ML17347B644
| ML17347B644 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1990 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Mcethinney T, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347B642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-90-04, 50-250-90-4, 50-251-90-04, 50-251-90-4, NUDOCS 9004020132 | |
| Download: ML17347B644 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1990004
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/90-04
and 50-251/90-04
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
Facility Name:
Turkey Point
3 and
4
License Nos.:
and
Inspection
Conduc
Inspectors
.
C.
8
Janua
7
199
through February
23,
Wz.
e ior
R sident Inspector
1990
3- 9'- 9'o
Date Signe
4
si
nt
nspector
~rZ-
ne
Resi
e
Inspector
G. A.
S
Approved by:
R.
V.. r
nja
,
Sec
on Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
9- 'p- 9o
ate
igne
Z i'/ Pd
ate
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident
inspector inspection entailed direct inspection at 'the
site in the areas
of monthly surveillance observations,
monthly maintenance
observations,
engineered
safety features
walkdowns, operational
safety,
and
plant events.
Results:
One violation, two NCVs and
one IFI were identified.
One strength
and
one
concern
were also noted.
50-250,251/90-04-01,
NCV - Failure to accomplish
post maintenance
testing
on a
containment
phase
A isolation valve to verify operability.
50-250,251/90-04-02,
Violation - Failure to follow procedure
4-OP-013 resulting
in the loss of instrument air to Unit 4.
50-250,251/90-04-03,
NCV - Failure to follow procedure
TP-594 resulting in the
detensioning
of reactor
vessel
head
studs
out of sequence.
50-250,251/90-04-04,
IFI - Followup licensee's
investigation of Unit 3
pump
shaft failure.
9LIOlII,I Oi ..2 9QQ3 $ 4
F'LIR
AEICICI; 0=I.IC>02..'D
C~
A strength
in control
room operation
was noted.
The prompt, decisive actions
by the control
room operators,
during
a loss of control air event, stabilized
the plant and mitigated the transient.
A concern
was noted in that the
SFP heat exchanger
room drain was partially
blocked
and under different c'ircumstances (i.e., longer time interval before
discovery)
a spill or leakage
inside the
SFP heat exchanger
room could have
propagated
into adjacent plant areas.
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
ensee
Employees
V. Abbatiello, guality Assurance
Supervisor
W Anderson, guality Assurance
Supervisor
Arias, Sr. Technical Assistant to'Plant
Manager
C. Balaquero,
Assistant Technical
Department Supervisor
W. Bladow, guality Assurance
Superintendent
E. Cross,
Plant Manager-Nuclear
J. Earl, guality Control Supervisor
A. Finn, Assistant Operations
Superintendent
J. Gianfrencesco,
Assistant Maintenance
Superintendent
T. Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor
N. Harris, Vice President
Hayes,
Instrumentation
and Controls Supervisor
Heisterman,
Assistant Superintendent
of Electrical Maintenance
A. Kaminskas,
Technical
Department
Super visor
A. Labarraque,
Senior Technical Advisor
Marsh, Reactor
Eng'ineering Supervisor
G. Mende, Operations
Supervisor
W. Pearce,
Operations
Superintendent
Powell, Regulatory
and Compliance Supervisor
Remington,
System
Performance
Supervisor
M. Smith, Service Manager-Nuclear
N. Steinke,
Chemistry Supervisor
C. Strong,
Mechanical
Department Supervisor
R. Timmons, Site Security Superintendent
S. -Warriner, equality Control Supervisor
B. Wayland, Maintenance
Superintendent
D. Webb, Assistant Superintendent
Planning
8 Scheduling
T. Zielonka, Engineering Supervisor
. Lic
T.
J.
J.
J.
- L
- J
R.
T.
R.
- S
- K.
E.
G.
- V
J.
G.
R.
- L
- D
K.
G.
R.
J.
F.
- G
- M.
J.
A.
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included construction
craftsman,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
and electricians.
- Attended exit interview on February 23,
1990.
Note:
An Alphabetical Tabulation of acronyms
used in this report is
listed in paragraph
10.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliance(s)
to assure
that
corrective actions
were adequately
implemented
and resulted
in conformance
with regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was
achieved
through record reviews, observation
and discussions
with licensee
personnel.
Licensee
correspondence
was evaluated
to ensure
that the
responses
were timely and that corrective actions
were implemented within
the time periods specified in the reply.
