and the other two in standby.
There are two diesel
driven
compressors
(3CD and
4CD) and two motor driven compressors
(3CM and
4CM).
NLOs were successful
in manually starting
IA compressors
and
isolating
a leak at the Unit 3 after cooler drain trap (DT-3-6326).
The
E2
E2.1
12
IA system
was returned to normal lineup except that DT-3-6326 was
bypassed.
Based
on these
observed failures of the IA system
and its risk
significance.
plant management initiated an event response
team
(ERT).
Condition report
No. 96-1592 was also written to document the event
and
corrective actions.
members
from engineering,
operations.
maintenance,
and other support groups participated
on the
ERT.
The
ERT concluded that design
and maintenance
inadequacies
were the root
cause of DT fai lure.
A maintenance
preventable
functional failure was
assigned.
Corrective actions included
an upgraded
DT installation on
both units.
and enhanced
maintenance
and operating procedures.
The
ERT
also concluded that the auto start function of IA was satisfactory,
however, the test methods
required
improvements.
Corrective actions
included revised
PMs,
and operating
and test enhancements.
The inspector
reviewed operations
response to the event
and concluded
that it wz" appropriate
and in compliance with procedures
and training.
In addition, the inspector attended
selected
ERT meetings
and reviewed
the final report.
ERT findings and corrective actions
appeared
thorough
and appropriate.
The inspector concluded that the
ERT function
demonstrated
sound
teamwork
and root cause analysis.
The inspector,
verified selected corrective actions.
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
General
Electr ic
HGA Rela
s
36100
37551
40500
On December
13,
1996, the inspector
became
aware of a
10 CFR 21 issue
regarding deficient
between
January
1989 and
June
1991.
A vendor (Farwell
8 Hendricks)
from Cincinnati,
OH,
made
a
report to the
NRC on this issue.
FPL had previously been
informed by GE
of this problem associated
with possible relay armature binding due to a
vendor fabrication defect.
Turkey Point had received
31 of these
suspect
relays in 1989.
The licensee
received this information on
November 8,
1996,
per
Supplement
1.
The licensee
immediately initiated condition report 96-1465 when they received the
letter
.
The licensee's
review and analysis
concluded that of the 31 suspect
relays purchased,
eight were in use in Unit 4,
and six were in use in
Unit 3.
The remaining
17 relays
had been either destroyed
during the
1992 Hurricane Andrew or were tagged
as not to be used.
Of the 14
relays in use in the plants,
the relay function was limited to alarm
annunciation only for the under voltage
(UV) load center
monitors.
The
UV trip functions were accomplished
by a different type relay.
Thus,
the suspect
HGA relays would not cause
a load center functional
failure.
The licensee
concluded that there were no operability
concerns.
Corrective actions
scheduled for the upcoming
1997 refueling
outages
included inspection
and checks
for the
14 installed relays.
The inspector
reviewed the
CR,
10 CFR 21 report,
and other related
documentation
including electrical
schematics,
wiring diagrams,
and
relay schemes.
The inspector also independently
confirmed that the
13
E8
E8.1
E8.2
E8.3
suspect
relays were not part of the load center'". tripping scheme.
The
inspector concluded that the licensee's
operating experience
feedback
and
CR programs
were effective.
and thoroughly documented
and
dispositioned this issue.
Miscellaneous
Engineering
Issues
Containment Structure
Re-Anal sis
92903
92902
(Closed) IFI 50-250,251/94-10-01,
Review the Results of a Containment
Structures
Re-Analysis With Regard to the
New Containment
Design
Pressure
and the Adequacy of the Containment
Tendon Pre-stress
Forces.
The 20th year containment
tendon surveillance
was conducted in 1991 and
1992 for both units.
Unit 3 results
were satisfactory.
However, Unit 4
had several
tendons with lower than expected pre-stress lift-offforces.
LER 50-251/92-009
and
NRC Inspection Reports
50-250.251/92-15.
16,
and
95-10 further
addressed
this issue.
