ML17352A070
| ML17352A070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Beckjord E, Jordan E, Murley T NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A905 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306230054 | |
| Download: ML17352A070 (10) | |
Text
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Cl cC 4***4 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMNIISSION WASHINGTON,D. C. 20555 Nay 28, 1993 HEHORANDUH FOR:
FROH:
SUBJECT:
Edward L. Jordan, Director, AEOD Thomas E. Hurley, Director, NRR Eric S. Beckjord, Director, RES Gerald F. Cranford, Director, IRH Thomas T. Hartin, Regional Administrator, RI Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, RIII James L. Hilhoan, Regional Administrator, RIV John B. Hartin, Regional Administrator, RV James H. Taylor Executive Director for Operations REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREM ON THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FROH AUGUST 20-30, 1992 A copy of the initial black and white version of the subject report was distributed to you by my memorandum to the Commission dated Harch 19, 1993.
The report compiles the results of the joint NRC/Industry Team's efforts in identifying the circumstances and lessons learned from the impact 'of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and forms the basis for several follow-on actions.
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and assign responsibility for generic follow-on actions resulting from the Team's review as documented in the report.
In this regard, you are requested to review the enclosure which specifies staff actions resulting from the review.
You are requested to determine the actions necessary to resolve each of the issues in your area of responsibility and, where appropriate, identify additional staff actions.
lfhen more than one office is indicated as responsible, the first office listed has lead responsibility.
I will monitor the resolution of each action item.
Mithin 60 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide a written summary of the plans,
- schedule, status, and point of contact for each item within your responsibility listed in the enclosure.
In addition, I request that you provide a written status report on the disposition of your items (and anticipated actions for uncompleted items) by the end of January each calendar year thereafter, until all items are resolved.
13 /00 p, 930b230054 930b08 PDR ADQCK 05000250 P
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The Director, AEOD will document in the AEOD Annual Report the resolution status or disposition of each staff action and thus, the Director, AEOD should also be placed on distribution as to the resolution or disposition of each action item.
Mhere a significant policy question may be involved in the resolution of an action item, it is requested that I be notified so that the need for review by the Coaeission may be evaluated.
Qrfjln8lsigned by dames I,TQAF James H. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Staff Actions Resulting from the Report on the Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 29-30, 1992 cc/w enclosure:
J.
H. Sniezek, DEDR J.
L. Blaha, OEDO F. J.
- Hebdon, NRR Distribution w encl:
EDO R/F JHSniezek JBlaha AEOD R/F DFRoss RLSpessard SDRubin JMTaylor HTaylor FJHebdon ELJordan DOA R/F DEIIB R/F HABailey Document Name:
ANDREN.SD OFFICE:
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DATE:
OFFICE:
NAME:
DATE:
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Enclosure STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE REVIEM OF THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREM ON THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION I.
Issue:
Adequacy of Timing Plant Shutdown in Anticipation of a Hurricane
(
References:
Sections:
2, 3.1)
Turkey Point procedures concerning the timing of plant shutdown in anticipation of hurricane force winds required that the plant be in at least Node 4 (i.e., shut down) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before the onset of hurricane force winds at the site.
The licensee estimated that it would take 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> s to complete an orderly shutdown.
Accordingly, the licensee began an orderly shutdown of the units at 6:00 p.m.
on August 23.
This was about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before the predicted landfall of the hurricane.
As a result both units were in Node 4 when Hurricane Andrew struck.
- However, the licensee's commitments in response to the Station Blackout Rule only required the licensee to commence shutdown at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the onset of hurricane force winds.
Therefore the timing of an orderly plant shutdown strictly in accordance with the licensee's commitments could have resulted in the plant being in the midst of a dual unit shutdown evolution when offsite power was lost.
Additionally, at Turkey Point (and other commercial reactor facilities that may be susceptible to damage by a hurricane) important equipment (e.g.,
AFM) is located outside.
This equipment would likely not be accessible during a hurricane if the equipment failed to function properly.
ACTIOII RESPONSIBLE OF C
~CTEGORY a.
Review the existing regulatory guidance and commitments made by all affected licensees related to timing of a facility shutdown in anticipation of hurricane "force winds.
Revise the guidance and obtain revised commitments as may be needed.
NRR Generic
2.
Issue:
Adequacy of Licensee Offsite Communications for Natural Disasters Within the Plant Design Basis
(
References:
Sections 2, 3.2, 3.5)
Although diverse and redundant ceaaunications equipment existed, offsite coamunications were lost during the storm due to a coaeon vulnerability to wind damage.
Normal telephone service failed because the storm blew down the lines near the station.
The dedicated coaeercial telephone lines servicing. the telephones installed in the control room, the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility, used to give initial notification and status to the state in an emergency, also failed.
The Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)-2000 lines used for the Emergency Notification System failed, cutting off normal coaeunications with the NRC Operations Center.
The cellular telephone systems also did not function because the storm damaged the onsite antennas and the offsite repeating stations.
Except for the Security
'epartment's one hand held radio for the company FH radio system, the licensee's radio systems did not function during and immediately following the storm.
Overall, all offsite comaunications were lost for about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during the storm, and reliable coamunications were not restored for about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the storm.