0
e
(Closed) Violation 50-250,251/89-24-01.
Concerning
two examples
of failure
to follow procedures.
The licensee
responded
to this violation in letter
L-89-283, dated August 14,
1989.
The corrective actions required for this
violation were reviewed
by the inspectors
and found to be adequate.
This
item is closed.
3.
Onsite
Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Non-routine
Events
and
10 CFR Part 21 Reviews
(90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee
Event Reports
and/or
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
discussed
below
were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements
had
been met, root cause
analysis
was performed, corrective actions
appeared
appropriate,
and generic applicability had
been considered.
Additionally,
the inspectors verified the licensee
had reviewed
each event, corrective
actions
were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions
not fully
completed
was clearly assigned,
safety questions
had
been evaluated
and
resolved,
and violations of regulations
or TS conditions
had
been
identified.
When applicable,
the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, were
applied.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/88-01.
Technical Specification limits exceeded for
safety
system settings
due to non-conservative
acceptance
criteria in plant
procedures.
This issue
was discussed
in detail in IR 50-250,251/88-02
and
was identified as
an
NCV due to licensee initiative for self-identification
and prompt resolution.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-13.
Functional test of Post Accident Hydrogen
Monitor did not test alarm function due to personnel
error.
The corrective
actions specified in this
LER were reviewed
and found to be adequate.
This
item. is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-17.
Control
Room Ventilation System
Out of Service
in Excess of TS Time Limit due to Intermittent Circuit Failure.
This item
was also tracked via URI 50-250,251/88-18-02
which was discussed
and closed
out in IR 50-250,251/89-34.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-23.
Plugged
Valves in Steam Generator
Blowdown
Sample
System Results
in No Sample
Flow to Process
Radiation Monitor R-19.
This item was also tracked via IFI 50-250,251/88-30-04,
which was discussed
and closed out in IR 50-250,251/89-40.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
P2188-07.
Morrison - Knudsen notification that
EMD Model 999,
excitation system for EMD emergency
diesel
generators,
have potential for
field breaker trip due to combined air temperature
and field amps.
The
licensee
has determined that Turkey Point diesel
generators utilize Model
2553 excitation system in lieu of the Model
999 systems
addressed
in the
10 CFR 21 report.
This information was confirmed by Morrison - Knudsen
Company, Inc., letter dated
November 23,
1988.
No further action is
required.
0
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observations
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
TS required surveillance testing
and verified:
The test procedure
conformed to the requirements
of TS; testing
was
performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures;
test instrumentation
was
calibrated; limiting conditions for operation
were met; test results
met
acceptance
criteria requirements
and were reviewed
by personnel
other than
the individual directing the test; deficiencies
were identified,
as
appropriate;
and were properly reviewed
and resolved
by management
personnel;
and system restoration
was adequate.
For completed tests,
the
inspectors verified testing frequencies
were met and tests
were performed
by qualified individuals.
The inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions of the following test
activities:
s.
4-OSP-075.
1
AFW Train
1 Operability Verification
'-0SP-075.6
AFW Train
1 Backup Nitrogen Test
0-OSP-075. 11
AFW Inservice Test
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Monthly Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related
systems
and components
were observed
and reviewed to ascertain
they were conducted
in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and.in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered
during this review,
as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components
or systems
were
removed from service';
approvals
were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were
accomplished
using approved
procedures
and were inspected
as applicable;
procedures
used
were adequate
to control the activity; troubleshooting
activities were controlled
and repair records
accurately reflected the
maintenance
performed; functional testing and/or calibrations
were
performed prior to returning components
or systems
to service;
gC records
were maintained; activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used
were properly certified; radiological controls
were properly implemented;
gC hold points were established
and observed
where required; fire prevention controls were implemented;
outside
contractor force activities were controlled in accordance
with the
approved
gA program;
and housekeeping
was actively pursued.
The inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions of the following maintenance
activities in progress:
Repair of 81 Blackstart Diesel
Fuel Oil Tank Leak.
Repair
and Replacement
of k'5 Blackstart Diesel
Cracked Cylinder
Liner.
Diesel
Driven Fire
Pump
18 Month Inspection.
Replacement
of 3B Boric Acid Transfer
Pump Seal.