Corrective actions included
a
re-analysis of the containment
design pressure
(changed
from 59 to 55
psig9.
a meeting with NRR in 1993, licensee submittals in 1994,
and
NRC/NRR approval in 1995.
NRC letter dated
November 29,
1995.
documented the completion
and approval of the re-analysis of the Turkey
Point containment structures.
This
NRC safety evaluation
concluded that
the cause of low lift-offforces
was due to increased
tendon steel
relaxation caused
by average
tendon wire temperatures
higher than
originally considered.
The licensee
conducted the 25th year tendon testing (section
M1.4) with
satisfactory results.
Based
on the
NRR safety evaluation
and on the
recent surveillance results.
the IFI was closed.
Char in
Pum
Res
onse to Safet
In 'ection
92903
(Open) IFI 250,251/96-04-01,
Charging
Pump Response
During SI.
The licensee
reviewed this issue,
and concluded that
a plant
modification would be appropriate.
A Plant Review Board
(PRB) meeting
held on December
18,
1996 allocated
a spot
on both units'op
20
modification lists for
a future refueling outage.
Request for
Engineering Assistance
(REA) No.96-018
had been previously developed to
review and assess
this issue.
The licensee
concluded that this project
was
a safety enhancement
such that the charging
pumps would not be
tripped on an SI signal.
This would improve plant response
to a number
of accident
and transient scenarios.
The inspector
reviewed the
REA and attended
the
PRB meeting.
The IFI
remains
open pending formal modification plans
development
and
scheduling.
Re ort Review
90712
90713
The inspector
reviewed the monthly operating report,
LER 96-12 (section
M1.2), and other routine and non-routine reports.
The inspector
noted
the reports were thorough
and complete.
and met timeliness
requirement.
Plant
Su
ort
14
Radiological Protection
and Chemistry
(RP8C) Controls
Resin Transfer
0 er ations
71750
The inspector observed
a resin transfer
operation
on November 20,
1996.
Spent resin was transferred
from the spent resin storage
tank
(SRST) in
the auxiliary building, to a vendor high integrity container
(HIC) in
the radwaste building.
The HIC was subsequently
shipped offsite for
burial as radioactive waste.
The licensee controlled the process
per
the following documents:
Radiation Work Permit
(RWP) No. 96-1071,
Operating
procedure
0-OP-061. 16, Spent Resin Operations,
Health Physics
(HP) surveillance
0-HPS-053. 1, Posting
and Controls
for Resin Transfer
from SRST To Radwaste Building Shipping
- Container,
Vendor (Chem-Nuclear)
operating procedures,
Administrative procedure
O-ADM-217, Conduct of Infrequently
Performed Tests
or Evolutions.
A pre-evolution was held by the
HPSS
and
ANPS for all operators,
HPs,
Chemistry,
and vendor personnel.
The transfer
was successfully
conducted
from the
SRST to the HIC.
The HIC was dewatered
and shipped
offsite.
The inspector
reviewed the above documentation,
UFSAR section 11.1,
and
piping drawings 5610-M-3061 sheets
1-10.
The resin transfer
was
witnessed
from all stations in the auxiliary and radwaste buildings.
The inspector also attended
the pre-evolution meeting,
and discussed
the
transfer with operations,
engineering,
and
HP personnel.
Overall. the
evolution was satisfactorily planned
and well implemented.
Radiation
protection controls were very good.
Operator
procedure
compliance
and
oversight was also very good.
The pre-evolution briefing was formal,
and the licensee
also conducted
a post-evolution debrief.
The inspector
did identify several
procedure
enhancement
issues to which the licensee
appropriately
responded,
including procedure
changes.
Since
a large
portion of the transfer
system
has
been
abandoned
in place,
the
drawings,
panels,
and controls were somewhat
confusing to the personnel
performing the operations.
The licensee is addressing this issue.
H drazine
S ill
71750
During peakshift
on November 23,
1996,
a small hydrazine spill occurred
in the Unit 3 condensate
polisher building.
Several
guards
were treated
for eye and throat irritation at the site medical facility.
No serious
injuries occurred.
The spill occurred
from a leaky fitting on the
hydrazine skid.
