ML17345A651
| ML17345A651 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1989 |
| From: | Saporito T AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| 2.206, NUDOCS 8905050146 | |
| Download: ML17345A651 (7) | |
Text
ACCE1Z RATED DIS3t
'Tr ~- r DE M04 STRlOY SYSTEM t
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8905050146 DOC.DATE: 89/04/25 NOTARIZED: NO
= DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit. 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SAPORITO,T.J.
AffiliationNot Assigned RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION STELLO,V.
Ofc of the Executive Director for Operations R
SUBJECT:
Recgxests suspension of Licenses DPR-31
& DPR-41
& imposition I
of civil penalty 're safety
& safeguards problems at plant.
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.r DISTRIBUTION CODE, YE03D COPIES RECEIVED.LTR g ENCL g SIZE.
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NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 LA EDISON,G INTERNAL: EDO/BRIDGERS NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/ROED EXTERNAL: LPDR COPIES LTTR ENCL NRR DIR OG~D N
01 NRC PDR RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1,1' D
D NAZE TO ALL "BIDS"BECIPIENIS'ii R
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S PLEASE HELP US K) REDUCE QUASI'E.'DNI'ACr '%HE DOCUMENT COHZROL DESK, BOOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079)
KO EIiQGKLTE YOUR NAME PRCH DISTRIKTTIQN LISTS H)R DOCUMENZS YOU DON'T NEED.'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 11 ENCL
0 Nr. Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 April 25, 1989 FAXED 5 Cerfifie,d (P 982 346 224)
RE:
10 CRF 2.206 Turkey Point Nuclear Stations Dockets Nos.
50-250/50-251 Operating Licenses DPR-31 0 DPR-41 Please be advised and officially informed as this letter represents formal notification to your office requesting speci+ic actions pursuant to 10 CRF 2.206 (by your office) as delineated below and appropriately warranted as elaborated in the basis and justification text o+ this of+icial petition.
SPECIFIC RE UEST:
Take immediate actions to cause the imposition o+ an escalated civil penalty.
Take immediate actions to cause the suspention o+ operating licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41.
I Take immediate actions to cause an order to your licensee outlining the required steps and measures to be taken within a defined time +rame to corr ect the numerous secur ity and sa+eguar ds problems at the plant.
BASIS 8( JUST IFI CATION!
April 21, 1987... (EA 87-040)
A civil penalty was proposed
+or numerous examples of access control violations.
The civil enalt was escalated because of rior oor erformance and rior notice based on internal re orts of similar roblems.
April 22, 1987... U. S.
NRC News Release.
~. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a
$75,000 civil penalty against the Florida Power 5
Light Company for alleged noncompliance with NRC security requirements at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, located near Homestead, F lori da.
The NRC said the action was taken a+ter an NRC resident inspector
+ound a
security guard asleep at his post, and a second incident in which a NRC inspector
+rom the agency's Region II office in Atlanta discovered a visitor without an escort in a vital area.
$+0$
In a
letter to the company, Dr. J.
Nelson Grace, Administrator o+ the NRC's Region I I of+ice in
- Atlanta, said the violations were 'of particular concern'ecause reviews of records during subsequent inspections
'confirmed the occurrence o+ six additional instances of security personnel being found asleep and identified eight additional instances where visitors were discovered without an escort.'race called the company' attention to the repetitious nature of the violations>
saying they demonstrate a lapse in management control and indicate an apparent weakness in the company' employee training for security at Turkey Point.
8905050146 890425
, PDR ADOCK 05000250 H
POC 1
BASIS
& JUSTIFICATION:
June 1,
1987 - June 30, 1988... (SALP) Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance...Weaknesses in the security program have continued to prevail in this SALP period as indicated by the number of violations.
Seven violations were identified during this rating period.
Severity Level III violation for +ailure to maintain positive access contr ol, six examples:
+ailure to adequately control access to the protected area;
+ailure to adequately control access to the Unit 4 containment personnel hatch;
+ai lure to adequately contr ol access to the Unit 3 containment hatch; officer sleeping in defensive tower; fai lure to adequately control access to the protected area; and an 'officer leaving a
vital area compensatory post without proper r el ief.