At 8:30 a.m.,
on January
19,
1990, with Unit 3 in Mode
1 at 100
percent
power, the Nuclear Watch Engineer discovered that
post-maintenance
testing
had not been
performed after adjusting
the valve stem -packing
on Phase
A containment isolation valve
CV-3-6275B (Steam Generator
B blowdown).
The adjustment of
valve stem packing is maintenance
that could affect valve
performance
parameters.
TS 3.3.3 requires
Phase
A containment
isolation valves'to
be operable
in Modes
1 through 4.
With a
Phase
A containment isolation valve inoperable,
compensatory
measures
must
be taken within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to avoid
a unit shutdown
required
by TS 3.3.3.
Valve stem packing adjustments
were
made
to CV-3-62758 at approximately -9:00 a.m.
on January
18,
1990.
Failure to perform .concurrent
post-maintenance
testing
on
CV-3-6275B during valve stem packing adjustments
was
due to
error by non-licensed utility personnel.
Neither the Nuclear
Plant Operator or Control
Room personnel
were notified that
valve packing adjustments
were being
made
on valve CV-3-6275B.
A sign
on the valve required that Control
Room personnel
be
notified prior to performing maintenance
on the valve but this
did not occur.
At approximately 9:10
a.m.,
on January
19,
1990,
CV-3-6275B was satisfactorily tested
and demonstrated
to
be operable.
The licensee
took prompt corrective actions for
this event which included the following:
(1)
Mechanical
Maintenance
Personnel
involved in this
event were counseled
on their responsibilities for:
Strict adherence
to work instructions
contained in
PWO
packages;
ensuring satisfactory
completion of
post-maintenance
testing;
and complying with caution
signs
posted
on, or adjacent to, equipment
being
worked.
(2)
The checklist
used
by Maintenance
Department
PWO work
planners
was revised.
PWOs involving TS Limiting
Conditions for. Operation will contain
a step requiring
a Foreman or Field Supervisor to verify that the job
task is under
a clearance
order or that
an individual
from the Operations
Department is present.
This licensee identified violation is not being cited because
the criteria specified in Section
V.G. 1 of the
NRC Enforce-
ment Policy were met.
This item will be tracked
as
NCV 50-250,251/90-04-01.
6.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room 'operators,
observed shift
turnovers
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors
verified the operability of selected
emergency
systems,
verified
maintenance
work orders
had
been submitted
as required
and followup and
prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors
reviewed tagout
records, verified compliance with TS
LCOs and verified the return to
service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct interviews, verification was
made that the
physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and implementation of
radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure,
diesel, auxiliary, control
and turbine
buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including
potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,
and excessive
vibrations.
The inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety
related
systems
to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and
B
Control
Room Vertical Panels
and Safeguards
Racks
ICW Structure
4160 Volt Buses
and 480 Volt Load and
HCCs
Unit 3 and
Platforms
Unit 3 and
4 Condensate
Storage
Tank Area
AFW Area
Unit 3 and
4 Hain Steam Platforms
Auxiliary Building
No violations or deviations
were ide'ntified in the areas
inspected.
7.
Plant Events
(93702)
The following plant events
were reviewed to determine facility status
and
the
need for further followup action.
Plant parameters
were evaluated
during transient
response.
The significance of the event
was evaluated
along with the performance of the appropriate
safety
systems
and the
actions
taken
by the licensee.
The inspectors verified that required
notifications wer e made to the
NRC.
Evaluations
were performed relative
to the
need for additional
NRC response
to the event.
Additionally, the
following issues
were examined,
as appropriate:
Details regarding
the
cause
of the event;
event chronology; safety
system performance;
licensee
compliance with approved
procedures;
radiological
consequences, if any;
and proposed corrective actions.
On January
28,
1990, at 3:25 p.m., the Control
Room received
a fire alarm
at an alarm point (Fire Zone 79A-North/South Auxiliary Building Breezeway).
In addition to the alarm, the deluge
system in the breezeway
actuated.
Operations
personnel
searched
the breezeway
and all adjacent
areas finding
no signs of fire.
The system
was then isolated.
The. licensee
performed
a
root cause
analysis
and determined that manual
push button actuation
was
considered
as the most likely root cause.
This was
based
on the results
found after testing the alarm circuit and detectors,
satisfactorily
verifying the pull station
was not actuated
and the deluge valve was reset
with no problems indicated.