The NRC's temporary satellite communications system considerably aided recovery efforts and would have been more beneficial if it had been onsfte before the storm.
a e b.
CTIONS Review the existing regulatory guidance and requirements related to normal and backup offsite communications system design capabilities for hurr'icanes.
Based on this review consider the adequacy of the guidance for other external events.
Issue revised guidance or requirements as may be needed.
Evaluate the need for NRC to preposition a temporary satellite communications system or other suitable communications at sites in advance of a hurricane.
Based on this review consider the applicability to other external events.
If appropriate, develop and implement such a capability.
RESPONSIBLE OFF CE NRR/AEOD 3AM AEOD/IRK
~CT ~RY Generic Generic
3.
Issue:
Adequacy of Compensatory measures and Design of Equipment or Facilities Not Designed for Hurricane
(
References:
Sections 2, 3.9, 3.10, Appendices R and G}
A number of important systems, structures or facilities associated with
- security, emergency
- response, effluent monitoring, effluent pathway and low level waste storage were not designed for hurricane force winds, and either were, or could have been, severely damaged during the storm.
In anticipation that these equipment and facilities could become inoperable, compensatory measures were taken or available either before or following the storm.
For example, after the storm, security officers were placed on roving patrols to compensate for the loss of the physical integrity of the protected area barriers.
Portable air-sampling equipment and dosimetry equipment were available at the site if needed to compensate for the air -sampling stations that were lost during the storm.
Although most of the emergency sirens were destroyed, city and county agencies are used to alert the public in the surrounding areas in lieu of sirens.
Before the storm, radioactive materials, including dry active waste, were secured in SeaLand containers and a high integrity container was used for solidified resins.
Thus, radioactive waste was adequately protected from the elements to prevent their spread during the storm, The emergency plan considered these circumstances and contained contingency measures.
In addition wind-generated missiles damaged associated ductwork, including ductwork from the Radwaste Building to the vent stack and, associated radiation monitoring systems became inoperable.
b.
c ACTIONS Reexamine the need for guidance for preplanned compensatory actions for important equipment and facilities not designed for a hurricane.
Issue guidance as appropriate.
Reexamine the need for guidance for preplanned compensatory actions for important equipment and facilities not designed for other severe external events.
Issue guidance as appropriate.
Consider the need for additional guidance or requirements to assure low level radwaste stored onsite is adequately protected from disposal by severe external events.
Issue revised guidance or requirements as may be needed.
RESPONSIBLE OF ICE NRR zo i=
~CAT GORY Generic Generic Generic
ACTIONS d.
Review the existing regulatory guidance related to ma)or release paths and monitoring equipment to determine ff equipment should be designed to Class I criteria. Issue revised guidance or requirements as may be needed..
RESPONSIBLE OFFIC NRR A.~
CATMORY Generic
4.
Issue:
Adequacy of NRC Guidance For Reviewing Licensee Preparation and
Response
to Natural Disasters and Industry Preplanned Support
(
References:
Sections 1, 2, 3.1, 3.4 and Appendix R)
The Turkey Point Plant benefited greatly from.the prior hurricane experience of the plant staff and the extensive preplanning done fn preparing and implementing the licensee's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 20106 for "Natural Emergencies.'he EPIP was also significantly expanded as a result of the insights gained fn part from the Individual Plant Examination for Turkey Point.
These additional procedures, which dealt with preparations for a Category 5 hurricane, contributed significantly to the licensee's preparations.
In the aftermath of the hurricane the licensee had to take numerous extraordinary actions to establish a support services infrastructure which would allow the station staff to report to the plant each day.
Such circumstances could potentially be more extreme following other external events (e.g.,
severe earthquake) for which there was no warning to permit advance preparations including the evacuation of families of plant personnel.
The assistance provided by the St. Lucie plant fn meeting Turkey Point's immediate and longer term needs such as personnel, spare parts and supplies, were helpful to the recovery.
a ~
b.
c ACTIONS Consider the need for development of additional guidance for review of licensee preparations for a predicted hurricane.
Develop and issue staff guidance as appropriate.
Consider the need for development of guidance for review of licensee preplanning for response to other external events.
Develop and issue staff guidance as appropriate.
Coordinate with industry fn consideration of preplanned measures to supplement individual utility resources to maintain adequate staffing and critical supplies famedfately following a severe external event.
RESPONSIBLE OFF CE NRR/Regions PM%'S NRR/Regions P~ ps AEOD/NRR tinR 5 CATEGORY Generic Generic Generic
Issue:
Adequacy of Examination of the Impact of Honsafety Equipment on Important Equipment During External Events
(
References:
Sections 2, 3.3, 3.6 and Appendix B)
During the storm nonsafety-grade equipment failure damaged certain important equipment (collapse oF the high water tank onto the fire water system) and threatened safety-related equipment (potential collapse of the damaged Unit 2 chimney onto the diesel generator building)-.
These interactions may not be fully anticipated and evaluated.
CTION
- Consider, as part of the IPE/IPEEE, the need for reexamination of the potential impact of nonsafety-grade equipment on safety-grade and other important equipment for severe external events.
RESPONSIBLE F
C RES
++GO~V Generic
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