Repairs
were effected,
and the spill was cleaned
up per
procedure
0-ADM-034. Hazardous
Material
Emergency
Response
Plan and
Environmental
Survey.
15
correcrive actions per condition report 96-1475.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee properly handled this minor spill of
potentially hazardous
material.
rl e inspector confirmed,
per the ADN,
that no formal reportabi lity criteria were exceeded.
Waste Monitor Tank
WNT
Overflow
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71707
71750
At about 2:30 p.m.
on December
17.
1996,
The "B" WNT overflowed several
thousand gallons of slightly radioactive water into the berm surrounding
the tanks.
A small
amount of water
(several
hundred gallons)
leaked
through wall piping penetrations
onto the floor of the radwaste
building.
HP personnel
responded to the spill, and notified operations
who then stopped the running
WNT pump.
HP personnel
contained
and
cleaned
up the spill.
Contamination
and swipe surveys in the radwaste
building did not detect
any contamination greater
tha", the limit of 1000
dpm.
No WNT spilled water left the radwaste building.
Observations
and Findin s
The licensee's
investigation
(per Condition Report 96-1595)
concluded
that the "C" WNT was being recirculated
per section 5. 1 of procedure
0-
OP-061. 12, Waste Disposal
System
- WNTs and Demineralizer Operation.
Apparently, water either leaked through the isolation valves or a valve
was out-of-position resulting in water filling a standby tank ("B" WNT).
The "8" WMT eventually overflowed into the berm area.
Interviews of
operators
and
HP personnel,
and
a re-creation of the
WMT recirculation
alignment could not determine the absolute
cause of the observed
scenario.
However, operations
management
noted that the non-licensed
operator
(NLO) performing the operation in the radwaste building did not
obtain the required independent verification (IV) of the valve alignment
as required
by the
OP attachment.
If a valve were mispositioned,
the IV
should have noted this anomaly.
License corrective actions included the following:
Spill cleanup. with no spread of contamination,
WNT water and berm water processing,
CR completion
and review by senior plant management,
NLO disciplinary action,
OP procedure
enhancements.
including requiring
NLOs to remain in
the radwaste building during water transfers,
and
Training and briefing of all operators of the event.
The inspector
reviewed the event. the
CR, operator logs,
HP surveys,
and
related documentation.
The inspector
walked
down the
OP in the radwaste
building with similarly qualified NLOs.
The corrective actions
were
verified.
Cunclusions
16
R2.1
p4
P4. 1
TS 6.8. 1 and
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 (Appendix A-Item 7.a) required
prncedures
to be implemented for activities involving liquid radwaste
disposal
systems.
Procedure
0-OP-61. 12 implemented the required
actions.
including IVs, for
WHT evolutions.
The
NLO failed to properly
implement 0-0P-61.12 in that the IV was not per formed prior to WHT
recirculation operations.
Failure to follow the.OP
was
a violation
(VIO 50-250,251/96-13-02.
Failure to Follow Liquid Radwaste
Procedure).
Normally,
a violation of this type could be considered
as
an
NCV per the
NRC Enforcement Policy,Section VII.B.l.
However,
a similar event
occurred
on February
26,
1996 (reference
NRC Inspection Report
50-250.251/96-02.
section Rl.l).
This previous event
was related to an
overflow and spill of another
WHT. caused
by misoperation
and failure to
follow procedure
by another
NLO.
Th~ inspector
concluded that
HP actions were prompt and thorough.
Op."r"tions management
followup was thorough
and tim ly for this
violation.
Status of RP8C Facilities and Equipment
Primar
Sam le Sink Rooms'aterial
Condition
71750
During the period, the inspector walked down the Unit 3 and 4 primary
sample sink rooms in the auxiliary building.
Poor material condition
and housekeeping
were noted
as evidenced
by the following:
items adrift on floor (equipment tag, light bulb, etc.),
deterioration of the room wall and floor coatings.
unsecured
equipment
(gas bottle, chemistry analytical
equipment, etc.),
several
leaks (previously identified),
and
posted
contaminated
areas restricting access
in a few areas.
