ML17349A963
| ML17349A963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1993 |
| From: | Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Pratt C, Pratt J SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306170150 | |
| Download: ML17349A963 (4) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 dune 10, 1993 Joan C. Pratt Charles W. Pratt Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 5 Market Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 Dear Hs. Pratt and Hr. Pratt:
I am responding to your letter of May 12, 1993, to Thomas E. Murley of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in which you provided further observations prompted by our April 8,
- 1993, response to your earlier letter concerning operation of the Seabrook nuclear power plant during the severe winter storm in March 1993.
In your letter of May 12,
- 1993, you identified three main concerns:
(1) Dr.
Murley's characterization of emergency planning as an added layer to NRC's defense-in-depth safety philosophy did not reflect its essential nature; (2) no range of protective actions was available during the storm, as required by 10 CFR 50,47(b)(10);
and (3) Seabrook should have been shut down for the duration of the March 13-14,
- 1993, storm just as Turkey Point was shut down voluntarily before Hurricane Andrew hit the Florida coast.
Let me try to address each of these concerns in turn.
- First, we agree with you regarding the essential nature of emergency planning.
'Emergency planning should provide public protection independent of engineered safety features.
However, the safety significance of emergency planning is not necessarily equal to that of other protective requirements.
As the Commission stated in a ruling during the Seabrook licensing proceedings:
[A]dequate emergency planning is "essential" just as adequate lifeboats are essential for a liner carrying passengers at sea.
Hut it is only common sense to acknowledge that emergency
- plans, like lifeboats, are a backstop, a second or. third line of defense that comes into play only in the rare circumstances that engineered design features and human capacity to take corrective action have both failed to avert a serious mishap.
[CLI-90-02, March 1,
- 1990, 31 NRC at 213]
Regarding your concern that a range of protective actions was not available during the storm, the Commission recognizes, as indicated in Dr. Hurley's letter of April 8, 1993, that there may be circumstances where not every option is available at all times and all places within the emergency planning zone.
However, this does not render an emergency plan unacceptable.
Finally, concerning shutdown of plants in advance of storms, as Dr. Hurley had previously stated in his letter of April 8, 1993, nuclear power plants are designed to operate and shut down safely under very severe natural conditions, including earthquakes, high winds, and flooding.
The NRC determines the
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1 limits on operation of a nuclear reactor during the licensing process and these limits are reflected in license conditions and the plant technical specifications.
As long as the Seabrook plant remained within its license conditions and technical specifications, there was no safety reason for the plant to shut down during the snowstorm.
Nevertheless, the NRC is now reviewing guidelines and practices related to storm preparation based on lessons learned from the effects of Hurricane Andrew.
As a result of this review, the NRC could decide that revised guidance is appropriate.
That storm struck the Turkey Point Electrical Generating Station on August 24, 1992, with sustained winds of 145 miles per hour.
The licensee made detailed methodical preparations before the storm.
The nuclear plants were placed in a safe shutdown condition on normal residual heat removal cooling well before the arrival of hurricane force winds.
On September 10,
- 1992, the NRC and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations agreed to establish a team to compile the experience gained from Hurricane Andrew's impact on Turkey Point.
The charter called for the team to (1) review the damage that the hurricane caused the nuclear units and the utility's actions to prepare for the storm and recover from it and (2) to compile lessons that might benefit other nuclear reactor facilities.
In closing, let me assure you that the NRC is very concerned about unusual circumstances and conditions, such as severe
- storms, and their possible impact on licensed nuclear power plants.
During the snowstorm of March 1993, the NRC staff was in contact with affected licensees and monitored the storm's progress from NRC incident response centers at Headquarters and Regional offices in Atlanta, Georgia and King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
At selected
- sites, including Seabrook, NRC inspectors were on site throughout the storm to monitor conditions and evaluate licensee activities.
DISTRIBUTION Central Files PEPB R/F PEPB Staff TMurley FMiraglia WRussell Sincerely, Original Signed By Frank J.
Congel Frank J.
Congel, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ADeAgazio JStolz SVarga FCongel EButcher LJCunningham PMcKee MGCrutchley (YT0930095)
NRR Mailroom (YT0930095)
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES OFC C:PEPB:NRR NAME RAErickson:jc DATE 06/02/93*
TECH EDITOR MMejac 06/02/93*
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OGC EReis 06/10/93*
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