ML17346A982
| ML17346A982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17346A981 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8505060475 | |
| Download: ML17346A982 (6) | |
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UiVITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v)ASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NLICLEAR REACTOR REGULATIOiI RELATED TO At"ENDHENT NO.
112 TO FACILITY OPERATINGi LICENSE NO.
DPR-31 AND AHENDHEtlT N0.106 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORIDA POMER AND LICHT COtlPANY TURKEY POINl UNIT NOS.
3 AfID 4 DOCKET NOS.
50-250 AND 50-251 I. Introduction In a letter from J.
M. Milliams, Jr.
to D.
G. Eisenhut, dated February 8, 1985, Florida Power 8 Light Company requested that the Turkey Point Units No.
3 and 4 Technical Specifications be amended to combine the reactor vessel material surveillance program for these units into a single inte-grated surveillance program.
Additional information concerning the pro-posed change was provided by the licensee in a letter from 'J.
M. Milliams, Jr.
to S.
A. Yarga dated March 6, 1985.
A revised Appendix H, 10 CFR 50 was published in the Federal Register on Hay 27, 1983 and became effective on July 26, 1983.
Section II.C of the revised Appendix H permits an integrated surveillance program provided it is approved by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
This section of Appendix H identifies the criteria to be used in evaluating the integrated surveillance program.
The criteria are:
1.
There must be substantial advantages to be gained, such as reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct res'ult of not requiring surveillance capsules in all reactors in the se t.
2.
The design and operating features of the reactors in the set must be sufficiently similar to permit accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage as a function of total power output, 3,
There must be an adequate dosimetry program for each reactor.
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4.
There must be a contingency plan to assure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected.
5.
Ho reduction in the requirements for number of materials to be irradiated, specimen
- type, or number of specimens per reactor is permitted, but the amount of testing may be reduced if the initial results agree vtith predictions.
6.
There must be adequate arrangement for data sharing between plants.
II. Evaluation Each unit at Turkey Point began commercial operation with 8 surveillance capsules in each reactor vessel.
Ten capsules contained forging material and six capsules contained weld metal, forging, and heat affected zone (HAZ) materials.
To date, two capsules containing forging material and two capsules containing weld metal, forging, and HAZ materials were irradiated, removed from the vessel, and tested.
The test results from the surveillance material indicate that the weld metal wi 11 sustain the most irradiation damage.
- Since, based on the initial test, the weld metal is more susceptible to irradiation damage than the forging material, the licensee has proposed to retain the capsules with forging material as standby specimens in the reactor vessel and test only those capsules with weld metal, forging, and HAZ materials.
Since fewer capsules will be withdrawn than originally anticipated, the radiation exposure (ALARA) to plant personnel should be reduced.
The licensee's FSAR Volume 2 indicates that the materials and designs for the core, thermal shield, core barrel and vessel are the same for each unit at Turkey Point.
Since the neutron energy spectrum is a function of geometry, materials, and core loading, the relative neutron spectrum for both reactors should be equivalent for equivalent core loadings.
The
3-licensee indicates that fuel management and cycle lengths for both units have been similar.
Thus neutron spectra profiles at the peak fluence 1 ocati ons shoul d be equi val ent.
The neutron fluence, which is used to predict radiation
As built dimensions and individual material properties %re incorporated into the DOT 4.3 modeTs.
- Hence, using these
- codes, the licensee will be able to predict radiation damage as a function of power output for each unit.
Each vessel has both in-capsule and in-cavity dosimetry, which will be used to verify the neutron spectra and the codes that were used to predict neutron fluence as a function of power output.
Since each plant has its own capsules and both plants are capable of independently predicting and monitoring radiation damage as a function of power output, the program will not be significantly jeopardized by operation at reduced power levels or by an extended outage of either plant.
Based on the intial test, the limiting material for each unit is weld material, which is identified as SA 1101.
This material is in each capsule that will be irradiated and tested.
Capsules that have been deleted from surveillance testing do not contain the limiting material and will be retained as standby specimens in the reactor vessel.
Since the amount of limiting material in the surveillance program has not chnaged, the number of useful surveillance specimens available for testing has not changed.
Both units have common management and the surveillance program will be managed by their Nuclear Energy Department.
Therefore, there should be adequate data sharing.
4 ill. ~Findin s
We have concluded based on the details in Section II of this Safety Evaluation, that the integrated surveillance program meets the evaluation criteria specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix H II.C. If future core designs are significantly different than those documented by the/ icensee, the licensee must explain the effect that the changes have on neutron irradiation damage and the surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule.
2.
In-cavity dosimetry testing should continue in order to reduce pro-Jected uncertainties in neutron fluence.
If these test results provide an effective method of monitoring vessel neutron fluence, the in-cavity dosimetry should be incorporated into the integrated I
surve i 1 1 ance program.
IV. Environmental Consideration These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas's defined in 10 CFR 20 and in surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, 8fd no significant change in the types, of any effluents 'that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a
proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
V. Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
pated.
April 22, 1985 Princi al Contributors:
B. Elliot