The inspector
noted that the Unit 4 sample
room was better than the Unit
3.
The inspector discussed
these
items with licensee
management
who
initiated corrective actions.
The inspector
intends to follow these
corrective actions in a future inspection.
Staff Training and Qualification in EP
Emer enc
Plan Drill
71750
and 82301
On December
6,
1996, the licensee
conducted
an Emergency
Preparedness
drill, including actuation of the Technical
Support Center
(TSC).
The
inspector monitored portions of the drill in the control
room simulator
as well as the TSC.
S1
S1.1
F2
F2.1
17
The inspector
concluded that the drill was well coordinated
and
critiqued.
Further, the drill incorporated
numerous
new personnel,
including the new operations
manager.
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
Personnel
Accountabilit
and Staffin
71750
During holiday (deep backshift) inspections.
the inspector verified that
site minimum staffing was appropriate.
Security force staffing of
facilities,
as well as operations
and maintenance staffing required by
the Emergency
Plan and TS, were verified.
The licensee's
program for
immediate site accountability was also checked to be satisfactory.
Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
0 erabilit
of Fire Protection Facilities and
E ui ment
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
64704
The inspector witnessed
two fire tests
performed for the licensee at
Omega Point Laboratories,
Inc. in San Antonio, Texas.
These tests
were
performed
on Thermo-Lag electrical
raceway fire barriers representative
of the fire barriers currently installed
on raceways at Turkey Point or
modifications being considered to upgrade the existing Thermo-Lag
raceway fire barriers.
The purpose of these tests
was to provide
documented
evidence that the fire barrier systems
would satisfactorily
withstand
an American Society for Testing
and Haterials
(ASTH) E-119.
Fire Test of Building Haterials, fire exposure for a period of one or
three hours followed by a hose stream test
and that the fire barriers
met the criteria of NRC Generic Letter 86-10,
Supplement
1.
Observations
and Findin s
The two tests
were performed in an appropriate test furnace.
The test
facility was well staffed
and operated.
Good test procedures
and
practices
were followed.
The first test was
a one hour fire test
and involved five conduits.
Four of these conduits were each enclosed in a fire barrier utilizing
nominal 5/8-inch thickness
Thermo-Lag 330-1 material.
The Thermo-Lag
joints were sealed with 3H Fire
Dam 150 caulk.
All four of these fire
barriers failed within approximately
29 to 49 minutes.
These failures
were apparently
due to the inability of the
3H caulk to prevent
significant heat penetr ation into the fire barrier
systems.
Heat
'enetrated
these fire barriers
and temperature
on the raceway surface
increased
above the permitted value of 325 degrees
F above the initial
temperature
in one hour.
In addition, the structural integrity of these
barriers
was not intact following the hose stream test performed
as soon
as the test assembly
was
removed from the furnace.
The conduit beneath
each fire barriers
was visible in a number of locations.
The fifth conduit of the first test consisted of a nominal 5/8-inch
thickness of 330-1 Thermo-Lag material with the joints caulked with the
3H Fire Dam material.
The base coat was covered with an additional
V.
18
3/8-inch layer of Thermo-Lag.
This fire barrier system failed after
approximately
52 minutes of fire exposure.
However, the structural
integrity of this barrier was maintained throughout the one hour fire
test
and subsequent
hose stream test.
These five fire barriers during the first test did not meet the test
acceptance criteria.
The second fire test
was
a three hour fire severity test followed by a
hose stream test for five electrical
raceways.
The purpose of this test
was to verify the adequacy of several
three hour fire barrier designs.
The tested
raceway fire barriers for four fire barriers involved designs
which had previously passed
similar tests.
The test for these four
barriers
demonstrated
that these barriers
designs
would pass
a
three-hour fire endurance.
The fifth raceway involved the installation
of two layers of 770-1 Thermo-Lag material that is normally installed
on
the exterior of a 330-1 Thermo-Lag base material.
This design failed to
pass the three hour test.
The fifth barrier failed after approximately
two hours
and
12 minutes.