Although the push button is designed with a
barrier to prevent actuation
by accidental
contact (i.e.
bumping into),
depressing
the button (i.e. fingers,
pen, screwdriver) maliciously is not
prevented.
Activity in the .area at the time of actuation
was low and
no
witnesses
could be located.
When operations
personnel
arrived
on the scene,
they found nothing unusual.
Based
on an additional licensee
review, the
likely root cause of the deluge
system actuation
was the actuation of
the manual
push button located in the front of the local alarm panel.
The
licensee will implement corrective actions to minimize or prevent the
problem.
These include installing
a nameplate
near the manual
pushbutton
on every alarm panel of this type to caution against the inadvertent
actuation of the deluge
system
and revising the general
employee training
to caution personnel
against inadvertently operating
any fire protection
related
equipment.
On February 4,
1990, with Unit 4 at
100% power, the instrument air supply
pressure
decreased
causing
the feedwater regulating valves to begin
to close.
To stabilize
levels,
the
PSN directed
the
RCO
to runback the turbine to match
steam flow with feed flow.
The load was
reduced
approximately
200
MWE before the instrument air pressure
was
returned to normal.
Investigation of the event revealed
the instrument
air supply to Unit 4 was isolated
by a
SNPO.
The Unit 4 air receiver
was
isolat'ed
by clearance
4-90-02-008, therefore,
Unit 3 instrument air was
cross-tied
to Unit 4 by opening the cross-tie isolation valves 3-40-IAS-012
and 4-40-IAS-012.
The
SNPO was instructed to return the Unit 4 instrument
air dryer to service using 4-0P-013,
Instrument Air System,
dated
December
15,
1989, Section 7.5,
and also to lift clearance
4-90-02-008.
Section
7.5, Step
14, directed the
SNPO to close 4-40-IAS-012.
Because
the
clearance
was not released,
the Unit 4 instrument air supply was still
isolated.
Therefore,
when the
SNPO performed step
1'4, the Unit 3
instrument air supply to Unit 4 was isolated.
The
SNPO noticed the air
pressure
decrease
and re-opened
the valve, 4-40-IAS-012, to restore
pressure.
The licensee attributed this event to
a combination of the
following factors:
(1) improper releasing
order of the clearance;
(2)
no job briefing; (3) operator
assumed
that 4-OP-013 would properly line up
system
and the prerequisites
were satisfied.
The
PSN discussed
the event
with the personnel
involved and the licensee initiated corrective actions
including ensuring job briefings are held for complex evolutions
and also
e
ensuring
SRO reviews releasing
order
on clearances.
The failure to verify
the prerequisites
contained
in 4-OP-013 constitutes
a violation of TS 6.8. 1.
This item will be tracked
as Violation 50-250,251/90-04-02.
The
inspectors
noted
a strength in control
room. operations
by personnel
on
shift.
The prompt, decisive actions, stabilized the plant and mitigated
the transient.
On February
12,
1990, while performing step 6.3. 17. 12 of TP-594, three
reactor vessel
head studs,'0,
39 and 58, were detensioned
instead of just
stud
58 as specified
by the procedure.
The licensee
recently obtained
a
new stud tensioning
system from Kleiber
& Schulz,
Inc.
The tensioning
system is manufactured
by Klockner - Becorit of West Germany.
Because
this outage
was the first time the licensee
was to use the
new detension-
ing system,
Kleiber
& Schulz technicians
were
on site to facilitate head
stud detensioning.
Although the tensioning
equipment
had
been tested
on
a
test block and
had
been found to be functioning properly,
when the
tensioning
system
was installed
on the first three studs,
minor adjust-
ments
were necessary.
The technician
was called in to trouble shoot
and
make necessary
adjustments.
step 6.3. 17. 12, states,
in the first.
sequence
for detensioning,
only nut 58 has to be turned
as
shown
on
attachment
6.
Step 6.3. 17. 12 states,
after tensioning,
using the nut
turning device, turn nuts to angle
shown
on attachment.6.
Attachment 6,
sequence
1, requires turning the nut rotating device only for stud 58.
It
also stated that studs
20 and
39 are loosened
in sequence
20.
While
making the final 'checkout of the stud detensioning
system,
the Kleiber
&
Schulz,
Inc. technician correctly tensioned
studs
20,
39 and
58 and then
rotated
the nuts- for all three studs
45 degrees
counter clockwise.