The violations continue to be repetitive in nature, involving a failure of the guard force to implement the security program, an inability of security personnel and supervisors to recognize violations and a lack of management oversight.
These violations included escalated enforcement in the areas of access control compensatory measures and the control o+ Safeguards In+ormation.
BASI8 5 JUSTIFICATION:
June 1,
1987 June 30, 1988... (SALP) continued from previous page.
Severity Level III violation +or +ai lure to recognize, properly mark and protect Safeguards Information.
Severity Level IV violation +or inadequate protected area lighting.
Severity Level IV violation for inadequate search o+ vital area prior to revitalization.
Severity Level IV violation +or inadequate compensatory measure.
Severity Level IV violation for inadequate protected area barriers.
Severity Level IV violation for inadequate vital area alarm testing.
S A L P
RATING...3 for the reporting period.
July 28, 1987... (EA 87-089) a civil penalty was escalated because of continued poor performance, and we emphasized the continuing need for increased management involvement in oversight and control of the security progr am.
Febuary 11, 1988... (EA 87-179) a civil penalty was proposed for access control violations.
The civil penalty was escalated due to continued poor performance and the number of violations.
In that letter, we noted that FPL's Security Enhancement Program had failed to adequately address the security problems at Turkey Point.
Januar y 20, 1989... at 4:00 am a security guard was observed sleeping at her post.
Febuary 1,
1989...4100,000 Civil Penalty... This violation is significant in that it demonstrates a lack of awareness of vital areas and vital area boundaries by the security
+orce and a
lack of management oversight for security force operations.
The base value of a civil penalty for a
Severity Level I I I violation is
$50000.
The escalation and mitigation factors were considered, and the base civi 1 penalty amount has been increased by 100%
due to your continued poor performance in the area of security...you must clearly understand that a
continuation of this level o+
performance cannot be tolerated...Should additional significant security violations occur, we intend to consider action in addition to civil penalties.
Febuary 6-10, 1989... inspection... The violations descr ibed in the enclosed Notice are similar to violations contained in the Notice sent to you by our letter dated Febuary 11, 1988.
Because
'similar violations,'s described in the NRC Enforcement Pol icy, are of significant concern to the NRC, please give particular attention in your response-to the identification of the root cause of these problems and your cor rective action to pr event recurrence.
Ne are concerned about the implementation of your security program that permits these repetitive violations to occur.
April 20, 1989...Licensee notified the NRC of a tower guard sleeping while on duty at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.
BAS I8 8( JU8TIF ICATION:
Because the voluminous inspection documentation and escalated civil penalties
+or violations in the areas of security and sa+eguards o+
which numerous violations in these areas were repetitive; and because these escalated civil penalties have not been a determent that your licensee acknowledges to correct these poor performing areas; and because of the continuing poor per formance in the area of secur ity and sa+eguar ds; and because o+ the investigative security material which was FAXED to your NRC Region I I o+fice on 4/25/89 relating to Turkey Point; I
submit to you and the NRC Commissioners that immediate en+orcement action beyond that which the NRC has (previously exer cised in the form of escalated civil penalties),
is justified and warranted as I believe that the Health and Safety of the Public is currently in jeopardy and wi 1 1 remain in Jeopardy until the suspention of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses DPR-31
& DPR-41 occurs.
CONCLUSIONS:
I respect+ul ly request a wr itten r esponse pursuant to 10 CFR 2. 206 and in
- addition, I
respectfully request my voice to be heard before the Honorable Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners in that I may apprise the Commissioners of the very grave conditions currently existing at the Tur key Po i nt Nuc 1'ear Stat ion.
S i ncere 1 y, cc:
U.S. President George Bush U.S.
Senator John Breaux Congressman Dante B. Fascell Govenor Bob Martinez, Fl U ~ ST NRC Region II, Oscar de Miranda ALL MEDIA SOURCES Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.
1202 Sioux Str eet
- Jupiter, Florida 33458 (407) 747-8873
Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.
1202 Sioux Street.
Jupiter, Florida 33458
~
P 982 39f 220