Conclusions
Fire endurance testing of the licensee's fire barrier
system designs
was
performed using good test procedures
which met the
NRC criteria.
The
testing facility was adequate
and was well staffed
and operated.
However, the barriers tested
for one hour fire endurance
and one of the
assemblies
tested for three hours failed the tests.
These
barriers did not meet the fire barrier
requirements
of 10 CFR 50
Appendix R.
Mana ement Meetin s
X1
Exit Meetin
Summar
The inspectors
presented
the inspection results to members of licensee
management
at the conclusion of the inspection
on January
10,
1997.
The
licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
All of the operat'.ons
management,
including the on-shift and off-shift NPSs were present.
The inspectors
asked the licensee
whether
any materials
examined during
the inspection should be considered
proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
19
Partial List of Persons
Contacted
Licensee
T. V. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager
R. J. Acosta, Director, Nuclear
Assurance
J.
C. Balaguero,
Plant Operations
Support Supervisor
P.
M. Banaszak,
Electrical/I&C Engineering Supervisor
C.
R. Bible. Systems
Engineering
Manager
T. J. Carter,
Project Engineer
B.
C.
Dunn, Mechanical
Systems
Supervisor
R. J. Earl,
QC Supervisor
C. Fisher.
Fire Protection
Engineer
S.
M. Franzone,
Instrumentation
and Controls Maintenance
Supervisor
R. J. Gianfrancesco.
Maintenance
Support Supervisor
R.
G. Heisterman,
Maintenance
Manager
J.
R. Hartzog,
Business
Systems
Manager
G.
E. Hollinger, Licensing Manager
R.
J-.
Hovey, Site Vice-President
M.
P.
Huba,
Nuclear Materials
Manage
D.
E. Jernigan.
Plant General
Manage
T. 0. Jones,
Acting Operations
Supervisor
M.
D. Jurmain, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
V. A. Kaminskas,
Services
Manager
J.
E. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection,
EP, Safety Supervisor
J.
E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Analyst
G.
D. Kuhn, Procurement
Engineering Supervisor
R. J. Kundalkar, Vice President.
Engineering
and Licensing
M. L. Lacal, Training Manager
J.
D. Lindsay. Health Physics Supervisor
J. T. Luke, Engineering
Manager
E. Lyons, Engineering Administrative Supervisor
F.
E. Marcussen,
Security Supervisor
R.
B. Marshall.
Human Resources
Manager
H.
N. Paduano,
Manager,
Licensing and Special
Projects
M. 0. Pearce,
Projects Supervisor
K.
W. Petersen,
Site Superintendent
T. F. Plunkett,
President,
Nuclear Division
K. L. Remington,
System
Performance
Supervisor
R.
E. Rose,
Outage
Manager
C.
V. Rossi,
QA and Assessments
Supervisor
A.
M. Singer,
Operations
Supervisor
and Acting Operations
Manager
W. Skelley, Plant Engineering
Manager
R.
N. Steinke.
Chemistry Supervisor
E. A. Thompson.
Project Engineer
D. J.
Tomaszewski.
Component Specialist Supervisor
B.
C. Waldrep,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
G. A. Warriner, Quality Surveillance Supervisor
R.
G. West, Operations
Manager
Other licensee
and contractor
employees
contacted
included onstruction
craftsmen.
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
and
electricians.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
20
B.
B. Desai,
Resident
Inspector
T.
P. Johnson,
Senior Resident. Inspector
Partial List of Opened,
Closed,
and Discussed
Items
0 ened
50-250,251/96-13-02.
VIO, Failure to Follow Liquid Radwaste
Procedure
(section
R1.3)
Closed
50-250,251/94-10-01,
IFI, Review Results of Containment Structures
Re-analysis
(section
E8. 1).
50-250,251/96-13-01,
NCV and
LER 50-250/96-12 'issed
Containment
Temperature
Monitoring Surveillance
(section
M1. 2) .
Discussed
50-250.251/96-04-01,
IFI, Charging
Pump Response to SI (section E8.2).