Licensee
and Westinghouse
representatives
were present,
at tHe top of the
refueling cavity, but were unaware that the technician
was actually
detensioni ng the studs.
When the technician stated that his checkout
was
completed,
and the stud detensioning
system functioned 'correctly, it was
determined that the procedure
was not followed.
The licensee
stopped
the
job and wrote
NCR 90-0054, describing
the non-conformance.
performed
an Engineering evaluation
and
recommended
retorquing studs
20
and 39.
A final Westinghouse
evaluation
regarding
the effects of the
above actions
on the integrity of the vessel
flange will be evaluated
by
the licensee prior to entering
Mode 4 following the refueling outage.
Also, Westinghouse
representatives
are to be present
when technical
representatives
are trouble shooting equipment.
Failure to follow
procedure
TP-594, is
a violation of TS 6.8. 1.
However, this licensee
identified violation is not being cited because
the criteria specified in
Section
V.G. 1, of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This item
will be tracked
as
NCV 50-250,251/90-04-03.
.On February
14,
1990, with Unit 3 in Mode 6, the NIS count rate increased
causing
the Migh Flux at Shutdown annunciator
to alarm and the containment
evacuation
alarm to actuate.
The
RCO followed ONOP-046. 1 and initiated
emergency
boration.
The Unit 3 containment
was evacuated
and the cause of
the increased
count rate
was investigated..
The licensee
found that
SRNI (N-31) spiked high and operated erratically as indicated
on the
ERDADS trend.
The licensee
switched to the spare detector
and declared
0
e.
9.
N-31 back ih service.
Personnel
were allowed to re-enter
containment
after the increased
count rate proved to be invalid.
The licensee
plans
to further troubleshoot
the suspect
detector to identify a failure mode.
On February 20,
1990, with Unit 3 in Mode 6, while removing fuel from the
reactor to the
SFP,
a leak from the operating
SFP cooling water
pump (3B)
was noted at 11:20 a.m.
Approximately
3 inches of water had accumulated
.
in the
SFP heat exchanger
room and cask
wash area.
The
NO entered
the
heat exchanger
room to isolate the failed pump.
Another
NO entered
the
room within twenty minutes to align the
3A SFP cooling water
pump.
Both
workers were slightly contaminated. 'hey returned to work, later that
day, after standard
decontamination
procedures.
The licensee
determined
approximately
2000 gallons of borated water leaked
from the
pump shaft
mechanical
seal.
The
pump shaft was subsequently
found to be sheared.
All of the water was contained within the
SFP heat exchanger
room and the
cask
wash area with no rele'ase
to the environment.
However, the floor
drain system did not work properly.
The resident inspectors
expressed
conc'em to licensee
management
that although tested
and found satisfactory
on January
25,
1990, the
SFP heat exchanger
room drains
were partially
blocked and,
under different circumstances,
this condition could have
resulted in a spill outside the
SFP heat exchanger
room.
The licensee
formed
ERT 90-04 to investigate this event.
The inspectors will followup
on the licensee's
root cause
evaluation
and corrective actions.
This item
will be tracked
as IFI 50-250,251/90-04-04.
Licensee guality Assurance
Program
Implementation
(35502)
An internal office evaluation
was conducted
on February
13,
1990, of the
licensee's
quality assurance
program implementation
by reviewing recent
inspection reports,
SALP reports,
open items, licensee corrective actions
for NRC inspection findings,
and licensee
event reports.
Particular
emphasis
was placed
on all
new items or findings since the last
SALP report
period (July 31, 1989).
During this evaluation, it was'ecognized
that
team inspections
in the area of Design Validation, Appendix R,
and
were conducted.
Based
on the licensee's
current performance
and the
results of this evaluation,
no recommendations
were
made to increase
the
inspection effort at Turkey Point.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
during management
interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager-
Nuclear
and selected
members of his staff.
An exit meeting
was conducted
on February
23,
1990.
The areas
requiring management
attention
were
reviewed.
No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors
during the reporting period.
The inspectors
had the following findings:
50-250,251/90-04-01,
NCV - Failure to accomplish
post maintenance
testing
on
a containment
phase
A isolation valve to verify
operability.
(paragraph
5)
v
1
~
'