ML17347A847

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 127 to Licenses DPR-31 & DPR-41,respectively
ML17347A847
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/12/1988
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17345A470 List:
References
NUDOCS 8810170415
Download: ML17347A847 (5)


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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.

133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-31 AND AMENDMENT N0.127 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-41 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNIT NOS.

3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251 BACKGROUND I

By letter dated February 11, 1988, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL, the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Tur key Point Plant, Units 3 and 4.

The proposed changes would modify the description of the reactor core in the TS to allow the replacement of individual fuel rods within fuel assemblies with stainless steel rods or vacant rod positions.

The changes would also allow the use of a natural uranium axial blanket in the core and disallow the use of part-length control rods.

During a phone call in September 1988, the licensee agreed to a TS provision concerning an additional special reporting requirement similar to those already listed in TS 6.9.3.

This change did not substantially change the action noticed, or affect the initial determination published in the Federal

~Re isrer on April 6, 1988.

DISCUSSION The licensee's proposed changes would modify the Turkey Point Technical Specifications Sections 5.2. 1 and 5.2.5 for Unit 3 and Unit 4 and delete a

related footnote.

The proposed revisions would allow, if justified by cycle-specific reload analyses using NRC-approved methodology, a) the replacement of fuel rods in fuel assemblies by stainless steel filler rods, or the removal of fuel rods with no replacement, and b) the use of, a natural uranium axial blanket in the core.

The term "NRC-approved methodology" includes those methodologies acknowledged in the FSAR and applied in support of issuance of the original operating licenses for the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4.

Additionally, it includes those subsequent methodologies which have been submitted to and accepted by the staff after the issuance of the Turkey Point operating licenses.

As noted in NRC Generic Letter 83-11, "Licensee guallficatiuns for Performing Safety Analyses in Support of Licensing Actions," each licensee or vendor who intends to use a

safety analysis methodology to support licensing actions must demonstrate their proficiency in using the methodology by submitting verification performed by 88iOi704i5 88i012IllI PDR ADOCie 05000200 P

them, not others.

Thus, methodologies approved by the NRC for a specific vendor may be used by that vendor in support of Turkey Point reload design and anaIysis; use of that methodology by other than that vendor does not constitute an "NRC-approved methodology" unless specifically authorized by the NRC.

With regard to the removal of fuel rods from the core, the proposed change permits the t>mely removal, during a refueling outage, of individual fuel rods which leak or are deemed likely to leak in the near future.

This should improve the licensee's fuel performance program and tend to minimize occupational radiation exposure and plant radiological release.

The staff wi 11 require that a provision be made to inform the staff by a Special Report if a relatively large number of fuel rods are replaced during a refueling.

The provision states that should more than 30 fuel rods in the core or 10 fuel rods in any fuel assembly be replaced per refueling, a Special Report discussing the rod replacements will be submitted to the Commission within 30 days after cycle startup.

The require-ment for special reporting is similar to those in existing TS 6.9.3 and satisfies the NRC's request to be informed in the event a significant deviation from past fuel performance occurs (e.g.,

the past performance record for Unit 3 shows that during Cycle 8 refueling 40 rods were removed, 29 from one assembly, and during Cycle 10 refueling two rods were removed).

The staff discussed this provision with the licensee by ieIephone, and the licensee has agreed to an additional modification to the TS in Section 6.9.3 to add item (o) to provide for a Special Report if needed.

The NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed revision of TS 5.2.1 to allow for modification of fuel assembly composition to be adequate and acceptable provided item (o) is added to TS 6.9.3 The NRC has recently approved a similar provision for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.

With regard to the use of axial blankets, the licensee expects to save several hunared thousand dollars per cycle by using fuel rods with natural uranium dioxide pellets at the ends in place of enriched pe11ecs.

Axial blankets reduce fast neutron flux in the blanket area, reducing neutron leakage from the ends of the core and improving uranium utilization.

The resulting increase in power density of the enriched fuel and potential increases in core peaking factors would be among the items considered in the cycle-specific core design and safety evaluation to assure that design criteria and safety limits are satisfied.

The application uf this design feature would depend on NRC acceptance of the cycle-specific Reload Safety Evaluation (RSE) in which the licensee must demon-strate that the safety and operating limits specified elsewhere in the TS are met.

For these

reasons, the NRC staff finds the proposed revision of TS 5.2.1 to allow for the use of natural uranium dioxide pellets in the core to be adequate and acceptable.

The NRC has accepted provisions for the use of axial blankets for R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Plant and for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating

Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The licensee will no longer use part-length control rods in the cores of Turkey Point Plant,.Units 3 and 4.

Hence, references to part-length control rods and the corresponding footnote have been deleted from Section 5.2.5.

SUMMARY

The staff finds that the proposed revisions to TS 5.2.1 and TS 5.2.5 do not result in any significant adverse change in the process for determining the adequacy of reload designs and associated safety analyses.

The licensee will continue to justify each cycle-specific reload by analyses using NRC-approved methodology in order to demonstrate thar. existing design limits and safety analyses criteria are met in advance of cycle operation.

The licensee wi 11 continue to keep the NRC informed in a timely manner regarding any significant adverse change in its fuel performance program in accordance with a new special reporting requirement in TS 6.9.3.

Therefore, the modifications to the descrip-tion of the reactor core proposed in these amendments submitted by FPL for the the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4 are judged by the NRC staff to be adequate and acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION Thes~

amendments involve changes in the installation or use of the facilities'omponents located within the restricted arbas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.

The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite arid that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.

Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(I) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed

manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:

October 12, 1988 Princi al Contributor:

John 0. Schiffgens

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