List of Inspection Procedures
Used
IP 36100:
IP 37550:
IP 37551:
IP 40500:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 64704:
IP 71707:
IP 71714:
IP 71750:
IP 82301:
IP 90712:
IP 90713:
IP 92700:
IP 92902:
IP 92903:
10 CFR Part 21 Inspections at Nuclear
Power Plants
Engineering
Onsite Engineering
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,
Resolving,
and Preventing
Problems
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance
Observations
Fire Protection
Program
Plant Operation
Cold Weather Preparation
Plant Support Activities
Emergency
Preparedness
Inoffice Review of Written Reports
Review of Periodic Reports
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at
Power Reactor Facilities
Followup - Engineering
Followup - Maintenance
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
a.m.
ANPO
Alternating Current
Administrati ve (Procedure)
Ante Meridiem
Associate Nuclear Plant Operator
ANPS
ANSI
ASHE
BAST
CD
CFR
CR
CV
DB/DBD
DEI
dpm
ECF .
e.g.
ERT
oF
FL
GL
HPS
HPSS
ICW
IFI
IV
JPN
KV
L
LER
LPDR
HOV
NI
No.
NRC
NWE
Zl
Assistant
Nuclear Plant Supervisor
American National Standards
Institute
American Society of Hechanical
Engineers
Boric Acid Storage
Tank
Component Cooling Water
Instrument Air Compressor
(diesel)
Code of Federal
Regulations
Instrument Air Compressor (electric)
Condition Report
Control
Room Emergency Ventilation System
Control Valve
Chemical
Volume Control System
Design Basis
(Document)
Direct Current
Dose Equivalent Iodine
Disintegrations
Per Hinute
Power Reactor License
Division of Reactor Projects
Division of Reactor Safety
Emergency Containment Filter
For Example
Emergency
Response
Data Acquisition and Display System
Event Response
Team
Degrees
Fahrenheit
Florida Power and Light
Generic Letter
Relay Type
High Mead Safety Injection
High Integrity Container
Health Physics
Health Physics
- Surveillance
HP Shift Supervisor
Instrument Air
Instrumentation
and Control
Intake Cooling Water
Inspector
Followup Item
Independent Verification
Juno Project Nuclear (Nuclear Engineering)
Kilovolt
Letter (licensing)
Licensee
Event Report
Local
Hotor-Operated
Valve
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Instrument
Non-licensed
Operator
Number
Nuclear Plant Operator
Nuclear Plant Supervisor
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Nuclear Watch Engineer
OH
ONOP
OP
P21
PC
PC/M
p.m.
Pslg
PTN
PWO
RCO
REA
RHR-
R
SECP
SEES
SNPO
SPST
TS
TSAS
TSPS
USG
V
VAC
VSL
WMT
22
Off-Normal Operating Procedure
Out-of-Service
Operating
Procedure
Operations Surveillance
Procedure
Pressure
Control (device)
Plant Change/Modification
Public Oocument
Room
Post Meridiem
Preventive
Maintenance
Post-Maintenance
Test
Plan of the Day
Pounds
Per Square
Inch Gauge
Project Turkey Nuclear
Plant
Work Order
Quality Control
Reactor Control Operator
Request for Engineering Assistance
Residual
Heat
Removal
Chart Recorder
Reactor
Operator
Radiation
Work Permit
Refueling Water Storage
Tank
Safety Evaluation Civil
Safety Evaluation Electrical
- Site
Safety Injection
Structural Integrity Test
Specification
Surveillance
Maintenance
- Mechanical
Senior
Nuclear Plant Operator
Spent Resin Storage
Tank
Senior Reactor Operator
Structures.
Systems,
Components
Stop-Think-Act-Review
Solenoid-Operated
Valve
Terminal
Box
Temperature
Control Valve
Temperature
Element
Technical Specification
Temporary System Alteration
TS Action Statement
Technical
Support Center
TS Position Statement
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
United States
Code
Ultrasonic Test
Volt
Volt AC
Volume Control Tank
Violation
Containment
Tendon Contractor
Waste Monitor Tank
~ ~ a
t ~