ML17352B132
| ML17352B132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1995 |
| From: | Cline W NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Goldberg J Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9505020155 | |
| Download: ML17352B132 (7) | |
Text
April 19, 1995 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. J.
H. Goldberg President
- Nuclear Division P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
FEMA LETTER FOR THE MARCH 22, 1995 TURKEY POINT EXERCISE Gentlemen:
Enclosed is the FEMA letter to the State of Florida dated April 12,
- 1995, identifying a deficiency involving the public alert and notification system activation process in Dade County.
Because of this deficiency a remedial exercise is required to be held within a 120 days of the exercise date and no later than July 21, 1995.
We encourage you to work closely with the State in resolving this deficiency.
If you have any questions, please contact K.
P. Barr at 404-331-0335.
Sincerely, William E. Cline, Chief Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Docket Nos.
50-250, 50-251 License Nos.
Enclosure:
FEMA Letter Dtd 4/12/95 cc w/encl:
H.
N.
- Paduano, Manager Licensing
& Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420 cc w/encl:
(Cont'd on page 2) 9505020155 950419 PDR ADOCK 05000250 PDR
FP&L (cc w/encl:
cont'd)
D.
E. Jernigan Plant General Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 029100
- Miami, FL 33102 T. F. Plunkett Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 029100
- Hiami, FL 33102 T. V. Abbatiello Site equality Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 029100
- Miami, FL 33102 E. J.
Weinkam Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 4332
- Miami, FL 33032-4332 J.
R.
- Newman, Esq.
- Morgan, Lewis
- 5. Bockius 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D.
C.
20036 John T. Butler, Esq.
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center
- Miami, FL 33131-2398 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 cc w/encl:
(Cont'd on page 3)
FPKL (cc w/encl:
cont'd)
Jack Shreve Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Hadison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Joaquin Avino County Hanager of Hetropolitan Dade County ill NW 1st Street, 29th Floor
- Hiami, FL 33128 Joe Hyers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Distribution w encl:
R. Croteau, NRR K. Landis, RII G. Hallstrom, RII PUBLIC Thomas P.
Johnson Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.
Box 1448 Homestead, FL 33090 9
N OPU IC 0
UM TR M
S NO RII:DRP OFFICE II:DRSS SIGNATURE Bar NAME 04 l,K/ 95 DATE 04/
/95 04/
/95 04/
/95 YES NO YES 0
COPY'ES NO YES NO OFFICIAL R RO COPY OOCU IIAME:
S: KORSSiTPFEMA.KPB 04/
/95 YES NO 04/
/95 YES NO
~
~
~
C Qj.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Rciiion IV 13ZI Pcichtree Street, NE, Suite Z00 htlarta, GA 30309 R4-PT-TEE April 12, 1995 Joseph F.
MJJers, Director Division of Emergency Management 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Dear Mr. Myers:
The evaluation of the March 22,
- 1995, Turkey point Nuclear Power Plant exercise identified a deficiency involving the public alert and notification system activation process in Dade County.
This Deficiency was compounded by the failure to fully coordinate protective action decisions among the key State and local decision makers at the utility's Emergency Opexating Facility (EOF).
As a
- result, a remedial exercise is required within 120 days of the exercise but not later than July 21, 1995.
The FERAL Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise Manual (FEMA-REP-14), September 1991, defines a Deficiency as an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a
finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
Xt further
- states, under Objective 10, that failure by responsible off-site response organizations (OROs) to complete the initial alert and.
notification sequence within 15 minutes will result in the identification of a
Deficiency.
Obf ective 11 addresses the processes by which the contents of notification messages are coordinated among the off-site response organizations and the clarity, completeness, and accuracy of message content.
The following Deficiency has been identified for Dade County under REP Ob)ective 10, FEME REP-14 (NUREQ 0654/FRe.
REP-1, REV.
1 reference is provided in parentheses at the conclusion of the description).
At 11:33 a.m.,
a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared by the utility operator.
The notification from the utility included no protective action recommendations.
At 12:17 p.m., the Dade County Emergency Operations Center was informed of the protective Action
Decision to activate the alert and notification system and to establish a marine exclusion area within five miles of the plant.
This decision was conveyed from the EOP by Dade county officials for action by the Metro-Dade County EOC and constituted the initial timed sequence of alert and notification system activation, The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message advised that the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant was under a SAE, that boat traffic within a S-mile perimeter of the plant had been diverted, and notified marine interests to monitor channel 16.
The message was broadcast at 12:40 p.m.
The execution of the alert and notification process took 23 minutes.
(E.6)
The above-mentioned
- actions, although discussed.
during a joint briefing chaired by the utility at the
- EOP, were not ]ointly decided on by Dade County, Monroe County, and State decision makers at the EOF.
Additionally, at the General Emergency, a joint decision was reached which called for the evacuation Zones 2
and 4 in Dade County and the establishment of a 10-mile marine exclusion area.
The Dade County EBB message subsequently provided to the public included the evacuation of Zones 2 and 4 but only specified a 2-mile marine exclusion area, and included in-place sheltering all other zones in the 10-mile EPZ.
The precautionary'actions excluding boat traffic within 5 miles of the plant and advising marine interests to monitor channel 16 taken unilaterally by Dade County at the SAR and the recommendation at the General Emergency to shelter all zones not evacuated which was added to the EBS message were acceptable, consexvative actions.
The issue is not the prudence of the actions which were recommended, but the collective decision process which enabled additional,. uncoordinated actions to be taken.
The failure to fully provide all important actions and information to all the decision makers raises concerns about the potential impact if this is not corrected.
It is therefore recommended that, as discussed, on March 29,
- 1995, between Dade County, Monroe County, Florida Power 5: Light Company'nd State Representatives,
- and, PENA staff at the National REP Conference, the following remedial actions be undertaken:
M.l plan or procedural changes required to correct the noted Deficiency will be submitted to the PEMA Region XV office within 120 days of the exercise but not later than June 22t 1995
~
A remedial drill addressing both Objectives 10 and 11 will be conducted within 120 days of the exercise but not later than June 22, 1995.
Florida Power and Light Company will prepare a scenario to support this demonstration and provide a
utility representative to serve as their Recovery Manager for interaction with the decision making cell.
Demonstration Criterion 1 for Objective 10: Primary Alert and Notification, FEMA REP-14 (pages D.X0-1 through D.10-4), will apply to the conduct of the remedial drill.
We suggest that the procedures for the decision makers be modified to include the recording and. concurrence of all decisions made by the group.
we also recommend that the message development process include a verification that the message contains clear instructions to the public and clearly reflects the precise protective action decision(s) and that all EBS messages contain mastheads clearly indicating the origin,.date, and time of release Should you have questions, please contact
- Conrad, Burnside at 404/853-4486.
Sincerely, K
h
. Hutchi on Regional Director